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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

THE
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OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENTS

(Continued)

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

THIRD PART.

QUESTION LXXXIV.

OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE.

(In Ten Articles.)

WE must now consider the Sacrament of Penance. We shall consider (1) Penance itself: (2) Its effect: (3) Its parts: (4) The recipients of this sacrament: (5) The power of the ministers, which pertains to the keys: (6) The solemnization of this sacrament.

The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Penance as a sacrament: (2) Penance as a virtue.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether Penance is a sacrament? (2) Of its proper matter. (3) Of its form. (4) Whether imposition of hands is necessary for this sacrament? (5) Whether this sacrament is necessary for salvation? (6) Of its relation to the other sacraments. (7) Of its institution. (8) Of its duration. (9) Of its continuance. (10) Whether it can be repeated?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE IS A SACRAMENT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that Penance is not a sacrament. For Gregory says (cf. Isidor.,—*Etym.* vi., ch. 19): *The sacraments are Baptism, Chrism, and the Body and Blood of Christ; which are called sacraments because under the veil*

of corporeal things the Divine power works our salvation in a hidden manner. But this does not happen in Penance, because therein corporeal things are not employed that, under them, the power of God may work our salvation. Therefore Penance is not a sacrament.

Obj. 2. Further, the sacraments of the Church are shown forth by the ministers of Christ, according to 1 Cor. iv. 1: *Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God.* But Penance is not conferred by the ministers of Christ, but is inspired inwardly into man by God, according to Jerem. xxxi. 19: *After Thou didst convert me, I did penance.* Therefore it seems that Penance is not a sacrament.

Obj. 3. Further, in the sacraments of which we have already spoken above, there is something that is sacrament only, something that is both reality and sacrament, and something that is reality only, as is clear from what has been stated (Q. LXVI., A. 1). But this does not apply to Penance. Therefore Penance is not a sacrament.

On the contrary, As Baptism is conferred that we may be cleansed from sin, so also is Penance: wherefore Peter said to Simon Magus (Acts viii. 22): *Do penance . . . from this thy wickedness.* But Baptism is a sacrament as stated above (Q. LXVI., A. 1). Therefore for the same reason Penance is also a sacrament.

I answer that, As Gregory says (*loc. cit.*), *a sacrament consists in a solemn act, whereby something is so done that we understand it to signify the holiness which it confers.* Now it is evident that in Penance something is done so that something holy is signified both on the part of the penitent sinner, and on the part of the priest absolving, because the penitent sinner, by deed and word, shows his heart to have renounced sin, and in like manner the priest, by his deed and word with regard to the penitent, signifies the work of God Who forgives his sins. Therefore it is evident that Penance, as practised in the Church, is a sacrament.

Reply Obj. 1. By corporeal things taken in a wide sense we may understand also external sensible actions, which

are to this sacrament what water is to Baptism, or chrism to Confirmation. But it is to be observed that in those sacraments, whereby an exceptional grace surpassing altogether the proportion of a human act, is conferred, some corporeal matter is employed externally, e.g. in Baptism, which confers full remission of all sins, both as to guilt and as to punishment, and in Confirmation, wherein the fulness of the Holy Ghost is bestowed, and in Extreme Unction, which confers perfect spiritual health derived from the virtue of Christ as from an extrinsic principle. Wherefore, such human acts, as are in these sacraments, are not the essential matter of the sacrament, but are dispositions thereto. On the other hand, in those sacraments whose effect corresponds to that of some human act, the sensible human act itself takes the place of matter, as in the case of Penance and Matrimony, even as in bodily medicines, some are applied externally, such as plasters and drugs, while others are acts of the person who seeks to be cured, such as certain exercises.

Reply Obj. 2. In those sacraments which have a corporeal matter, this matter needs to be applied by a minister of the Church, who stands in the place of Christ, which denotes that the excellence of the power which operates in the sacraments is from Christ. But in the sacrament of Penance, as stated above (*ad 1*), human actions take the place of matter, and these actions proceed from internal inspiration, wherefore the matter is not applied by the minister, but by God working inwardly; while the minister furnishes the complement of the sacrament, when he absolves the penitent.

Reply Obj. 3. In Penance also, there is something which is sacrament only, viz. the acts performed outwardly both by the repentant sinner, and by the priest in giving absolution; that which is reality and sacrament is the sinner's inward repentance; while that which is reality, and not sacrament, is the forgiveness of sin. The first of these taken altogether is the cause of the second; and the first and second together are the cause of the third.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER SINS ARE THE PROPER MATTER OF THIS SACRAMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that sins are not the proper matter of this sacrament. Because, in the other sacraments, the matter is hallowed by the utterance of certain words, and being thus hallowed produces the sacramental effect. Now sins cannot be hallowed, for they are opposed to the effect of the sacrament, viz. grace which blots out sin. Therefore sins are not the proper matter of this sacrament.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says in his book *De Pœnitentia* : * *No one can begin a new life, unless he repent of the old.* Now not only sins but also the penalties of the present life belong to the old life. Therefore sins are not the proper matter of Penance.

Obj. 3. Further, sin is either original, mortal or venial. Now the sacrament of Penance is not ordained against original sin, for this is taken away by Baptism, (nor against mortal sin, for this is taken away by the sinner's confession), † nor against venial sin, which is taken away by the beating of the breast and the sprinkling of holy water and the like. Therefore sins are not the proper matter of Penance.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. xii. 21): *(Who) have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness, that they have committed.*

I answer that matter is twofold, viz. proximate and remote: thus the proximate matter of a statue is a metal, while the remote matter is water. Now it has been stated (A. 1, ad 1, ad 2), that the proximate matter of this sacrament consists in the acts of the penitent, the matter of which acts are the sins over which he grieves, which he confesses, and for which he satisfies. Hence it follows that sins are the remote matter of Penance, as a matter, not for approval, but for detestation, and destruction.

* Cf. *Serm.* cccli.

† The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers the proximate matter of a sacrament.

Reply Obj. 2. The old life that was subject to death is the object of Penance, not as regards the punishment, but as regards the guilt connected with it.

Reply Obj. 3. Penance regards every kind of sin in a way, but not each in the same way. Because Penance regards actual mortal sin properly and chiefly; properly, since, properly speaking, we are said to repent of what we have done of our own will; chiefly, since this sacrament was instituted chiefly for the blotting out of mortal sin. Penance regards venial sins, properly speaking indeed, in so far as they are committed of our own will, but this was not the chief purpose of its institution. But as to original sin, Penance regards it neither chiefly, since Baptism, and not Penance, is ordained against original sin, nor properly, because original sin is not done of our own will, except in so far as Adam's will is looked upon as ours, in which sense the Apostle says (Rom. v. 12): *In whom all have sinned*. Nevertheless, Penance may be said to regard original sin, if we take it in a wide sense for any detestation of something past: in which sense Augustine uses the term in his book *De Pœnitentia* (*loc. cit.*).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FORM OF THIS SACRAMENT IS: *I absolve thee?*

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the form of this sacrament is not: *I absolve thee*. Because the forms of the sacraments are received from Christ's institution and the Church's custom. But we do not read that Christ instituted this form. Nor is it in common use; in fact in certain absolutions which are given publicly in church (e.g. at Prime and Compline and on Maundy Thursday), absolution is given not in the indicative form by saying: *I absolve thee*, but in the deprecatory form, by saying: *May Almighty God have mercy on you*, or: *May Almighty God grant you absolution*

and forgiveness. Therefore the form of this sacrament is not: *I absolve thee*.

Obj. 2. Further, Pope Leo says (*Ep. cviii.*) that God's forgiveness cannot be obtained without the priestly supplications: and he is speaking there of God's forgiveness granted to the penitent. Therefore the form of this sacrament should be deprecatory.

Obj. 3. Further, to absolve from sin is the same as to remit sin. But God alone remits sin, for He alone cleanses man inwardly from sin, as Augustine says (*Contra Donatist. v, ch. 21*). Therefore it seems that God alone absolves from sin. Therefore the priest should not say: *I absolve thee*, as neither does he say: *I remit thy sins*.

Obj. 4. Further, just as Our Lord gave His disciples the power to absolve from sins, so also did He give them the power to heal infirmities, to cast out devils, and to cure diseases (*Matth. x. 1: Luke ix. 1*). Now the apostles, in healing the sick, did not use the words: *I heal thee*, but: *The Lord Jesus Christ heal* (*Vulg.,—heals*) *thee*, as Peter said to the palsied man (*Acts ix. 34*). Therefore since priests have the power which Christ gave His apostles, it seems that they should not use the form: *I absolve thee*, but: *May Christ absolve thee*.

Obj. 5. Further, some explain this form by stating that when they say: *I absolve thee*, they mean *I declare you to be absolved*. But neither can this be done by a priest unless it be revealed to him by God, wherefore, as we read in *Matth. xvi. 19* before it was said to Peter: *Whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth*, etc., it was said to him (*verse 17*): *Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jona: because flesh and blood have not revealed it to thee, but My Father Who is in heaven*. Therefore it seems presumptuous for a priest, who has received no revelation on the matter, to say: *I absolve thee*, even if this be explained to mean: *I declare thee absolved*.

On the contrary, As Our Lord said to His disciples (*Matth. xxviii. 19*): *Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them*, etc., so did He say to Peter (*Matth. xvi. 19*): *Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth*, etc. Now the priest, relying on

the authority of those words of Christ, says: *I baptize thee*. Therefore on the same authority he should say in this sacrament: *I absolve thee*.

I answer that, The perfection of a thing is ascribed to its form. Now it has been stated above (A. 1, *ad* 2) that this sacrament is perfected by that which is done by the priest. Wherefore the part taken by the penitent, whether it consist of words or deeds, must needs be the matter of this sacrament, while the part taken by the priest, takes the place of the form.

Now since the sacraments of the New Law accomplish what they signify, as stated above (Q. LXII., A. 1, *ad* 1), it behoves the sacramental form to signify the sacramental effect in a manner that is in keeping with the matter. Hence the form of Baptism is: *I baptize thee*, and the form of Confirmation is: *I sign thee with the sign of the cross, and I confirm thee with the chrism of salvation*, because these sacraments are perfected in the use of their matter: while in the sacrament of the Eucharist, which consists in the very consecration of the matter, the reality of the consecration is expressed in the words: *This is My Body*.

Now this sacrament, namely the sacrament of Penance, consists not in the consecration of a matter, nor in the use of a hallowed matter, but rather in the removal of a certain matter, viz. sin, in so far as sins are said to be the matter of Penance, as explained above (A. 2). This removal is expressed by the priest saying: *I absolve thee*: because sins are fetters, according to Prov. v. 22: *His own iniquities catch the wicked, and he is fast bound with the ropes of his own sins*. Wherefore it is evident that this is the most fitting form of this sacrament: *I absolve thee*.

Reply Obj. 1. This form is taken from Christ's very words which He addressed to Peter (Matth. xvi. 19): *Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, etc.*, and such is the form employed by the Church in sacramental absolution. But such absolutions as are given in public are not sacramental, but are prayers for the remission of venial sins. Wherefore in giving sacramental absolution it would not suffice to say:

May Almighty God have mercy on thee, or: May God grant thee absolution and forgiveness, because by such words the priest does not signify the giving of absolution, but prays that it may be given. Nevertheless the above prayer is said before the sacramental absolution is given, lest the sacramental effect be hindered on the part of the penitent, whose acts are as matter in this sacrament, but not in Baptism or Confirmation.

Reply Obj. 2. The words of Leo are to be understood of the prayer that precedes the absolution, and do not exclude the fact that the priest pronounces absolution.

Reply Obj. 3. God alone absolves from sin and forgives sins authoritatively; yet priests do both ministerially, because the words of the priest in this sacrament work as instruments of the Divine power, as in the other sacraments: because it is the Divine power that works inwardly in all the sacramental signs, be they things or words, as shown above (Q. LXII., A. 4; Q. LXIV., AA. 1, 2). Wherefore Our Lord expressed both: for He said to Peter (Matth. xvi. 19): *Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth*, etc., and to His disciples (John xx. 23): *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them*. Yet the priest says: *I absolve thee*, rather than: *I forgive thee thy sins*, because it is more in keeping with the words of Our Lord, by expressing the power of the keys whereby priests absolve. Nevertheless, since the priest absolves ministerially, something is suitably added in reference to the supreme authority of God, by the priest saying: *I absolve thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost*, or by the power of Christ's Passion, or by the authority of God. However, as this is not defined by the words of Christ, as it is for Baptism, this addition is left to the discretion of the priest.

Reply Obj. 4. Power was given to the apostles, not that they themselves might heal the sick, but that the sick might be healed at the prayer of the apostles: whereas power was given to them to work instrumentally or ministerially in the sacraments; wherefore they could express their own agency in the sacramental forms rather than in

the healing of infirmities. Nevertheless in the latter case they did not always use the deprecatory form, but sometimes employed the indicative or imperative: thus we read (Acts iii. 6) that Peter said to the lame man: *What I have, I give thee: In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, arise and walk.*

Reply Obj. 5. It is true in a sense that the words, *I absolve thee* mean *I declare thee absolved*, but this explanation is incomplete. Because the sacraments of the New Law not only signify, but effect what they signify. Wherefore, just as the priest in baptizing anyone, declares by deed and word that the person is washed inwardly, and this not only significatively but also effectively, so also when he says: *I absolve thee*, he declares the man to be absolved not only significatively but also effectively. And yet he does not speak as of something uncertain, because just as the other sacraments of the New Law have, of themselves, a sure effect through the power of Christ's Passion, which effect, nevertheless, may be impeded on the part of the recipient, so is it with this sacrament. Hence Augustine says (*De Adult. Conjug. ii.*): *There is nothing disgraceful or onerous in the reconciliation of husband and wife, when adultery committed has been washed away, since there is no doubt that remission of sins is granted through the keys of the kingdom of heaven.* Consequently there is no need for a special revelation to be made to the priest, but the general revelation of faith suffices, through which sins are forgiven. Hence the revelation of faith is said to have been made to Peter.

It would be a more complete explanation to say that the words, *I absolve thee* mean: *I grant thee the sacrament of absolution.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF THE PRIEST'S HANDS IS
NECESSARY FOR THIS SACRAMENT?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the imposition of the priest's hands is necessary for this sacrament. For it is written

(Mark xvi. 18): *They shall lay hands upon the sick, and they shall recover.* Now sinners are sick spiritually, and obtain recovery through this sacrament. Therefore an imposition of hands should be made in this sacrament.

Obj. 2. Further, in this sacrament man regains the Holy Ghost Whom he had lost, wherefore it is said in the person of the penitent (Ps. l. 14): *Restore unto me the joy of Thy salvation, and strengthen me with a perfect spirit.* Now the Holy Ghost is given by the imposition of hands; for we read (Acts viii. 17) that the apostles *laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost*; and (Matth. xix. 13) that *little children were presented to Our Lord, that He should impose hands upon them.* Therefore an imposition of hands should be made in this sacrament.

Obj. 3. Further, the priest's words are not more efficacious in this than in the other sacraments. But in the other sacraments the words of the minister do not suffice, unless he perform some action: thus, in Baptism, the priest while saying: *I baptize thee*, has to perform a bodily washing. Therefore, also while saying: *I absolve thee*, the priest should perform some action in regard to the penitent, by laying hands on him.

On the contrary, When Our Lord said to Peter (Matth. xvi. 19): *Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth*, etc., He made no mention of an imposition of hands; nor did He when He said to all the apostles (John xx. 13): *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.* Therefore no imposition of hands is required for this sacrament.

I answer that, In the sacraments of the Church the imposition of hands is made, to signify some abundant effect of grace, through those on whom the hands are laid being, as it were, united to the ministers in whom grace should be plentiful. Wherefore an imposition of hands is made in the sacrament of Confirmation, wherein the fulness of the Holy Ghost is conferred; and in the sacrament of Order, wherein is bestowed a certain excellence of power over the Divine mysteries; hence it is written (2 Tim. i. 6): *Stir up the grace of God which is in thee, by the imposition of my hands.*

Now the sacrament of Penance is ordained, not that man may receive some abundance of grace, but that his sins may be taken away; and therefore no imposition of hands is required for this sacrament, as neither is there for Baptism, wherein nevertheless a fuller remission of sins is bestowed.

Reply Obj. 1. That imposition of hands is not sacramental, but is intended for the working of miracles, namely, that by the contact of a sanctified man's hand, even bodily infirmity might be removed; even as we read of Our Lord (Mark vi. 5) that He cured the sick, *laying His hands upon them*, and (Matth. viii. 3) that He cleansed a leper by touching him.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not every reception of the Holy Ghost that requires an imposition of hands, since even in Baptism man receives the Holy Ghost, without any imposition of hands: it is at the reception of the fulness of the Holy Ghost which belongs to Confirmation that an imposition of hands is required.

Reply Obj. 3. In those sacraments which are perfected in the use of the matter, the minister has to perform some bodily action on the recipient of the sacrament, e.g. in Baptism, Confirmation, and Extreme Unction; whereas this sacrament does not consist in the use of matter employed outwardly, the matter being supplied by the part taken by the penitent: wherefore, just as in the Eucharist the priest perfects the sacrament by merely pronouncing the words over the matter, so the mere words which the priest while absolving pronounces over the penitent perfect the sacrament of absolution. If, indeed, any bodily act were necessary on the part of the priest, the sign of the cross, which is employed in the Eucharist, would not be less becoming than the imposition of hands, in token that sins are forgiven through the blood of Christ crucified; and yet this is not essential to this sacrament as neither is it to the Eucharist.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament is not necessary for salvation. Because on Ps. cxxv. 5, *They that sow in tears, etc.*, the gloss says: *Be not sorrowful, if thou hast a good will, of which peace is the mead.* But sorrow is essential to Penance, according to 2 Cor. vii. 10: *The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation.* Therefore a good will without Penance suffices for salvation.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Prov. x. 12): *Charity covereth all sins*, and further on (xv. 27): *By mercy and faith sins are purged away.* But this sacrament is for nothing else but the purging of sins. Therefore if one has charity, faith, and mercy, one can obtain salvation, without the sacrament of Penance.

Obj. 3. Further, the sacraments of the Church take their origin from the institution of Christ. But according to John viii. Christ absolved the adulterous woman without Penance. Therefore it seems that Penance is not necessary for salvation.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Luke xiii. 3): *Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish.*

I answer that, A thing is necessary for salvation in two ways; first, absolutely, secondly, on a supposition. A thing is absolutely necessary for salvation, if no one can obtain salvation without it, as, for example, the grace of Christ, and the sacrament of Baptism, whereby a man is born again in Christ. The sacrament of Penance is necessary on a supposition, for it is necessary, not for all, but for those who are in sin. For it is written (2 Paral. xxxvii.),* *Thou, Lord, God of the righteous, hast not appointed repentance to the righteous, to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, nor to those who sinned not against Thee.* But sin, when it is completed,

* The prayer of Manasses, among the Apocrypha.

begetteth death (James i. 15). Consequently it is necessary for the sinner's salvation that sin be taken away from him; which cannot be done without the sacrament of Penance, wherein the power of Christ's Passion operates through the priest's absolution and the acts of the penitent, who co-operates with grace unto the destruction of his sin. For as Augustine says (*Tract. lxxii. in Joan.**), *He Who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee.* Therefore it is evident that after sin the sacrament of Penance is necessary for salvation, even as bodily medicine after man has contracted a dangerous disease.

Reply Obj. 1. This gloss should apparently be understood as referring to the man who has a good will unimpaired by sin, for such a man has no cause for sorrow: but as soon as the good will is forfeited through sin, it cannot be restored without that sorrow whereby a man sorrows for his past sin, and which belongs to Penance.

Reply Obj. 2. As soon as a man falls into sin, charity, faith, and mercy do not deliver him from sin, without Penance. Because charity demands that a man should grieve for the offence committed against his friend, and that he should be anxious to make satisfaction to his friend; faith requires that he should seek to be justified from his sins through the power of Christ's Passion which operates in the sacraments of the Church; and well ordered pity necessitates that man should succour himself by repenting of the pitiful condition into which sin has brought him, according to Prov. xiv. 34: *Sin maketh nations miserable*; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. xxx. 24): *Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God.*

Reply Obj. 3. It was due to His power of *excellence*, which He alone had, as stated above (Q. LXIV., A. 3), that Christ bestowed on the adulterous woman the effect of the sacrament of Penance, viz. the forgiveness of sins, without the sacrament of Penance, although not without internal repentance, which He operated in her by grace.

* Implicitly in the passage referred to, but explicitly *Serm. xv. de verb. Apost.*

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE IS A SECOND PLANK AFTER SHIPWRECK ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Penance is not a second plank after shipwreck. Because on Isa. iii. 9, *They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom*, a gloss says: *The second plank after shipwreck is to hide one's sins.* Now Penance does not hide sins, but reveals them. Therefore Penance is not a second plank.

Obj. 2. Further, in a building the foundation takes the first, not the second place. Now in the spiritual edifice, Penance is the foundation, according to Heb. vi. 1: *Not laying again the foundation of Penance from dead works*; wherefore it precedes even Baptism, according to Acts ii. 38: *Do penance, and be baptized every one of you.* Therefore Penance should not be called a second plank.

Obj. 3. Further, all the sacraments are planks, i.e. helps against sin. Now Penance holds, not the second but the fourth, place among the sacraments, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. LXV., AA. 1, 2). Therefore Penance should not be called a second plank after shipwreck.

On the contrary, Jerome says (*Ep. cxxx.*) that *Penance is a second plank after shipwreck.*

I answer that, That which is of itself precedes naturally that which is accidental, as substance precedes accident. Now some sacraments are, of themselves, ordained to man's salvation, e.g. Baptism, which is the spiritual birth, Confirmation which is the spiritual growth, the Eucharist which is the spiritual food; whereas Penance is ordained to man's salvation accidentally as it were, and on something being supposed, viz. sin: for unless man were to sin actually, he would not stand in need of Penance, and yet he would need Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist; even as in the life of the body, man would need no medical treatment, unless he were ill, and yet life, birth, growth, and food are, of themselves, necessary to man.

Consequently Penance holds the second place with regard to the state of integrity which is bestowed and safeguarded by the aforesaid sacraments, so that it is called metaphorically *a second plank after shipwreck*. For just as the first help for those who cross the sea is to be safeguarded in a whole ship, while the second help when the ship is wrecked, is to cling to a plank, so too the first help in this life's ocean is that man safeguard his integrity, while the second help is, if he lose his integrity through sin, that he regain it by means of Penance.

Reply Obj. 1. To hide one's sins may happen in two ways: first, in the very act of sinning. Now it is worse to sin in public than in private, both because a public sinner seems to sin more from contempt, and because by sinning he gives scandal to others. Consequently in sin it is a kind of remedy to sin secretly, and it is in this sense that the gloss says that *to hide one's sins is a second plank after shipwreck*; not that it takes away sin, as Penance does, but because it makes the sin less grievous. Secondly, one hides one's sin previously committed, by neglecting to confess it: this is opposed to Penance, and to hide one's sins thus is not a second plank, but is the reverse, since it is written (Prov. xxviii. 13): *He that hideth his sins shall not prosper*.

Reply Obj. 2. Penance cannot be called the foundation of the spiritual edifice simply, i.e. in the first building thereof; but it is the foundation in the second building which is accomplished by destroying sin, because man, on his return to God, needs Penance first. However, the Apostle is speaking there of the foundation of spiritual doctrine. Moreover, the penance which precedes Baptism is not the sacrament of Penance.

Reply Obj. 3. The three sacraments which precede Penance refer to the ship in its integrity, i.e. to man's state of integrity, with regard to which Penance is called a second plank.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT WAS SUITABLY INSTITUTED IN
THE NEW LAW ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament was unsuitably instituted in the New Law. Because those things which belong to the natural law need not to be instituted. Now it belongs to the natural law that one should repent of the evil one has done: for it is impossible to love good without grieving for its contrary. Therefore Penance was unsuitably instituted in the New Law.

Obj. 2. Further, that which existed in the Old Law had not to be instituted in the New. Now there was Penance in the Old Law, wherefore the Lord complains (Jer. viii. 6) saying: *There is none that doth penance for his sin, saying: What have I done?* Therefore Penance should not have been instituted in the New Law.

Obj. 3. Further, Penance comes after Baptism, since it is a second plank, as stated above (A. 6). Now it seems that Our Lord instituted Penance before Baptism, because we read that at the beginning of His preaching He said (Matth. iv. 17): *Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.* Therefore this sacrament was not suitably instituted in the New Law.

Obj. 4. Further, the sacraments of the New Law were instituted by Christ, by Whose power they work, as stated above (Q. LXII., A. 5; Q. LXIV., A. 1). But Christ does not seem to have instituted this sacrament, since He made no use of it, as of the other sacraments which He instituted. Therefore this sacrament was unsuitably instituted in the New Law.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Luke xxiv. 46, 47): *It behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise again from the dead the third day: and that penance and remission of sins should be preached in His name unto all nations.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1., ad 1, ad 2), in this sacrament the acts of the penitent are as matter, while the

part taken by the priest, who works as Christ's minister, is the formal and completive element of the sacrament. Now in the other sacraments the matter pre-exists, being provided by nature, as water, or by art, as bread: but that such and such a matter be employed for a sacrament requires to be decided by the institution; while the sacrament derives its form and power entirely from the institution of Christ, from Whose Passion the power of the sacraments proceeds.

Accordingly the matter of this sacrament pre-exists, being provided by nature; since it is by a natural principle of reason that man is moved to repent of the evil he has done: yet it is due to Divine institution that man does penance in this or that way. Wherefore at the outset of His preaching, Our Lord admonished men, not only to repent, but also to *do penance*, thus pointing to the particular manner of actions required for this sacrament. As to the part to be taken by the ministers, this was fixed by Our Lord when He said to Peter (Matth. xvi. 19): *To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven, etc.*; but it was after His resurrection that He made known the efficacy of this sacrament and the source of its power, when He said (Luke xxiv. 47) that *penance and remission of sins should be preached in His name unto all nations*, after speaking of His Passion and resurrection. Because it is from the power of the name of Jesus Christ suffering and rising again that this sacrament is efficacious unto the remission of sins.

It is therefore evident that this sacrament was suitably instituted in the New Law.

Reply Obj. 1. It is a natural law that one should repent of the evil one has done, by grieving for having done it, and by seeking a remedy for one's grief in some way or other, and also that one should show some signs of grief, even as the Ninevites did, as we read in Jon. iii. And yet even in their case there was also something of faith which they had received through Jonas' preaching, inasmuch as they did these things in the hope that they would receive pardon from God, according as we read (*ibid.* 9): *Who can tell if God will turn and forgive, and will turn away from His fierce*

anger, and we shall not perish? But just as other matters which are of the natural law were fixed in detail by the institution of the Divine law, as we have stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. XCI., A. 4: Q. XCV., A. 2: Q. XCIX.), so was it with Penance.

Reply Obj. 2. Things which are of the natural law were determined in various ways in the Old and in the New Law, in keeping with the imperfection of the Old, and the perfection of the New. Wherefore Penance was fixed in a certain way in the Old Law,—with regard to sorrow, that it should be in the heart rather than in external signs, according to Joel ii. 13: *Rend your hearts and not your garments*;—and with regard to seeking a remedy for sorrow, that they should in some way confess their sins, at least in general, to God's ministers. Wherefore the Lord said (Levit. v. 17, 18): *If anyone sin through ignorance, . . . he shall offer of the flocks a ram without blemish to the priest, according to the measure and estimation of the sin, and the priest shall pray for him, because he did it ignorantly, and it shall be forgiven him*; since by the very fact of making an offering for his sin, a man, in a fashion, confessed his sin to the priest. And accordingly it is written (Prov. xxviii. 13): *He that hideth his sins, shall not prosper: but he that shall confess, and forsake them, shall obtain mercy.* Not yet, however, was the power of the keys instituted, which is derived from Christ's Passion, and consequently it was not yet ordained that a man should grieve for his sin, with the purpose of submitting himself by confession and satisfaction to the keys of the Church, in the hope of receiving forgiveness through the power of Christ's Passion.

Reply Obj. 3. If we note carefully what Our Lord said about the necessity of Baptism (John iii. v. 3, *seqq.*), we shall see that this was said before His words about the necessity of Penance (Matth. iv. 17); because He spoke to Nicodemus about Baptism before the imprisonment of John, of whom it is related afterwards (John iii. 23, 24) that he baptized, whereas His words about Penance were said after John was cast into prison.

If, however, He had admonished men to do penance before admonishing them to be baptized, this would be because also before Baptism some kind of penance is required, according to the words of Peter (Acts ii. 38): *Do penance, and be baptized, every one of you.*

Reply Obj. 4. Christ did not use the Baptism which He instituted, but was baptized with the baptism of John, as stated above (Q. XXXIX., AA. 1, 2). Nor did He use it actively by administering it Himself, because He *did not baptize* as a rule, *but His disciples* did, as related in John iv. 2, although it is to be believed that He baptized His disciples, as Augustine asserts (*Ep. cclxv. ad Seleuc.*). But with regard to His institution of this sacrament it was nowise fitting that He should use it, neither by repenting Himself, in Whom there was no sin, nor by administering the sacrament to others, since, in order to show His mercy and power, He was wont to confer the effect of this sacrament without the sacrament itself, as stated above (A. 5, *ad* 3). On the other hand, He both received and gave to others the sacrament of the Eucharist, both in order to commend the excellence of that sacrament, and because that sacrament is a memorial of His Passion, in which Christ is both priest and victim.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE SHOULD LAST TILL THE END OF LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Penance should not last till the end of life. Because Penance is ordained for the blotting out of sin. Now the penitent receives forgiveness of his sins at once, according to Ezech. xviii. 21: *If the wicked do penance for all his sins which he hath committed . . . he shall live and shall not die.* Therefore there is no need for Penance to be further prolonged.

Obj. 2. Further, Penance belongs to the state of beginners. But man ought to advance from that state to the state of the proficient, and, from this, on to the state of the per-

fect. Therefore man need not do Penance till the end of his life.

Obj. 3. Further, man is bound to observe the laws of the Church in this as in the other sacraments. But the duration of repentance is fixed by the canons, so that, to wit, for such and such a sin one is bound to do penance for so many years. Therefore it seems that Penance should not be prolonged till the end of life.

On the contrary, Augustine says in his book, *De Pœnitentia* :* *What remains for us to do, save to sorrow ever in this life? For when sorrow ceases, repentance fails; and if repentance fails, what becomes of pardon?*

I answer that, Penance is twofold, internal and external. Internal penance is that whereby one grieves for a sin one has committed, and this penance should last until the end of life. Because man should always be displeased at having sinned, for if he were to be pleased thereat, he would for this very reason fall into sin and lose the fruit of pardon. Now displeasure causes sorrow in one who is susceptible to sorrow, as man is in this life; but after this life the saints are not susceptible to sorrow, wherefore they will be displeased at without sorrowing for their past sins, according to Isa. lxxv. 16: *The former distresses are forgotten.*

External penance is that whereby a man shows external signs of sorrow, confesses his sins verbally to the priest who absolves him, and makes satisfaction for his sins according to the judgment of the priest. Such penance need not last until the end of life, but only for a fixed time according to the measure of the sin.

Reply Obj. 1. True penance not only removes past sins, but also preserves man from future sins. Consequently, although a man receives forgiveness of past sins in the first instant of his true penance, nevertheless he must persevere in his penance, lest he fall again into sin.

Reply Obj. 2. To do penance both internal and external belongs to the state of beginners, of those, to wit, who are making a fresh start from the state of sin. But there is

* *De vera et falsa Pœnitentia*, the authorship of which is unknown.

room for internal penance even in the proficient and the perfect, according to Ps. lxxxiii. 7: *In his heart he hath disposed to ascend by steps, in the vale of tears.* Wherefore Paul says (1 Cor. xv. 9): *I . . . am not worthy to be called an apostle because I persecuted the Church of God.*

Reply Obj. 3. These durations of time are fixed for penitents as regards the exercise of external penance.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE CAN BE CONTINUOUS ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that penance cannot be continuous. For it is written (Jerem. xxxi. 16): *Let thy voice cease from weeping, and thy eyes from tears.* But this would be impossible if penance were continuous, for it consists in weeping and tears. Therefore penance cannot be continuous.

Obj. 2. Further, man ought to rejoice at every good work, according to Ps. xcix. 1: *Serve ye the Lord with gladness.* Now to do penance is a good work. Therefore man should rejoice at it. But man cannot rejoice and grieve at the same time, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic. ix.*). Therefore a penitent cannot grieve continually for his past sins, which is essential to penance. Therefore penance cannot be continuous.

Obj. 3. Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. ii. 7): *Comfort him, viz. the penitent, lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.* But comfort dispels grief, which is essential to penance. Therefore penance need not be continuous.

On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on Penance: * *In doing penance grief should be continual.*

I answer that, One is said to repent in two ways, actually and habitually. It is impossible for a man continually to repent actually; for the acts, whether internal or external, of a penitent must needs be interrupted by sleep and other

* Cf. footnote, p. 20.

things which the body needs. Secondly, a man is said to repent habitually; and thus he should repent continually, both by never doing anything contrary to penance, so as to destroy the habitual disposition of the penitent, and by being resolved that his past sins should always be displeasing to him.

Reply Obj. 1. Weeping and tears belong to the act of external penance, and this act needs neither to be continuous, nor to last until the end of life, as stated above (A. 8): wherefore it is significantly added: *For there is a reward for thy work.* Now the reward of the penitent's work is the full remission of sin both as to guilt and as to punishment; and after receiving this reward there is no need for man to proceed to acts of external penance. This, however, does not prevent penance being continual, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 2. Of sorrow and joy we may speak in two ways: first, as being passions of the sensitive appetite; and thus they can nowise be together, since they are altogether contrary to one another, either on the part of the object (as when they have the same object), or at least on the part of the movement, for joy is with expansion* of the heart, whereas sorrow is with contraction; and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks in *Ethic.* ix. Secondly, we may speak of joy and sorrow as being simple acts of the will, to which something is pleasing or displeasing. Accordingly, they cannot be contrary to one another, except on the part of the object, as when they concern the same object in the same respect, in which way joy and sorrow cannot be simultaneous, because the same thing in the same respect cannot be pleasing and displeasing. If, on the other hand, joy and sorrow, understood thus, be not of the same object in the same respect, but either of different objects, or of the same object in different respects, in that case joy and sorrow are not contrary to one another, so that nothing hinders a man from being joyful and sorrowful at the same time,—for instance, if we see a good man suffer, we both

* Cf. I.-II., Q. XXXIII., A. 1.

rejoice at his goodness and at the same time grieve for his suffering. In this way a man may be displeased at having sinned, and be pleased at his displeasure together with his hope for pardon, so that his very sorrow is a matter of joy. Hence Augustine says (*loc. cit.*): *The penitent should ever grieve and rejoice at his grief.*

If, however, sorrow were altogether incompatible with joy, this would prevent the continuance, not of habitual penance, but only of actual penance.

Reply Obj. 3. According to the Philosopher (*Ethic. ii.*) it belongs to virtue to establish the mean in the passions. Now the sorrow which, in the sensitive appetite of the penitent, arises from the displeasure of his will, is a passion; wherefore it should be moderated according to virtue, and if it be excessive it is sinful, because it leads to despair, as the Apostle teaches (*ibid.*), saying: *Lest such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.* Accordingly comfort, of which the Apostle speaks, moderates sorrow but does not destroy it altogether.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE MAY BE REPEATED ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the sacrament of Penance should not be repeated. For the Apostle says (Heb. vi. 4, *seqq.*): *It is impossible for those, who were once illuminated, have tasted also the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost . . . and are fallen away, to be renewed again to penance.* Now whosoever have done penance, have been illuminated, and have received the gift of the Holy Ghost. Therefore whosoever sin after doing penance, cannot do penance again.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says (*De Penit. ii.*): *Some are to be found who think they ought often to do penance, who take liberties with Christ : for if they were truly penitent, they would not think of doing penance over again, since there is but one*

Penance even as there is but one Baptism. Now Baptism is not repeated. Neither, therefore, is Penance to be repeated.

Obj. 3. Further, the miracles whereby Our Lord healed bodily diseases, signify the healing of spiritual diseases, whereby men are delivered from sins. Now we do not read that Our Lord restored the sight to any blind man twice, or that He cleansed any leper twice, or twice raised any dead man to life. Therefore it seems that He does not twice grant pardon to any sinner.

Obj. 4. Further, Gregory says (*Hom. xxxiv. in Evang.*): *Penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again those we have deplored*: and Isidore says (*De Summo Bono, ii.*): *He is a mocker and no penitent who still does what he has repented of.* If, therefore, a man is truly penitent, he will not sin again. Therefore Penance cannot be repeated.

Obj. 5. Further, just as Baptism derives its efficacy from the Passion of Christ, so does Penance. Now Baptism is not repeated, on account of the unity of Christ's Passion and death. Therefore in like manner Penance is not repeated

Obj. 6. Further, Ambrose says on Ps. cxviii. 58, *I entreated Thy face, etc., that facility of obtaining pardon is an incentive to sin.* If, therefore, God frequently grants pardon through Penance, it seems that He affords man an incentive to sin, and thus He seems to take pleasure in sin, which is contrary to His goodness. Therefore Penance cannot be repeated.

On the contrary, Man is induced to be merciful by the example of Divine mercy, according to Luke vi. 36: *Be ye . . . merciful, as your Father also is merciful.* Now Our Lord commanded His disciples to be merciful by frequently pardoning their brethren who had sinned against them; wherefore, as related in Matth. xviii. 21, when Peter asked: *How often shall my brother offend against me, and I forgive him? till seven times?* Jesus answered: *I say not to thee, till seven times, but till seventy times seven times.* Therefore

also God over and over again, through Penance, grants pardon to sinners, especially as He teaches us to pray (Matth. vi. 12): *Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us.*

I answer that, As regards Penance, some have erred, saying that a man cannot obtain pardon of his sins through Penance a second time. Some of these, viz. the Novatians, went so far as to say that he who sins after the first Penance which is done in Baptism, cannot be restored again through Penance. There were also other heretics who, as Augustine relates in *De Pœnitentia*,* said that, after Baptism, Penance is useful, not many times, but only once.

These errors seem to have arisen from a twofold source: first from not knowing the nature of true Penance. For since true Penance requires charity, without which sins are not taken away, they thought that charity once possessed could not be lost, and that, consequently, Penance, if true, could never be removed by sin, so that it should be necessary to repeat it. But this was refuted in the Second Part (II.-II., Q. XXIV., A. 11), where it was shown that on account of free-will charity, once possessed, can be lost, and that, consequently, after true Penance, a man can sin mortally.—Secondly, they erred in their estimation of the gravity of sin. For they deemed a sin committed by a man after he had received pardon, to be so grave that it could not be forgiven. In this they erred not only with regard to sin which, even after a sin has been forgiven, can be either more or less grievous than the first, which was forgiven, but much more did they err against the infinity of Divine mercy, which surpasses any number and magnitude of sins, according to Ps. l. 1, 2: *Have mercy on me, O God, according to Thy great mercy: and according to the multitude of Thy tender mercies, blot out my iniquity.* Wherefore the words of Cain were reprehensible, when he said (Gen. iv. 13): *My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon.* And so God's mercy, through Penance, grants pardon to sinners, without any end, wherefore it is written

* Cf. footnote, p. 20.

(2 Paralip. xxxvii.*): *Thy merciful promise is unmeasurable and unsearchable . . . (and Thou repentest) for the evil brought upon man.* It is therefore evident that Penance can be repeated many times.

Reply Obj. 1. Some of the Jews thought that a man could be washed several times in the laver of Baptism, because among them the Law prescribed certain washing-places where they were wont to cleanse themselves repeatedly from their uncleannesses. In order to disprove this the Apostle wrote to the Hebrews that *it is impossible for those who were once illuminated, viz. through Baptism, to be renewed again to penance, viz. through Baptism, which is the laver of regeneration, and renovation of the Holy Ghost,* as stated in Tit. iii. 5: and he declares the reason to be that by Baptism man dies with Christ, wherefore he adds (Heb. vi. 6): *Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God.*

Reply Obj. 2. Ambrose is speaking of solemn Penance, which is not repeated in the Church, as we shall state further on (Suppl., Q. XXVIII., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (*loc. cit.*), *Our Lord gave sight to many blind men at various times, and strength to many infirm, thereby showing, in these different men, that the same sins are repeatedly forgiven, at one time healing a man from leprosy and afterwards from blindness. For this reason He healed so many stricken with fever, so many feeble in body, so many lame, blind, and withered, that the sinner might not despair; for this reason He is not described as healing anyone but once, that every one might fear to link himself with sin; for this reason He declares Himself to be the physician welcomed not of the hale, but of the unhealthy. What sort of a physician is he who knows not how to heal a recurring disease? For if a man ail a hundred times it is for the physician to heal him a hundred times: and if he failed where others succeed, he would be a poor physician in comparison with them.*

Reply Obj. 4. Penance is to deplore past sins, and, *while deploring them,* not to commit again, either by act or by in-

* Prayer of Manasses, among the Apocrypha. S. Thomas is evidently quoting from memory, and omits the words in brackets.

tention, those which we have to deplore. Because a man is a mocker and not a penitent, who, *while doing penance*, does what he repents having done, or intends to do again what he did before, or even commits actually the same or another kind of sin. But if a man sin afterwards either by act or intention, this does not destroy the fact that his former penance was real, because the reality of a former act is never destroyed by a subsequent contrary act: for even as he truly ran who afterwards sits, so he truly repented who subsequently sins.

Reply Obj. 5. Baptism derives its power from Christ's Passion, as a spiritual regeneration, with a spiritual death, of a previous life. Now *it is appointed unto man once to die* (Heb. ix. 27), and to be born once, wherefore man should be baptized but once. On the other hand, Penance derives its power from Christ's Passion, as a spiritual medicine, which can be repeated frequently.

Reply Obj. 6. According to Augustine (*loc. cit.*), *it is evident that sins displease God exceedingly, for He is always ready to destroy them, lest what He created should perish, and what He loved be lost, viz. by despair.*

QUESTION LXXXV.

OF PENANCE AS A VIRTUE.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider penance as a virtue, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether penance is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) To what species of virtue does it belong? (4) Of its subject. (5) Of its cause. (6) Of its relation to the other virtues.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that penance is not a virtue. For penance is a sacrament numbered among the other sacraments, as was shown above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 1: Q. LXV., A. 1). Now no other sacrament is a virtue. Therefore neither is penance a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iv.*), *shame is not a virtue*, both because it is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, and because it is not the disposition of a perfect thing, since it is about an evil act, so that it has no place in a virtuous man. Now, in like manner, penance is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, viz. tears, according to Gregory, who says (*Hom. xxxiv. in Evang.*) that *penance consists in deploring past sins*: moreover it is about evil deeds, viz. sins, which have no place in a virtuous man. Therefore penance is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iv.*), *no virtuous man is foolish*. But it seems foolish to deplore

what has been done in the past, since it cannot be otherwise, and yet this is what we understand by penance. Therefore penance is not a virtue.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue, because a lawgiver intends to make the citizens virtuous (*Ethic.* ii.). But there is a precept about penance in the Divine law, according to Matth. iv. 17: *Do penance*, etc. Therefore penance is a virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (*Obj.* 2, Q. LXXXIV., A. 10, *ad* 4), to repent is to deplore something one has done. Now it has been stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 9) that sorrow or sadness is twofold. First, it denotes a passion of the sensitive appetite, and in this sense penance is not a virtue, but a passion. Secondly, it denotes an act of the will, and in this way it implies choice, and if this be right, it must, of necessity, be an act of virtue. For it is stated in *Ethic.* ii. that virtue is a habit of choosing according to right reason. Now it belongs to right reason that one should grieve for a proper object of grief as one ought to grieve, and for an end for which one ought to grieve. And this is observed in the penance of which we are speaking now; since the penitent assumes a moderated grief for his past sins, with the intention of removing them. Hence it is evident that the penance of which we are speaking now, is either a virtue or the act of a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 1, *ad* 1: AA. 2, 3), in the sacrament of Penance, human acts take the place of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and Confirmation. Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of an act, penance is either a virtue or accompanies a virtue, rather than Baptism or Confirmation.

Reply Obj. 2. Penance, considered as a passion, is not a virtue, as stated above, and it is thus that it is accompanied by a bodily alteration. On the other hand, it is a virtue, according as it includes a right choice on the part of the will; which, however, applies to penance rather than to shame. Because shame regards the evil deed as present,

whereas penance regards the evil deed as past. Now it is contrary to the perfection of virtue that one should have an evil deed actually present, of which one ought to be ashamed; whereas it is not contrary to the perfection of virtue that we should have previously committed evil deeds, of which it behoves us to repent, since a man from being wicked becomes virtuous.

Reply Obj. 3. It would indeed be foolish to grieve for what has already been done, with the intention of trying to make it not done. But the penitent does not intend this: for his sorrow is displeasure or disapproval with regard to the past deed, with the intention of removing its result, viz. the anger of God and the debt of punishment: and this is not foolish

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that penance is not a special virtue. For it seems that to rejoice at the good one has done, and to grieve for the evil one has done are acts of the same nature. But joy for the good one has done is not a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy emotion proceeding from charity, as Augustine states (*De Civ. Dei*, xiv.): wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. xiii. 6) that charity *rejoiceth not at iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth*. Therefore, in like manner, neither is penance, which is sorrow for past sins, a special virtue, but an emotion resulting from charity.

Obj. 2. Further, every special virtue has its special matter, because habits are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their objects. But penance has no special matter, because its matter is past sins in any matter whatever. Therefore penance is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing is removed except by its contrary. But penance removes all sins. Therefore it is contrary to all sins, and consequently is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, The Law has a special precept about penance, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., AA. 5, 7).

I answer that, As stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. LIV., A. 1, *ad* 1, A. 2), habits are specifically distinguished according to the species of their acts, so that whenever an act has a special reason for being praiseworthy, there must needs be a special habit. Now it is evident that there is a special reason for praising the act of penance, because it aims at the destruction of past sin, considered as an offence against God, which does not apply to any other virtue. We must therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. An act springs from charity in two ways: first as being elicited by charity, and a like virtuous act requires no other virtue than charity, e.g. to love the good, to rejoice therein, and to grieve for what is opposed to it. Secondly, an act springs from charity, being, so to speak, commanded by charity; and thus, since charity commands all the virtues, inasmuch as it directs them to its own end, an act springing from charity may belong even to another special virtue. Accordingly, if in the act of the penitent we consider the mere displeasure in the past sin, it belongs to charity immediately, in the same way as joy for past good acts; but the intention to aim at the destruction of past sin requires a special virtue subordinate to charity.

Reply Obj. 2. In point of fact, penance has indeed a general matter, inasmuch as it regards all sins; but it does so under a special aspect, inasmuch as they can be remedied by an act of man in co-operating with God for his justification.

Reply Obj. 3. Every special virtue removes formally the habit of the opposite vice, just as whiteness removes blackness from the same subject: but penance removes every sin effectively, inasmuch as it works for the destruction of sins, according as they are pardonable through the grace of God if man co-operate therewith. Wherefore it does not follow that it is a general virtue.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE VIRTUE OF PENANCE IS A SPECIES OF JUSTICE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the virtue of penance is not a species of justice. For justice is not a theological but a moral virtue, as was shown in the Second Part (II.-II., Q. LXII., A. 3). But penance seems to be a theological virtue, since God is its object, for it makes satisfaction to God, to Whom, moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice.

Obj. 2. Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes the mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to the extreme, according to Jerem. vi. 26: *Make thee mourning as for an only son, a bitter lamentation*. Therefore penance is not a species of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, there are two species of justice, as stated in *Ethic. v.*, viz. *distributive* and *commutative*. But penance does not seem to be contained under either of them. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice.

Obj. 4. Further, a gloss on Luke vi. 21, *Blessed are ye that weep now*, says: *It is prudence that teaches us the unhappiness of earthly things and the happiness of heavenly things*. But weeping is an act of penance. Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of justice.

On the contrary, Augustine says in *De Pœnitentia*:* *Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry for having done*. But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore Tully says (*De Inv Rhetor. ii.*) that one kind of justice is called vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), penance is a special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as

* *De vera et falsa Pœnitentia*, the authorship of which is unknown.

it is an offence against God, and purposes to amend. Now amendment for an offence committed against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offences committed against another, just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice.

It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v.) a thing is said to be just in two ways, simply and relatively. A thing is just simply when it is between equals, since justice is a kind of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil just, because all citizens are equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler, retaining their freedom. But a thing is just relatively when it is between parties of whom one is subject to the other, as a servant under his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband. It is this kind of just that we consider in penance. Wherefore the penitent has recourse to God with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his master, according to Ps. cxxii. 2: *Behold, as the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters, . . . so are our eyes unto the Lord our God, until He have mercy on us*; and as a son to his father, according to Luke xv. 21: *Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee*; and as a wife to her husband, according to Jerem. iii. 1: *Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, saith the Lord.*

Reply Obj. 1. As stated in *Ethic.* v., justice is a virtue towards another person, and the matter of justice is not so much the person to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not God, but human acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is as one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is not a theological virtue, because God is not its matter or object.

Reply Obj. 2. The mean of justice is the equality that is established between those between whom justice is, as stated in *Ethic.* v. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on account of the excellence of one, as between father and son, God and man, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* viii.), wherefore in such cases, he that falls short of the other must do whatever he can. Yet this will not be sufficient simply, but only according to the acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing excess to penance.

Reply Obj. 3. As there is a kind of commutation in favours, when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favour received, so also is there commutation in the matter of offences, when, on account of an offence committed against another, a man is either punished against his will, which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge. Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative justice.

Reply Obj. 4. Although penance is directly a species of justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it must have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the object of which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in Christ's Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon, and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only something belonging to justice, but also something belonging to temperance and fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which pertain to temperance, and those which cause terror, which fortitude moderates, are objects of commutative justice. Accordingly it belongs to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance, and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL IS PROPERLY THE SUBJECT OF
PENANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the subject of penance is not properly the will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is in the concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in the concupiscible faculty.

Obj. 2. Further, Penance is a kind of vengeance, as Augustine states in *De Pœnitentia* (*loc. cit.*, A. 3). But vengeance seems to regard the irascible faculty, since anger is the desire for vengeance. Therefore it seems that penance is in the irascible part.

Obj. 3. Further, the past is the proper object of the memory, according to the Philosopher (*De Memoria*, i.). Now penance regards the past, as stated above (A. 1, *ad 2*, *ad 3*). Therefore penance is subjected in the memory.

Obj. 4. Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance removes sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance is in every power of the soul, and not only in the will.

On the contrary, Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Ps. 1. 19: *A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.* But to offer a sacrifice is an act of the will, according to Ps. liii. 8: *I will freely sacrifice to Thee.* Therefore penance is in the will.

I answer that, We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so far as it is a passion, and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is in the concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it is a virtue, and thus, as stated above (A. 3), it is a species of justice. Now justice, as stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. LVI., A. 6), is subjected in the rational appetite which is the will. Therefore it is evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue, is subjected in the will, and its proper act is the purpose of amending what was committed against God.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers penance as a passion.

Reply Obj. 2. To desire vengeance on another, through passion, belongs to the irascible appetite, but to desire or take vengeance on oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will.

Reply Obj. 3. The memory is a power that apprehends the past. But penance belongs not to the apprehensive but to the appetitive power, which presupposes an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance is not in the memory, but presupposes it.

Reply Obj. 4. The will, as stated above (P. I., Q. LXXXII., A. 4; P. I.-II., Q. IX., A. 1), moves all the other powers of the soul; so that it is not unreasonable for penance to be subjected in the will, and to produce an effect in each power of the soul.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE ORIGINATES FROM FEAR?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that penance does not originate from fear. For penance originates in displeasure at sin. But this belongs to charity, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore penance originates from love rather than fear.

Obj. 2. Further, men are induced to do penance, through the expectation of the heavenly kingdom, according to Matth. iii. 2 and iv. 17: *Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.* Now the kingdom of heaven is the object of hope. Therefore penance results from hope rather than from fear.

Obj. 3. Further, fear is an internal act of man. But penance does not seem to arise in us through any work of man, but through the operation of God, according to Jerem. xxxi. 19: *After Thou didst convert me I did penance.* Therefore penance does not result from fear.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xxvi. 17): *As a woman with child, when she draweth near the time of her delivery, is in pain, and crieth out in her pangs, so are we become, by*

penance, to wit; and according to another* version the text continues: *Through fear of Thee, O Lord, we have conceived, and been as it were in labour, and have brought forth the spirit of salvation*, i.e. of salutary penance, as is clear from what precedes. Therefore penance results from fear.

I answer that, We may speak of penance in two ways: first, as to the habit, and then it is infused by God immediately without our operating as principal agents, but not without our co-operating dispositively by certain acts. Secondly, we may speak of penance, with regard to the acts whereby in penance we co-operate with God operating, the first principle† of which acts is the operation of God in turning the heart, according to Lament. v. 21: *Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted*; the second, an act of faith; the third, a movement of servile fear, whereby a man is withdrawn from sin through fear of punishment; the fourth, a movement of hope, whereby a man makes a purpose of amendment, in the hope of obtaining pardon; the fifth, a movement of charity, whereby sin is displeasing to man for its own sake and no longer for the sake of the punishment; the sixth, a movement of filial fear whereby a man, of his own accord, offers to make amends to God through fear of Him.

Accordingly it is evident that the act of penance results from servile fear as from the first movement of the appetite in this direction and from filial fear as from its immediate and proper principle.

Reply Obj. 1. Sin begins to displease a man, especially a sinner, on account of the punishments which servile fear regards, before it displeases him on account of its being an offence against God, or on account of its wickedness, which pertains to charity.

Reply Obj. 2. When the kingdom of heaven is said to be at hand, we are to understand that the king is on his way, not only to reward but also to punish. Wherefore John the Baptist said (Matth. iii. 7): *Ye brood of vipers, who hath showed you to flee from the wrath to come?*

* The Septuagint.

† Cf. i-ii., Q. cxiii.

Reply Obj. 3. Even the movement of fear proceeds from God's act in turning the heart; wherefore it is written (Deut. v. 29): *Who shall give them to have such a mind, to fear Me?* And so the fact that penance results from fear does not hinder its resulting from the act of God in turning the heart.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE IS THE FIRST OF THE VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that penance is the first of the virtues. Because, on Matth. iii. 2, *Do penance, etc.*, a gloss says: *The first virtue is to destroy the old man, and hate sin by means of penance.*

Obj. 2. Further, withdrawal from one extreme seems to precede approach to the other. Now all the other virtues seem to regard approach to a term, because they all direct man to do good; whereas penance seems to direct him to withdraw from evil. Therefore it seems that penance precedes all the other virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, before penance, there is sin in the soul. Now no virtue is compatible with sin in the soul. Therefore no virtue precedes penance, which is itself the first of all, and opens the door to the others by expelling sin.

On the contrary, Penance results from faith, hope, and charity, as already stated (AA. 2, 5). Therefore penance is not the first of the virtues.

I answer that, In speaking of the virtues, we do not consider the order of time with regard to the habits, because, since the virtues are connected with one another, as stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. LXV., A. 1), they all begin at the same time to be in the soul; but one is said to precede the other in the order of nature, which order depends on the order of their acts, in so far as the act of one virtue presupposes the act of another. Accordingly, then, one must say that, even in the order of time, certain praiseworthy acts can precede the act and the habit of penance, e.g. acts of dead faith and hope, and an act of servile

fear; while the act and habit of charity are, in point of time, simultaneous with the act and habit of penance, and with the habits of the other virtues. For, as was stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. CXIII., AA. 7, 8), in the justification of the ungodly, the movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and the movement of the free-will towards sin, which is the act of penance, are simultaneous. Yet of these two acts, the former naturally precedes the latter, because the act of the virtue of penance is directed against sin, through love of God; where the first-mentioned act is the reason and cause of the second.

Consequently penance is not simply the first of the virtues, either in the order of time, or in the order of nature, because, in the order of nature, the theological virtues precede it simply. Nevertheless, in a certain respect, it is the first of the other virtues in the order of time, as regards its act, because this act is the first in the justification of the ungodly; whereas in the order of nature, the other virtues seem to precede, as that which is natural precedes that which is accidental; because the other virtues seem to be necessary for man's good, by reason of their very nature, whereas penance is only necessary if something, viz. sin, be presupposed, as stated above (Q. LV., A. 2), when we spoke of the relation of the sacrament of penance to the other sacraments aforesaid.

Reply Obj. 1. This gloss is to be taken as meaning that the act of penance is the first in point of time, in comparison with the acts of the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. In successive movements withdrawal from one extreme precedes approach to the other, in point of time; and also in the order of nature, if we consider the subject, i.e. the order of the material cause; but if we consider the order of the efficient and final causes, approach to the end is first, for it is this that the efficient cause intends first of all: and it is this order which we consider chiefly in the acts of the soul, as stated in *Phys.* ii.

Reply Obj. 3. Penance opens the door to the other virtues,

because it expels sin by the virtues of faith, hope and charity, which precede it in the order of nature; yet it so opens the door to them that they enter at the same time as it: because, in the justification of the ungodly, at the same time as the free-will is moved towards God and against sin, the sin is pardoned and grace infused, and with grace all the virtues, as stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. LXV., AA. 3, 5).

QUESTION LXXXVI.

OF THE EFFECT OF PENANCE, AS REGARDS THE PARDON OF MORTAL SIN.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider the effect of Penance; and (1) as regards the pardon of mortal sins: (2) as regards the pardon of venial sins: (3) as regards the return of sins which have been pardoned: (4) as regards the recovery of the virtues.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether all mortal sins are taken away by Penance? (2) Whether they can be taken away without Penance? (3) Whether one can be taken away without the other? (4) Whether Penance takes away the guilt while the debt remains? (5) Whether any remnants of sin remain? (6) Whether the removal of sin is the effect of Penance as a virtue, or as a sacrament?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL SINS ARE TAKEN AWAY BY PENANCE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that not all sins are taken away by Penance. For the Apostle says (Heb. xii. 17) that Esau found no place of repentance, although with tears he had sought it, which a gloss explains as meaning that he found no place of pardon and blessing through Penance: and it is related (2 Machab. ix. 13) of Antiochus, that *this wicked man prayed to the Lord, of Whom he was not to obtain mercy.* Therefore it does not seem that all sins are taken away by Penance.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, i.) that *so great is the stain of that sin* (namely, when a man,

after coming to the knowledge of God through the grace of Christ, resists fraternal charity, and by the brands of envy combats grace itself) that he is unable to humble himself in prayer, although he is forced by his wicked conscience to acknowledge and confess his sin. Therefore not every sin can be taken away by Penance.

Obj. 3. Further, Our Lord said (Matth. xii. 32): *He that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come.* Therefore not every sin can be pardoned through Penance.

On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. xviii. 22): *I will not remember any more all his iniquities that he hath done.*

I answer that, The fact that a sin cannot be taken away by Penance may happen in two ways: first, because of the impossibility of repenting of sin; secondly, because of Penance being unable to blot out a sin. In the first way the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be blotted out by Penance, because their will is confirmed in evil, so that sin cannot displease them as to its guilt, but only as to the punishment which they suffer, by reason of which they have a kind of repentance, which yet is fruitless, according to Wis. v. 3: *Repenting, and groaning for anguish of spirit.* Consequently such Penance brings no hope of pardon, but only despair. Nevertheless no sin of a wayfarer can be such as that, because his will is flexible to good and evil. Wherefore to say that in this life there is any sin of which one cannot repent, is erroneous, first, because this would destroy free-will, secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of grace, whereby the heart of any sinner whatsoever can be moved to repent, according to Prov. xxi. 1: *The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it.*

It is also erroneous to say that any sin cannot be pardoned through true Penance. First, because this is contrary to Divine mercy, of which it is written (Joel ii. 13) that God *is gracious and merciful, patient, and rich in mercy, and ready to repent of the evil;* for, in a manner, God would be overcome by man, if man wished a sin to be blotted out, which

God were unwilling to blot out. Secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of Christ's Passion, through which Penance produces its effect, as do the other sacraments, since it is written (1 John ii. 2): *He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.*

Therefore we must say simply that, in this life, every sin can be blotted out by true Penance.

Reply Obj. 1. Esau did not truly repent. This is evident from his saying (Gen. xxvii. 41): *The days will come of the mourning of my father, and I will kill my brother Jacob.* Likewise neither did Antiochus repent truly; since he grieved for his past sin, not because he had offended God thereby, but on account of the sickness which he suffered in his body.

Reply Obj. 2. These words of Augustine should be understood thus: *So great is the stain of that sin, that man is unable to humble himself in prayer,* i.e. it is not easy for him to do so; in which sense we say that a man cannot be healed, when it is difficult to heal him. Yet this is possible by the power of God's grace, which sometimes turns men even *into the depths of the sea* (Ps. lxxvii. 23).

Reply Obj. 3. The word or blasphemy spoken against the Holy Ghost is final impenitence, as Augustine states (*De Verb. Dom.* xi.), which is altogether unpardonable, because after this life is ended, there is no pardon of sins. Or, if by the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, we understand sin committed through certain malice, this means either that the blasphemy itself against the Holy Ghost is unpardonable, i.e. not easily pardonable, or that such a sin does not contain in itself any motive for pardon, or that for such a sin a man is punished both in this and in the next world, as we explained in the Second Part (II.-II., Q. XIV., A. 3).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN CAN BE PARDONED WITHOUT PENANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that sin can be pardoned without Penance. For the power of God is no less with regard to adults than with regard to children. But He pardons the sins of children without Penance. Therefore He also pardons adults without penance.

Obj. 2. Further, God did not bind His power to the sacraments. But Penance is a sacrament. Therefore by God's power sin can be pardoned without Penance.

Obj. 3. Further, God's mercy is greater than man's. Now man sometimes forgives another for offending him, without his repenting: wherefore Our Lord commanded us (Matth. v. 44): *Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you.* Much more, therefore, does God pardon men for offending him, without their repenting.

On the contrary, The Lord said (Jerem. xviii. 8): *If that nation . . . shall repent of their evil which they have done, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do them,* so that, on the other hand, if man *do not penance,* it seems that God will not pardon him his sin.

I answer that, It is impossible for a mortal actual sin to be pardoned without penance, if we speak of penance as a virtue. For, as sin is an offence against God, He pardons sin in the same way as he pardons an offence committed against Him. Now an offence is directly opposed to grace, since one man is said to be offended with another, because he excludes him from his grace. Now, as stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. CX., A. 1), the difference between the grace of God and the grace of man, is that the latter does not cause, but presupposes true or apparent goodness in him who is graced, whereas the grace of God causes goodness in the man who is graced, because the good-will of God, which is denoted by the word *grace*, is the cause of all created good. Hence it is possible for a man to pardon an

offence, for which he is offended with someone, without any change in the latter's will; but it is impossible that God pardon a man for an offence, without his will being changed. Now the offence of mortal sin is due to man's will being turned away from God, through being turned to some mutable good. Consequently, for the pardon of this offence against God, it is necessary for man's will to be so changed as to turn to God and to renounce having turned to something else in the aforesaid manner, together with a purpose of amendment; all of which belongs to the nature of penance as a virtue. Therefore it is impossible for a sin to be pardoned anyone without penance as a virtue.

But the sacrament of Penance, as stated above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 3), is perfected by the priestly office of binding and loosing, without which God can forgive sins, even as Christ pardoned the adulterous woman, as related in John viii., and the woman that was a sinner, as related in Luke vii., whose sins, however, He did not forgive without the virtue of penance: for as Gregory states (*Hom. xxxiii. in Evang.*), *He drew inwardly by grace, i.e. by penance, her whom He received outwardly by His mercy.*

Reply Obj. 1. In children there is none but original sin, which consists, not in an actual disorder of the will, but in a habitual disorder of nature, as explained in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. LXXXII., A. 1), and so in them the forgiveness of sin is accompanied by a habitual change resulting from the infusion of grace and virtues, but not by an actual change. On the other hand, in the case of an adult, in whom there are actual sins, which consist in an actual disorder of the will, there is no remission of sins, even in Baptism, without an actual change of the will, which is the effect of Penance.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument takes Penance as a sacrament.

Reply Obj. 3. God's mercy is more powerful than man's, in that it moves man's will to repent, which man's mercy cannot do.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER BY PENANCE ONE SIN CAN BE PARDONED
WITHOUT ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that by Penance one sin can be pardoned without another. For it is written (Amos iv. 7): *I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece was rained upon: and the piece whereupon I rained not, withered.* These words are expounded by Gregory, who says (*Hom. x. super Ezech.*): *When a man who hates his neighbour, breaks himself of other vices, rain falls on one part of the city, leaving the other part withered, for there are some men who, when they prune some vices, become much more rooted in others.* Therefore one sin can be forgiven by Penance, without another.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose in commenting on Ps. cxviii., *Blessed are the undefiled in the way*, after expounding verse 136 (*My eyes have sent forth) springs of water*, says that *the first consolation is that God is mindful to have mercy; and the second, that He punishes, for although faith be wanting, punishment makes satisfaction and raises us up.* Therefore a man can be raised up from one sin, while the sin of unbelief remains.

Obj. 3. Further, when several things are not necessarily together, one can be removed without the other. Now it was stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. LXXIII., A. 1) that sins are not connected together, so that one sin can be without another. Therefore also one sin can be taken away by Penance without another being taken away.

Obj. 4. Further, sins are the debts, for which we pray for pardon when we say in the Lord's Prayer: *Forgive us our trespasses*, etc. Now man sometimes forgives one debt without forgiving another. Therefore God also, by Penance, forgives one sin without another.

Obj. 5. Further, man's sins are forgiven him through the love of God, according to Jerem. xxxi. 3: *I have loved thee*

with an everlasting love, therefore have I drawn thee, taking pity on thee. Now there is nothing to hinder God from loving a man in one respect, while being offended with him in another, even as He loves the sinner as regards his nature, while hating him for his sin. Therefore it seems possible for God, by Penance, to pardon one sin without another.

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Pœnitentia : There are many who repent having sinned, but not completely ; for they except certain things which give them pleasure, forgetting that Our Lord delivered from the devil the man who was both dumb and deaf, whereby He shows us that we are never healed unless it be from all sins.*

*I answer that, It is impossible for Penance to take one sin away without another. First because sin is taken away by grace removing the offence against God. Wherefore it was stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. CIX., A. 7: Q. CXIII., A. 2) that without grace no sin can be forgiven. Now every mortal sin is opposed to grace and excludes it. Therefore it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned without another. Secondly, because, as shown above (A. 2) mortal sin cannot be forgiven without true Penance, to which it belongs to renounce sin, by reason of its being against God, which is common to all mortal sins: and where the same reason applies, the result will be the same. Consequently a man cannot be truly penitent, if he repent of one sin and not of another. For if one particular sin were displeasing to him, because it is against the love of God above all things (which motive is necessary for true repentance), it follows that he would repent of all. Whence it follows that it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned through Penance, without another. Thirdly, because this would be contrary to the perfection of God's mercy, since His works are perfect, as stated in Deut. xxxii. 4; wherefore whomsoever He pardons, He pardons altogether. Hence Augustine says (*loc. cit.*), that *it is irreverent and heretical to expect half a pardon from Him Who is just and justice itself.**

* *De vera et falsa Pœnitentia*, the authorship of which is unknown.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of Gregory do not refer to the forgiveness of the guilt, but to the cessation from act, because sometimes a man who has been wont to commit several kinds of sin, renounces one and not the other; which is indeed due to God's assistance, but does not reach to the pardon of the sin.

Reply Obj. 2. In this saying of Ambrose *faith* cannot denote the faith whereby we believe in Christ, because, as Augustine says on John xv. 22, *If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin* (viz. unbelief): *for this is the sin which contains all others*: but it stands for consciousness, because sometimes a man receives pardon for a sin of which he is not conscious, through the punishment which he bears patiently.

Reply Obj. 3. Although sins are not connected in so far as they turn towards a mutable good, yet they are connected in so far as they turn away from the immutable Good, which applies to all mortal sins in common; and it is thus that they have the character of an offence which needs to be removed by Penance.

Reply Obj. 4. Debt as regards external things, e.g. money, is not opposed to friendship through which the debt is pardoned; hence one debt can be condoned without another. On the other hand, the debt of sin is opposed to friendship, and so one sin or offence is not pardoned without another; for it would seem absurd for anyone to ask even a man to forgive him one offence and not another.

Reply Obj. 5. The love whereby God loves man's nature, does not ordain man to the good of glory from which man is excluded by any mortal sin; but the love of grace, whereby mortal sin is forgiven, ordains man to eternal life, according to Rom. vi. 23: *The grace of God* (is) *life everlasting*. Hence there is no comparison.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT REMAINS AFTER THE GUILT HAS BEEN FORGIVEN THROUGH PENANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no debt of punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven through Penance. For when the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But the guilt is the cause of the debt of punishment: since a man deserves to be punished because he has been guilty of a sin. Therefore when the sin has been forgiven, no debt of punishment can remain.

Obj. 2. Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. v.) the gift of Christ is more effective than the sin of Adam. Now, by sinning, man incurs at the same time guilt and the debt of punishment. Much more therefore, by the gift of grace, is the guilt forgiven and at the same time the debt of punishment remitted.

Obj. 3. Further, the forgiveness of sins is effected in Penance through the power of Christ's Passion, according to Rom. iii. 25: *Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood, . . . for the remission of former sins.* Now Christ's Passion made satisfaction sufficient for all sins, as stated above (QQ. XLVIII., XLIX., LXXIX., A. 5). Therefore after the guilt has been pardoned, no debt of punishment remains.

On the contrary, It is related (2 Kings xii. 13) that when David penitent had said to Nathan: *I have sinned against the Lord,* Nathan said to him: *The Lord also hath taken away thy sin, thou shalt not die. Nevertheless . . . the child that is born to thee shall surely die,* which was to punish him for the sin he had committed, as stated in the same place. Therefore a debt of some punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven.

I answer that, As stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. LXXXVII., A. 4), in mortal sin there are two things, namely, a turning from the immutable Good, and an in-

ordinate turning to mutable good. Accordingly, in so far as mortal sin turns away from the immutable Good, it induces a debt of eternal punishment, so that whosoever sins against the eternal Good should be punished eternally. Again, in so far as mortal sin turns inordinately to a mutable good, it gives rise to a debt of some punishment, because the disorder of guilt is not brought back to the order of justice, except by punishment: since it is just that he who has been too indulgent to his will, should suffer something against his will, for thus will equality be restored. Hence it is written (Apoc. xviii. 7): *As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.*

Since, however, the turning to mutable good is finite, sin does not, in this respect, induce a debt of eternal punishment. Wherefore, if man turns inordinately to a mutable good, without turning from God, as happens in venial sins, he incurs a debt, not of eternal but of temporal punishment. Consequently when guilt is pardoned through grace, the soul ceases to be turned away from God, through being united to God by grace: so that at the same time, the debt of punishment is taken away, albeit a debt of some temporal punishment may yet remain.

Reply Obj. 1. Mortal sin both turns away from God and turns to a created good. But, as stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. LXXI., A. 6), the turning away from God is as its form, while the turning to created good is as its matter. Now if the formal element of anything be removed, the species is taken away: thus, if you take away rational, you take away the human species. Consequently mortal sin is said to be pardoned from the very fact that, by means of grace, the aversion of the mind from God is taken away together with the debt of eternal punishment: and yet the material element remains, viz. the inordinate turning to a created good, for which a debt of temporal punishment is due.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. CIX., AA. 7, 8: Q. CXI., A. 2), it belongs to grace to operate in man by justifying him from sin, and to co-operate with man

that his work may be rightly done. Consequently the forgiveness of guilt and of the debt of eternal punishment belongs to operating grace, while the remission of the debt of temporal punishment belongs to co-operating grace, in so far as man, by bearing punishment patiently with the help of Divine grace, is released also from the debt of temporal punishment. Consequently just as the effect of operating grace precedes the effect of co-operating grace, so too, the remission of guilt and of eternal punishment precedes the complete release from temporal punishment, since both are from grace, but the former, from grace alone, the latter, from grace and free-will.

Reply Obj. 3. Christ's Passion is of itself sufficient to remove all debt of punishment, not only eternal, but also temporal; and man is released from the debt of punishment according to the measure of his share in the power of Christ's Passion. Now in Baptism man shares the Power of Christ's Passion fully, since by water and the Spirit of Christ, he dies with Him to sin, and is born again in Him to a new life, so that, in Baptism, man receives the remission of all debt of punishment. In Penance, on the other hand, man shares in the power of Christ's Passion according to the measure of his own acts, which are the matter of Penance, as water is of Baptism, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., AA. 1, 3). Wherefore the entire debt of punishment is not remitted at once after the first act of Penance, by which act the guilt is remitted, but only when all the acts of Penance have been completed.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE REMNANTS OF SIN ARE REMOVED WHEN A MORTAL SIN IS FORGIVEN?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all the remnants of sin are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven. For Augustine says in *De Pœnitentia* :* *Our Lord never healed anyone without*

* *De vera et falsa Pœnitentia*, the authorship of which is unknown.

delivering him wholly ; for He wholly healed the man on the Sabbath, since He delivered his body from all disease, and his soul from all taint. Now the remnants of sin belong to the disease of sin. Therefore it does not seem possible for any remnants of sin to remain when the guilt has been pardoned.

Obj. 2. Further, according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.), *good is more efficacious than evil, since evil does not act save in virtue of some good.* Now, by sinning, man incurs the taint of sin all at once. Much more, therefore, by repenting, is he delivered also from all remnants of sin.

Obj. 3. Further, God's work is more efficacious than man's. Now by the exercise of good human works the remnants of contrary sins are removed. Much more, therefore, are they taken away by the remission of guilt, which is a work of God.

On the contrary, We read (Mark viii.) that the blind man whom Our Lord enlightened, was restored first of all to imperfect sight, wherefore he said (*verse 24*): *I see men, as it were trees, walking ;* and afterwards he was restored perfectly, so that he saw all things clearly. Now the enlightenment of the blind man signifies the delivery of the sinner. Therefore after the first remission of sin, whereby the sinner is restored to spiritual sight, there still remain in him some remnants of his past sin.

I answer that, Mortal sin, in so far as it turns inordinately to a mutable good, produces in the soul a certain disposition, or even a habit, if the acts be repeated frequently. Now it has been said above (A. 4) that the guilt of mortal sin is pardoned through grace removing the aversion of the mind from God. Nevertheless when that which is on the part of the aversion has been taken away by grace, that which is on the part of the inordinate turning to a mutable good can remain, since this may happen to be without the other, as stated above (A. 4). Consequently, there is no reason why, after the guilt has been forgiven, the dispositions caused by preceding acts should not remain, which are called the remnants of sin. Yet they remain weakened and diminished, so as not to domineer over man, and they

are after the manner of dispositions rather than of habits, like the *fomes* which remains after Baptism.

Reply Obj. 1. God heals the whole man perfectly; but sometimes suddenly, as Peter's mother-in-law was restored at once to perfect health, so that *rising she ministered to them* (Luke iv. 39), and sometimes by degrees, as we said above (Q. XLIV., A. 3, *ad 2*) about the blind man who was restored to sight (Matth. viii.). And so too, He sometimes turns the heart of man with such power, that it receives at once perfect spiritual health, not only the guilt being pardoned, but all remnants of sin being removed, as was the case with Magdalen (Luke vii.); whereas at other times He sometimes first pardons the guilt by operating grace, and afterwards, by co-operating grace, removes the remnants of sin by degrees.

Reply Obj. 2. Sin too, sometimes induces at once a weak disposition, such as is the result of one act, and sometimes a stronger disposition, the result of many acts.

Reply Obj. 3. One human act does not remove all the remnants of sin, because, as stated in the *Predicaments* (*Categor. viii.*), *a vicious man by doing good works will make but little progress so as to be any better, but if he continue in good practice, he will end in being good as to acquired virtue.* But God's grace does this much more effectively, whether by one or by several acts.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FORGIVENESS OF GUILT IS AN EFFECT OF
PENANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the forgiveness of guilt is not an effect of penance as a virtue. For penance is said to be a virtue, in so far as it is a principle of a human action. But human action does nothing towards the remission of guilt, since this is an effect of operating grace. Therefore the forgiveness of guilt is not an effect of penance as a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, certain other virtues are more excellent than penance. But the forgiveness of sin is not said to be the effect of any other virtue. Neither, therefore, is it the effect of penance as a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, there is no forgiveness of sin except through the power of Christ's Passion, according to Heb. ix. 22: *Without shedding of blood there is no remission.* Now Penance, as a sacrament, produces its effect through the power of Christ's Passion, even as the other sacraments do, as was shown above (Q. LXII., AA. 4, 5). Therefore the forgiveness of sin is the effect of Penance, not as a virtue, but as a sacrament.

On the contrary, Properly speaking, the cause of a thing is that without which it cannot be, since every defect depends on its cause. Now forgiveness of sin can come from God without the sacrament of Penance, but not without the virtue of penance, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV. A. 5, *ad* 3: Q. LXXXV., A. 2); so that, even before the sacraments of the New Law were instituted, God pardoned the sins of the penitent. Therefore the forgiveness of sin is chiefly the effect of penance as a virtue.

I answer that, Penance is a virtue in so far as it is a principle of certain human acts. Now the human acts, which are performed by the sinner, are the material element in the sacrament of Penance. Moreover every sacrament produces its effect, in virtue not only of its form, but also of its matter; because both these together make the one sacrament, as stated above (Q. LX., A. 6, *ad* 2, A. 7). Hence in Baptism forgiveness of sin is effected, in virtue not only of the form (but also of the matter, viz. water, albeit chiefly in virtue of the form)* from which the water receives its power--and, similarly, the forgiveness of sin is the effect of Penance, chiefly by the power of the keys, which is vested in the ministers, who furnish the formal part of the sacrament, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 3), and secondarily by the instrumentality of those acts of the penitent which pertain to the virtue of penance, but only in so far as such

* The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition.

acts are, in some way, subordinate to the keys of the Church. Accordingly it is evident that the forgiveness of sin is the effect of penance as a virtue, but still more of Penance as a sacrament.

Reply Obj. 1. The effect of operating grace is the justification of the ungodly (as stated in the Second Part, I.-II., Q. CXIII.), wherein there is, as was there stated (AA. 1, 2, 3), not only infusion of grace and forgiveness of sin, but also a movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and a movement of the free-will against sin, which is the act of penance. Yet these human acts are there as the effects of operating grace, and are produced at the same time as the forgiveness of sin. Consequently the forgiveness of sin does not take place without an act of the virtue of penance, although it is the effect of operating grace.

Reply Obj. 2. In the justification of the ungodly there is not only an act of penance, but also an act of faith, as stated above (*ad 1*: I.-II., Q. CXIII., A. 4). Wherefore the forgiveness of sin is accounted the effect not only of the virtue of penance, but also, and that chiefly, of faith and charity.

Reply Obj. 3. The act of the virtue of penance is subordinate to Christ's Passion both by faith, and by its relation to the keys of the Church; and so, in both ways, it causes the forgiveness of sin, by the power of Christ's Passion.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that the act of the virtue of penance is necessary for the forgiveness of sin, through being an inseparable effect of grace, whereby chiefly is sin pardoned, and which produces its effect in all the sacraments. Consequently it only follows that grace is a higher cause of the forgiveness of sin than the sacrament of Penance. Moreover, it must be observed that, under the Old Law and the law of nature, there was a sacrament of Penance after a fashion, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7, *ad 2*).

QUESTION LXXXVII.

OF THE REMISSION OF VENIAL SIN.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the forgiveness of venial sins, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether venial sin can be forgiven without Penance? (2) Whether it can be forgiven without the infusion of grace? (3) Whether venial sins are forgiven by the sprinkling of holy water, a bishop's blessing, the beating of the breast, the Lord's Prayer, and the like? (4) Whether a venial sin can be taken away without a mortal sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE FORGIVEN WITHOUT PENANCE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that venial sin can be forgiven without penance. For, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 10, *ad* 4), it is essential to true penance that man should not only sorrow for his past sins, but also that he should purpose to avoid them for the future. Now venial sins are forgiven without any such purpose, for it is certain that man cannot lead the present life without committing venial sins. Therefore venial sins can be forgiven without penance.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no penance without actual displeasure at one's sins. But venial sins can be taken away without any actual displeasure at them, as would be the case if a man were to be killed in his sleep, for Christ's

sake, since he would go to heaven at once, which would not happen if his venial sins remained. Therefore venial sins can be forgiven without penance.

Obj. 3. Further, venial sins are contrary to the fervour of charity, as stated in the Second Part (II.-II., Q. XXIV., A. 10). Now one contrary is removed by another. Therefore forgiveness of venial sins is caused by the fervour of charity, which may be without actual displeasure at venial sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says in *De Pœnitentia*,* that there is a penance which is done for venial sins in the Church every day, which would be useless if venial sins could be forgiven without Penance.

I answer that, Forgiveness of sin, as stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 2), is effected by man being united to God from Whom sin separates him in some way. Now this separation is made complete by mortal sin, and incomplete by venial sin: because, by mortal sin, the mind through acting against charity is altogether turned away from God; whereas by venial sin man's affections are clogged, so that they are slow in tending towards God. Consequently both kinds of sin are taken away by penance, because by both of them man's will is disordered through turning inordinately to a created good; for just as mortal sin cannot be forgiven so long as the will is attached to sin, so neither can venial sin, because while the cause remains, the effect remains.

Yet a more perfect penance is requisite for the forgiveness of mortal sin, namely that man should detest actually the mortal sin which he committed, so far as lies in his power, that is to say, he should endeavour to remember each single mortal sin, in order to detest each one. But this is not required for the forgiveness of venial sins; although it does not suffice to have habitual displeasure, which is included in the habit of charity or of penance as a virtue, since then venial sin would be incompatible with charity, which is evidently untrue. Consequently it is necessary to

* *De vera et falsa Pœnitentia*, the authorship of which is unknown.

have a certain virtual displeasure, so that, for instance, a man's affections so tend to God and Divine things, that whatever might happen to him to hamper that tendency would be displeasing to him, and would grieve him, were he to commit it, even though he were not to think of it actually: and this is not sufficient for the remission of mortal sin, except as regards those sins which he fails to remember after a careful examination.

Reply Obj. 1. When man is in a state of grace, he can avoid all mortal sins, and each single one; and he can avoid each single venial sin, but not all, as was explained in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. LXXIV., A. 3, *ad 2*: Q. CIX., A. 8). Consequently penance for mortal sins requires man to purpose abstaining from mortal sins, all and each; whereas penance for venial sins requires man to purpose abstaining from each, but not from all, because the weakness of this life does not allow of this. Nevertheless he needs to have the purpose of taking steps to commit fewer venial sins, else he would be in danger of falling back, if he gave up the desire of going forward, or of removing the obstacles to spiritual progress, such as venial sins are.

Reply Obj. 2. Death for Christ's sake, as stated above (Q. LXVI., A. 11), obtains the power of Baptism, wherefore it washes away all sin, both venial and mortal, unless it find the will attached to sin.

Reply Obj. 3. The fervour of charity implies virtual displeasure at venial sins, as stated above (Q. LXXIX., A. 4).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER INFUSION OF GRACE IS NECESSARY FOR THE
REMISSION OF VENIAL SINS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of venial sins. Because an effect is not produced without its proper cause. Now the proper cause of the remission of sins is grace; for man's sins are not forgiven through his own merits; wherefore it is written (Eph.

ii. 4, 5): *God, Who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity, wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ, by Whose grace you are saved.* Therefore venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.

Obj. 2. Further, venial sins are not forgiven without Penance. Now grace is infused, in Penance as in the other sacraments of the New Law. Therefore venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.

Obj. 3. Further, venial sin produces a stain on the soul. Now a stain is not removed save by grace which is the spiritual beauty of the soul. Therefore it seems that venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.

On the contrary, The advent of venial sin neither destroys nor diminishes grace, as stated in the Second Part (II.-II., Q. XXIV., A. 10). Therefore, in like manner, an infusion of grace is not necessary in order to remove venial sin.

I answer that, Each thing is removed by its contrary. But venial sin is not contrary to habitual grace or charity, but hampers its act, through man being too much attached to a created good, albeit not in opposition to God, as stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. LXXXVIII., A. 1: II.-II., Q. XXIV., A. 10). Therefore, in order that venial sin be removed, it is not necessary that habitual grace be infused, but a movement of grace or charity suffices for its forgiveness.

Nevertheless, since in those who have the use of free-will (in whom alone can there be venial sins), there can be no infusion of grace without an actual movement of the free-will towards God and against sin, consequently whenever grace is infused anew, venial sins are forgiven.

Reply Obj. 1. Even the forgiveness of venial sins is an effect of grace, in virtue of the act which grace produces anew, but not through any habit infused anew into the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. Venial sin is never forgiven without some act, explicit or implicit, of the virtue of penance, as stated above (A. 1): it can, however, be forgiven without the sacrament of Penance, which is formally perfected by the priestly

absolution, as stated above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 2). Hence it does not follow that infusion of grace is required for the forgiveness of venial sin, for although this infusion takes place in every sacrament, it does not occur in every act of virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as there are two kinds of bodily stain, one consisting in the privation of something required for beauty, e.g. the right colour or the due proportion of members, and another by the introduction of some hindrance to beauty, e.g. mud or dust; so too, a stain is put on the soul, in one way, by the privation of the beauty of grace through mortal sin, in another, by the inordinate inclination of the affections to some temporal thing, and this is the result of venial sin. Consequently, an infusion of grace is necessary for the removal of mortal sin, but in order to remove venial sin, it is necessary to have a movement proceeding from grace, removing the inordinate attachment to the temporal thing.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER VENIAL SINS ARE REMOVED BY THE SPRINKLING OF HOLY WATER AND THE LIKE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that venial sins are not removed by the sprinkling of holy water, a bishop's blessing, and the like. For venial sins are not forgiven without Penance, as stated above (A. 1). But Penance suffices by itself for the remission of venial sins. Therefore the above have nothing to do with the remission of venial sins.

Obj. 2. Further, each of the above bears the same relation to one venial sin as to all. If therefore, by means of one of them, some venial sin is remitted, it follows that in like manner all are remitted, so that by beating his breast once, or by being sprinkled once with holy water, a man would be delivered from all his venial sins, which seems unreasonable.

Obj. 3. Further, venial sins occasion a debt of some punishment, albeit temporal; for it is written (1 Cor. iii, 12, 15) of him that builds up *wood, hay, stubble* that *he shall*

be saved, yet so as by fire. Now the above things whereby venial sins are said to be taken away, contain either no punishment at all, or very little. Therefore they do not suffice for the full remission of venial sins.

On the contrary, Augustine says in *De Pœnitentia* (cf. *Ep.* cclxv.) that *for our slight sins we strike our breasts, and say: Forgive us our trespasses,* and so it seems that striking one's breast, and the Lord's Prayer cause the remission of venial sins: and the same seems to apply to the other things.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), no infusion of fresh grace is required for the forgiveness of a venial sin, but it is enough to have an act proceeding from grace, in detestation of that venial sin, either explicit or at least implicit, as when one is moved fervently to God. Hence, for three reasons, certain things cause the remission of venial sins: first, because they imply the infusion of grace, since the infusion of grace removes venial sins, as stated above (A. 2); and so, by the Eucharist, Extreme Unction, and by all the sacraments of the New Law without exception, wherein grace is conferred, venial sins are remitted. Secondly, because they imply a movement of detestation for sin, and in this way the general confession,* the beating of one's breast, and the Lord's Prayer conduce to the remission of venial sins, for we ask in the Lord's Prayer: *Forgive us our trespasses.* Thirdly, because they include a movement of reverence for God and Divine things; and in this way a bishop's blessing, the sprinkling of holy water, any sacramental anointing, a prayer said in a dedicated church, and anything else of the kind, conduce to the remission of venial sins.

Reply Obj. 1. All these things cause the remission of venial sins, in so far as they incline the soul to the movement of penance, viz. the implicit or explicit detestation of one's sins.

Reply Obj. 2. All these things, so far as they are concerned, conduce to the remission of all venial sins: but the remission may be hindered as regards certain venial sins, to which

* i. e., the recital of the *Confiteor* or of an act of contrition.

the mind is still actually attached, even as insincerity sometimes impedes the effect of Baptism.

Reply Obj. 3. By the above things, venial sins are indeed taken away as regards the guilt, both because those things are a kind of satisfaction, and through the virtue of charity whose movement is aroused by such things. Yet it does not always happen that, by means of each one, the whole guilt of punishment is taken away, because, in that case, whoever was entirely free from mortal sin, would go straight to heaven if sprinkled with holy water: but the debt of punishment is remitted by means of the above, according to the movement of fervour towards God, which fervour is aroused by such things, sometimes more, sometimes less.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT MORTAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin. For, on John viii. 7: *He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her*, a gloss says that *all those men were in a state of mortal sin: for venial offences were forgiven them through the legal ceremonies.* Therefore venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, no infusion of grace is required for the remission of venial sin: but it is required for the forgiveness of mortal sin. Therefore venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, a venial sin differs from a mortal sin more than from another venial sin. But one venial sin can be pardoned without another, as stated above (A. 3, *ad 2*: Q. LXXXVII., A. 3). Therefore a venial sin can be taken away without a mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. v. 26): *Amen I say to thee, thou shalt not go out from thence, viz. from the prison, into which a man is cast for mortal sin, till thou repay the*

last farthing, by which venial sin is denoted. Therefore a venial sin is not forgiven without mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 3), there is no remission of any sin whatever except by the power of grace, because, as the Apostle declares (Rom. iv. 8), it is owing to God's grace that He does not impute sin to a man, which a gloss on that passage expounds as referring to venial sin. Now he that is in a state of mortal sin is without the grace of God. Therefore no venial sin is forgiven him.

Reply Obj. 1. Venial offences, in the passage quoted, denote the irregularities or uncleannesses which men contracted in accordance with the Law.

Reply Obj. 2. Although no new infusion of habitual grace is requisite for the remission of venial sin, yet it is necessary to exercise some act of grace, which cannot be in one who is a subject of mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Venial sin does not preclude every act of grace whereby all venial sins can be removed; whereas mortal sin excludes altogether the habit of grace, without which no sin, either mortal or venial, is remitted. Hence the comparison fails.

QUESTION LXXXVIII.

OF THE RETURN OF SINS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY BY PENANCE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the return of sins which have been taken away by Penance: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether sins which have been taken away by Penance return simply through a subsequent sin? (2) Whether more specially as regards certain sins they return, in a way, on account of ingratitude? (3) Whether the debt of punishment remains the same for sins thus returned? (4) Whether this ingratitude, on account of which sins return, is a special sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SINS ONCE FORGIVEN RETURN THROUGH A SUBSEQUENT SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin. For Augustine says (*De Bapt. contra Donat.*, i.): *Our Lord teaches most explicitly in the Gospel that sins which have been forgiven return, when fraternal charity ceases, in the example of the servant from whom his master exacted the payment of the debt already forgiven, because he had refused to forgive the debt of his fellow-servant.* Now fraternal charity is destroyed through each mortal sin. Therefore sins already taken away through Penance, return through each subsequent mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, on Luke xi. 24, *I will return into my*

house, whence I came out, Bede says: *This verse should make us tremble, we should not endeavour to explain it away lest through carelessness we give place to the sin which we thought to have been taken away, and become its slave once more.* Now this would not be so unless it returned. Therefore a sin returns after once being taken away by Penance.

Obj. 3. Further, the Lord said (Ezech. xviii. 24): *If the just man turn himself away from his justice, and do iniquity . . . all his justices which he hath done, shall not be remembered.* Now among the other justices which he had done, is also his previous penance, since it was said above (Q. LXXXV., A. 3) that penance is a part of justice. Therefore when one who has done penance, sins, his previous penance, whereby he received forgiveness of his sins, is not imputed to him. Therefore his sins return.

Obj. 4. Further, past sins are covered by grace, as the Apostle declares (Rom. iv. 7) where he quotes Ps. xxxi. 1: *Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered.* But a subsequent mortal sin takes away grace. Therefore the sins committed previously, become uncovered: and so, seemingly, they return.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. xi. 29): *The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance.* Now the penitent's sins are taken away by a gift of God. Therefore the sins which have been taken away do not return through a subsequent sin, as though God repented His gift of forgiveness.

Moreover, Augustine says (*Lib. Resp. Prosperi, i.*): *When he that turns away from Christ, comes to the end of this life a stranger to grace, whither does he go, except to perdition? Yet he does not fall back into that which had been forgiven, nor will he be condemned for original sin.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 4), mortal sin contains two things, aversion from God and adherence to a created good. Now, in mortal sin, whatever attaches to the aversion, is, considered in itself common to all mortal sins, since man turns away from God by every mortal sin, so that, in consequence, the stain resulting

from the privation of grace, and the debt of everlasting punishment are common to all mortal sins. This is what is meant by what is written (James ii. 10): *Whosoever . . . shall offend in one point, is become guilty of all.* On the other hand, as regards their adherence they are different from, and sometimes contrary to one another. Hence it is evident, that on the part of the adherence, a subsequent mortal sin does not cause the return of mortal sins previously done away, else it would follow that by a sin of wastefulness a man would be brought back to the habit or disposition of avarice previously dispelled, so that one contrary would be the cause of another, which is impossible. But if in mortal sins we consider that which attaches to the aversion absolutely, then a subsequent mortal sin (causes the return of that which was comprised in the mortal sins before they were pardoned, in so far as the subsequent mortal sin)* deprives man of grace, and makes him deserving of everlasting punishment, just as he was before. Nevertheless, since the aversion of mortal sin is (in a way, caused by the adherence, those things which attach to the aversion are)* diversified somewhat in relation to various adherences, as it were to various causes, so that there will be a different aversion, a different stain, a different debt of punishment, according to the different acts of mortal sin from which they arise; hence the question is moved whether the stain and the debt of eternal punishment, as caused by acts of sins previously pardoned, return through a subsequent mortal sin.

Accordingly some have maintained that they return simply even in this way. But this is impossible, because what God has done cannot be undone by the work of man. Now the pardon of the previous sins was a work of Divine mercy, so that it cannot be undone by man's subsequent sin, according to Rom. iii. 3: *Shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect?*

Wherefore others who maintained the possibility of sins returning, said that God pardons the sins of a penitent who

* The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition.

will afterwards sin again, not according to His foreknowledge, but only according to His present justice: since He foresees that He will punish such a man eternally for his sins, and yet, by His grace, He makes him righteous for the present. But this cannot stand: because if a cause be placed absolutely, its effect is placed absolutely; so that if the remission of sins were effected by grace and the sacraments of grace, not absolutely but under some condition dependent on some future event, it would follow that grace and the sacraments of grace are not the sufficient causes of the remission of sins, which is erroneous, as being derogatory to God's grace.

Consequently it is in no way possible for the stain of past sins and the debt of punishment incurred thereby, to return, as caused by those acts. Yet it may happen that a subsequent sinful act virtually contains the debt of punishment due to the previous sin, in so far as when a man sins a second time, for this very reason he seems to sin more grievously than before, as stated in Rom. ii. 5: *According to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath against the day of wrath*, from the mere fact, namely, that God's goodness, which waits for us to repent, is despised. And so much the more is God's goodness despised, if the first sin is committed a second time after having been forgiven, as it is a greater favour for the sin to be forgiven than for the sinner to be endured.

Accordingly the sin which follows repentance brings back, in a sense, the debt of punishment due to the sins previously forgiven, not as caused by those sins already forgiven, but as caused by this last sin being committed, on account of its being aggravated in view of those previous sins. This means that those sins return, not simply, but in a restricted sense, viz. in so far as they are virtually contained in the subsequent sin.

Reply Obj. 1. This saying of Augustine seems to refer to the return of sins as to the debt of eternal punishment considered in itself, namely, that he who sins after doing penance incurs a debt of eternal punishment, just as before, but not

altogether for the same reason. Wherefore Augustine, after saying (*Lib. Resp. Prosperi*, i.) that *he does not fall back into that which was forgiven, nor will he be condemned for original sin*, adds: *Nevertheless, for these last sins he will be condemned to the same death, which he deserved to suffer for the former*, because he incurs the punishment of eternal death which he deserved for his previous sins.

Reply Obj. 2. By these words Bede means that the guilt already forgiven enslaves man, not by the return of his former debt of punishment, but by the repetition of his act.

Reply Obj. 3. The effect of a subsequent sin is that the former *justices* are not remembered, in so far as they were deserving of eternal life, but not in so far as they were a hindrance to sin. Consequently if a man sins mortally after making restitution, he does not become guilty as though he had not paid back what he owed; and much less is penance previously done forgotten as to the pardon of the guilt, since this is the work of God rather than of man.

Reply Obj. 4. Grace removes the stain and the debt of eternal punishment simply; but it covers the past sinful acts, lest, on their account, God deprive man of grace, and judge him deserving of eternal punishment; and what grace has once done, endures for ever.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER SINS THAT HAVE BEEN FORGIVEN, RETURN THROUGH INGRATITUDE WHICH IS SHOWN ESPECIALLY IN FOUR KINDS OF SIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that sins do not return through ingratitude, which is shown especially in four kinds of sin, viz. hatred of one's neighbour, apostasy from faith, contempt of confession and regret for past repentance, and which have been expressed in the following verse:

*Brotherly hatred, apostasy from faith, scorn of confession,
Penance regretted, these cause previous sins to return.*

For the more grievous the sin committed against God after one has received the grace of pardon, the greater the ingratitude. But there are sins more grievous than these, such as blasphemy against God, and the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that sins already pardoned do not return through ingratitude as manifested in these sins, any more than as shown in other sins.

Obj. 2. Further, Rabanus says: *God delivered the wicked servant to the torturers, until he should pay the whole debt, because a man will be deemed punishable not only for the sins he commits after Baptism, but also for original sin which was taken away when he was baptized.* Now venial sins are reckoned among our debts, since we pray in their regard: *Forgive us our trespasses (debita).* Therefore they too return through ingratitude; and, in like manner seemingly, sins already pardoned return through venial sins, and not only through those sins mentioned above.

Obj. 3. Further, ingratitude is all the greater, according as one sins after receiving a greater favour. Now innocence whereby one avoids sin is a Divine favour, for Augustine says (*Conf. ii.*): *Whatever sins I have avoided committing, I owe it to Thy grace.* Now innocence is a greater gift, than even the forgiveness of all sins. Therefore the first sin committed after innocence is no less an ingratitude to God, than a sin committed after repentance, so that seemingly ingratitude in respect of the aforesaid sins is not the chief cause of sins returning.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral. xviii.*): *It is evident from the words of the Gospel that if we do not forgive from our hearts the offences committed against us, we become once more accountable for what we rejoiced in as forgiven through Penance:* so that ingratitude implied in the hatred of one's brother is a special cause of the return of sins already forgiven: and the same seems to apply to the others.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), sins pardoned through Penance are said to return, in so far as their debt of punishment, by reason of ingratitude, is virtually contained in the subsequent sin. Now one may be guilty of ingratitude in

two ways: first by doing something against the favour received, and, in this way, man is ungrateful to God in every mortal sin whereby he offends God Who forgave his sins, so that by every subsequent mortal sin, the sins previously pardoned return, on account of the ingratitude. Secondly, one is guilty of ingratitude, by doing something not only against the favour itself, but also against the form of the favour received. If this form be considered on the part of the benefactor, it is the remission of something due to him, wherefore he who does not forgive his brother when he asks pardon, and persists in his hatred, acts against this form. If, however, this form be taken in regard to the penitent who receives this favour, we find on his part a twofold movement of the free-will. The first is the movement of the free-will towards God, and is an act of faith quickened by charity; and against this man acts by apostatizing from the faith. The second is a movement of the free-will against sin, and is the act of penance. This act consists first, as we have stated above (Q. LXXXV., AA. 2, 5) in man's detestation of his past sins; and against this a man acts when he regrets having done penance. Secondly, the act of penance consists in the penitent purposing to subject himself to the keys of the Church by confession, according to Ps. xxxi. 5: *I said : I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord : and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin :* and against this a man acts when he scorns to confess as he had purposed to do.

Accordingly it is said that the ingratitude of sinners is a special cause of the return of sins previously forgiven.

Reply Obj. 1. This is not said of these sins as though they were more grievous than others, but because they are more directly opposed to the favour of the forgiveness of sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Even venial sins and original sin return in the way explained above, just as mortal sins do, in so far as the favour conferred by God in forgiving those sins is despised. A man does not, however, incur ingratitude by committing a venial sin, because by sinning venially man does not act against God, but apart from Him, where-

fore venial sins nowise cause the return of sins already forgiven.

Reply Obj. 3. A favour can be weighed in two ways. First by the quantity of the favour itself, and in this way innocence is a greater favour from God than penance, which is called the second plank after shipwreck (cf. Q. LXXXIV. A. 6). Secondly, a favour may be weighed with regard to the recipient, who is less worthy, wherefore a greater favour is bestowed on him, so that he is the more ungrateful if he scorns it. In this way the favour of the pardon of sins is greater when bestowed on one who is altogether unworthy, so that the ingratitude which follows is all the greater.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT THAT ARISES THROUGH INGRATITUDE IN RESPECT OF A SUBSEQUENT SIN IS AS GREAT AS THAT OF THE SINS PREVIOUSLY PARDONED ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the debt of punishment arising through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as that of the sins previously pardoned. Because the greatness of the favour of the pardon of sins is according to the greatness of the sin pardoned, and so too, in consequence, is the greatness of the ingratitude whereby this favour is scorned. But the greatness of the consequent debt of punishment is in accord with the greatness of the ingratitude. Therefore the debt of punishment arising through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as the debt of punishment due for all the previous sins.

Obj. 2. Further, it is a greater sin to offend God than to offend man. But a slave who is freed by his master returns to the same state of slavery from which he was freed, or even to a worse state. Much more therefore he that sins against God after being freed from sin, returns to the debt of as great a punishment as he had incurred before.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Matth. xviii. 34) that *his lord being angry, delivered him* (whose sins returned to him

on account of his ingratitude) *to the torturers, until he paid all the debt.* But this would not be so unless the debt of punishment incurred through ingratitude were as great as that incurred through all previous sins. Therefore an equal debt of punishment returns through ingratitude.

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. xxv. 2): *According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be,* whence it is evident that a great debt of punishment does not arise from a slight sin. But sometimes a subsequent mortal sin is much less grievous than any one of those previously pardoned. Therefore the debt of punishment incurred through subsequent sins is not equal to that of sins previously forgiven.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the debt of punishment incurred through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is equal to that of the sins previously pardoned, in addition to the debt proper to this subsequent sin. But there is no need for this, because, as stated above (A. 1), the debt of punishment incurred by previous sins does not return on account of a subsequent sin, as resulting from the acts of the previous sins, but as resulting from the act of the subsequent sin. Wherefore the amount of the debt that returns must be according to the gravity of the subsequent sin.

It is possible, however, for the gravity of the subsequent sin to equal the gravity of all previous sins. But it need not always be so, whether we speak of the gravity which a sin has from its species (since the subsequent sin may be one of simple fornication, while the previous sins were adulteries, murders, or sacrileges); or of the gravity which it incurs through the ingratitude connected with it. For it is not necessary that the measure of ingratitude should be exactly equal to the measure of the favour received, which latter is measured according to the greatness of the sins previously pardoned. Because it may happen that in respect of the same favour, one man is very ungrateful, either on account of the intensity of his scorn for the favour received, or on account of the gravity of the offence com-

mitted against the benefactor, while another man is slightly ungrateful, either because his scorn is less intense, or because his offence against the benefactor is less grave. But the measure of ingratitude is proportionately equal to the measure of the favour received: for supposing an equal contempt of the favour, or an equal offence against the benefactor, the ingratitude will be so much the greater, as the favour received is greater.

Hence it is evident that the debt of punishment incurred by a subsequent sin need not always be equal to that of previous sins; but it must be in proportion thereto, so that the more numerous or the greater the sins previously pardoned, the greater must be the debt of punishment incurred by any subsequent mortal sin whatever.

Reply Obj. 1. The favour of the pardon of sins takes its absolute quantity from the quantity of the sins previously pardoned: but the sin of ingratitude does not take its absolute quantity from the measure of the favour bestowed, but from the measure of the contempt or of the offence, as stated above: and so the objection does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2. A slave who has been given his freedom is not brought back to his previous state of slavery for any kind of ingratitude, but only when this is grave.

Reply Obj. 3. He whose forgiven sins return to him on account of subsequent ingratitude, incurs the debt for all, in so far as the measure of his previous sins is contained proportionally in his subsequent ingratitude, but not absolutely, as stated above.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INGRATITUDE WHEREBY A SUBSEQUENT SIN CAUSES THE RETURN OF PREVIOUS SINS, IS A SPECIAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the ingratitude, whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of sins previously forgiven, is a special sin. For the giving of thanks belongs to counter-

passion which is a necessary condition of justice, as the Philosopher shows (*Ethic.* v.). But justice is a special virtue. Therefore this ingratitude is a special sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Tully says (*De Inv. Rhetor.* ii.) that thanksgiving is a special virtue. But ingratitude is opposed to thanksgiving. Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.

Obj. 3. Further, a special effect proceeds from a special cause. Now ingratitude has a special effect, viz. the return, after a fashion, of sins already forgiven. Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.

On the contrary, That which is a sequel to every sin is not a special sin. Now by any mortal sin whatever, a man becomes ungrateful to God, as evidenced from what has been said (A. 1). Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

I answer that, The ingratitude of the sinner is sometimes a special sin; and sometimes it is not, but a circumstance arising from all mortal sins in common committed against God. For a sin takes its species according to the sinner's intention, wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* v.) that *he who commits adultery in order to steal is a thief rather than an adulterer.*

If, therefore, a sinner commits a sin in contempt of God and of the favour received from Him, that sin is drawn to the species of ingratitude, and in this way a sinner's ingratitude is a special sin. If, however, a man, while intending to commit a sin, e.g. murder or adultery, is not withheld from it on account of its implying contempt of God, his ingratitude will not be a special sin, but will be drawn to the species of the other sin, as a circumstance thereof. And, as Augustine observes (*De Nat. et Grat.* xxix.), not every sin is committed through contempt, although every sin implies contempt of God in His commandments. Therefore it is evident that the sinner's ingratitude is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first (three) objections prove that ingratitude is in itself a special sin; while the last objection proves that ingratitude, as included in every sin, is not a special sin.

QUESTION LXXXIX.

OF THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE BY MEANS OF PENANCE.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider the recovery of virtues by means of Penance, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether virtues are restored through Penance? (2) Whether they are restored in equal measure? (3) Whether equal dignity is restored to the penitent? (4) Whether works of virtue are deadened by subsequent sin? (5) Whether works deadened by sin revive through Penance? (6) Whether dead works, i.e. works that are done without charity, are quickened by Penance?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE VIRTUES ARE RESTORED THROUGH PENANCE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the virtues are not restored through penance. Because lost virtue cannot be restored by penance, unless penance be the cause of virtue. But, since penance is itself a virtue, it cannot be the cause of all the virtues, and all the more, since some virtues naturally precede penance, viz. faith, hope, and charity, as stated above (Q. LXXXV., A. 6). Therefore the virtues are not restored through penance.

Obj. 2. Further, Penance consists in certain acts of the penitent. But the gratuitous virtues are not caused through any act of ours: for Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* ii.: *In Ps.* cxviii.) that *God forms the virtues in us without us.*

Therefore it seems that the virtues are not restored through Penance.

Obj. 3. Further, he that has virtue performs works of virtue with ease and pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic. i.*) that *a man is not just if he does not rejoice in just deeds*. Now many penitents find difficulty in performing deeds of virtue. Therefore the virtues are not restored through Penance.

On the contrary, We read (Luke xv. 22) that the father commanded his penitent son to be clothed in *the first robe*, which, according to Ambrose (*Expos. in Luc., vii.*), is the *mantle of wisdom*, from which all the virtues flow together, according to Wis. viii. 7: *She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life*. Therefore all the virtues are restored through Penance.

I answer that, Sins are pardoned through Penance, as stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 1). But there can be no remission of sins except through the infusion of grace. Wherefore it follows that grace is infused into man through Penance. Now all the gratuitous virtues flow from grace, even as all the powers result from the essence of the soul, as stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. CX., A. 4, *ad 1*). Therefore all the virtues are restored through Penance.

Reply Obj. 1. Penance restores the virtues in the same way as it causes grace, as stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 1). Now it is a cause of grace, in so far as it is a sacrament, because, in so far as it is a virtue, it is rather an effect of grace. Consequently it does not follow that penance, as a virtue, needs to be the cause of all the other virtues, but that the habit of penance together with the habits of the other virtues is caused through the sacrament of Penance.

Reply Obj. 2. In the sacrament of Penance human acts stand as matter, while the formal power of this sacrament is derived from the power of the keys. Consequently the power of the keys causes grace and virtue effectively indeed, but instrumentally; and the first act of the penitent, viz. contrition, stands as ultimate disposition to the reception of

grace, while the subsequent acts of Penance proceed from the grace and virtues which are already there.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 5), sometimes after the first act of Penance, which is contrition, certain remnants of sin remain, viz. dispositions caused by previous acts, the result being that the penitent finds difficulty in doing deeds of virtue. Nevertheless, so far as the inclination itself of charity and of the other virtues is concerned, the penitent performs works of virtue with pleasure and ease; even as a virtuous man may accidentally find it hard to do an act of virtue, on account of sleepiness or some indisposition of the body.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER, AFTER PENANCE, MAN RISES AGAIN TO EQUAL VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that, after Penance, man rises again to equal virtue. For the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 28): *To them that love God all things work together unto good*, whereupon a gloss of Augustine says that *this is so true that, if any such man goes astray and wanders from the path, God makes even this conduce to his good*. But this would not be true if he rose again to lesser virtue. Therefore it seems that a penitent never rises again to lesser virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says* that *Penance is a very good thing, for it restores every defect to a state of perfection*. But this would not be true unless virtues were recovered in equal measure. Therefore equal virtue is always recovered through Penance.

Obj. 3. Further, on Gen. i. 5: *There was evening and morning, one day*, a gloss says: *The evening light is that from which we fall, the morning light is that to which we rise again*. Now the morning light is greater than the evening light. Therefore a man rises to greater grace or charity than that

* Cf. *Hypognosticon* iii., an anonymous work falsely ascribed to S. Augustine.

which he had before; which is confirmed by the Apostle's words (Rom. v. 20): *Where sin abounded, grace did more abound.*

On the contrary, Charity whether proficient or perfect is greater than incipient charity. But sometimes a man falls from proficient charity, and rises again to incipient charity. Therefore man always rises again to less virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 6, *ad* 3; Q. LXXXIX., A. 1, *ad* 2), the movement of the free-will, in the justification of the ungodly, is the ultimate disposition to grace; so that in the same instant there is infusion of grace together with the aforesaid movement of the free-will, as stated in the Second Part (I-II., Q. CXIII., AA. 5, 7), which movement includes an act of penance, as stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 2). But it is evident that forms which admit of being more or less, become intense or remiss, according to the different dispositions of the subject, as stated in the Second Part (Q. LII., AA. 1, 2; Q. LXVI., A. 1). Hence it is that, in Penance, according to the degree of intensity or remissness in the movement of the free-will, the penitent receives greater or lesser grace. Now the intensity of the penitent's movement may be proportionate sometimes to a greater grace than that from which man fell by sinning, sometimes to an equal grace, sometimes to a lesser. Wherefore the penitent sometimes arises to a greater grace than that which he had before, sometimes to an equal, sometimes to a lesser grace: and the same applies to the virtues, which flow from grace.

Reply Obj. 1. The very fact of falling away from the love of God by sin, does not work unto the good of all those who love God, which is evident in the case of those who fall and never rise again, or who rise and fall yet again; but only to the good of *such as according to His purpose are called to be saints*, viz. the predestined, who, however often they may fall, yet rise again finally. Consequently good comes of their falling, not that they always rise again to greater grace, but that they rise to more abiding grace, not indeed on the part of grace itself, because the greater the grace, the

more abiding it is, but on the part of man, who the more careful and humble he is, the more steadfastly does he abide in grace. Hence the same gloss adds that *their fall conduces to their good, because they rise more humble and more enlightened.*

Reply Obj. 2. Penance, considered in itself, has the power to bring all defects back to perfection, and even to advance man to a higher state; but this is sometimes hindered on the part of man, whose movement towards God and in detestation of sin is too remiss, just as in Baptism adults receive a greater or a lesser grace, according to the various ways in which they prepare themselves.

Reply Obj. 3. This comparison of the two graces to the evening and morning light is made on account of a likeness of order, since the darkness of night follows after the evening light, and the light of day after the light of morning, but not on account of a likeness of greater or lesser quantity.—Again, this saying of the Apostle refers to the grace of Christ, which abounds more than any number of man's sins. Nor is it true of all, that the more their sins abound, the more abundant grace they receive, if we measure habitual grace by the quantity. Grace is, however, more abundant, as regards the very notion of grace, because to him who sins more a more *gratuitous* favour is vouchsafed by his pardon; although sometimes those whose sins abound, abound also in sorrow, so that they receive a more abundant habit of grace and virtue, as was the case with Magdalen.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense it must be replied that in one and the same man proficient grace is greater than incipient grace, but this is not necessarily the case in different men, for one begins with a greater grace than another has in the state of proficiency: thus Gregory says (*Dial. ii.*): *Let all, both now and hereafter, acknowledge how perfectly the boy Benedict turned to the life of grace from the very beginning.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER, BY PENANCE, MAN IS RESTORED TO HIS FORMER DIGNITY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that man is not restored by Penance to his former dignity: because a gloss on Amos v. 2, *The virgin of Israel is cast down*, observes: *It is not said that she cannot rise up, but that the virgin of Israel shall not rise; because the sheep that has once strayed, although the shepherd bring it back on his shoulder, has not the same glory as if it had never strayed.* Therefore man does not, through Penance, recover his former dignity.

Obj. 2. Further, Jerome says: *Whoever fail to preserve the dignity of the sacred order, must be content with saving their souls; for it is a difficult thing to return to their former degree.* Again, Pope Innocent I. says (*Ep. vi. ad Agapit.*) that the canons framed at the council of Nicea exclude penitents from even the lowest orders of clerics. Therefore man does not, through Penance, recover his former dignity.

Obj. 3. Further, before sinning a man can advance to a higher sacred order. But this is not permitted to a penitent after his sin, for it is written (*Ezech. xlv. 10, 13*): *The Levites that went away . . . from Me . . . shall never (Vulg., not) come near to Me, to do the office of priest: and as laid down in the Decretals (Dist. 1., ch. 52), and taken from the council of Lerida: If those who serve at the Holy Altar fall suddenly into some deplorable weakness of the flesh, and by God's mercy do proper penance, let them return to their duties, yet so as not to receive further promotion.* Therefore Penance does not restore man to his former dignity.

On the contrary, As we read in the same *Distinction*, Gregory writing to Secundinus says: *We consider that when a man has made proper satisfaction, he may return to his honourable position: and moreover we read in the acts of the council of Agde: Contumacious clerics, so far as their position allows should be corrected by their bishops; so that when*

Penance has reformed them, they may recover their degree and dignity.

*I answer that, By sin, man loses a twofold dignity, one in respect of God, the other in respect of the Church. In respect of God he again loses a twofold dignity. One is his principal dignity, whereby he was counted among the children of God, and this he recovers by Penance, which is signified (Luke xv.) in the prodigal son, for when he repented, his father commanded that the first garment should be restored to him, together with a ring and shoes. The other is his secondary dignity, viz. innocence, of which, as we read in the same chapter, the elder son boasted saying (verse 29): *Behold, for so many years do I serve thee, and I have never transgressed thy commandments*: and this dignity the penitent cannot recover. Nevertheless he recovers something greater sometimes; because as Gregory says (*Hom. de centum Ovibus*) *those who acknowledge themselves to have strayed away from God, make up for their past losses, by subsequent gains: so that there is more joy in heaven on their account, even as in battle, the commanding officer thinks more of the soldier who, after running away, returns and bravely attacks the foe, than of one who has never turned his back, but has done nothing brave.**

By sin man loses his ecclesiastical dignity, because thereby he becomes unworthy of those things which appertain to the exercise of the ecclesiastical dignity. This he is debarred from recovering: first, because he fails to repent; wherefore Isidore wrote to the bishop Masso, and as we read in the *Distinction* quoted above (*Obj. 3*): *The canons order those to be restored to their former degree, who by repentance have made satisfaction for their sins, or have made worthy confession of them. On the other hand, those who do not mend their corrupt and wicked ways are neither allowed to exercise their order, nor received to the grace of communion.*

Secondly, because he does penance negligently, wherefore it is written in the same *Distinction*: *We can be sure that those who show no signs of humble compunction, or of earnest prayer, who avoid fasting or study, would exercise their*

former duties with great negligence if they were restored to them.

Thirdly, if he has committed a sin to which an irregularity is attached; wherefore it is said in the same *Distinction*, quoting the council of Pope Martin: *If a man marry a widow or the relict of another, he must not be admitted to the ranks of the clergy: and if he has succeeded in creeping in, he must be turned out. In like manner, if anyone after Baptism be guilty of homicide, whether by deed, or by command, or by counsel, or in self-defence. But this is in consequence not of sin, but of irregularity.*

Fourthly, on account of scandal, wherefore it is said in the same *Distinction*: *Those who have been publicly convicted or caught in the act of perjury, robbery, fornication, and of suchlike crimes, according to the prescription of the sacred canons must be deprived of the exercise of their respective orders, because it is a scandal to God's people that such persons should be placed over them. But those who commit such sins occultly and confess them secretly to a priest, may be retained in the exercise of their respective orders, with the assurance of God's merciful forgiveness, provided they be careful to expiate their sins by fasts and alms, vigils and holy deeds. The same is expressed (Extra, De Qual. Ordinand.): If the aforesaid crimes are not proved by a judicial process, or in some other way made notorious, those who are guilty of them must not be hindered, after they have done penance, from exercising the orders they have received, or from receiving further orders, except in cases of homicide.*

Reply Obj. 1. The same is to be said of the recovery of virginity as of the recovery of innocence which belongs to man's secondary dignity in the sight of God.

Reply Obj. 2. In these words Jerome does not say that it is impossible, but that it is difficult, for man to recover his former dignity after having sinned, because this is allowed to none but those who repent perfectly, as stated above. To those canonical statutes, which seem to forbid this, Augustine replies in his letter to Boniface (*Ep. clxxxv.*): *If the law of the Church forbids anyone, after doing penance*

for a crime, to become a cleric, or to return to his clerical duties, or to retain them, the intention was not to deprive him of the hope of pardon, but to preserve the rigour of discipline ; else we should have to deny the keys given to the Church, of which it was said : ' Whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.' And further on he adds: For holy David did penance for his deadly crimes, and yet he retained his dignity ; and Blessed Peter by shedding most bitter tears did indeed repent him of having denied his Lord, and yet he remained an apostle. Nevertheless we must not deem the care of later teachers excessive, who without endangering a man's salvation, exacted more from his humility, having, in my opinion, found by experience, that some assumed a pretended repentance through hankering after honours and power.

Reply Obj. 3. This statute is to be understood as applying to those who do public penance, for these cannot be promoted to a higher order. For Peter, after his denial, was made shepherd of Christ's sheep, as appears from John xxi., where Chrysostom comments as follows: After his denial and repentance Peter gives proof of greater confidence in Christ : for whereas, at the supper, he durst not ask Him, but deputed John to ask in his stead, afterwards he was placed at the head of his brethren, and not only did not depute another to ask for him, what concerned him, but henceforth asks the Master instead of John.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER VIRTUOUS DEEDS DONE IN CHARITY CAN BE DEADENED ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that virtuous deeds done in charity cannot be deadened. For that which is not cannot be changed. But to be deadened is to be changed from life to death. Since therefore virtuous deeds, after being done are no more, it seems that they cannot afterwards be deadened.

Obj. 2. Further, by virtuous deeds done in charity, man

merits eternal life. But to take away the reward from one who has merited it is an injustice, which cannot be ascribed to God. Therefore it is not possible for virtuous deeds done in charity to be deadened by a subsequent sin.

Obj. 3. Further, the strong is not corrupted by the weak. Now works of charity are stronger than any sins, because, as it is written (Prov. x. 12), *charity covereth all sins*. Therefore it seems that deeds done in charity cannot be deadened by a subsequent mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. xviii. 24): *If the just man turn himself away from his justice . . . all his justices which he hath done shall not be remembered.*

I answer that, A living thing, by dying, ceases to have vital operations: for which reason, by a kind of metaphor, a thing is said to be deadened when it is hindered from producing its proper effect or operation.

Now the effect of virtuous works, which are done in charity, is to bring man to eternal life; and this is hindered by a subsequent mortal sin, inasmuch as it takes away grace. Wherefore deeds done in charity are said to be deadened by a subsequent mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as sinful deeds pass as to the act but remain as to guilt, so deeds done in charity, after passing, as to the act, remain as to merit, in so far as they are acceptable to God. It is in this respect that they are deadened, inasmuch as man is hindered from receiving his reward.

Reply Obj. 2. There is no injustice in withdrawing the reward from him who has deserved it, if he has made himself unworthy by his subsequent fault, since at times a man justly forfeits through his own fault, even that which he has already received.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not on account of the strength of sinful deeds that deeds, previously done in charity, are deadened, but on account of the freedom of the will which can be turned away from good to evil.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER DEEDS DEADENED BY SIN, ARE REVIVED BY
PENANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that deeds deadened by sin are not revived by Penance. Because just as past sins are remitted by subsequent Penance, so are deeds previously done in charity, deadened by subsequent sin. But sins remitted by Penance do not return, as stated above (Q. LXXXVIII., AA. 1, 2). Therefore it seems that neither are dead deeds revived by charity.

Obj. 2. Further, deeds are said to be deadened by comparison with animals who die, as stated above (A. 4). But a dead animal cannot be revived. Therefore neither can dead works be revived by Penance.

Obj. 3. Further, deeds done in charity are deserving of glory according to the quantity of grace or charity. But sometimes man arises through Penance to lesser grace or charity. Therefore he does not receive glory according to the merit of his previous works; so that it seems that deeds deadened by sin are not revived.

On the contrary, On Joel ii. 25, *I will restore to you the years, which the locust . . . hath eaten*, a gloss says: *I will not suffer to perish the fruit which you lost when your soul was disturbed.* But this fruit is the merit of good works which was lost through sin. Therefore meritorious deeds done before are revived by Penance.

I answer that, Some have said that meritorious works deadened by subsequent sin are not revived by the ensuing Penance, because they deemed such works to have passed away, so that they could not be revived. But that is no reason why they should not be revived: because they are conducive to eternal life (wherein their life consists) not only as actually existing, but also after they cease to exist actually, and as abiding in the Divine acceptance. Now, they abide thus, so far as they are concerned, even after

they have been deadened by sin, because those works, according as they were done, will ever be acceptable to God and give joy to the saints, according to Apoc. iii. 11: *Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown.* That they fail in their efficacy to bring the man, who did them, to eternal life, is due to the impediment of the supervening sin whereby he is become unworthy of eternal life. But this impediment is removed by Penance, inasmuch as sins are taken away thereby. Hence it follows that deeds previously deadened, recover, through Penance, their efficacy in bringing him, who did them, to eternal life, and, in other words, they are revived. It is therefore evident that deadened works are revived by Penance.

Reply Obj. 1. The very works themselves of sin are removed by Penance, so that, by God's mercy, no further stain or debt of punishment is incurred on their account: on the other hand, works done in charity are not removed by God, since they abide in His acceptance, but they are hindered on the part of man who does them; wherefore if this hindrance, on the part of the man who does those works, be removed, God on His side fulfils what those works deserved.

Reply Obj. 2. Deeds done in charity are not in themselves deadened, as explained above, but only with regard to a supervening impediment on the part of the man who does them. On the other hand, an animal dies in itself, through being deprived of the principle of life: so that the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. He who, through Penance, arises to lesser charity, will receive the essential reward according to the degree of charity in which he is found. Yet he will have greater joy for the works he had done in his former charity, than for those which he did in his subsequent charity: and this joy belongs to the accidental reward.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT PENANCE IS TO
QUICKEN EVEN DEAD WORKS ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the effect of subsequent Penance is to quicken even dead works, those, namely, that were not done in charity. For it seems more difficult to bring to life that which has been deadened, since this is never done naturally, than to quicken that which never had life, since certain living things are engendered naturally from things without life. Now deadened works are revived by Penance, as stated above (A. 5). Much more, therefore, are dead works revived.

Obj. 2. Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. But the cause of the lack of life in works generically good done without charity, was the lack of charity and grace; which lack is removed by Penance. Therefore dead works are quickened by charity.

Obj. 3. Further, Jerome in commenting on Agg. i. 6: *You have sowed much*, says: *If at any time you find a sinner, among his many evil deeds, doing that which is right, God is not so unjust as to forget the few good deeds on account of his many evil deeds.* Now this seems to be the case chiefly when past evil *deeds* are removed by Penance. Therefore it seems that through Penance, God rewards the former deeds done in the state of sin, which implies that they are quickened.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. xiii. 3): *If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.* But this would not be true, if, at least by subsequent Penance, they were quickened. Therefore Penance does not quicken works which before were dead.

I answer that, A work is said to be dead in two ways: first, effectively, because, to wit, it is a cause of death, in which sense sinful works are said to be dead, according to

Heb. ix. 14: *The blood of Christ . . . shall cleanse our conscience from dead works.* These dead works are not quickened but removed by Penance, according to Heb. vi. 1: *Not laying again the foundation of Penance from dead works.* Secondly, works are said to be dead privatively, because, to wit, they lack spiritual life, which is founded on charity, whereby the soul is united to God, the result being that it is quickened as the body by the soul: in which sense too, faith, if it lack charity, is said to be dead, according to James ii. 20: *Faith without works is dead.* In this way also, all works that are generically good, are said to be dead, if they be done without charity, inasmuch as they fail to proceed from the principle of life; even as we might call the sound of a harp, a dead voice. Accordingly, the difference of life and death in works is in relation to the principle from which they proceed. But works cannot proceed a second time from a principle, because they are transitory, and the same identical deed cannot be resumed. Therefore it is impossible for dead works to be quickened by Penance.

Reply Obj. 1. In the physical order things whether dead or deadened lack the principle of life. But works are said to be deadened, not in relation to the principle whence they proceeded, but in relation to an extrinsic impediment; while they are said to be dead in relation to a principle. Consequently there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 2. Works generically good done without charity are said to be dead on account of the lack of grace and charity, as principles. Now the subsequent Penance does not supply that want, so as to make them proceed from such a principle. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 3. God remembers the good deeds a man does when in a state of sin, not by rewarding them in eternal life, which is due only to living works, i.e. those done from charity, but by a temporal reward: thus Gregory declares (*Hom. de Divite et Lazaro*) that *unless that rich man had done some good deed, and had received his reward in this world, Abraham would certainly not have said to him: 'Thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.'*—Or again, this may

mean that he will be judged less severely: wherefore Augustine says (*De Patientia* xxvi.): *We cannot say that it would be better for the schismatic that by denying Christ he should suffer none of those things which he suffered by confessing Him; but we must believe that he will be judged with less severity, than if by denying Christ, he had suffered none of those things. Thus the words of the Apostle, 'If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing,' refer to the obtaining of the kingdom of heaven, and do not exclude the possibility of being sentenced with less severity at the last judgment.*

QUESTION XC.

OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN GENERAL.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the parts of Penance: (1) in general; (2) each one in particular.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Penance has any parts? (2) Of the number of its parts. (3) What kind of parts are they? (4) Of its division into subjective parts.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE SHOULD BE ASSIGNED ANY PARTS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that parts should not be assigned to Penance. For it is the Divine power that works our salvation most secretly in the sacraments. Now the Divine power is one and simple. Therefore Penance, being a sacrament, should have no parts assigned to it.

Obj. 2. Further, Penance is both a virtue and a sacrament. Now no parts are assigned to it as a virtue, since virtue is a habit, which is a simple quality of the mind. In like manner, it seems that parts should not be assigned to Penance as a sacrament, because no parts are assigned to Baptism and the other sacraments. Therefore no parts at all should be assigned to Penance.

Obj. 3. Further, the matter of Penance is sin, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 2). But no parts are assigned to sin. Neither, therefore, should parts be assigned to Penance.

On the contrary, The parts of a thing are those out of which the whole is composed. Now the perfection of Penance is composed of several things, viz. contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Therefore Penance has parts.

I answer that, The parts of a thing are those into which the whole is divided materially, for the parts of a thing are to the whole, what matter is to the form; wherefore the parts are reckoned as a kind of material cause, and the whole, as a kind of formal cause (*Phys.* ii.). Accordingly wherever, on the part of matter, we find a kind of plurality, there we shall find a reason for assigning parts.

Now it has been stated above (Q. LXXXIV., AA. 2, 3), that, in the sacrament of Penance, human actions stand as matter: and so, since several actions are requisite for the perfection of Penance, viz. contrition, confession, and satisfaction, as we shall show further on (A. 2), it follows that the sacrament of Penance has parts.

Reply Obj. 1. Every sacrament is something simple by reason of the Divine power, which operates therein: but the Divine power is so great that it can operate both through one and through many, and by reason of these many, parts may be assigned to a particular sacrament.

Reply Obj. 2. Parts are not assigned to penance as a virtue: because the human acts of which there are several in penance, are related to the habit of virtue, not as its parts, but as its effects. It follows, therefore, that parts are assigned to Penance as a sacrament, to which the human acts are related as matter: whereas in the other sacraments the matter does not consist of human acts, but of some one external thing, either simple, as water or oil, or compound, as chrism, and so parts are not assigned to the other sacraments.

Reply Obj. 3. Sins are the remote matter of Penance, inasmuch, to wit, as they are the matter or object of the human acts, which are the proper matter of Penance as a sacrament.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONTRITION, CONFESSION, AND SATISFACTION ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED AS PARTS OF PENANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that contrition, confession, and satisfaction are not fittingly assigned as parts of Penance. For contrition is in the heart, and so belongs to interior penance; while confession consists of words, and satisfaction in deeds; so that the two latter belong to interior penance. Now interior penance is not a sacrament, but only exterior penance which is perceptible by the senses. Therefore these three parts are not fittingly assigned to the sacrament of Penance.

Obj. 2. Further, grace is conferred in the sacraments of the New Law, as stated above (Q. LXII., AA. 1, 3). But no grace is conferred in satisfaction. Therefore satisfaction is not part of a sacrament.

Obj. 3. Further, the fruit of a thing is not the same as its part. But satisfaction is a fruit of penance, according to Luke iii. 8: *Bring forth . . . fruits worthy of penance.* Therefore it is not a part of Penance.

Obj. 4. Further, Penance is ordained against sin. But sin can be completed merely in the thought by consent, as stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. LXXII., A. 7): therefore Penance can also. Therefore confession in word and satisfaction in deed should not be reckoned as parts of Penance.

On the contrary, It seems that yet more parts should be assigned to Penance. For not only is the body assigned as a part of man, as being the matter, but also the soul, which is his form. But the aforesaid three, being the acts of the penitent, stand as matter, while the priestly absolution stands as form. Therefore the priestly absolution should be assigned as a fourth part of Penance.

I answer that, A part is twofold, essential and quantitative. The essential parts are naturally the form and the

matter, and logically the genus and the difference. In this way, each sacrament is divided into matter and form as its essential parts. Hence it has been said above (Q. LX., AA. 5, 6) that sacraments consist of things and words. But since quantity is on the part of matter, quantitative parts are parts of matter: and, in this way, as stated above (A. 1), parts are assigned specially to the sacrament of Penance, as regards the acts of the penitent, which are the matter of this sacrament.

Now it has been said above (Q. LXXXV., A. 3, *ad* 3) that an offence is atoned otherwise in Penance than in vindictive justice. Because, in vindictive justice the atonement is made according to the judge's decision, and not according to the discretion of the offender or of the person offended; whereas, in Penance, the offence is atoned according to the will of the sinner, and the judgment of God against Whom the sin was committed, because in the latter case we seek not only the restoration of the equality of justice, as in vindictive justice, but also and still more the reconciliation of friendship, which is accomplished by the offender making atonement according to the will of the person offended. Accordingly the first requisite on the part of the penitent is the will to atone, and this is done by contrition; the second is that he submit to the judgment of the priest standing in God's place, and this is done in confession; and the third is that he atone according to the decision of God's minister, and this is done in satisfaction: and so contrition, confession, and satisfaction are assigned as parts of Penance.

Reply Obj. 1. Contrition, as to its essence, is in the heart, and belongs to interior penance; yet, virtually, it belongs to exterior penance, inasmuch as it implies the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 2. Satisfaction confers grace, in so far as it is in man's purpose, and it increases grace, according as it is accomplished, just as Baptism does in adults, as stated above (Q. LXVIII., A. 2; Q. LXIX., A. 8).

Reply Obj. 3. Satisfaction is a part of Penance as a sacrament, and a fruit of penance as a virtue.

Reply Obj. 4. More things are required for good, which proceeds from a cause that is entire, than for evil, which results from each single defect, as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom. iv.*). And thus, although sin is completed in the consent of the heart, yet the perfection of Penance requires contrition of the heart, together with confession in word and satisfaction in deed.

The *Reply to the Fifth Objection* is clear from what has been said.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THESE THREE ARE INTEGRAL PARTS OF PENANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that these three are not integral parts of Penance. For, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 3), Penance is ordained against sin. But sins of thought, word, and deed are the subjective and not integral parts of sin, because sin is predicated of each one of them. Therefore in Penance also, contrition in thought, confession in word, and satisfaction in deed are not integral parts.

Obj. 2. Further, no integral part includes within itself another that is condivided with it. But contrition includes both confession and satisfaction in the purpose of amendment. Therefore they are not integral parts.

Obj. 3. Further, a whole is composed of its integral parts, taken at the same time and equally, just as a line is made up of its parts. But such is not the case here. Therefore these are not integral parts of Penance.

On the contrary, Integral parts are those by which the perfection of the whole is integrated. But the perfection of Penance is integrated by these three. Therefore they are integral parts of Penance.

I answer that, Some have said that these three are subjective parts of Penance. But this is impossible, because the entire power of the whole is present in each subjective part at the same time and equally, just as the entire power of an animal, as such, is assured to each animal species, all of which species divide the animal genus at the same time

and equally: which does not apply to the point in question. Wherefore others have said that these are potential parts: yet neither can this be true, since the whole is present, as to the entire essence, in each potential part, just as the entire essence of the soul is present in each of its powers: which does not apply to the case in point. Therefore it follows that these three are integral parts of Penance, the nature of which is that the whole is not present in each of the parts, either as to its entire power, or as to its entire essence, but that it is present to all of them together at the same time.

Reply Obj. 1. Sin, forasmuch as it is an evil, can be completed in one single point, as stated above (A. 2, *ad* 4); and so the sin which is completed in thought alone, is a special kind of sin. Another species is the sin that is completed in thought and word: and yet a third species is the sin that is completed in thought, word, and deed; and the quasi-integral parts of this last sin, are that which is in thought, that which is in word, and that which is in deed, Wherefore these three are the integral parts of Penance, which is completed in them.

Reply Obj. 2. One integral part can include the whole, though not as to its essence: because the foundation, in a way, contains virtually the whole building. In this way contrition includes virtually the whole of Penance.

Reply Obj. 3. All integral parts have a certain relation of order to one another: but some are only related as to position, whether in sequence as the parts of an army, or by contact, as the parts of a heap, or by being fitted together, as the parts of a house, or by continuation, as the parts of a line; while some are related, in addition, as to power, as the parts of an animal, the first of which is the heart, the others in a certain order being dependent on one another: and thirdly some are related in the order of time; as the parts of time and movement. Accordingly the parts of Penance are related to one another in the order of power and time, since they are actions, but not in the order of position, since they do not occupy a place.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO PENANCE BEFORE BAPTISM, PENANCE FOR MORTAL SINS, AND PENANCE FOR VENIAL SINS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that penance is unfittingly divided into penance before Baptism, penance for mortal, and penance for venial sins. For Penance is the second plank after shipwreck, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 6), while Baptism is the first. Therefore that which precedes Baptism should not be called a species of penance.

Obj. 2. Further, that which can destroy the greater, can destroy the lesser. Now mortal sin is greater than venial; and penance which regards mortal sins regards also venial sins. Therefore they should not be considered as different species of penance.

Obj. 3. Further, just as after Baptism man commits venial and mortal sins, so does he before Baptism. If therefore penance for venial sins is distinct from penance for mortal sins after Baptism, in like manner they should be distinguished before Baptism. Therefore penance is not fittingly divided into these species.

On the contrary, Augustine says in *De Pœnitentia** that these three are species of Penance.

I answer that, This is a division of penance as a virtue. Now it must be observed that every virtue acts in accordance with the time being, as also in keeping with other due circumstances, wherefore the virtue of penance has its act at this time, according to the requirements of the New Law.

Now it belongs to penance to detest one's past sins, and to purpose, at the same time, to change one's life for the better, which is the end, so to speak, of penance. And since moral matters take their species from the end, as stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. I., A. 3; Q. XVIII.,

* Cf. *Hom.* 30 inter l.

AA. 4, 6), it is reasonable to distinguish various species of penance, according to the various changes intended by the penitent.

Accordingly there is a threefold change intended by the penitent. The first is by regeneration unto a new life, and this belongs to that penance which precedes Baptism. The second is by reforming one's past life after it has been already destroyed, and this belongs to penance for mortal sins committed after Baptism. The third is by changing to a more perfect operation of life, and this belongs to penance for venial sins, which are remitted through a fervent act of charity, as stated above (Q. LXXXVII., AA. 2, 3).

Reply Obj. 1. The penance which precedes Baptism is not a sacrament, but an act of virtue disposing one to that sacrament.

Reply Obj. 2. The penance which washes away mortal sins, washes away venial sins also, but the converse does not hold. Wherefore these two species of penance are related to one another as perfect and imperfect.

Reply Obj. 3. Before Baptism there are no venial sins without mortal sins. And since a venial sin cannot be remitted without mortal sin, as stated above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 4), before Baptism, penance for mortal sins is not distinct from penance for venial sins.

EDITOR'S NOTE

AFTER writing these few questions of the treatise on Penance, St. Thomas was called to the heavenly reward which he had merited by writing so well of his Divine Master. The remainder of the "Summa Theologica," known as the Supplement, was compiled probably by Fra Rainaldo da Piperno, companion and friend of the Angelic Doctor, and was gathered from St. Thomas's commentary on the Fourth Book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard. This commentary was written in the years 1235-1253, while St. Thomas was under thirty years of age. Everywhere it reveals the influence of him whom St. Thomas always called the Master. But that influence was not to be always supreme. That the mind of the Angelic Doctor moved forward to positions which directly contradicted the Master may be seen by any student of the "Summa Theologica." The compiler of the Supplement was evidently well acquainted with the commentary on the Sentences, which had been in circulation for some twenty years or more, but it is probable that he was badly acquainted with the "Summa Theologica." This will be realized and must be borne in mind when we read the Supplement, notably (in this volume) Q. XVIII., A. 1, as compared with the "Summa Theologica," P. III., Q. LXII., A. 1.

SUPPLEMENT

TO THE THIRD PART OF THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS GATHERED FROM HIS COMMENTARY
ON BOOK IV. "OF THE SENTENCES."

QUESTION I.

OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN PARTICULAR, AND
FIRST OF CONTRITION.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider each single part of Penance, and
(1) Contrition; (2) Confession; (3) Satisfaction. The con-
sideration about Contrition will be fourfold: (1) What is it?
(2) What should it be about? (3) How great should it be?
(4) Of its duration. (5) Of its effect.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Contrition is suitably defined? (2) Whether
it is an act of virtue? (3) Whether attrition can become
contrition?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONTRITION IS AN ASSUMED SORROW FOR SINS,
TOGETHER WITH THE PURPOSE OF CONFESSING THEM
AND OF MAKING SATISFACTION FOR THEM?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that contrition is not *an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making satisfaction for them*, as some define it. For, as Augustine states (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.), *sorrow is for those things that happen against our will*. But this does not apply to sin. Therefore contrition is not sorrow for sins.

Obj. 2. Further, contrition is given us by God. But what is given is not assumed. Therefore contrition is not an assumed sorrow.

Obj. 3. Further, satisfaction and confession are necessary for the remission of the punishment which was not remitted by contrition. But sometimes the whole punishment is remitted in contrition. Therefore it is not always necessary for the contrite person to have the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction.

On the contrary stands the definition.

I answer that, As stated in Ecclus. x. 15, *pride is the beginning of all sin*, because thereby man clings to his own judgment, and strays from the Divine commandments. Consequently that which destroys sin must needs make man give up his own judgment. Now he that persists in his own judgment, is called metaphorically rigid and hard: wherefore anyone is said to be broken when he is torn from his own judgment. But, in material things, whence these expressions are transferred to spiritual things, there is a difference between breaking and crushing or contrition, as stated in *Meteor. iv.*, in that we speak of breaking when a thing is sundered into large parts, but of crushing or contrition when that which was in itself solid is reduced to minute particles. And since, for the remission of sin, it is necessary that man should put aside entirely his attachment to sin, which implies a certain state of continuity and solidity in his mind, therefore it is that the act through which sin is cast aside is called contrition metaphorically.

In this contrition several things are to be observed, viz. the very substance of the act, the way of acting, its origin and its effect: in respect of which we find that contrition has been defined in various ways. For, as regards the substance of the act, we have the definition given above: and since the act of contrition is both an act of virtue, and a part of the sacrament of Penance, its nature as an act of virtue is explained in this definition by mentioning its genus, viz. *sorrow*, its object by the words *for sins*, and the act of choice which is necessary for an act of virtue, by the word

assumed: while, as a part of the sacrament, it is made manifest by pointing out its relation to the other parts, in the words, *together with the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction*.

There is another definition which defines contrition, only as an act of virtue; but at the same time including the difference which confines it to a special virtue, viz. penance, for it is thus expressed: *Contrition is voluntary sorrow for sin whereby man punishes in himself that which he grieves to have done*, because the addition of the word *punishes* confines the definition to a special virtue.—Another definition is given by Isidore (*De Sum. Bono*, xii.) as follows: *Contrition is a tearful sorrow and humility of mind, arising from remembrance of sin and fear of the Judgment*. Here we have an allusion to the derivation of the word, when it is said that it is *humility of the mind*, because just as pride makes the mind rigid, so is a man humbled, when contrition leads him to give up his mind. Also the external manner is indicated by the word *tearful*, and the origin of contrition, by the words, *arising from remembrance of sin*, etc.—Another definition is taken from the words of Augustine, and indicates the effect of contrition. It runs thus: *Contrition is the sorrow which takes away sin*.—Yet another is gathered from the words of Gregory (*Moral.* xxxiii.) as follows: *Contrition is humility of the soul, crushing sin between hope and fear*. Here the derivation is indicated by saying that contrition is *humility of the soul*; the effect, by the words, *crushing sin*; and the origin, by the words, *between hope and fear*. Indeed, it includes not only the principal cause, which is fear, but also its joint cause, which is hope, without which, fear might lead to despair.

Reply Obj. 1. Although sins, when committed, were voluntary, yet when we are contrite for them, they are no longer voluntary, so that they occur against our will; not indeed in respect of the will that we had when we consented to them, but in respect of that which we have now, so as to wish they had never been.

Reply Obj. 2. Contrition is from God alone as to the form

that quickens it, but as to the substance of the act, it is from the free-will and from God, Who operates in all works both of nature and of will.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the entire punishment may be remitted by contrition, yet confession and satisfaction are still necessary, both because man cannot be sure that his contrition was sufficient to take away all, and because confession and satisfaction are a matter of precept: wherefore he becomes a transgressor, who confesses not and makes not satisfaction.

SECOND ARTICLE

WHETHER CONTRITION IS AN ACT OF VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that contrition is not an act of virtue. For passions are not acts of virtue, since *they bring us neither praise nor blame* (*Ethic. ii.*). But sorrow is a passion. As therefore contrition is sorrow, it seems that it is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, as contrition is so called from its being a crushing, so is attrition. Now all agree in saying that attrition is not an act of virtue. Neither, therefore, is contrition an act of virtue.

On the contrary, Nothing but an act of virtue is meritorious. But contrition is a meritorious act. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

I answer that, Contrition as to the literal signification of the word, does not denote an act of virtue, but a corporeal passion. But the question in point does not refer to contrition in this sense, but to that which the word is employed to signify by way of metaphor. For just as the inflation of one's own will unto wrong-doing implies, in itself, a generic evil, so the utter undoing and crushing of that same will implies something generically good, for this is to detest one's own will whereby sin was committed. Wherefore contrition, which signifies this, implies rectitude of the will; and so it is the act of that virtue to which it belongs to detest and destroy past sins, the act, to wit, of penance, as is

Contrit
is
good

evident from what was said above (*Sentent.* iv., D. 14., Q. I., A. 1: P. iii., Q. LXXXV., A.A. 2, 3).

Reply Obj. 1. Contrition includes a twofold sorrow for sin. One is in the sensitive part, and is a passion. This does not belong essentially to contrition as an act of virtue, but is rather its effect. For just as the virtue of penance inflicts outward punishment on the body, in order to compensate for the offence done to God through the instrumentality of the bodily members, so does it inflict on the concupiscible part of the soul a punishment, viz. the aforesaid sorrow, because the concupiscible also co-operated in the sinful deeds. Nevertheless this sorrow may belong to contrition taken as part of the sacrament, since the nature of a sacrament is such that it consists not only of internal but also of external acts and sensible things.—The other sorrow is in the will, and is nothing else save displeasure for some evil, for the emotions of the will are named after the passions, as stated above (*Sentent.* iii., D. 26, Q. I., A. 5: I.-II. Q. XXII., A. 3, *ad* 3). Accordingly, contrition is essentially a kind of sorrow, and is an act of the virtue of penance.

Reply Obj. 2. Attrition denotes approach to perfect contrition, wherefore in corporeal matters, things are said to be attrite, when they are worn away to a certain extent, but not altogether crushed to pieces; while they are said to be contrite, when all the parts are crushed (*tritæ*) minutely. Wherefore, in spiritual matters, attrition signifies a certain but not a perfect displeasure for sins committed, whereas contrition denotes perfect displeasure.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ATTRITION CAN BECOME CONTRITION?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that attrition can become contrition. For contrition differs from attrition, as living from dead. Now dead faith becomes living. Therefore attrition can become contrition.

Obj. 2. Further, matter receives perfection when priva-

tion is removed. Now sorrow is to grace, as matter to form, because grace quickens sorrow. Therefore the sorrow that was previously lifeless, while guilt remained, receives perfection through being quickened by grace: and so the same conclusion follows as above.

On the contrary, Things which are caused by principles altogether diverse cannot be changed, one into the other. Now the principle of attrition is servile fear, while filial fear is the cause of contrition. Therefore attrition cannot become contrition.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question: for some say that attrition may become contrition, even as lifeless faith becomes living faith. But, seemingly, this is impossible; since, although the habit of lifeless faith becomes living, yet never does an act of lifeless faith become an act of living faith, because the lifeless act passes away and remains no more, as soon as charity comes. Now attrition and contrition do not denote a habit, but an act only: and those habits of infused virtue which regard the will cannot be lifeless, since they result from charity, as stated above (*Sentent.* iii., D. 27, Q. II., A. 4: I.-II. Q. LXV., A. 4). Wherefore until grace be infused, there is no habit by which afterwards the act of contrition may be elicited; so that attrition can nowise become contrition: and this is the other opinion.

Reply Obj. 1. There is no comparison between faith and contrition, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. When the privation is removed from matter, the matter is quickened if it remains when the perfection comes. But the sorrow which was lifeless, does not remain when charity comes, wherefore it cannot be quickened.

It may also be replied that matter does not take its origin from the form essentially, as an act takes its origin from the habit which quickens it. Wherefore nothing hinders matter being quickened anew by some form, whereby it was not quickened previously: whereas this cannot be said of an act, even as it is impossible for the identically same thing to arise from a cause wherefrom it did not arise before, since a thing is brought into being but once.

QUESTION II.

OF THE OBJECT OF CONTRITION.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider the object of contrition. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether a man should be contrite on account of his punishment? (2) Whether, on account of original sin? (3) Whether, for every actual sin he has committed? (4) Whether, for actual sins he will commit? (5) Whether, for the sins of others? (6) Whether, for each single mortal sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN SHOULD BE CONTRITE ON ACCOUNT OF THE PUNISHMENT, AND NOT ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on account of his sin. For Augustine says in *De Pœnitentia* :* *No man desires life everlasting unless he repent of this mortal life.* But the mortality of this life is a punishment. Therefore the penitent should be contrite on account of his punishments also.

Obj. 2. Further, the Master says (*Sentent. iv., D. 16, cap. i.*), quoting Augustine (*De vera et falsa Pœnitentia*†), that the penitent should be sorry for having deprived himself of virtue. But privation of virtue is a punishment. Therefore contrition is sorrow for punishments also.

* Cf. *Hom. 50 inter l.*

† Work of an unknown author.

On the contrary, No one holds to that for which he is sorry. But a penitent, by the very signification of the word, is one who holds to his punishment.* Therefore he is not sorry on account of his punishment, so that contrition which is penitential sorrow is not on account of punishment.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. I., A. 1), contrition implies the crushing of something hard and whole. Now this wholeness and hardness is found in the evil of fault, since the will, which is the cause thereof in the evil-doer, sticks to its own ground,† and refuses to yield to the precept of the law, wherefore displeasure at a suchlike evil is called metaphorically *contrition*. But this metaphor cannot be applied to evil of punishment, because punishment simply denotes a lessening, so that it is possible to have sorrow for punishment but not contrition.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Augustine, penance should be on account of this mortal life, not by reason of its mortality (unless penance be taken broadly for every kind of sorrow); but by reason of sins, to which we are prone on account of the weakness of this life.

Reply Obj. 2. Sorrow for the loss of virtue through sin is not essentially the same as contrition, but is its principle. For just as we are moved to desire a thing on account of the good we expect to derive from it, so are we moved to be sorry for something, on account of the evil accruing to us therefrom.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONTRITION SHOULD BE ON ACCOUNT OF ORIGINAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that contrition should be on account of original sin. For we ought to be contrite on account of actual sin; not by reason of the act, considered as a kind of being, but by reason of its deformity, since the act, regarded

* *Pœnitens*, i.e. *Pœnam tenens*.

† There is a play on the words here,—*integer* (whole) and *in suis terminis* (to its own ground).

in its substance, is a good, and is from God. Now original sin has a deformity, even as actual sin has. Therefore we should be contrite on its account also.

Obj. 2. Further, by original sin man has been turned away from God, since in punishment thereof he was to be deprived of seeing God. But every man should be displeased at having been turned away from God. Therefore man should be displeased at original sin; and so he ought to have contrition for it.

On the contrary, The medicine should be proportionate to the disease. Now we contracted original sin without willing to do so. Therefore it is not necessary that we should be cleansed from it by an act of the will, such as contrition is.

I answer that, Contrition is sorrow, as stated above (Q. I., AA. 1, 2), respecting and, so to speak, crushing the hardness of the will. Consequently it can regard those sins only which result in us through the hardness of our will. And as original sin was not brought upon us by our own will, but contracted from the origin of our infected nature, it follows that, properly speaking, we cannot have contrition on its account, but only displeasure or sorrow.

Reply Obj. 1. Contrition is for sin, not by reason of the mere substance of the act, because it does not derive the character of evil therefrom; nor again, by reason of its deformity alone, because deformity, of itself, does not include the notion of guilt, and sometimes denotes a punishment. But contrition ought to be on account of sin, as implying deformity resulting from an act of the will; and this does not apply to original sin, so that contrition does not regard it.

The same Reply avails for the Second Objection, because contrition is due to aversion of the will.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER WE SHOULD HAVE CONTRITION FOR EVERY
ACTUAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that we have no need to have contrition for every actual sin we have committed. For contraries are healed by their contraries. Now some sins are committed through sorrow, e.g. sloth and envy. Therefore their remedy should not be sorrow, such as contrition is, but joy.

Obj. 2. Further, contrition is an act of the will, which cannot refer to that which is not known. But there are sins of which we have no knowledge, such as those we have forgotten. Therefore we cannot have contrition for them.

Obj. 3. Further, by voluntary contrition those sins are blotted out which we committed voluntarily. But ignorance takes away voluntariness, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* iii.). Therefore contrition need not cover things which have occurred through ignorance.

Obj. 4. Further, we need not be contrite for a sin which is not removed by contrition. Now some sins are not removed by contrition, e.g. venial sins, that remain after the grace of contrition. Therefore there is no need to have contrition for all one's past sins.

On the contrary, Penance is a remedy for all actual sins. But penance cannot regard some sins, without contrition regarding them also, for it is the first part of Penance. Therefore contrition should be for all one's past sins.

Further, no sin is forgiven a man unless he be justified. But justification requires contrition, as stated above (Q. I., A. 1 : I.-II., Q. CXIII.). Therefore it is necessary to have contrition for all one's sins.

I answer that, Every actual sin is caused by our will not yielding to God's law, either by transgressing it, or by omitting it, or by acting beside it: and since a hard thing

is one that is disposed not to give way easily, hence it is that a certain hardness of the will is to be found in every actual sin. Wherefore, if a sin is to be remedied, it needs to be taken away by contrition which crushes it.

Reply Obj. 1. As clearly shown above (A. 2, *ad 1*), contrition is opposed to sin, in so far as it proceeds from the choice of the will that had failed to obey the command of God's law, and not as regards the material part of sin: and it is on this that the choice of the will falls. Now the will's choice falls not only on the acts of the other powers, which the will uses for its own end, but also on the will's own proper act: for the will wills to will something. Accordingly the will's choice falls on that pain or sadness which is to be found in the sin of envy and the like, whether such pain be in the senses or in the will itself. Consequently the sorrow of contrition is opposed to those sins.

Reply Obj. 2. One may forget a thing in two ways, either so that it escapes the memory altogether, and then one cannot search for it; or so that it escapes from the memory in part, and in part remains, as when I remember having heard something in general, but know not what it was in particular, and then I search my memory in order to discover it. Accordingly a sin also may be forgotten in two ways, either so as to remain in a general, but not in a particular remembrance, and then a man is bound to bethink himself in order to discover the sin, because he is bound to have contrition for each individual mortal sin. And if he is unable to discover it, after applying himself with due care, it is enough that he be contrite for it, according as it stands in his knowledge, and indeed he should grieve not only for the sin, but also for having forgotten it, because this is owing to his neglect. If, however, the sin has escaped from his memory altogether, then he is excused from his duty through being unable to fulfil it, and it is enough that he be contrite in general for everything wherein he has offended God. But when this inability is removed, as when the sin is recalled to his memory, then he is bound to have contrition for that sin in particular, even as a poor man,

who cannot pay a debt, is excused, and yet is bound to, as soon as he can.

Reply Obj. 3. If ignorance were to remove altogether the will to do evil, it would excuse, and there would be no sin: but sometimes it does not remove the will altogether, and then it does not altogether excuse, but only to a certain extent: wherefore a man is bound to be contrite for a sin committed through ignorance.

Reply Obj. 4. A venial sin can remain after contrition for a mortal sin, but not after contrition for the venial sin: wherefore contrition should also cover venial sins even as penance does, as stated above (*Sentent. iv.*, D. 16, Q. II., A. 2, qu. 2; P. III., Q. LXXXVII., A. 1).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN IS BOUND TO HAVE CONTRITION FOR HIS FUTURE SINS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins also. For contrition is an act of the free-will: and the free-will extends to the future rather than to the past, since choice, which is an act of the free-will, is about future contingents, as stated in *Ethic. iii.* Therefore contrition is about future sins rather than about past sins.

Obj. 2. Further, sin is aggravated by the result that ensues from it: wherefore Jerome says* that the punishment of Arius is not yet ended, for it is yet possible for some to be ruined through his heresy, by reason of whose ruin his punishment would be increased: and the same applies to a man who is judged guilty of murder, if he has committed a murderous assault, even before his victim dies. Now the sinner ought to be contrite during that intervening time. Therefore the degree of his contrition ought to be proportionate not only to his past act, but also to its eventual result: and consequently contrition regards the future.

* S. Basil asserts this implicitly (*De Vera Virgin.*).

On the contrary, Contrition is a part of penance. But penance always regards the past: and therefore contrition does also, and consequently is not for a future sin.

I answer that, In every series of things moving and moved ordained to one another, we find that the inferior mover has its proper movement, and besides this, it follows, in some respect, the movement of the superior mover: this is seen in the movement of the planets, which, in addition to their proper movements, follow the movement of the first heaven. Now, in all the moral virtues, the first mover is prudence, which is called the charioteer of the virtues. Consequently each moral virtue, in addition to its proper movement, has something of the movement of prudence: and therefore, since penance is a moral virtue, as it is a part of justice, in addition to its own act, it acquires the movement of prudence. Now its proper movement is towards its proper object, which is a sin committed. Wherefore its proper and principal act, viz. contrition, essentially regards past sins alone; but, inasmuch as it acquires something of the act of prudence, it regards future sins indirectly, although it is not essentially moved towards those future sins. For this reason, he that is contrite, is sorry for his past sins, and is cautious of future sins. Yet we do not speak of contrition for future sins, but of caution, which is a part of prudence conjoined to penance.

Reply Obj. 1. The free-will is said to regard future contingents, in so far as it is concerned with acts, but not with the objects of acts: because, of his own free-will, a man can think about past and necessary things, and yet the very act of thinking, in so far as it is subject to the free-will, is a future contingent. Hence the act of contrition also is a future contingent, in so far as it is subject to the free-will; and yet its object can be something past.

Reply Obj. 2. The consequent result which aggravates a sin was already present in the act as in its cause; wherefore when the sin was committed, its degree of gravity was already complete, and no further guilt accrued to it when the result took place. Nevertheless some accidental punish-

ment accrues to it, in respect of which the damned will have the more motives of regret for the more evils that have resulted from their sins. It is in this sense that Jerome (Basil) speaks. Hence there is no need for contrition to be for other than past sins.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO HAVE CONTRITION FOR ANOTHER'S SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a man ought to have contrition for another's sin. For one should not ask forgiveness for a sin unless one is contrite for it. Now forgiveness is asked for another's sin in Ps. xviii. 13: *From those of others spare thy servant.* Therefore a man ought to be contrite for another's sins.

Obj. 2. Further, man is bound, out of charity, to love his neighbour as himself. Now, through love of himself, he both grieves for his ills, and desires good things. Therefore, since we are bound to desire the goods of grace for our neighbour, as for ourselves, it seems that we ought to grieve for his sins, even as for our own. But contrition is nothing else than sorrow for sins. Therefore man should be contrite for the sins of others.

On the contrary, Contrition is an act of the virtue of penance. But no one repents save for what he has done himself. Therefore no one is contrite for others' sins.

I answer that, The same thing is crushed (*conteritur*) which hitherto was hard and whole. Hence contrition for sin must needs be in the same subject in which the hardness of sin was hitherto: so that there is no contrition for the sins of others.

Reply Obj. 1. The prophet prays to be spared from the sins of others, in so far as, through fellowship with sinners, a man contracts a stain by consenting to their sins: thus it is written (Ps. xvii. 27): *With the perverse thou wilt be perverted.*

Reply Obj. 2. We ought to grieve for the sins of others, but not to have contrition for them, because not all sorrow for past sins is contrition, as is evident from what has been said already.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE CONTRITION FOR EACH MORTAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin. For the movement of contrition in justification is instantaneous: whereas a man cannot think of every mortal sin in an instant. Therefore it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, contrition should be for sins, inasmuch as they turn us away from God, because we need not be contrite for turning to creatures without turning away from God. Now all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God. Therefore one contrition for all is sufficient.

Obj. 3. Further, mortal sins have more in common with one another, than actual and original sin. Now one Baptism blots out all sins both actual and original. Therefore one general contrition blots out all mortal sins.

On the contrary, For diverse diseases there are diverse remedies, since *what heals the eye will not heal the foot*, as Jerome says (*Super Marc.* ix. 28). But contrition is the special remedy for one mortal sin. Therefore one general contrition for all mortal sins does not suffice.

Further, contrition is expressed by confession. But it is necessary to confess each mortal sin. Therefore it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin.

I answer that, Contrition may be considered in two ways, as to its origin, and as to its term. By origin of contrition I mean the process of thought, when a man thinks of his sin and is sorry for it, albeit not with the sorrow of contrition, yet with that of attrition. The term of contrition is when that sorrow is already quickened by grace. Accord-

ingly, as regards the origin of contrition, a man needs to be contrite for each sin that he calls to mind; but as regards its term, it suffices for him to have one general contrition for all, because then the movement of his contrition acts in virtue of all his preceding dispositions.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2. Although all mortal sins agree in turning man away from God, yet they differ in the cause and mode of aversion, and in the degree of separation from God; and this regards the different ways in which they turn us to creatures.

Reply Obj. 3. Baptism acts in virtue of Christ's merit, Who had infinite power for the blotting out of all sins; and so for all sins one Baptism suffices. But in contrition, in addition to the merit of Christ, an act of ours is requisite, which must, therefore, correspond to each sin, since it has not infinite power for contrition.

It may also be replied that Baptism is a spiritual generation; whereas Penance, as regards contrition and its other parts, is a kind of spiritual healing by way of some alteration. Now it is evident in the generation of a body, accompanied by corruption of another body, that all the accidents contrary to the thing generated, and which were the accidents of the thing corrupted, are removed by the one generation: whereas in alteration, only that accident is removed which was contrary to the accident which is the term of the alteration. In like manner, one Baptism blots out all sins together and introduces a new life; whereas Penance does not blot out each sin, unless it be directed to each. For this reason it is necessary to be contrite for, and to confess each sin.

QUESTION III.

OF THE DEGREE OF CONTRITION.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider the degree of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world? (2) Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great? (3) Whether sorrow for one sin ought to be greater than for another?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONTRITION IS THE GREATEST POSSIBLE SORROW
IN THE WORLD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that contrition is not the greatest possible sorrow in the world. For sorrow is the sensation of hurt. But some hurts are more keenly felt than the hurt of sin, e.g. the hurt of a wound. Therefore contrition is not the greatest sorrow.

Obj. 2. Further, we judge of a cause according to its effect. Now the effect of sorrow is tears. Since therefore sometimes a contrite person does not shed outward tears for his sins, whereas he weeps for the death of a friend, or for a blow, or the like, it seems that contrition is not the greatest sorrow.

Obj. 3. Further, the more a thing is mingled with its contrary, the less its intensity. But the sorrow of contrition has a considerable admixture of joy, because the contrite man rejoices in his delivery, in the hope of pardon, and in many like things. Therefore his sorrow is very slight.

Obj. 4. Further, the sorrow of contrition is a kind of displeasure. But there are many things more displeasing to the contrite than their past sins; for they would not prefer to suffer the pains of hell rather than to sin; nor to have suffered, nor yet to suffer all manner of temporal punishment; else few would be found contrite. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is not the greatest.

On the contrary, According to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xiv.), *all sorrow is based on love.* Now the love of charity, on which the sorrow of contrition is based, is the greatest love. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is the greatest sorrow.

Further, sorrow is for evil. Therefore the greater the evil, the greater the sorrow. But the fault is a greater evil than its punishment. Therefore contrition which is sorrow for fault, surpasses all other sorrow.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 1., A. 2, *ad* 1), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the will, and is the very essence of contrition, being nothing else than displeasure at past sin, and this sorrow, in contrition, surpasses all other sorrows. For the more pleasing a thing is, the more displeasing is its contrary. Now the last end is above all things pleasing: wherefore sin, which turns us away from the last end, should be, above all things, displeasing.—The other sorrow is in the sensitive part, and is caused by the former sorrow, either from natural necessity, in so far as the lower powers follow the movements of the higher, or from choice, in so far as a penitent excites in himself this sorrow for his sins. In neither of these ways is such sorrow, of necessity, the greatest, because the lower powers are more deeply moved by their own objects than through redundancy from the higher powers. Wherefore the nearer the operation of the higher powers approaches to the objects of the lower powers, the more do the latter follow the movement of the former. Consequently there is greater pain in the sensitive part, on account of a sensible hurt, than that which redounds into the sensitive part from the reason; and likewise, that which redounds from the reason when it deliberates on corporeal things, is greater

than that which redounds from the reason in considering spiritual things. Therefore the sorrow which results in the sensitive part from the reason's displeasure at sin, is not greater than the other sorrows of which that same part is the subject: and likewise, neither is the sorrow which is assumed voluntarily greater than other sorrows,—both because the lower appetite does not obey the higher appetite infallibly, as though in the lower appetite there should arise a passion of such intensity and of such a kind as the higher appetite might ordain,—and because the passions are employed by the reason, in acts of virtue, according to a certain measure, which the sorrow that is without virtue sometimes does not observe, but exceeds.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as sensible sorrow is on account of the sensation of hurt, so interior sorrow is on account of the thought of something hurtful. Therefore, although the hurt of sin is not perceived by the external sense, yet it is perceived to be the most grievous hurt by the interior sense or reason.

Reply Obj. 2. Affections of the body are the immediate result of the sensitive passions and, through them, of the emotions of the higher appetite. Hence it is that bodily tears flow more quickly from sensible sorrow, or even from a thing that hurts the senses, than from the spiritual sorrow of contrition.

Reply Obj. 3. The joy which a penitent has for his sorrow does not lessen his displeasure (for it is not contrary to it), but increases it, according as every operation is increased by the delight which it causes, as stated in *Ethic. x.* Thus he who delights in learning a science, learns the better, and, in like manner, he who rejoices in his displeasure, is the more intensely displeased. But it may well happen that this joy tempers the sorrow that results from the reason in the sensitive part.

Reply Obj. 4. The degree of displeasure at a thing should be proportionate to the degree of its malice. Now the malice of mortal sin is measured from Him against Whom it is committed, inasmuch as it is offensive to Him; and from

him who sins, inasmuch as it is hurtful to him. And, since man should love God more than himself, therefore he should hate sin, as an offence against God, more than as being hurtful to himself. Now it is hurtful to him chiefly because it separates him from God; and in this respect the separation from God which is a punishment, should be more displeasing than the sin itself, as causing this hurt (since what is hated on account of something else, is less hated), but less than the sin, as an offence against God. Again, among all the punishments of malice a certain order is observed according to the degree of the hurt. Consequently, since this is the greatest hurt, inasmuch as it consists in privation of the greatest good, the greatest of all punishments will be separation from God.

Again, with regard to this displeasure, it is necessary to observe that there is also an accidental degree of malice, in respect of the present and the past; since what is past, is no more, whence it has less of the character of malice or goodness. Hence it is that a man shrinks from suffering an evil at the present, or at some future time, more than he shudders at the past evil: wherefore also, no passion of the soul corresponds directly to the past, as sorrow corresponds to present evil, and fear to future evil. Consequently, of two past evils, the mind shrinks the more from that one which still produces a greater effect at the present time, or which, it fears, will produce a greater effect in the future, although in the past it was the lesser evil. And, since the effect of the past sin is sometimes not so keenly felt as the effect of the past punishment, both because sin is more perfectly remedied than punishment, and because bodily defect is more manifest than spiritual defect, therefore even a man, who is well disposed, sometimes feels a greater abhorrence of his past punishment than of his past sin, although he would be ready to suffer the same punishment over again rather than commit the same sin.

We must also observe, in comparing sin with punishment, that some punishments are inseparable from offence of God, e.g. separation from God; and some also are everlasting,

e.g. the punishment of hell. Therefore the punishment to which is connected offence of God is to be shunned in the same way as sin; whereas that which is everlasting is simply to be shunned more than sin. If, however, we separate from these punishments the notion of offence, and consider only the notion of punishment, they have the character of malice, less than sin has as an offence against God: and for this reason should cause less displeasure.

We must, however, take note that, although the contrite should be thus disposed, yet he should not be questioned about his feelings, because man cannot easily measure them. Sometimes that which displeases least seems to displease most, through being more closely connected with some sensible hurt, which is more known to us

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SORROW OF CONTRITION CAN BE TOO GREAT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great. For no sorrow can be more immoderate than that which destroys its own subject. But the sorrow of contrition, if it be so great as to cause death or corruption of the body, is praiseworthy. For Anselm says in his *Meditations*: *Would that such were the exuberance of my inmost soul, as to dry up the marrow of my body*; and Augustine* confesses that *he deserves to blind his eyes with tears.* Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great.

Obj. 2. Further, the sorrow of contrition results from the love of charity. But the love of charity cannot be too great. Neither, therefore, can the sorrow of contrition be too great.

Obj. 3. *On the contrary,* Every moral virtue is destroyed by excess and deficiency. But contrition is an act of a moral virtue, viz. penance, since it is a part of justice. Therefore sorrow for sins can be too great.

I answer that, Contrition, as regards the sorrow in the

* *De Contritione Cordis*, work of an unknown author.

reason, i.e. the displeasure, whereby the sin is displeasing through being an offence against God, cannot be too great; even as neither can the love of charity be too great, for when this is increased the aforesaid displeasure is increased also. But, as regards the sensible sorrow, contrition may be too great, even as outward affliction of the body may be too great. In all these things the rule should be the safeguarding of the subject, and of that general well-being which suffices for the fulfilment of one's duties; hence it is written (Rom. xii. 1): *Let your sacrifice be reasonable.**

Reply Obj. 1. Anselm desired the marrow of his body to be dried up by the exuberance of his devotion, not as regards the natural humour, but as to his bodily desires and concupiscences. And, although Augustine acknowledged that he deserved to lose the use of his bodily eyes on account of his sins, because every sinner deserves not only eternal, but also temporal death, yet he did not wish his eyes to be blinded.

Reply Obj. 2. This objection considers the sorrow which is in the reason: while the Third considers the sorrow of the sensitive part.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER SORROW FOR ONE SIN SHOULD BE GREATER THAN FOR ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that sorrow for one sin need not be greater than for another. For Jerome (*Ep. cviii.*) commends Paula for that *she deplored her slightest sins as much as great ones*. Therefore one need not be more sorry for one sin than for another.

Obj. 2. Further, the movement of contrition is instantaneous. Now one instantaneous movement cannot be at the same time more intense and more remiss. Therefore contrition for one sin need not be greater than for another.

Obj. 3. Further, contrition is for sin chiefly as turning us away from God. But all mortal sins agree in turning us

* Vulg.,—*Present your bodies . . . a reasonable sacrifice.*

away from God, since they all deprive us of grace whereby the soul is united to God. Therefore we should have equal contrition for all mortal sins.

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. xxv. 2): *According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be* Now, in contrition, the stripes are measured according to the sins, because to contrition is united the purpose of making satisfaction. Therefore contrition should be for one sin more than for another.

Further, man should be contrite for that which he ought to have avoided. But he ought to avoid one sin more than another, if that sin is more grievous, and it be necessary to do one or the other. Therefore, in like manner, he ought to be more sorry for one, viz. the more grievous, than for the other.

I answer that, We may speak of contrition in two ways: first, in so far as it corresponds to each single sin, and thus, as regards the sorrow in the higher appetite, a man ought to be more sorry for a more grievous sin, because there is more reason for sorrow, viz. the offence against God, in such a sin than in another, since the more inordinate the act is, the more it offends God. In like manner, since the greater sin deserves a greater punishment, the sorrow also of the sensitive part, in so far as it is voluntarily undergone for sin, as the punishment thereof, ought to be greater where the sin is greater. But in so far as the emotions of the lower appetite result from the impression of the higher appetite, the degree of sorrow depends on the disposition of the lower faculty to the reception of impressions from the higher faculty, and not on the greatness of the sin.

Secondly, contrition may be taken in so far as it is directed to all one's sins together, as in the act of justification. Such contrition arises either from the consideration of each single sin, and thus although it is but one act, yet the distinction of the sins remains virtually therein; or, at least, it includes the purpose of thinking of each sin; and in this way too it is habitually more for one than for another.

Reply Obj. 1. Paula is commended, not for deploring all

her sins equally, but because she grieved for her slight sins as much as though they were grave sins, in comparison with other persons who grieve for their sins: but for graver sins she would have grieved much more.

Reply Obj. 2. In that instantaneous movement of contrition, although it is not possible to find an actually distinct intensity in respect of each individual sin, yet it is found in the way explained above; and also in another way, in so far as, in this general contrition, each individual sin is related to that particular motive of sorrow which occurs to the contrite person, viz. the offence against God. For he who loves a whole, loves its parts potentially although not actually, and accordingly he loves some parts more and some less, in proportion to their relation to the whole; thus he who loves a community, virtually loves each one more or less according to their respective relations to the common good. In like manner he who is sorry for having offended God, implicitly grieves for his different sins in different ways, according as by them he offended God more or less.

Reply Obj. 3. Although each mortal sin turns us away from God and deprives us of His grace, yet some remove us further away than others, inasmuch as through their inordinateness they become more out of harmony with the order of the Divine goodness, than others do.

QUESTION IV.

OF THE TIME FOR CONTRITION.

(In Three Articles.)

WE must now consider the time for contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition? (2) Whether it is expedient to grieve continually for our sins? (3) Whether souls grieve for their sins even after this life?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WHOLE OF THIS LIFE IS THE TIME FOR CONTRITION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the time for contrition is not the whole of this life. For as we should be sorry for a sin committed, so should we be ashamed of it. But shame for sin does not last all one's life, for Ambrose says (*De Pœnit.* ii.), that *he whose sin is forgiven has nothing to be ashamed of.* Therefore it seems that neither should contrition last all one's life, since it is sorrow for sin.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (1 John iv. 18) that *perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain.* But sorrow also has pain. Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot remain in the state of perfect charity.

Obj. 3. Further, there cannot be any sorrow for the past (since it is, properly speaking, about a present evil), except in so far as something of the past sin remains in the present time. Now, in this life, sometimes one attains to a

state in which nothing remains of a past sin, neither disposition, nor guilt, nor any debt of punishment. Therefore there is no need to grieve any more for that sin.

Obj. 4. Further, it is written (Rom. viii. 28) that *to them that love God all things work together unto good*, even sins as a gloss declares (Augustine, *De Corrept. et Grat.*). Therefore there is no need for them to grieve for sin after it has been forgiven.

Obj. 5. Further, contrition is a part of Penance, condivided with satisfaction. But there is no need for continual satisfaction. Therefore contrition for sin need not be continual.

On the contrary, Augustine in *De Pœnitentia** says that *when sorrow ceases, penance fails, and when penance fails, no pardon remains*. Therefore, since it behoves one not to lose the forgiveness which has been granted, it seems that one ought always to grieve for one's sins.

Further, it is written (Ecclus. v. 5): *Be not without fear about sin forgiven*. Therefore man should always grieve, that his sins may be forgiven him.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. III., A. 1), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the reason, and is detestation of the sin committed; the other is in the sensitive part, and results from the former: and as regards both, the time for contrition is the whole of the present state of life. For as long as one is a wayfarer, one detests the obstacles which retard or hinder one from reaching the end of the way. Wherefore, since past sin retards the course of our life towards God (because the time which was given to us for that course cannot be recovered), it follows that the state of contrition remains during the whole of this lifetime, as regards the detestation of sin. The same is to be said of the sensible sorrow, which is assumed by the will as a punishment: for since man, by sinning, deserved everlasting punishment, and sinned against the eternal God, the everlasting punishment being commuted into a temporal one, sorrow ought to remain during the whole of man's eternity, i.e. during the whole of the state of this life. For this reason

* *De vera et falsa Pœnitentia*, work of an unknown author.

Hugh of S. Victor says (*De Pot. Ligandi et Solvendi*, 3, 5, 13) that *when God absolves a man from eternal guilt and punishment, He binds him with a chain of eternal detestation of sin.*

Reply Obj. 1. Shame regards sin only as a disgraceful act; wherefore after sin has been taken away as to its guilt, there is no further motive for shame; but there does remain a motive of sorrow, which is for the guilt, not only as being something disgraceful, but also as having a hurt connected with it.

Reply Obj. 2. Servile fear which charity casts out, is opposed to charity by reason of its servility, because it regards the punishment. But the sorrow of contrition results from charity, as stated above (Q. III., A. 2): wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. Although, by penance, the sinner returns to his former state of grace and immunity from the debt of punishment, yet he never returns to his former dignity of innocence, and so something always remains from his past sin. ||

Reply Obj. 4. Just as a man ought not to do evil that good may come of it, so he ought not to rejoice in evil, for the reason that good may perchance come from it through the agency of Divine grace or providence, because his sins did not cause but hindered those goods; rather was it Divine providence that was their cause, and in this man should rejoice, whereas he should grieve for his sins.

Reply Obj. 5. Satisfaction depends on the punishment appointed, which should be enjoined for sins; hence it can come to an end, so that there be no further need of satisfaction. But that punishment is proportionate to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence to a creature whence it derives its finiteness. On the other hand, the sorrow of contrition corresponds to sin on the part of the aversion, whence it derives a certain infinity; wherefore contrition ought to continue always; nor is it unreasonable if that which precedes remains, when that which follows is taken away.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS EXPEDIENT TO GRIEVE FOR SIN
CONTINUALLY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually. For it is sometimes expedient to rejoice, as is evident from Philip. iv. 4, where the gloss on the words, *Rejoice in the Lord always*, says that *it is necessary to rejoice*. Now it is not possible to rejoice and grieve at the same time. Therefore it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually.

Obj. 2. Further, that which, in itself, is an evil and a thing to be avoided should not be taken upon oneself, except in so far as it is necessary as a remedy against something, as in the case of burning or cutting a wound. Now sorrow is in itself an evil; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. xxx. 24): *Drive away sadness far from thee*, and the reason is given (verse 25): *For sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it*. Moreover the Philosopher says the same (*Ethic. vii., x.*). Therefore one should not grieve for sin any longer than suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already blotted out after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore it is not expedient to grieve any longer.

Obj. 3. Further, Bernard says (*Serm. xi. in Cant.*): *Sorrow is a good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with wormwood*. Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve continually.

On the contrary, Augustine* says: *The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice in his grief*.

Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible, those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is sorrow for sin, as is shown by the words of Matth. v. 5, *Blessed are they that mourn*. Therefore it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.

I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that in them excess and defect are not possible, as

* *De vera et falsa Pœnitentia*, work of an unknown author.

is proved in *Ethic.* ii. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance, there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to its duration, except in so far as the act of one virtue hinders the act of another which is more urgent for the time being. Consequently the more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better it is, provided he exercises the acts of other virtues when and how he ought to. On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both in intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow, which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long, man fall into despair, cowardice, and suchlike vices.

Reply Obj. 1. The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has sorrow itself for object.

Reply Obj. 2. The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy: and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we should make moderate use, according as the end, for which it is assumed, demands.

Reply Obj. 3. Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion. ✓

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR SOULS ARE CONTRITE FOR SINS EVEN AFTER THIS LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that our souls are contrite for sins even after this life. For the love of charity causes displeasure at sin. Now, after this life, charity remains in some, both as to its act and as to its habit, since *charity never falleth away*. Therefore the displeasure at the sin committed, which is the essence of contrition, remains.

Obj. 2. Further, we should grieve more for sin than for punishment. But the souls in purgatory grieve for their sensible punishment and for the delay of glory. Much more, therefore, do they grieve for the sins they committed.

Obj. 3. Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies for sin. But satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power of contrition. Therefore contrition remains after this life.

On the contrary, contrition is a part of the sacrament of Penance. But the sacraments do not endure after this life. Neither, therefore, does contrition.

Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both guilt and punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory could have contrition, it would be possible for their debt of punishment to be remitted through the power of their contrition, so that they would be delivered from their sensible pain, which is false.

I answer that, Three things are to be observed in contrition: first, its genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for it is an act of virtue quickened by charity; thirdly, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious and sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory. Accordingly, after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly country, cannot have contrition, because they are void of sorrow by reason of the fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, have no contrition, for although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which quickens sorrow; while those which are in purgatory have a sorrow for their sins, that is quickened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for they are not in the state of meriting. In this life, however, all these three can be found.

Reply Obj. 1. Charity does not cause this sorrow, save in those who are capable of it; but the fulness of joy in the Blessed excludes all capability of sorrow from them: wherefore, though they have charity, they have no contrition.

Reply Obj. 2. The souls in purgatory grieve for their sins; but their sorrow is not contrition, because it lacks the efficacy of contrition.

Reply Obj. 3. The pain which the souls suffer in purgatory, cannot, properly speaking, be called satisfaction, because satisfaction demands a meritorious work; yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the punishment due may be called satisfaction.

QUESTION V

OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition? (2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely? (3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?

FIRST ARTICLE

WHETHER THE FORGIVENESS OF SIN IS THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the forgiveness of sin is not the effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. But we are somewhat the cause of contrition, since it is an act of our own. Therefore contrition is not the cause of forgiveness.

Obj. 2. Further, contrition is an act of virtue. Now virtue follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue and sin are not together in the soul. Therefore contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness of sin.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to receiving the Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Communion before going to confession. Therefore they have not yet received the forgiveness of their sins.

On the contrary, The gloss on Ps. l. 19, *A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit*, says: *A hearty contrition is the sacrifice by which sins are loosed.*

Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted by the same causes, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. Now sin is committed through the heart's inordinate love. Therefore it is destroyed by sorrow caused by the heart's ordinate love; and consequently contrition blots out sin.

I answer that, Contrition can be considered in two ways, either as part of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an instrument for the forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments (cf. *Sent.* iv., D. 1, Q. 1., A. 4: P. III., Q. LXII., A. 1); while, as an act of virtue, it is the quasi-material cause of sin's forgiveness. For a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification, and a disposition is reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise in the case of an agent's disposition to act, because this is reduced to the genus of efficient cause.

Reply Obj. 1. God alone is the principal efficient cause of the forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive cause can be from us also, and likewise the sacramental cause, since the sacramental forms are words uttered by us, having an instrumental power of conferring grace whereby sins are forgiven.

Reply Obj. 2. The forgiveness of sin precedes virtue and the infusion of grace, in one way, and, in another, follows: and in so far as it follows, the act elicited by the virtue can be a cause of the forgiveness of sin.

Reply Obj. 3. The dispensation of the Eucharist belongs to the ministers of the Church: wherefore a man should not go to Communion until his sin has been forgiven through the ministers of the Church, although his sin may be forgiven him before God.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONTRITION CAN TAKE AWAY THE DEBT OF
PUNISHMENT ENTIRELY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that contrition cannot take away the debt of punishment entirely. For satisfaction and confession are ordained for man's deliverance from the debt of punishment. Now no man is so perfectly contrite as not to be bound to confession and satisfaction. Therefore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire debt of punishment.

Obj. 2. Further, in Penance the punishment should in some way compensate for the sin. Now some sins are accomplished by members of the body. Therefore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that *by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented* (Wis. xi. 17), it seems that the punishment for suchlike sins can never be remitted by contrition.

Obj. 3. Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. Now an infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, sins. Therefore contrition can never be so great as to remit the whole punishment.

On the contrary, The affections of the heart are more acceptable to God than external acts. Now man is absolved from both punishment and guilt by means of external actions; and therefore he is also by means of the heart's affections, such as contrition is.

Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to whom it was said (Luke xxiii. 43): *This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise*, on account of his one act of repentance.

As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always taken away by contrition, this question has already been moved above (*Sent.* iv., D. 14, Q. II., AA. 1, 2; P. III., Q. LXXXVI., A. 4), where the same question was raised with regard to Penance.

I answer that, The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways. First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and in this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the removal of guilt, but also the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of the sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition: and since this sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense as to suffice for the remission of both guilt and punishment.

Reply Obj. 1. A man cannot be sure that his contrition suffices for the remission of both punishment and guilt: wherefore he is bound to confess and to make satisfaction, especially since his contrition would not be true contrition, unless he had the purpose of confessing united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into effect, on account of the precept given concerning confession.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as inward joy redounds into the outward parts of the body, so does interior sorrow show itself in the exterior members: wherefore it is written (Prov. xvii. 22): *A sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones.*

Reply Obj. 3. Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in its intensity, even as the punishment due for mortal sin is finite; yet it derives infinite power from charity, whereby it is quickened, and so it avails for the remission of both guilt and punishment.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER SLIGHT CONTRITION SUFFICES TO BLOT OUT
GREAT SINS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that slight contrition does not suffice to blot out great sins. For contrition is the remedy for sin. Now a bodily remedy, that heals a lesser bodily infirmity, does not suffice to heal a greater. Therefore the least contrition does not suffice to blot out very great sins.

Obj. 2. Further, it was stated above (Q. III., A. 3) that

for greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Now contrition does not blot out sin, unless it fulfils the requisite conditions. Therefore the least contrition does not blot out all sins.

On the contrary, Every sanctifying grace blots out every mortal sin, because it is incompatible therewith. Now every contrition is quickened by sanctifying grace. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all sins.

I answer that, As we have often said (Q. I., A. 2, *ad* 1; Q. III., A. 1; Q. IV., A. 1), contrition includes a twofold sorrow. One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can be so slight as not to suffice for real contrition, e.g. if a sin were less displeasing to a man, than separation from his last end ought to be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity. The other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself, belong essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor again is it under our control. Accordingly we must say that sorrow, however slight it be, provided it suffice for true contrition, blots out all sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Spiritual remedies derive infinite efficacy from the infinite power which operates in them: wherefore the remedy which suffices for healing a slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin. This is seen in Baptism which looses great and small: and the same applies to contrition, provided it fulfil the necessary conditions.

Reply Obj. 2. It follows of necessity that a man grieves more for a greater sin than for a lesser, according as it is more repugnant to the love which causes his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of sorrow for a greater sin, as another has for a lesser, this would suffice for the remission of the sin.

QUESTION VI.

OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider confession, about which there are six points for our consideration: (1) The necessity of confession: (2) Its nature: (3) Its minister: (4) Its quality: (5) Its effect: (6) The seal of confession.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation? (2) Whether confession is according to the natural law? (3) Whether all are bound to confession? (4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty? (5) Whether one is bound to confess at once? (6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONFESSION IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that confession is not necessary for salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is ordained for the sake of the remission of sin. But sin is sufficiently remitted by the infusion of grace. Therefore confession is not necessary in order to do penance for one's sins.

Obj. 2. Further, we read of some being forgiven their sins without confession, e.g. Peter, Magdalen and Paul. But the grace that remits sins is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore neither is it necessary for salvation now that man should confess.

Obj. 3. Further, a sin which is contracted from another,

should receive its remedy from another. Therefore actual sin, which a man has committed through his own act, must take its remedy from the man himself. Now Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore confession is not necessary for salvation.

Obj. 4. Further, confession is necessary for a judicial sentence, in order that punishment may be inflicted in proportion to the offence. Now a man is able to inflict on himself a greater punishment than even that which might be inflicted on him by another. Therefore it seems that confession is not necessary for salvation.

On the contrary, Boethius says (*De Consol. i.*): *If you want the physician to be of assistance to you, you must make your disease known to him.* But it is necessary for salvation that man should take medicine for his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation that man should make his disease known by means of confession.

Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the accused. Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought not to be his own judge, but should be judged by another and consequently ought to confess to him.

I answer that, Christ's Passion, without whose power, neither original nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the reception of the sacraments which derive their efficacy from it. Wherefore for the remission of both actual and original sin, a sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament actually, through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin which is incompatible with salvation, are necessary for salvation: and so just as Baptism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance. And just as a man through asking to be baptized, submits to the ministers of the Church, to whom the dispensation of that sacrament belongs, even so, by confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that, through the sacrament of Penance dispensed by him,

he may receive the pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless he be acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the penitent's confession. Wherefore confession is necessary for the salvation of a man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin.

Reply Obj. 1. The infusion of grace suffices for the remission of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, the sinner still owes a debt of temporal punishment. Moreover, the sacraments of grace are ordained in order that man may receive the infusion of grace, and before he receives them, either actually or in his intention, he does not receive grace. This is evident in the case of Baptism, and applies to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates his temporal punishment by undergoing the shame of confession, by the power of the keys to which he submits, and by the enjoined satisfaction which the priest moderates according to the kind of sins made known to him in confession. Nevertheless the fact that confession is necessary for salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for sins, because this punishment to which one remains bound after the remission of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way of salvation remains open, without such punishment being expiated in this life: but it is due to its conducing to the remission of sin, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 2. Although we do not read that they confessed, it may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded in writing. Moreover Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments; so that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament without using the things which belong to the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 3. The sin that is contracted from another, viz. original sin, can be remedied by an entirely extrinsic cause, as in the case of infants: whereas actual sin, which a man commits of himself, cannot be expiated, without some co-operation on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself, though he was sufficient to sin by himself, because sin is finite on the part of the thing to which it turns, in which respect the sinner

returns to self; while, on the part of the aversion, sin derives infinity, in which respect the remission of sin must needs begin from someone else, because *that which is last in order of generation is first in the order of intention* (*Ethic.* iii.). Consequently actual sin also must needs take its remedy from another.

Reply Obj. 4. Satisfaction would not suffice for the expiation of sin's punishment, by reason of the severity of the punishment which is enjoined in satisfaction, but it does suffice as being a part of the sacrament having the sacramental power; wherefore it ought to be imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and consequently confession is necessary.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONFESSION IS ACCORDING TO THE NATURAL LAW ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that confession is according to the natural law. For Adam and Cain were bound to none but the precepts of the natural law, and yet they are reproached for not confessing their sin. Therefore confession of sin is according to the natural law.

Obj. 2. Further, those precepts which are common to the Old and New Law are according to the natural law. But confession was prescribed in the Old Law, as may be gathered from Isa. xxiii. 26: *Tell, if thou hast anything to justify thyself.* Therefore it is according to the natural law.

Obj. 3. Further, Job was subject only to the natural law. But he confessed his sins, as appears from his words (xxxix. 33) *If, as a man, I have hid my sin.* Therefore confession is according to the natural law.

On the contrary, Isidore says (*Etym.* v.) that the natural law is the same in all. But confession is not in all in the same way. Therefore it is not according to the natural law.

Further, confession is made to one who has the keys. But the keys of the Church are not an institution of the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession.

I answer that, The sacraments are professions of faith,

wherefore they ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the sacraments. And since *the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but a product of a certain innate power*, as Tully states (*De Inv. Rhet. ii.*), consequently the sacraments are not part of the natural law, but of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however, is sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature. But such things are above nature as God reserves to Himself; and these are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of miracles, or in the revelation of mysteries, or in the institution of the sacraments. Hence confession which is of sacramental necessity, is according to Divine, but not according to natural law.

Reply Obj. 1. Adam is reproached for not confessing his sin before God: because the confession which is made to God by the acknowledgment of one's sin, is according to the natural law; whereas here we are speaking of confession made to a man.—We may also reply that in such a case confession of one's sin is according to the natural law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to confess in a court of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying his sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made voluntarily to a man in order to receive from God the forgiveness of one's sins, is not according to the natural law.

Reply Obj. 2. The precepts of the natural law avail in the same way in the law of Moses and in the New Law. But although there was a kind of confession in the law of Moses, yet it was not after the same manner as in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for in the law of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one's sin inwardly before God; while in the law of Moses it was necessary for a man to declare his sin by some external sign, as by making a sin-offering, whereby the fact of his having sinned became known

to another man; but it was not necessary for him to make known what particular sin he had committed, or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law.

Reply Obj. 3. Job is speaking of the man who hides his sin by denying it or excusing himself when he is accused thereof, as we may gather from a gloss on the passage (Gregory, *Moral.* xxii.).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL ARE BOUND TO CONFESSION ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that not all are bound to confession, for Jerome says on Isa. iii. 9 (*They have proclaimed abroad, their sin, etc.: Penance is the second plank after shipwreck.*) But some have not suffered shipwreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting them, and consequently neither is confession which is a part of Penance.

Obj. 2. Further, it is to the judge that confession should be made in any court. But some have no judge over them. Therefore they are not bound to confession.

Obj. 3. Further, some have none but venial sins. Now a man is not bound to confess such sins. Therefore not everyone is bound to confession.

On the contrary, Confession is condivided with satisfaction and contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore all are bound to confession also.

Further, this appears from the Decretals (*De Pœnit. et Remiss.* xii.), where it is stated that *all of either sex are bound to confess their sins as soon as they shall come to the age of discretion.*

I answer that, We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the Divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in this way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into mortal sin after Baptism; secondly, by a precept of positive law, and in this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid down in the general council (Later. iv.: *Can.* 21) under Innocent III.,

both in order that everyone may acknowledge himself to be a sinner, because *all have sinned and need the grace of God* (Rom. iii. 23); and that the Eucharist may be approached with greater reverence; and lastly, that parish priests may know their flock, lest a wolf may hide therein.

Reply Obj. 1. Although it is possible for a man, in this mortal life, to avoid shipwreck, i.e. mortal sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot avoid venial sins, which dispose him to shipwreck, and against which also Penance is ordained; wherefore there is still room for Penance, and consequently for confession, even in those who do not commit mortal sins.

Reply Obj. 2. All must acknowledge Christ as their judge, to Whom they must confess in the person of His vicar; and although the latter may be the inferior if the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the superior, in so far as the penitent is a sinner, while the confessor is the minister of Christ.

Reply Obj. 3. A man is bound to confess his venial sins, not in virtue of the sacrament, but by the institution of the Church, and that, when he has no other sins to confess.— We may also, with others, answer that the Decretal quoted above does not bind others than those who have mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that it orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot apply to venial sins, because no one can confess all his venial sins. Accordingly, a man who has no mortal sins to confess, is not bound to confess his venial sins, but it suffices for the fulfilment of the commandment of the Church that he present himself before the priest, and declare himself to be unconscious of any mortal sin: and this will count for his confession.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A MAN TO CONFESS A SIN WHICH HE HAS NOT COMMITTED ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (*Regist. xii.*), *it is the mark of a good conscience to acknow-*

ledge a fault where there is none. Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience to accuse oneself of those sins which one has not committed.

Obj. 2. Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be praised. But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he thinks he is. Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed a more grievous sin than one has.

Obj. 3. Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it be mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess it as mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he has not committed.

Obj. 4. Further, satisfaction originates from confession. But a man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed. Therefore he can also confess a sin which he has not done.

On the contrary, Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells an untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since every untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he has not committed.

Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of a crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses. Now the witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man ought not to accuse himself of a sin which is not on his conscience.

I answer that, The penitent should, by his confession, make his state known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does not make his state known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore his confession is unavailing; and in order for it to be effective his words must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him only of what is on his conscience.

Reply Obj. 1. To acknowledge a fault where there is none, may be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of the act, and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an erroneous conscience, to acknow-

ledge having done what one has not done.—Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and thus the saying of Gregory is true, because a just man fears lest, in any act which is good in itself, there should be any defect on his part; thus it is written (Job ix. 28): *I feared all my works*. Wherefore it is also the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words of this fear which he holds in his thoughts.

From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since a just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not as though he had committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in those things which he seems to do well, he may by pride sin more grievously.

Reply Obj. 3. When a man doubts whether a certain sin be mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt, because he sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, however, affirm that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and what is not.

Reply Obj. 4. A man does not commit a falsehood by making satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone confesses a sin which he thinks he has not committed. And if he mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he does not lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession thereof tally with his conscience.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE IS BOUND TO CONFESS AT ONCE?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that one is bound to confess at once. For Hugh of S. Victor says (*De Sacram. i.*): *The contempt of confession is inexcusable, unless there be an urgent reason*

for delay. But everyone is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is bound to confess as soon as possible.

Obj. 2. Further, everyone is bound to do more to avoid spiritual disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now if a man who is sick in body were to delay sending for the physician, it would be detrimental to his health. Therefore it seems that it must needs be detrimental to a man's health if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be one at hand.

Obj. 3. Further, that which is due always, is due at once. But man owes confession to God always. Therefore he is bound to confess at once.

On the contrary, A fixed time both for confession and for receiving the Eucharist is determined by the Decretals (*De Pœnit. et Remiss.*). Now a man does not sin by failing to receive the Eucharist before the fixed time. Therefore he does not sin if he does not confess before that time.

Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a commandment bids us to do. If therefore a man is bound to confess at once, and omits to do so, with a priest at hand, he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner at any other time, and so on, so that he would fall into many mortal sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems unreasonable.

I answer that, As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition, viz. when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless his sin be forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at hand, he is bound to confess, or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to contrition and to have the purpose of confessing.

But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. First, accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do something which he cannot do without committing a mortal sin, unless he go to confession first: for then he is bound to confess; for instance, if he has to receive the Eucharist, to which no one can approach, after committing a mortal sin, without

confessing first, if a priest be at hand, and there be no urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church obliges all to confess once a year; because she commands all to receive Holy Communion once a year, viz. at Easter, wherefore all must go to confession before that time.

Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confession; and here the same reason applies to delay of confession as to delay of Baptism, because both are necessary sacraments. Now a man is not bound to receive Baptism as soon as he makes up his mind to be baptized; and so he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: nor is there any fixed time beyond which if he defer Baptism, he would incur a mortal sin. Nevertheless the delay of Baptism may amount to a mortal sin, or it may not, and this depends on the cause of the delay, since, as the Philosopher says (*Phys.* viii.), the will does not defer doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable cause. Wherefore if the cause of the delay of Baptism has a mortal sin connected with it, e.g. if a man put off being baptized through contempt, or some like motive, the delay will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same seems to apply to confession, which is not more necessary than Baptism. Moreover, since man is bound to fulfil in this life those things that are necessary for salvation, therefore, if he be in danger of death, he is bound, even absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to receive Baptism. For this reason too, James proclaimed at the same time the commandment about making confession and that about receiving Extreme Unction (James v. 14, 16). Therefore the opinion seems probable of those who say that a man is not bound to confess at once, though it is dangerous to delay.

Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to confess at once, as soon as he has a reasonable and proper opportunity. Nor does it matter that the Decretal fixes the time limit to an annual confession, because the Church does not favour delay, but forbids the neglect involved in a further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who delays is excused, not from sin in the tribunal of conscience,

but from punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that such a person would not be deprived of proper burial if he were to die before that time. But this seems too severe, because affirmative precepts bind, not at once, but at a fixed time; and this, not because it is most convenient to fulfil them then (for in that case if a man were not to give alms of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in need, he would commit a mortal sin, which is false), but because the time involves urgency. Consequently, if he does not confess at the very first opportunity, it does not follow that he commits a mortal sin, even though he does not await a better opportunity; unless it becomes urgent for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor is it on account of the Church's indulgence that he is not bound to confess at once, but on account of the nature of an affirmative precept, so that before the commandment was made, there was still less obligation.

Others again say that secular persons are not bound to confess before Lent, which is the time of penance for them; but that religious are bound to confess at once, because, for them, all time is a time for penance. But this is not to the point; for religious have no obligations besides those of other men, with the exception of such as they are bound to by vow.

Reply Obj. 1. Hugh is speaking of those who die without this sacrament.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not necessary for bodily health that the physician be sent for at once, except when there is necessity for being healed: and the same applies to spiritual disease.

Reply Obj. 3. The retaining of another's property against the owner's will is contrary to a negative precept, which binds always and for always, and therefore one is always bound to make immediate restitution. It is not the same with the fulfilment of an affirmative precept, which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is not bound to fulfil it at once

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE CAN BE DISPENSED FROM CONFESSION ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one can be dispensed from confessing his sins to a man. For precepts of positive law are subject to dispensation by the prelates of the Church. Now such is confession, as appears from what was said above (A. 3). Therefore one may be dispensed from confession.

Obj. 2. Further, a man can grant a dispensation in that which was instituted by a man. But we read of confession being instituted, not by God, but by a man (James v. 16): *Confess your sins, one to another.* Now the Pope has the power of dispensation in things instituted by the apostles as appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore he can also dispense a man from confessing.

On the contrary, Penance, whereof confession is a part, is a necessary sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since therefore no one can be dispensed from Baptism, neither can one be dispensed from confession.

I answer that, The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church which is founded by God. Wherefore they need to be appointed by the Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the Church is founded on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power to publish new articles of faith, or to do away with those which are already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to abolish those that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ alone, Who is the foundation of the Church. Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be saved without Baptism, nor that he be saved without confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however, dispense from confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the commandment of the

Church; so that a man may delay confession longer than the limit prescribed by the Church.

Reply Obj. 1. The precepts of the Divine law do not bind less than those of the natural law: wherefore, just as no dispensation is possible from the natural law, so neither can there be from positive Divine law.

Reply Obj. 2. The precept about confession was not instituted by a man first of all, though it was promulgated by James: it was instituted by God, and although we do not read it explicitly, yet it was somewhat foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being prepared by John's Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed their sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the priests, and though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood of the New Testament was foreshadowed in them.

QUESTION VII.

OF THE NATURE OF CONFESSION.

(In Three Articles.)

WE must now consider the nature of confession, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession? (2) Whether confession is an act of virtue? (3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER AUGUSTINE FITTINGLY DEFINES CONFESSION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that Augustine defines confession unfittingly, when he says (*Super Ps. xxi.*) that confession *lays bare the hidden disease by the hope of pardon.* For the disease against which confession is ordained, is sin. Now sin is sometimes manifest. Therefore it should not be said that confession is the remedy for a *hidden* disease.

Obj. 2. Further, the beginning of penance is fear. But confession is a part of Penance. Therefore fear rather than *hope* should be set down as the cause of confession.

Obj. 3. Further, that which is placed under a seal, is not laid bare, but closed up. But the sin which is confessed is placed under the seal of confession. Therefore sin is not laid bare in confession, but closed up.

Obj. 4. Further, other definitions are to be found differing from the above. For Gregory says (*Hom. xl. in Evang.*) that confession is *the uncovering of sins, and the opening of the wound.* Others say that *confession is a legal declaration*

of our sins in the presence of a priest. Others define it thus: Confession is the sinner's sacramental self-accusation through shame for what he has done, which through the keys of the Church makes satisfaction for his sins, and binds him to perform the penance imposed on him. Therefore it seems that the definition in question is insufficient, since it does not include all that these include.

I answer that, Several things offer themselves to our notice in the act of confession: first, the very substance or genus of the act, which is a kind of manifestation; secondly, the matter manifested, viz. sin; thirdly, the person to whom the manifestation is made, viz. the priest; fourthly, its cause, viz. hope of pardon; fifthly, its effect, viz. release from part of the punishment, and the obligation to pay the other part. Accordingly the first definition, given by Augustine, indicates the substance of the act, by saying that *it lays bare*,—the matter of confession, by saying that it is a *hidden disease*,—its cause, which is *the hope of pardon*; while the other definitions include one or other of the five things aforesaid, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the priest, as a man, may sometimes have knowledge of the penitent's sin, yet he does not know it as a vicar of Christ (even as a judge sometimes knows a thing, as a man, of which he is ignorant, as a judge), and in this respect it is made known to him by confession. Or we may reply that although the external act may be in the open, yet the internal act, which is the cause of the external act, is hidden; so that it needs to be revealed by confession.

Reply Obj. 2. Confession presupposes charity, which gives us life, as stated in the text (iv. *Sent.*, D. 17). Now it is in contrition that charity is given; while servile fear, which is void of hope, is previous to charity: yet he that has charity is moved more by hope than by fear. Hence hope rather than fear is set down as the cause of confession.

Reply Obj. 3. In every confession sin is laid bare to the priest, and closed to others by the seal of confession.

Reply Obj. 4. It is not necessary that every definition should include everything connected with the thing defined: and for this reason we find some definitions or descriptions that indicate one cause, and some that indicate another.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONFESSION IS AN ACT OF VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that confession is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue belongs to the natural law, since *we are naturally capable of virtue*, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii.). But confession does not belong to the natural law. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, an act of virtue is more befitting one who is innocent than one who has sinned. But the confession of a sin, which is the confession of which we are speaking now, cannot be befitting an innocent man. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, the grace which is in the sacraments differs somewhat from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts. But confession is part of a sacrament. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But confession comes under a precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is meritorious, for *it opens the gate of heaven*, as the Master says (iv. *Sent.*, D. 17). Therefore it seems that it is an act of virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. XVIII., AA. 6, 7; II.-II., Q. LXXX.; Q. LXXXV., A. 3; Q. CIX., A. 3), for an act to belong to a virtue it suffices that it be of such a nature as to imply some condition belonging to virtue. Now, although confession does not include everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name implies the manifestation of that which a man has on his conscience: for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man professes with

his lips what he does not hold in his heart, it is not a confession but a fiction. Now to express in words what one has in one's thoughts is a condition of virtue; and, consequently, confession is a good thing generically, and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it be devoid of other due circumstances.

Reply Obj. 1. Natural reason, in a general way, inclines a man to make confession in the proper way, to confess as he ought, what he ought, and when he ought, and in this way confession belongs to the natural law. But it belongs to the Divine law to determine the circumstances, when, how, what, and to whom, with regard to the confession of which we are speaking now. Accordingly it is evident that the natural law inclines a man to confession, by means of the Divine law, which determines the circumstances, as is the case with all matters belonging to the positive law.

Reply Obj. 2. Although an innocent man may have the habit of the virtue whose object is a sin already committed, he has not the act, so long as he remains innocent. Wherefore the confession of sins, of which confession we are speaking now, is not befitting an innocent man, though it is an act of virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. Though the grace of the sacraments differs from the grace of the virtues, they are not contrary but disparate; hence there is nothing to prevent that which is an act of virtue, in so far as it proceeds from the free-will quickened by grace, from being a sacrament, or part of a sacrament, in so far as it is ordained as a remedy for sin.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONFESSION IS AN ACT OF THE VIRTUE OF
PENANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that confession is not an act of the virtue of penance. For an act belongs to the virtue which is its cause. Now the cause of confession is the hope of pardon, as appears from the definition given above (A. 1).

Therefore it seems that it is an act of hope and not of penance.

Obj. 2. Further, shame is a part of temperance. But confession arises from shame, as appears in the definition given above (A. 1, *Obj. 4*). Therefore it is an act of temperance and not of penance.

Obj. 3. Further, the act of penance leans on Divine mercy. But confession leans rather on Divine wisdom, by reason of the truth which is required in it. Therefore it is not an act of penance.

Obj. 4. Further, we are moved to penance by the article of the Creed which is about the Judgment, on account of fear, which is the origin of penance. But we are moved to confession by the article which is about life everlasting, because it arises from hope of pardon. Therefore it is not an act of penance.

Obj. 5. Further, it belongs to the virtue of truth that a man shows himself to be what he is. But this is what a man does when he goes to confession. Therefore confession is an act of that virtue which is called truth, and not of penance.

On the contrary, Penance is ordained for the destruction of sin. Now confession is ordained to this also. Therefore it is an act of penance.

I answer that, It must be observed with regard to virtues, that when a special reason of goodness or difficulty is added over and above the object of a virtue, there is need of a special virtue: thus the expenditure of large sums is the object of magnificence, although the ordinary kind of average expenditure and gifts belongs to liberality, as appears from *Ethic.* ii., iv. The same applies to the confession of truth, which, although it belongs to the virtue of truth absolutely, yet, on account of the additional reason of goodness, begins to belong to another kind of virtue. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv.) that a confession made in a court of justice belongs to the virtue of justice rather than to truth. In like manner the confession of God's favours, in praise of God, belongs not to truth, but to religion: and

so too the confession of sins, in order to receive pardon for them, is not the elicited act of the virtue of truth, as some say, but of the virtue of penance. It may, however, be the commanded act of many virtues, in so far as the act of confession can be directed to the end of many virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. Hope is the cause of confession, not as eliciting but as commanding.

Reply Obj. 2. In that definition shame is not mentioned as the cause of confession, since it is more of a nature to hinder the act of confession, but rather as the joint cause of delivery from punishment (because shame is in itself a punishment), since also the keys of the Church are the joint cause with confession, to the same effect.

Reply Obj. 3. By a certain adaptation the parts of Penance can be ascribed to three Personal Attributes, so that contrition may correspond to mercy or goodness, by reason of its being sorrow for evil,—confession to wisdom, by reason of its being a manifestation of the truth,—and satisfaction to power, on account of the labour it entails. And since contrition is the first part of Penance, and renders the other parts efficacious, for this reason the same is to be said of Penance as a whole, as of contrition.

Reply Obj. 4. Since confession results from hope rather than from fear, as stated above (A. 1, *ad 2*), it is based on the article about eternal life which hope looks to, rather than on the article about the Judgment, which fear considers; although penance, in its aspect of contrition, is the opposite.

The Reply to the Fifth Objection is to be gathered from what has been said.

QUESTION VIII.

OF THE MINISTER OF CONFESSION.

(*In Seven Articles.*)

WE must now consider the minister of confession, under which head there are seven points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest? (2) Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest? (3) Whether outside a case of necessity one who is not a priest can hear the confession of venial sins? (4) Whether it is necessary for a man to confess to his own priest? (5) Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or of the command of a superior? (6) Whether a penitent, in danger of death, can be absolved by any priest? (7) Whether the temporal punishment should be enjoined in proportion to the sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO CONFESS TO A PRIEST?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not necessary to confess to a priest. For we are not bound to confession, except in virtue of its Divine institution. Now its Divine institution is made known to us (James v. 16): *Confess your sins, one to another*, where there is no mention of a priest. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a priest.

Obj. 2. Further, Penance is a necessary sacrament, as is also Baptism. But any man is the minister of Baptism, on account of its necessity. Therefore any man is the minister

of Penance. Now confession should be made to the minister of Penance. Therefore it suffices to confess to anyone.

Obj. 3. Further, confession is necessary in order that the measure of satisfaction should be imposed on the penitent. Now, sometimes another than a priest might be more discreet than many priests are in imposing the measure of satisfaction on the penitent. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a priest.

Obj. 4. Further, confession was instituted in the Church in order that the rectors might know their sheep by sight. But sometimes a rector or prelate is not a priest. Therefore confession should not always be made to a priest.

On the contrary, The absolution of the penitent, for the sake of which he makes his confession, is imparted by none but priests to whom the keys are intrusted. Therefore confession should be made to a priest.

Further, confession is foreshadowed in the raising of the dead Lazarus to life. Now Our Lord commanded none but the disciples to loose Lazarus (John xi. 44). Therefore confession should be made to a priest.

I answer that, The grace which is given in the sacraments, descends from the Head to the members. Wherefore he alone who exercises a ministry over Christ's true body is a minister of the sacraments, wherein grace is given; and this belongs to a priest alone, who can consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, since grace is given in the sacrament of Penance, none but a priest is the minister of the sacrament: and consequently sacramental confession which should be made to a minister of the Church, should be made to none but a priest.

Reply Obj. 1. James speaks on the presupposition of the Divine institutions: and since confession had already been prescribed by God to be made to a priest, in that He empowered them, in the person of the apostles, to forgive sins, as related in John xx. 23, we must take the words of James as conveying an admonishment to confess to priests.

Reply Obj. 2. Baptism is a sacrament of greater necessity than Penance, as regards confession and absolution, because

sometimes Baptism cannot be omitted without loss of eternal salvation, as in the case of children who have not come to the use of reason: whereas this cannot be said of confession and absolution, which regard none but adults, in whom contrition, together with the purpose of confessing and the desire of absolution, suffices to deliver them from everlasting death. Consequently there is no parity between Baptism and confession.

Reply Obj. 3. In satisfaction we must consider not only the quantity of the punishment but also its power, inasmuch as it is part of a sacrament. In this way it requires a dispenser of the sacraments, though the quantity of the punishment may be fixed by another than a priest.

Reply Obj. 4. It may be necessary for two reasons to know the sheep by sight. First in order to register them as members of Christ's flock, and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the pastoral charge and care, which is sometimes the duty of those who are not priests. Secondly, that they may be provided with suitable remedies for their health; and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the man, i.e. the priest, whose business it is to provide remedies conducive to health, such as the sacrament of the Eucharist, and other like things. It is to this knowledge of the sheep that confession is ordained.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS EVER LAWFUL TO CONFESS TO ANOTHER
THAN A PRIEST?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is never lawful to confess to another than a priest. For confession is a sacramental accusation, as appears from the definition given above (Q. VII., A. 1). But the dispensing of a sacrament belongs to none but the minister of a sacrament. Since then the proper minister of Penance is a priest, it seems that confession should be made to no one else.

Obj. 2. Further, in every court of justice confession is

ordained to the sentence. Now in a disputed case the sentence is void if pronounced by another than the proper judge; so that confession should be made to none but a judge. But, in the court of conscience, the judge is none but a priest, who has the power of binding and loosing. Therefore confession should be made to no one else.

Obj. 3. Further, in the case of Baptism, since anyone can baptize, if a layman has baptized, even without necessity, the Baptism should not be repeated by a priest. But if anyone confess to a layman in a case of necessity, he is bound to repeat his confession to a priest, when the cause for urgency has passed. Therefore confession should not be made to a layman in a case of necessity.

On the contrary, is the authority of the text (iv. *Sent.*, D. 17).

I answer that Just as Baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is Penance. And Baptism, through being a necessary sacrament has a twofold minister: one whose duty it is to baptize, in virtue of his office, viz. the priest, and another, to whom the conferring of Baptism is committed, in a case of necessity. In like manner the minister of Penance, to whom, in virtue of his office, confession should be made, is a priest; but in a case of necessity even a layman may take the place of a priest, and hear a person's confession.

Reply Obj. 1. In the sacrament of Penance there is not only something on the part of the minister, viz. the absolution and imposition of satisfaction, but also something on the part of the recipient, which is also essential to the sacrament, viz. contrition and confession. Now satisfaction originates from the minister in so far as he enjoins it, and from the penitent who fulfils it; and, for the fulness of the sacrament, both these things should concur when possible. But when there is reason for urgency, the penitent should fulfil his own part, by being contrite and confessing to whom he can; and although this person cannot perfect the sacrament, so as to fulfil the part of the priest by giving absolution, yet this defect is supplied by the High Priest.

Nevertheless confession made to a layman, through lack* of a priest, is quasi-sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, on account of the absence of the part which belongs to the priest.

Reply Obj. 2. Although a layman is not the judge of the person who confesses to him, yet, on account of the urgency, he does take the place of a judge over him, absolutely speaking, in so far as the penitent submits to him, through lack of a priest

Reply Obj. 3. By means of the sacraments man must needs be reconciled not only to God, but also to the Church. Now he cannot be reconciled to the Church, unless the hallowing of the Church reach him. In Baptism the hallowing of the Church reaches a man through the element itself applied externally, which is sanctified by *the word of life* (Eph. v. 26), by whomsoever it is conferred: and so when once a man has been baptized, no matter by whom, he must not be baptized again. On the other hand in Penance the hallowing of the Church reaches man by the minister alone, because in that sacrament there is no bodily element applied externally, through the hallowing of which grace may be conferred. Consequently although the man who, in a case of necessity, has confessed to a layman, has received forgiveness from God, for the reason that he fulfilled, so far as he could, the purpose which he conceived in accordance with God's command, he is not yet reconciled to the Church, so as to be admitted to the sacraments, unless he first be absolved by a priest, even as he who has received the Baptism of desire, is not admitted to the Eucharist. Wherefore he must confess again to a priest, as soon as there is one at hand, and the more so since, as stated above (*ad 1*), the sacrament of Penance was not perfected, and so it needs yet to be perfected, in order that by receiving the sacrament, the penitent may receive a more plentiful effect, and that he may fulfil the commandment about receiving the sacrament of Penance.

* Here and in the Reply to the Second Objection the Leonine edition reads *through desire for a priest*.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER, OUTSIDE A CASE OF NECESSITY, ANYONE WHO IS NOT A PRIEST MAY HEAR THE CONFESSION OF VENIAL SINS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that, outside a case of necessity, no one but a priest may hear the confession of venial sins. For the dispensation of a sacrament is committed to a layman by reason of necessity. But the confession of venial sins is not necessary. Therefore it is not committed to a layman.

Obj. 2. Further, Extreme Unction is ordained against venial sin, just as Penance is. But the former may not be given by a layman, as appears from James v. 14. Therefore neither can the confession of venial sins be made to a layman.

On the contrary, is the authority of Bede (on James v. 16, *Confess . . . one to another*) quoted in the text (iv. *Sent* D. 17).

I answer that, By venial sin man is separated neither from God nor from the sacraments of the Church: wherefore he does not need to receive any further grace for the forgiveness of such a sin, nor does he need to be reconciled to the Church. Consequently a man does not need to confess his venial sins to a priest. And since confession made to a layman is a sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, and since it proceeds from charity, it has a natural aptitude to remit sins, just as the beating of one's breast, or the sprinkling of holy water (cf. P. III., Q. LXXXVII., A. 3).

This suffices for the *Reply to the First Objection*, because there is no need to receive a sacrament for the forgiveness of venial sins; and a sacramental, such as holy water or the like, suffices for the purpose.

Reply Obj. 2. Extreme unction is not given directly as a remedy for venial sin, nor is any other sacrament.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR ONE TO CONFESS TO ONE'S OWN PRIEST?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not necessary to confess to one's own priest. For Gregory says (cf. *Can. Ex auctoritate xvi., Q. 1.*): *By our apostolic authority and in discharge of our solicitude we have decreed that priests, who as monks imitate the example of the apostles, may preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose penances, and absolve from sins.* Now monks are not the proper priests of anyone, since they have not the care of souls. Since, therefore, confession is made for the sake of absolution, it suffices for it to be made to any priest.

Obj. 2. Further, the minister of this sacrament is a priest, as also of the Eucharist. But any priest can perform the Eucharist. Therefore any priest can administer the sacrament of Penance. Therefore there is no need to confess to one's own priest.

Obj. 3. Further, when we are bound to one thing in particular it is not left to our choice. But the choice of a discreet priest is left to us, as appears from the authority of Augustine quoted in the text (iv. *Sent.*, D. 17): for he says in *De vera et falsa Pœnitentia* :* *He who wishes to confess his sins, in order to find grace, must seek a priest who knows how to loose and to bind.* Therefore it seems unnecessary to confess to one's own priest.

Obj. 4. Further, there are some, such as prelates, who seem to have no priest of their own, since they have no superior: yet they are bound to confession. Therefore a man is not always bound to confess to his own priest.

Obj. 5. Further, *That which is instituted for the sake of charity, does not militate against charity*, as Bernard observes (*De Praecept. et Dispens.* ii.). Now confession, which was instituted for the sake of charity, would militate against

* Work of an unknown author.

charity, if a man were bound to confess to any particular priest: e.g. if the sinner know that his own priest is a heretic, or a man of evil influence, or weak and prone to the very sin that he wishes to confess to him, or reasonably suspected of breaking the seal of confession, or if the penitent has to confess a sin committed against his confessor. Therefore it seems that one need not always confess to one's own priest.

Obj. 6. Further, men should not be straitened in matters necessary for salvation, lest they be hindered in the way of salvation. But it seems a great inconvenience to be bound of necessity to confess to one particular man, and many might be hindered from going to confession, through either fear, or shame, or something else of the kind. Therefore, since confession is necessary for salvation, men should not be straitened, as apparently they would be, by having to confess to their own priest.

On the contrary stands a decree of Pope Innocent III. in the Fourth Lateran Council (Can. 21), who appointed *all of either sex to confess once a year to their own priest.*

Further, as a bishop is to his diocese, so is a priest to his parish. Now it is unlawful, according to canon law (Can. *Nullus primas* ix., Q. II.; and Can. *Si quis episcoporum* xvi., Q. V.), for a bishop to exercise the episcopal office in another diocese. Therefore it is not lawful for one priest to hear the confession of another's parishioner.

I answer that, The other sacraments do not consist in an action of the recipient, but only in his receiving something, as is evident with regard to Baptism and so forth; though the action of the recipient is required as removing an obstacle, i.e. insincerity, in order that he may receive the benefit of the sacrament, if he has come to the use of his free-will. On the other hand, the action of the man who approaches the sacrament of Penance is essential to the sacrament, since contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are acts of the penitent, are parts of Penance. Now our actions, since they have their origin in us, cannot be dispensed by others, except through their command. Hence

whoever is appointed a dispenser of this sacrament, must be such as to be able to command something to be done. Now a man is not competent to command another unless he have jurisdiction over him. Consequently it is essential to this sacrament, not only for the minister to be in orders, as in the case of the other sacraments, but also for him to have jurisdiction: wherefore he that has no jurisdiction cannot administer this sacrament any more than one who is not a priest. Therefore confession should be made not only to a priest, but to one's own priest; for since a priest does not absolve a man except by binding him to do something, he alone can absolve, who, by his command, can bind the penitent to do something.

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory is speaking of those monks who have jurisdiction, through having charge of a parish; about whom some had maintained that from the very fact that they were monks, they could not absolve or impose penances, which is false.

Reply Obj. 2. The sacrament of the Eucharist does not require the power of command over a man, whereas this sacrament does, as stated above: and so the argument proves nothing. Nevertheless it is not lawful to receive the Eucharist from another than one's own priest, although it is a real sacrament that one receives from another.

Reply Obj. 3. The choice of a discreet priest is not left to us in such a way that we can do just as we like: but it is left to the permission of a higher authority, if perchance one's own priest happens to be less suitable for applying a salutary remedy to our sins.

Reply Obj. 4. Since it is the duty of prelates to dispense the sacraments, which the clean alone should handle, they are allowed by law (*De Pœnit. et Remiss.*, Cap. *Ne pro dilatione*) to choose a priest for their confessor; who in this respect is the prelate's superior; even as one physician is cured by another, not as a physician but as a patient.

Reply Obj. 5. In those cases wherein the penitent has reason to fear some harm to himself or to the priest by reason of his confessing to him, he should have recourse to

the higher authority, or ask permission of the priest himself to confess to another; and if he fails to obtain permission, the case is to be decided as for a man who has no priest at hand; so that he should rather choose a layman and confess to him. Nor does he disobey the law of the Church by so doing, because the precepts of positive law do not extend beyond the intention of the lawgiver, which is the end of the precept, and in this case, is charity, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. i. 5). Nor is any slur cast on the priest, for he deserves to forfeit his privilege, for abusing the power intrusted to him.

Reply Obj. 6. The necessity of confessing to one's own priest does not straiten the way of salvation, but determines it sufficiently. A priest, however, would sin if he were not easy in giving permission to confess to another, because many are so weak that they would rather die without confession than confess to such a priest. Wherefore those priests who are too anxious to probe the consciences of their subjects by means of confession, lay a snare of damnation for many, and consequently for themselves.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR ANYONE TO CONFESS TO ANOTHER THAN HIS OWN PRIEST, IN VIRTUE OF A PRIVILEGE OR A COMMAND GIVEN BY A SUPERIOR?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, even in virtue of a privilege or command given by a superior. For no privilege should be given that wrongs a third party. Now it would be prejudicial to the subject's own priest, if he were to confess to another. Therefore this cannot be allowed by a superior's privilege, permission, or command.

Obj. 2. Further, that which hinders the observance of a Divine command cannot be the subject of a command or privilege given by man. Now it is a Divine command to the rectors of Churches to *know the countenance of their own*

cattle (Prov. xxvii. 23); and this is hindered if another than the rector hear the confession of his subjects. Therefore this cannot be prescribed by any human privilege or command.

Obj. 3. Further, he that hears another's confession is the latter's own judge, else he could not bind or loose him. Now one man cannot have several priests or judges of his own, for then he would be bound to obey several men, which would be impossible, if their commands were contrary or incompatible. Therefore one may not confess to another than one's own priest, even with the superior's permission.

Obj. 4. Further, it is derogatory to a sacrament, or at least useless, to repeat a sacrament over the same matter. But he who has confessed to another priest, is bound to confess again to his own priest, if the latter requires him to do so, because he is not absolved from his obedience, whereby he is bound to him in this respect. Therefore it cannot be lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest.

On the contrary, he that can perform the actions of an order can depute the exercise thereof to anyone who has the same order. Now a superior, such as a bishop, can hear the confession of anyone belonging to a priest's parish, for sometimes he reserves certain cases to himself, since he is the chief rector. Therefore he can also depute another priest to hear that man.

Further, a superior can do whatever his subject can do. But the priest himself can give his parishioner permission to confess to another. Much more, therefore, can his superior do this.

Further, the power which a priest has among his people, comes to him from the bishop. Now it is through that power that he can hear confessions. Therefore, in like manner, another can do so, to whom the bishop gives the same power.

I answer that, A priest may be hindered in two ways from hearing a man's confession: first, through lack of jurisdic-

tion; secondly, through being prevented from exercising his order, as those who are excommunicate, degraded, and so forth. Now whoever has jurisdiction, can depute to another whatever comes under his jurisdiction; so that if a priest is hindered from hearing a man's confession through want of jurisdiction, anyone who has immediate jurisdiction over that man, priest, bishop, or Pope, can depute that priest to hear his confession and absolve him. If, on the other hand, the priest cannot hear the confession, on account of an impediment to the exercise of his order, anyone who has the power to remove that impediment can permit him to hear confessions.

Reply Obj. 1. No wrong is done to a person unless what is taken away from him was granted for his own benefit. Now the power of jurisdiction is not granted a man for his own benefit, but for the good of the people and for the glory of God. Wherefore if the higher prelates deem it expedient for the furthering of the people's salvation and God's glory, to commit matters of jurisdiction to others, no wrong is done to the inferior prelates, except to those who *seek the things that are their own; not the things that are Jesus Christ's* (Philip. ii. 21), and who rule their flock, not by feeding it, but by feeding on it.

Reply Obj. 2. The rector of a Church should *know the countenance of his own cattle* in two ways. First, by an assiduous attention to their external conduct, so as to watch over the flock committed to his care: and in acquiring this knowledge he should not believe his subject, but, as far as possible, inquire into the truth of facts. Secondly, by the manifestation of confession; and with regard to this knowledge, he cannot arrive at any greater certainty than by believing his subject, because this is necessary that he may help his subject's conscience. Consequently in the tribunal of confession, the penitent is believed whether he speak for himself or against himself, but not in the court of external judgment: wherefore it suffices for this knowledge that he believe the penitent when he says that he has confessed to one who could absolve him. It is therefore clear that this

knowledge of the flock is not hindered by a privilege granted to another to hear confessions.

Reply Obj. 3. It would be inconvenient, if two men were placed equally over the same people, but there is no inconvenience if over the same people two are placed one of whom is over the other. In this way the parish priest, the bishop, and the Pope are placed immediately over the same people, and each of them can commit matters of jurisdiction to some other. Now a higher superior delegates a man in two ways: first, so that the latter takes the superior's place, as when the Pope or a bishop appoints his penitentiaries; and then the man thus delegated is higher than the inferior prelate, as the Pope's penitentiary is higher than a bishop, and the bishop's penitentiary than a parish priest, and the penitent is bound to obey the former rather than the latter. Secondly, so that the delegate is appointed the coadjutor of this other priest; and since a coadjutor is subordinate to the person he is appointed to help, he holds a lower rank, and the penitent is not so bound to obey him as his own priest.

Reply Obj. 4. No man is bound to confess sins that he has no longer. Consequently, if a man has confessed to the bishop's penitentiary, or to someone else having faculties from the bishop, his sins are forgiven both before the Church and before God, so that he is not bound to confess them to his own priest, however much the latter may insist: but on account of the Ecclesiastical precept (*De Pœnit. et Remiss.*, Cap. *Omnis utriusque*) which prescribes confession to be made once a year to one's own priest, he is under the same obligation as one who has committed none but venial sins. For such a one according to some is bound to confess none but venial sins, or he must declare that he is free from mortal sin, and the priest, in the tribunal of conscience, ought, and is bound, to believe him. If, however, he were bound to confess again, his first confession would not be useless, because the more priests one confesses to, the more is the punishment remitted, both by reason of the shame in confessing, which is reckoned as a satisfactory

punishment, and by reason of the power of the keys : so that one might confess so often as to be delivered from all punishment. Nor is repetition derogatory to a sacrament, except in those wherein there is some kind of sanctification, either by the impressing of a character, or by the consecration of the matter, neither of which applies to Penance. Hence it would be well for him who hears confessions by the bishop's authority, to advise the penitent to confess to his own priest, yet he must absolve him, even if he declines to do so.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A PENITENT, AT THE POINT OF DEATH, CAN BE
ABSOLVED BY ANY PRIEST ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a penitent, at the point of death, cannot be absolved by any priest. For absolution requires jurisdiction, as stated above (A. 5). Now a priest does not acquire jurisdiction over a man who repents at the point of death. Therefore he cannot absolve him.

Obj. 2. Further, he that receives the sacrament of Baptism, when in danger of death, from another than his own priest, does not need to be baptized again by the latter. If, therefore, any priest can absolve, from any sin, a man who is in danger of death, the penitent, if he survive the danger, need not go to his own priest; which is false, since otherwise the priest would not *know the countenance of his cattle*.

Obj. 3. Further, when there is danger of death, Baptism can be conferred not only by a strange priest, but also by one who is not a priest. But one who is not a priest can never absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore neither can a priest absolve a man who is not his subject, when he is in danger of death.

On the contrary, Spiritual necessity is greater than bodily necessity. But it is lawful in a case of extreme necessity, for a man to make use of another's property, even against the owner's will, in order to supply a bodily need. There-

fore in danger of death, a man may be absolved by another than his own priest, in order to supply his spiritual need.

Further, the authorities quoted in the text prove the same (iv. *Sent.* D. 20, Cap. *Non Habet*).

I answer that, If we consider the power of the keys, every priest has power over all men equally and over all sins: and it is due to the fact that by the ordination of the Church, he has a limited jurisdiction or none at all, that he cannot absolve all men from all sins. But since *necessity knows no law*,* in cases of necessity the ordination of the Church does not hinder him from being able to absolve, since he has the keys sacramentally: and the penitent will receive as much benefit from the absolution of this other priest as if he had been absolved by his own. Moreover a man can then be absolved by any priest not only from his sins, but also from excommunication, by whomsoever pronounced, because such absolution is also a matter of that jurisdiction which by the ordination of the Church is confined within certain limits.

Reply Obj. 1. One person may act on the jurisdiction of another according to the latter's will, since matters of jurisdiction can be deputed. Since, therefore, the Church recognizes absolution granted by any priest at the hour of death, from this very fact a priest has the use of jurisdiction though he lack the power of jurisdiction.

Reply Obj. 2. He needs to go to his own priest, not that he may be absolved again from the sins, from which he was absolved when in danger of death, but that his own priest may know that he is absolved. In like manner, he who has been absolved from excommunication needs to go to the judge, who in other circumstances could have absolved him, not in order to seek absolution, but in order to offer satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 3. Baptism derives its efficacy from the sanctification of the matter itself, so that a man receives the sacrament whosoever baptizes him: whereas the sacramental power of Penance consists in a sanctification pronounced by

* Cap. *Consilium*, *De observ. jejun.*; *De reg. jur.* (v. Decretal.).

the minister, so that if a man confess to a layman, although he fulfils his own part of the sacramental confession, he does not receive sacramental absolution. Wherefore his confession avails him somewhat, as to the lessening of his punishment, owing to the merit derived from his confession and to his repentance; but he does not receive that diminution of his punishment which results from the power of the keys; and consequently he must confess again to a priest; and one who has confessed thus, is more punished hereafter than if he had confessed to a priest.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE TEMPORAL PUNISHMENT IS IMPOSED
ACCORDING TO THE DEGREE OF THE FAULT?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the temporal punishment, the debt of which remains after Penance, is not imposed according to the degree of fault. For it is imposed according to the degree of pleasure derived from the sin, as appears from Apoc. xviii. 7: *As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye her.* Yet sometimes where there is greater pleasure, there is less fault, since *carnal sins, which afford more pleasure than spiritual sins, are less guilty*, according to Gregory (*Moral.* xxxiii.). Therefore the punishment is not imposed according to the degree of fault.

Obj. 2. Further, in the New Law one is bound to punishment for mortal sins, in the same way as in the Old Law. Now in the Old Law the punishment for sin was due to last seven days, in other words, they had to remain unclean seven days for one mortal sin. Since therefore, in the New Testament, a punishment of seven years is imposed for one mortal sin, it seems that the quantity of the punishment does not answer to the degree of fault.

Obj. 3. Further, the sin of murder in a layman is more grievous than that of fornication in a priest, because the circumstance which is taken from the species of a sin, is

more aggravating than that which is taken from the person of the sinner. Now a punishment of seven years' duration is appointed for a layman guilty of murder, while for fornication a priest is punished for ten years, according to Can. *Presbyter*, Dist. lxxxii. Therefore punishment is not imposed according to the degree of fault.

Obj. 4. Further, a sin committed against the very body of Christ is most grievous, because the greater the person sinned against, the more grievous the sin. Now for spilling the blood of Christ in the sacrament of the altar a punishment of forty days or a little more is enjoined, while a punishment of seven years is prescribed for fornication, according to the Canons (*ibid*). Therefore the quantity of the punishment does not answer to the degree of fault.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xxvii. 8): *In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it.* Therefore the quantity of punishment adjudicated for sin answers the degree of fault.

Further, man is reduced to the equality of justice by the punishment inflicted on him. But this would not be so if the quantity of the fault and of the punishment did not mutually correspond. Therefore one answers to the other.

I answer that, After the forgiveness of sin, a punishment is required for two reasons, viz. to pay the debt, and to afford a remedy. Hence the punishment may be imposed in consideration of two things. First in consideration of the debt, and in this way the quantity of the punishment corresponds radically to the quantity of the fault, before anything of the latter is forgiven: yet the more there is remitted by the first of those things which are of a nature to remit punishment, the less there remains to be remitted or paid by the other, because the more contrition remits of the punishment, the less there remains to be remitted by confession. Secondly, in consideration of the remedy, either as regards the one who sinned, or as regards others: and thus sometimes a greater punishment is enjoined for a lesser sin; either because one man's sin is more difficult to resist than another's (thus a heavier punishment is imposed on a

young man for fornication, than on an old man, though the former's sin be less grievous), or because one man's sin, for instance, a priest's, is more dangerous to others, than another's sin, or because the people are more prone to that particular sin, so that it is necessary by the punishment of the one man to deter others. Consequently, in the tribunal of Penance, the punishment has to be imposed with due regard to both these things: and so a greater punishment is not always imposed for a greater sin. On the other hand, the punishment of Purgatory is only for the payment of the debt, because there is no longer any possibility of sinning, so that this punishment is meted only according to the measure of sin, with due consideration however for the degree of contrition, and for confession and absolution, since all these lessen the punishment somewhat: wherefore the priest in enjoining satisfaction should bear them in mind.

Reply Obj. 1. In the words quoted two things are mentioned with regard to the sin, viz. *glorification* and *delicacies* or *delectation*; the first of which regards the uplifting of the sinner, whereby he resists God; while the second regards the pleasure of sin: and though sometimes there is less pleasure in a greater sin, yet there is greater uplifting; wherefore the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2. This punishment of seven days did not expiate the punishment due for the sin, so that even if the sinner died after that time, he would be punished in Purgatory: but it was in expiation of the irregularity incurred, from which all the legal sacrifices expiated. Nevertheless, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously under the New Law than under the Old, on account of the more plentiful sanctification received in Baptism, and on account of the more powerful blessings bestowed by God on the human race. This is evident from Heb. x. 29: *How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments*, etc.—And yet it is not universally true that a seven years' penance is exacted for every mortal sin: but it is a kind of general rule applicable to the majority of cases, which must,

nevertheless, be disregarded, with due consideration for the various circumstances of sins and penitents.

Reply Obj. 3. A bishop or priest sins with greater danger to others or to himself; wherefore the canons are more anxious to withdraw him from sin, by inflicting a greater punishment, in as much as it is intended as a remedy; although sometimes so great a punishment is not strictly due. Hence he is punished less in Purgatory.

Reply Obj. 4. This punishment refers to the case when this happens against the priest's will: for if he spilled it willingly, he would deserve a much heavier punishment.

QUESTION IX.

OF THE QUALITY OF CONFESSION.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the quality of confession: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether confession can be lacking in form? (2) Whether confession ought to be entire? (3) Whether one can confess through another, or by writing? (4) Whether the sixteen conditions, which are assigned by the masters, are necessary for confession?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONFESSION CAN BE LACKING IN FORM?

Objection 1. It seems that confession cannot be lacking in form. For it is written (Ecclus. xvii. 26): *Praise (confessio) perisheth from the dead as nothing.* But a man without charity is dead, because charity is the life of the soul. Therefore there can be no confession without charity.

Obj. 2. Further, confession is condivided with contrition and satisfaction. But contrition and satisfaction are impossible without charity. Therefore confession is also impossible without charity.

Obj. 3. Further, it is necessary in confession that the word should agree with the thought, for the very name of confession requires this. Now if a man confess while remaining attached to sin, his word is not in accord with his thought, since in his heart he holds to sin, while he condemns it with his lips. Therefore such a man does not confess.

On the contrary, Every man is bound to confess his mortal sins. Now if a man in mortal sin has confessed once, he is

not bound to confess the same sins again, because, as no man knows himself to have charity, no man would know of him that he had confessed. Therefore it is not necessary that confession should be quickened by charity.

I answer that, Confession is an act of virtue, and is part of a sacrament. In so far as it is an act of virtue, it has the property of being meritorious, and thus is of no avail without charity, which is the principle of merit. But in so far as it is part of a sacrament, it subordinates the penitent to the priest who has the keys of the Church, and who by means of the confession knows the conscience of the person confessing. In this way it is possible for confession to be in one who is not contrite, for he can make his sins known to the priest, and subject himself to the keys of the Church: and though he does not receive the fruit of absolution then, yet he will begin to receive it, when he is sincerely contrite, as happens in the other sacraments: wherefore he is not bound to repeat his confession, but to confess his lack of sincerity.

Reply Obj. 1. These words must be understood as referring to the receiving of the fruit of confession, which none can receive who is not in the state of charity.

Reply Obj. 2. Contrition and satisfaction are offered to God: but confession is made to man: hence it is essential to contrition and satisfaction, but not to confession, that man should be united to God by charity.

Reply Obj. 3. He who declares the sins which he has, speaks the truth; and thus his thought agrees with his lips or words, as to the substance of confession, though it is discordant with the purpose of confession.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONFESSION SHOULD BE ENTIRE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not necessary for confession to be entire, namely, for a man to confess all his sins to one priest. For shame conduces to the diminution of

punishment. Now the greater the number of priests to whom a man confesses, the greater his shame. Therefore confession is more fruitful if it be divided among several priests.

Obj. 2. Further, confession is necessary in Penance in order that punishment may be enjoined for sin according to the judgment of the priest. Now a sufficient punishment for different sins can be imposed by different priests. Therefore it is not necessary to confess all one's sins to one priest.

Obj. 3. Further, it may happen that a man after going to confession and performing his penance, remembers a mortal sin, which escaped his memory while confessing, and that his own priest to whom he confessed first is no longer available, so that he can only confess that sin to another priest, and thus he will confess different sins to different priests.

Obj. 4. Further, the sole reason for confessing one's sins to a priest is in order to receive absolution. Now sometimes, the priest who hears a confession can absolve from some of the sins, but not from all. Therefore in such a case at all events the confession need not be entire.

On the contrary, Hypocrisy is an obstacle to Penance. But it savours of hypocrisy to divide one's confession, as Augustine says.* Therefore confession should be entire. Further, confession is a part of Penance. But Penance should be entire. Therefore confession also should be entire.

I answer that, In prescribing medicine for the body, the physician should know not only the disease for which he is prescribing, but also the general constitution of the sick person, since one disease is aggravated by the addition of another, and a medicine which would be adapted to one disease, would be harmful to another. The same is to be said in regard to sins, for one is aggravated when another is added to it; and a remedy which would be suitable for one sin, might prove an incentive to another, since sometimes a man is guilty of contrary sins, as Gregory says (*Pastoral. iii.*). Hence it is necessary for confession that man confess all the sins that he calls to mind, and if he fails to do this, it is not a confession, but a pretence of confession.

* *De vera et falsa Pœnitentia*, work of an unknown author.

Reply Obj. 1. Although a man's shame is multiplied when he makes a divided confession to different confessors, yet all his different shames together are not so great as that with which he confesses all his sins together: because one sin considered by itself does not prove the evil disposition of the sinner, as when it is considered in conjunction with several others, for a man may fall into one sin through ignorance or weakness, but a number of sins proves the malice of the sinner, or his great corruption.

Reply Obj. 2. The punishment imposed by different priests would not be sufficient, because each would only consider one sin by itself, and not the gravity which it derives from being in conjunction with another. Moreover sometimes the punishment which would be given for one sin would foster another. Again the priest in hearing a confession takes the place of God, so that confession should be made to him just as contrition is made to God: wherefore as there would be no contrition unless one were contrite for all the sins which one calls to mind, so is there no confession unless one confess all the sins that one remembers committing.

Reply Obj. 3. Some say that when a man remembers a sin which he had previously forgotten, he ought to confess again the sins which he had confessed before, especially if he cannot go to the same priest to whom his previous confession was made, in order that the total quantity of his sins may be made known to one priest. But this does not seem necessary, because sin takes its quantity both from itself and from the conjunction of another; and as to the sins which he confessed he had already manifested their quantity which they have of themselves, while as to the sin which he had forgotten, in order that the priest may know the quantity which it has under both the above heads, it is enough that the penitent declare it explicitly, and confess the others in general, saying that he had confessed many sins in his previous confession, but had forgotten this particular one.

Reply Obj. 4. Although the priest may be unable to absolve the penitent from all his sins, yet the latter is

bound to confess all to him, that he may know the total quantity of his guilt, and refer him to the superior with regard to the sins from which he cannot absolve him.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE MAY CONFESS THROUGH ANOTHER, OR BY WRITING ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one may confess through another, or by writing. For confession is necessary in order that the penitent's conscience may be made known to the priest. But a man can make his conscience known to the priest, through another or by writing. Therefore it is enough to confess through another or by writing.

Obj. 2. Further, some are not understood by their own priests on account of a difference of language, and consequently cannot confess save through others. Therefore it is not essential to the sacrament that one should confess by oneself, so that if anyone confesses through another in any way whatever, it suffices for his salvation.

Obj. 3. Further, it is essential to the sacrament that a man should confess to his own priest, as appears from what has been said (Q. VIII., A. 5). Now sometimes a man's own priest is absent, so that the penitent cannot speak to him with his own voice. But he could make his conscience known to him by writing. Therefore it seems that he ought to manifest his conscience to him by writing to him.

On the contrary, Man is bound to confess his sins even as he is bound to confess his faith. But confession of faith should be made *with the mouth*, as appears from Rom. x. 10: therefore confession of sins should also.

Further, who sinned by himself should, by himself, do penance. But confession is part of penance. Therefore the penitent should confess his own sins.

I answer that, Confession is not only an act of virtue, but also part of a sacrament. Now, though, in so far as it is an act of virtue it matters not how it is done, even if it be

easier to do it in one way than in another, yet, in so far as it is part of a sacrament, it has a determinate act, just as the other sacraments have a determinate matter. And as in Baptism, in order to signify the inward washing, we employ that element which is chiefly used in washing, so in the sacramental act which is intended for manifestation we generally make use of that act which is most commonly employed for the purpose of manifestation, viz. our own words; for other ways have been introduced as supplementary to this.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as in Baptism it is not enough to wash with anything, but it is necessary to wash with a determinate element, so neither does it suffice, in Penance, to manifest one's sins anyhow, but they must be declared by a determinate act.

Reply Obj. 2. It is enough for one who is ignorant of a language, to confess by writing, or by signs, or by an interpreter, because a man is not bound to do more than he can: although a man is not able or obliged to receive Baptism, except with water, which is from an entirely external source and is applied to us by another: whereas the act of confession is from within and is performed by ourselves, so that when we cannot confess in one way, we must confess as we can.

Reply Obj. 3. In the absence of one's own priest, confession may be made even to a layman, so that there is no necessity to confess in writing, because the act of confession is more essential than the person to whom confession is made.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SIXTEEN CONDITIONS USUALLY ASSIGNED
ARE NECESSARY FOR CONFESSION ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the conditions assigned by masters, and contained in the following lines, are not requisite for confession :

Simple, humble, pure, faithful,
Frequent, undisguised, discreet, voluntary, shamefaced,
Entire, secret, tearful, not delayed,
Courageously accusing, ready to obey.

For fidelity, simplicity, and courage are virtues by themselves, and therefore should not be reckoned as conditions of confession.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing is *pure* when it is not mixed with anything else: and *simplicity*, in like manner, removes composition and admixture. Therefore one or the other is superfluous.

Obj. 3. Further, no one is bound to confess more than once a sin which he has committed but once. Therefore if a man does not commit a sin again, his penance need not be *frequent*.

Obj. 4. Further, confession is directed to satisfaction. But satisfaction is sometimes public. Therefore confession should not always be *secret*.

Obj. 5. Further, that which is not in our power is not required of us. But it is not in our power to shed *tears*. Therefore it is not required of those who confess.

On the contrary, We have the authority of the masters who assigned the above.

I answer that, Some of the above conditions are essential to confession, and some are requisite for its well-being. Now those things which are essential to confession belong to it either as to an act of virtue, or as to part of a sacrament. If in the first way, it is either by reason of virtue in general, or by reason of the special virtue of which it is the act, or by reason of the act itself. Now there are four conditions of virtue in general, as stated in *Ethic. ii.* The first is knowledge, in respect of which confession is said to be *discreet*, inasmuch as prudence is required in every act of virtue: and this discretion consists in giving greater weight to greater sins. The second condition is choice, because acts of virtue should be voluntary, and in this respect confession is said to be *voluntary*. The third condition is that the act be done for a particular purpose, viz. the due end, and in this respect confession is said to be *pure*, i.e. with a right intention. The fourth condition is that one should act immovably, and in this respect it is said that confession should be *courageous*, viz. that the truth should not be forsaken through shame.

Now confession is an act of the virtue of penance. First of all it takes its origin in the horror which one conceives for the shamefulness of sin, and in this respect confession should be *full of shame*, so as not to be a boastful account of one's sins, by reason of some worldly vanity accompanying it. Then it goes on to deplore the sin committed, and in this respect it is said to be *tearful*. Thirdly, it culminates in self-abjection, and in this respect it should be *humble*, so that one confesses one's misery and weakness.

By reason of its very nature, viz. confession, this act is one of manifestation: which manifestation can be hindered by four things: first by falsehood, and in this respect confession is said to be *faithful*, i.e. true. Secondly, by the use of vague words, and against this confession is said to be *open*, so as not to be wrapped up in vague words; thirdly, by *multiplicity* of words, in which respect it is said to be *simple*, indicating that the penitent should relate only such matters as affect the gravity of the sin; fourthly none of those things should be suppressed which should be made known, and in this respect confession should be *entire*.

In so far as confession is part of a sacrament it is subject to the judgment of the priest who is the minister of the sacrament. Wherefore it should be an *accusation* on the part of the penitent, should manifest his *readiness to obey* the priest, should be *secret* as regards the nature of the court wherein the hidden affairs of conscience are tried.

The well-being of confession requires that it should be *frequent*; and *not delayed*, i.e. that the sinner should confess at once.

Reply Obj. 1. There is nothing unreasonable in one virtue being a condition of the act of another virtue, through this act being commanded by that virtue; or through the mean which belongs to one virtue principally, belonging to other virtues by participation.

Reply Obj. 2. The condition *pure* excludes perversity of intention, from which man is cleansed: but the condition *simple* excludes the introduction of unnecessary matter.

Reply Obj. 3. This is not necessary for confession, but is a condition of its well-being.

Reply Obj. 4. Confession should be made not publicly but privately, lest others be scandalized, and led to do evil through hearing the sins confessed. On the other hand, the penance enjoined in satisfaction does not give rise to scandal, since like works of satisfaction are done sometimes for slight sins, and sometimes for none at all.

Reply Obj. 5. We must understand this to refer to tears of the heart.

QUESTION X.
OF THE EFFECT OF CONFESSION.
(*In Five Articles.*)

WE must now consider the effect of confession: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin? (2) Whether confession delivers one in any way from punishment? (3) Whether confession opens Paradise to us? (4) Whether confession gives hope of salvation? (5) Whether a general confession blots out mortal sins that one has forgotten?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONFESSION DELIVERS ONE FROM THE DEATH OF
SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that confession does not deliver one from the death of sin. For confession follows contrition. But contrition sufficiently blots out guilt. Therefore confession does not deliver one from the death of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, just as mortal sin is a fault, so is venial. Now confession renders venial that which was mortal before, as stated in the text (iv. *Sent. D. 17*). Therefore confession does not blot out guilt, but one guilt is changed into another.

On the contrary, Confession is part of the sacrament of Penance. But Penance delivers from guilt. Therefore confession does also.

I answer that, Penance, as a sacrament, is perfected chiefly in confession, because by the latter a man submits to the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacra-

ments: for contrition has the desire of confession united thereto, and satisfaction is enjoined according to the judgment of the priest who hears the confession. And since in the sacrament of Penance, as in Baptism, that grace is infused whereby sins are forgiven, therefore confession in virtue of the absolution granted remits guilt, even as Baptism does. Now Baptism delivers one from the death of sin, not only by being received actually, but also by being received in desire, as is evident with regard to those who approach the sacrament of Baptism after being already sanctified. And unless a man offers an obstacle, he receives, through the very fact of being baptized, grace whereby his sins are remitted, if they are not already remitted. The same is to be said of confession, to which absolution is added, because it delivered the penitent from guilt through being previously in his desire. Afterwards at the time of actual confession and absolution he receives an increase of grace, and forgiveness of sins would also be granted to him, if his previous sorrow for sin was not sufficient for contrition, and if at the time he offered no obstacle to grace. Consequently just as it is said of Baptism that it delivers from death, so can it be said of confession.

Reply Obj. 1. Contrition has the desire of confession attached to it, and therefore it delivers penitents from death in the same way as the desire of Baptism delivers those who are going to be baptized.

Reply Obj. 2. In the text venial does not designate guilt, but punishment that is easily expiated; and so it does not follow that one guilt is changed into another, but that it is wholly done away. For *venial* is taken in three senses:* first, for what is venial generically, e.g. an idle word: secondly, for what is venial in its cause, i.e. having within itself a motive of pardon, e.g. sins due to weakness: thirdly, for what is venial in the result, in which sense it is understood here, because the result of confession is that man's past guilt is pardoned.

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXVIII., A. 2.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONFESSION DELIVERS FROM PUNISHMENT IN SOME WAY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that confession nowise delivers from punishment. For sin deserves no punishment but what is either eternal or temporal. Now eternal punishment is remitted by contrition, and temporal punishment by satisfaction. Therefore nothing of the punishment is remitted by confession.

Obj. 2. Further, *the will is taken for the deed*,* as stated in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 17). Now he that is contrite has the intention to confess; wherefore his intention avails him as though he had already confessed, and so the confession which he makes afterwards remits no part of the punishment.

On the contrary, Confession is a penal work. But all penal works expiate the punishment due to sin. Therefore confession does also.

I answer that, Confession together with absolution has the power to deliver from punishment, for two reasons. First, from the power of absolution itself: and thus the very desire of absolution delivers a man from eternal punishment, as also from the guilt. Now this punishment is one of condemnation and total banishment: and when a man is delivered therefrom he still remains bound to a temporal punishment, in so far as punishment is a cleansing and perfecting remedy; and so this punishment remains to be suffered in Purgatory by those who also have been delivered from the punishment of hell. Which temporal punishment is beyond the powers of the penitent dwelling in this world, but is so far diminished by the power of the keys, that it is within the ability of the penitent, and he is able, by making satisfaction, to cleanse himself in this life.—Secondly, confession diminishes the punishment in virtue

* Cf. Can. *Magna Pictas, De Pœnit.* Dist. i.

of the very nature of the act of the one who confesses, for this act has the punishment of shame attached to it, so that the oftener one confesses the same sins, the more is the punishment diminished.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2. The will is not taken for the deed, if this is done by another, as in the case of Baptism: for the will to receive Baptism is not worth as much as the reception of Baptism. But a man's will is taken for the deed, when the latter is something done by him entirely. Again this is true of the essential reward, but not of the removal of punishment and the like, which come under the head of accidental and secondary reward. Consequently one who has confessed and received absolution will be less punished in Purgatory than one who has gone no further than contrition.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONFESSION OPENS PARADISE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that confession does not open Paradise. For different sacraments have different effects. But it is the effect of Baptism to open Paradise. Therefore it is not the effect of confession.

Obj. 2. Further, it is impossible to enter by a closed door before it be opened. But a dying man can enter heaven before making his confession. Therefore confession does not open Paradise.

On the contrary, Confession makes a man submit to the keys of the Church. But Paradise is opened by those keys. Therefore it is opened by confession.

I answer that, Guilt and the debt of punishment prevent a man from entering into Paradise: and since confession removes these obstacles, as shown above (AA. 1, 2), it is said to open Paradise.

Reply Obj. 1. Although Baptism and Penance are different sacraments, they act in virtue of Christ's one Passion, whereby a way was opened unto Paradise.

Reply Obj. 2. If the dying man was in mortal sin Paradise was closed to him before he conceived the desire to confess his sin, although afterwards it was opened by contrition implying a desire for confession, even before he actually confessed. Nevertheless the obstacle of the debt of punishment was not entirely removed before confession and satisfaction.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONFESSION GIVES HOPE OF SALVATION ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that hope of salvation should not be reckoned an effect of confession. For hope arises from all meritorious acts. Therefore, seemingly, it is not the proper effect of confession.

Obj. 2. Further, we arrive at hope through tribulation, as appears from Rom. v. 3, 4. Now man suffers tribulation chiefly in satisfaction. Therefore, satisfaction rather than confession gives hope of salvation.

On the contrary, Confession makes a man more humble and more wary, as the Master states in the text (iv. Sent. D. 17). But the result of this is that man conceives a hope of salvation. Therefore it is the effect of confession to give hope of salvation.

I answer that, We can have no hope for the forgiveness of our sins except through Christ: and since by confession a man submits to the keys of the Church which derive their power from Christ's Passion, therefore do we say that confession gives hope of salvation.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not our actions, but the grace of our Redeemer, that is the principal cause of the hope of salvation: and since confession relies upon the grace of our Redeemer, it gives hope of salvation, not only as a meritorious act, but also as part of a sacrament.

Reply Obj. 2. Tribulation gives hope of salvation, by making us exercise our own virtue, and by paying off the debt of punishment: while confession does so also in the way mentioned above.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A GENERAL CONFESSION SUFFICES TO BLOT OUT FORGOTTEN MORTAL SINS ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a general confession does not suffice to blot out forgotten mortal sins. For there is no necessity to confess again a sin which has been blotted out by confession. If, therefore, forgotten sins were forgiven by a general confession, there would be no need to confess them when they are called to mind.

Obj. 2. Further, whoever is not conscious of sin, either is not guilty of sin, or has forgotten his sin. If, therefore, mortal sins are forgiven by a general confession, whoever is not conscious of a mortal sin, can be certain that he is free from mortal sin, whenever he makes a general confession: which is contrary to what the Apostle says (1 Cor. iv. 4), *I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified.*

Obj. 3. Further, no man profits by neglect. Now a man cannot forget a mortal sin without neglect, before it is forgiven him. Therefore he does not profit by his forgetfulness so that the sin is forgiven him without special mention thereof in confession.

Obj. 4. Further, that which the penitent knows nothing about is further from his knowledge than that which he has forgotten. Now a general confession does not blot out sins committed through ignorance, else heretics, who are not aware that certain things they have done are sinful, and certain simple people, would be absolved by a general confession, which is false. Therefore a general confession does not take away forgotten sins.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xxxiii. 6): *Come ye to Him and be enlightened, and your faces shall not be confounded.* Now he who confesses all the sins of which he is conscious, approaches to God as much as he can: nor can more be required of him. Therefore he will not be confounded by being repelled, but will be forgiven.

Further, he that confesses is pardoned unless he be insincere. But he who confesses all the sins that he calls to mind, is not insincere through forgetting some, because he suffers from ignorance of fact, which excuses from sin. Therefore he receives forgiveness, and then the sins which he has forgotten, are loosened, since it is wicked to hope for half a pardon.

I answer that, Confession produces its effect, on the presupposition that there is contrition which blots out guilt: so that confession is directly ordained to the remission of punishment, which it causes in virtue of the shame which it includes, and by the power of the keys to which a man submits by confessing. Now it happens sometimes that by previous contrition a sin has been blotted out as to the guilt, either in a general way (if it was not remembered at the time) or in particular (and yet is forgotten before confession): and then general sacramental confession works for the remission of the punishment in virtue of the keys, to which man submits by confessing, provided he offers no obstacle so far as he is concerned: but so far as the shame of confessing a sin diminishes its punishment, the punishment for the sin for which a man does not express his shame, through failing to confess it to the priest, is not diminished.

Reply Obj. 1. In sacramental confession, not only is absolution required, but also the judgment of the priest who imposes satisfaction is awaited. Wherefore although the latter has given absolution, nevertheless the penitent is bound to confess in order to supply what was wanting to the sacramental confession.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above, confession does not produce its effect, unless contrition be presupposed; concerning which no man can know whether it be true contrition, even as neither can one know for certain if he has grace. Consequently a man cannot know for certain whether a forgotten sin has been forgiven him in a general confession, although he may think so on account of certain conjectural signs.

Reply Obj. 3. He does not profit by his neglect, since he

does not receive such full pardon, as he would otherwise have received, nor is his merit so great. Moreover he is bound to confess the sin when he calls it to mind.

Reply Obj. 4. Ignorance of the law does not excuse, because it is a sin by itself: but ignorance of fact does excuse. Therefore if a man omits to confess a sin, because he does not know it to be a sin, through ignorance of the Divine law, he is not excused from insincerity. On the other hand, he would be excused, if he did not know it to be a sin, through being unaware of some particular circumstance, for instance, if he had knowledge of another's wife, thinking her his own. Now forgetfulness of an act of sin comes under the head of ignorance of fact, wherefore it excuses from the sin of insincerity in confession, which is an obstacle to the fruit of absolution and confession.

QUESTION XI.

OF THE SEAL OF CONFESSION.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE must now inquire about the seal of confession, about which there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether in every case a man is bound to hide what he knows under the seal of confession? (2) Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession? (3) Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession? (4) Whether, by permission of the penitent, the priest can make known to another, a sin of his which he knew under the seal of confession? (5) Whether he is bound to hide even what he knows through other sources besides?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN EVERY CASE THE PRIEST IS BOUND TO HIDE THE SINS WHICH HE KNOWS UNDER THE SEAL OF CONFESSION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the priest is not bound in every case to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession. For, as Bernard says (*De Præcep. et Dispens. ii.*), *that which is instituted for the sake of charity does not militate against charity.* Now the secret of confession would militate against charity in certain cases: for instance, if a man knew through confession that a certain man was a heretic, whom he cannot persuade to desist from misleading the people; or, in like manner, if a man knew, through confession, that

certain people who wish to marry are related to one another. Therefore such ought to reveal what they know through confession.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is obligatory solely on account of a precept of the Church need not be observed, if the commandment be changed to the contrary. Now the secret of confession was introduced solely by a precept of the Church. If therefore the Church were to prescribe that anyone who knows anything about such and such a sin must make it known, a man that had such knowledge through confession would be bound to speak.

Obj. 3. Further, a man is bound to safeguard his conscience rather than the good name of another, because there is order in charity. Now it happens sometimes that a man by hiding a sin injures his own conscience,—for instance, if he be called upon to give witness of a sin of which he has knowledge through confession, and is forced to swear to tell the truth,—or when an abbot knows through confession the sin of a prior who is subject to him, which sin would be an occasion of ruin to the latter, if he suffers him to retain his priorship, wherefore he is bound to deprive him of the dignity of his pastoral charge, and yet in depriving him he seems to divulge the secret of confession. Therefore it seems that in certain cases it is lawful to reveal a confession.

Obj. 4. Further, it is possible for a priest through hearing a man's confession to be conscious that the latter is unworthy of ecclesiastical preferment. Now everyone is bound to prevent the promotion of the unworthy, if it is his business. Since then by raising an objection he seems to raise a suspicion of sin, and so to reveal the confession somewhat, it seems that it is necessary sometimes to divulge a confession.

On the contrary, The Decretal says (*De Pœnit. et Remiss. Cap. Omnis utriusque*): *Let the priest beware lest he betray the sinner, by word, or sign, or in any other way whatever.*

Further, the priest should conform himself to God, Whose minister he is. But God does not reveal the sins which are

made known to Him in confession, but hides them. Neither, therefore, should the priest reveal them.

I answer that, Those things which are done outwardly in the sacraments are the signs of what takes place inwardly: wherefore confession, whereby a man subjects himself to a priest, is a sign of the inward submission, whereby one submits to God. Now God hides the sins of those who submit to Him by Penance; wherefore this also should be signified in the sacrament of Penance, and consequently the sacrament demands that the confession should remain hidden, and he who divulges a confession sins by violating the sacrament. Besides this there are other advantages in this secrecy, because thereby men are more attracted to confession, and confess their sins with greater simplicity.

Reply Obj. 1. Some say that the priest is not bound by the seal of confession to hide other sins than those in respect of which the penitent promises amendment; otherwise he may reveal them to one who can be a help and not a hindrance. But this opinion seems erroneous, since it is contrary to the truth of the sacrament; for just as, though the person baptized be insincere, yet his Baptism is a sacrament, and there is no change in the essentials of the sacrament on that account, so confession does not cease to be sacramental, although he that confesses, does not purpose amendment. Therefore, this notwithstanding, it must be held secret; nor does the seal of confession militate against charity on that account, because charity does not require man to find a remedy for a sin which he knows not: and that which is known in confession, is, as it were, unknown, since a man knows it, not as man, but as God knows it. Nevertheless in the cases quoted one should apply some kind of remedy, so far as this can be done without divulging the confession, e.g. by admonishing the penitent, and by watching over the others lest they be corrupted by heresy. He can also tell the prelate to watch over his flock with great care, yet so as by neither word nor sign to betray the penitent.

Reply Obj. 2. The precept concerning the secret of confession follows from the sacrament itself. Wherefore just as

the obligation of making a sacramental confession is of Divine law, so that no human dispensation or command can absolve one therefrom, even so, no man can be forced or permitted by another man to divulge the secret of confession. Consequently if he be commanded under pain of excommunication to be incurred *ipso facto*, to say whether he knows anything about such and such a sin, he ought not to say it, because he should assume that the intention of the person in commanding him thus, was that he should say what he knew as man. And even if he were expressly interrogated about a confession, he ought to say nothing, nor would he incur the excommunication, for he is not subject to his superior, save as a man, and he knows this not as a man, but as God knows it.

Reply Obj. 3. A man is not called upon to witness except as a man, wherefore without wronging his conscience he can swear that he knows not, what he knows only as God knows it. In like manner a superior can, without wronging his conscience, leave a sin unpunished which he knows only as God knows it, or he may forbear to apply a remedy, since he is not bound to apply a remedy, except according as it comes to his knowledge. Wherefore with regard to matters which come to his knowledge in the tribunal of Penance, he should apply the remedy, as far as he can, in the same court: thus as to the case in point, the abbot should advise the prior to resign his office, and if the latter refuse, he can absolve him from the priorship on some other occasion, yet so as to avoid all suspicion of divulging the confession.

Reply Obj. 4. A man is rendered unworthy of ecclesiastical preferment, by many other causes besides sin, for instance, by lack of knowledge, age, or the like: so that by raising an objection one does not raise a suspicion of crime or divulge the secret of confession.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEAL OF CONFESSION EXTENDS TO OTHER MATTERS THAN THOSE WHICH HAVE REFERENCE TO CONFESSION ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1: It seems that the seal of confession extends to other matters besides those which have reference to confession. For sins alone have reference to confession. Now sometimes, besides sins other matters are told which have no reference to confession. Therefore, since such things are told to the priest, as to God, it seems that the seal of confession extends to them also.

Obj. 2. Further, sometimes one person tells another a secret, which the latter receives under the seal of confession. Therefore the seal of confession extends to matters having no relation to confession.

On the contrary, The seal of confession is connected with sacramental confession. But those things which are connected with a sacrament, do not extend outside the bounds of the sacrament. Therefore the seal of confession does not extend to matters other than those which have reference to sacramental confession.

I answer that, The seal of confession does not extend directly to other matters than those which have reference to sacramental confession, yet indirectly matters also which are not connected with sacramental confession are affected by the seal of confession, those, for instance, which might lead to the discovery of a sinner or of his sin. Nevertheless these matters also must be most carefully hidden, both on account of scandal, and to avoid leading others into sin through their becoming familiar with it.

This suffices for the *Reply* to the *First Objection*.

Reply Obj. 2. A confidence ought not easily to be accepted in this way: but if it be done, the secret must be kept in the way promised, as though one had the secret through confession, though not through the seal of confession.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PRIEST ALONE IS BOUND BY THE SEAL OF
CONFESSION ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession. For sometimes a priest hears a confession through an interpreter, if there be an urgent reason for so doing. But it seems that the interpreter is bound to keep the confession secret. Therefore one who is not a priest knows something under the seal of confession.

Obj. 2. Further, it is possible sometimes in cases of urgency for a layman to hear a confession. But he is bound to secrecy with regard to those sins, since they are told to him as to God. Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.

Obj. 3. Further, it may happen that a man pretends to be a priest, so that by this deceit he may know what is on another's conscience: and it would seem that he also sins if he divulges the confession. Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.

On the contrary, A priest alone is the minister of this sacrament. But the seal of confession is connected with this sacrament. Therefore the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession.

Further, the reason why a man is bound to keep secret what he hears in confession, is because he knows them, not as man but as God knows them. But the priest alone is God's minister. Therefore he alone is bound to secrecy.

I answer that, The seal of confession affects the priest as minister of this sacrament: which seal is nothing else than the obligation of keeping the confession secret, even as the key is the power of absolving. Yet, as one who is not a priest, in a particular case has a kind of share in the act of the keys, when he hears a confession in a case of urgency, so also does he have a certain share in the act of the seal of

confession, and is bound to secrecy, though, properly speaking, he is not bound by the seal of confession.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER BY THE PENITENT'S PERMISSION, A PRIEST MAY REVEAL TO ANOTHER A SIN WHICH HE KNOWS UNDER THE SEAL OF CONFESSION ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a priest may not, by the penitent's permission, reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal of confession. For an inferior may not do what his superior may not. Now the Pope cannot give permission for anyone to divulge a sin which he knows through confession. Neither therefore can the penitent give him such a permission.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is instituted for the common good of the Church cannot be done away at the will of an individual. Now the secrecy of confession was instituted for the good of the whole Church, in order that men might have greater confidence in approaching the confessional. Therefore the penitent cannot allow the priest to divulge his confession.

Obj. 3. Further, if the priest could grant such a permission, this would seem to palliate the wickedness of bad priests, for they might pretend to have received the permission and so they might sin with impunity, which would be unbecoming. Therefore it seems that the penitent cannot grant this permission.

Obj. 4. Further, the one to whom this sin is divulged, does not know that sin under the seal of confession, so that he may publish a sin which is already blotted out, which is unbecoming. Therefore this permission cannot be granted.

On the contrary, If the sinner consent, a superior may refer him by letter to an inferior priest. Therefore with the consent of the penitent, the priest may reveal a sin of his to another.

Further, whosoever can do a thing of his own authority, can do it through another. But the penitent can by his own authority reveal his sin to another. Therefore he can do it through the priest.

I answer that, There are two reasons for which the priest is bound to keep a sin secret: first and chiefly, because this very secrecy is essential to the sacrament, in so far as the priest knows that sin, as it is known to God, Whose place he holds in confession: secondly, in order to avoid scandal. Now the penitent can make the priest know, as a man, what he knew before only as God knows it, and he does this when he allows him to divulge it: so that if the priest does reveal it, he does not break the seal of confession. Nevertheless he should beware of giving scandal by revealing the sin, lest he be deemed to have broken the seal.

Reply Obj. 1. The Pope cannot permit a priest to divulge a sin, because he cannot make him to know it as a man, whereas he that has confessed it, can.

Reply Obj. 2. When that is told which was known through another source, that which is instituted for the common good is not done away, because the seal of confession is not broken,

Reply Obj. 3. This does not bestow impunity on wicked priests, because they are in danger of having to prove that they had the penitent's permission to reveal the sin, if they should be accused of the contrary.

Reply Obj. 4. He that is informed of a sin through the priest with the penitent's consent, shares in an act of the priest's, so that the same applies to him as to an interpreter, unless perchance the penitent wish him to know it unconditionally and freely.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN MAY REVEAL THAT WHICH HE KNOWS THROUGH CONFESSION AND THROUGH SOME OTHER SOURCE BESIDES ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a man may not reveal what he knows through confession and through some other source besides. For the seal of confession is not broken unless one reveals a sin known through confession. If therefore a man divulges a sin which he knows through confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise, he seems to break the seal.

Obj. 2. Further, whoever hears someone's confession, is under obligation to him not to divulge his sins. Now if one were to promise someone to keep something secret, he would be bound to do so, even if he knew it through some other source. Therefore a man is bound to keep secret what he knows through the confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise.

Obj. 3. Further, the stronger of two things draws the other to itself. Now the knowledge whereby a man knows a sin as God knows it, is stronger and more excellent than the knowledge whereby he knows a sin as man. Therefore it draws the latter to itself: and consequently a man cannot reveal that sin, because this is demanded by his knowing it as God knows it.

Obj. 4. Further, the secrecy of confession was instituted in order to avoid scandal, and to prevent men being shy of going to confession. But if a man might say what he had heard in confession, though he knew it otherwise, scandal would result all the same. Therefore he can nowise say what he has heard.

On the contrary, No one can put another under a new obligation, unless he be his superior, who can bind him by a precept. Now he who knew of a sin by witnessing it was not bound to keep it secret. Therefore he that confesses

to him, not being his superior, cannot put him under an obligation of secrecy by confessing to him.

Further, the justice of the Church would be hindered if a man, in order to escape a sentence of excommunication, incurred on account of some sin, of which he has been convicted, were to confess to the person who has to sentence him. Now the execution of justice falls under a precept. Therefore a man is not bound to keep a sin secret, which he has heard in confession, but knows from some other source.

I answer that, There are three opinions about this question. For some say that a man can by no means tell another what he has heard in confession, even if he knew it from some other source either before or after the confession: while others assert that the confession debars him from speaking of what he knew already, but not from saying what he knew afterwards and in another way. Now both these opinions, by exaggerating the seal of confession, are prejudicial to the truth and to the safeguarding of justice. For a man might be more inclined to sin, if he had no fear of being accused by his confessor supposing that he repeated the sin in his presence: and furthermore it would be most prejudicial to justice if a man could not bear witness to a deed which he has seen committed again after being confessed to him. Nor does it matter that, as some say, he ought to declare that he cannot keep it secret, for he cannot make such a declaration until the sin has already been confessed to him, and then every priest could, if he wished, divulge a sin, by making such a declaration, if this made him free to divulge it. Consequently there is a third and truer opinion, viz. that what a man knows through another source either before or after confession, he is not bound to keep secret, in so far as he knows it as a man, for he can say: *I know so and so since I saw it.* But he is bound to keep it secret in so far as he knows it as God knows it, for he cannot say: *I heard so and so in confession.* Nevertheless, on account of the scandal he should refrain from speaking of it unless there is an urgent reason.

Reply Obj. 1. If a man says that he has seen what he has heard in the confessional, he does not reveal what he heard in confession, save indirectly: even as one who knows something through hearing and seeing it, does not, properly speaking, divulge what he saw, if he says he heard it, but only indirectly, because he says he has heard what he incidentally saw. Wherefore he does not break the seal of confession.

Reply Obj. 2. The confessor is not forbidden to reveal a sin simply, but to reveal it as heard in confession: for in no case is he allowed to say that he has heard it in the confessional.

Reply Obj. 3. This is true of things that are in opposition to one another: whereas to know a sin as God knows it, and to know it as man knows it, are not in opposition; so that the argument proves nothing.

Reply Obj. 4. It would not be right to avoid scandal so as to desert justice: for the truth should not be gainsayed for fear of scandal. Wherefore when justice and truth are in the balance, a man should not be deterred by the fear of giving scandal, from divulging what he has heard in confession, provided he knows it from some other source: although he ought to avoid giving scandal, as far as he is able.

QUESTION XII.

OF SATISFACTION, AS TO ITS NATURE.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider satisfaction; about which four things have to be considered: (1) Its nature: (2) Its possibility: (3) Its quality: (4) The means whereby man offers satisfaction to God.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue? (2) Whether it is an act of justice? (3) Whether the definition of satisfaction contained in the text is suitable?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SATISFACTION IS A VIRTUE OR AN ACT OF VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that satisfaction is neither a virtue nor an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is meritorious; whereas, seemingly, satisfaction is not, since merit is gratuitous, while satisfaction answers to a debt. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, every act of virtue is voluntary. But sometimes a man has to make satisfaction for something against his will, as when anyone is punished by the judge for an offence against another. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. viii.*): *Choice holds the chief place in moral virtue.* But satisfaction is not an act of choice but regards chiefly external works. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

On the contrary, Satisfaction belongs to penance. Now penance is a virtue. Therefore satisfaction is also an act of virtue.

Further, none but an act of virtue has the effect of blotting out sin, for one contrary is destroyed by the other. Now satisfaction destroys sin altogether. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

I answer that, An act is said to be the act of a virtue in two ways. First, materially; and thus any act which implies no malice, or defect of a due circumstance, may be called an act of virtue, because virtue can make use of any such act for its end, e.g. to walk, to speak, and so forth. Secondly, an act is said to belong to a virtue formally, because its very name implies the form and nature of virtue; thus to suffer courageously is an act of courage. Now the formal element in every moral virtue is the observance of a mean: wherefore every act that implies the observance of a mean is formally an act of virtue. And since equality is the mean implied in the name of satisfaction (for a thing is said to be satisfied by reason of an equal proportion to something), it is evident that satisfaction also is formally an act of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Although to make satisfaction is due in itself, yet, in so far as the deed is done voluntarily by the one who offers satisfaction, it becomes something gratuitous on the part of the agent, so that he makes a virtue of necessity. For debt diminishes merit through being necessary and consequently against the will, so that if the will consent to the necessity, the element of merit is not forfeited.

Reply Obj. 2. An act of virtue demands voluntariness not in the patient but in the agent, for it is his act. Consequently since he on whom the judge wreaks vengeance is the patient and not the agent as regards satisfaction, it follows that satisfaction should be voluntary not in him but in the judge as agent.

Reply Obj. 3. The chief element of virtue can be understood in two ways. First, as being the chief element of virtue as virtue, and thus the chief element of virtue denotes

whatever belongs to the nature of virtue or is most akin thereto; thus choice and other internal acts hold the chief place in virtue. Secondly, the chief element of virtue may be taken as denoting that which holds the first place in such and such a virtue; and then the first place belongs to that which gives its determination. Now the interior act, in certain virtues, is determined by some external act, since choice, which is common to all virtues, becomes proper to such and such a virtue through being directed to such and such an act. Thus it is that external acts hold the chief place in certain virtues; and this is the case with satisfaction.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER SATISFACTION IS AN ACT OF JUSTICE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that satisfaction is not an act of justice. Because the purpose of satisfaction is that one may be reconciled to the person offended. But reconciliation, being an act of love, belongs to charity. Therefore satisfaction is an act of charity and not of justice.

Obj. 2. Further, the causes of sin in us are the passions of the soul, which incline us to evil. But justice, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v.), is not about passions, but about operations. Since therefore satisfaction aims at removing the causes of sin, as stated in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 15,) it seems that it is not an act of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, to be careful about the future is not an act of justice but of prudence, of which caution is a part. But it belongs to satisfaction, *to give no opening to the suggestions of sin.** Therefore satisfaction is not an act of justice.

On the contrary, No virtue but justice considers the notion of that which is due. But satisfaction gives due honour to God, as Anselm states (*Cur Deus Homo*, i.). Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.

* Cf. next article, *Obj.* 1.

Further, no virtue save justice establishes equality between external things. But this is done by satisfaction which establishes equality between amendment and the previous offence. Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*Ethic. v.*), the mean of justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing and thing according to a certain proportion. Wherefore, since the very name of satisfaction implies an equation of the kind, because the adverb *satis* (*enough*) denotes an equality of proportion, it is evident that satisfaction is formally an act of justice. Now the act of justice, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. v.*) is either an act done by one man to another, as when a man pays another what he owes him, or an act done by one man between two others, as when a judge does justice between two men. When it is an act of justice of one man to another, the equality is set up in the agent, while when it is something done between two others, the equality is set up in the subject that has suffered an injustice. And since satisfaction expresses equality in the agent, it denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one man to another. Now a man may do justice to another either in actions and passions or in external things; even as one may do an injustice to another, either by taking something away, or by a hurtful action. And since to give is to use an external thing, the act of justice, in so far as it establishes equality between external things, signifies, properly speaking, a giving back: but to make satisfaction clearly points to equality between actions, although sometimes one is put for the other. Now equalization concerns only such things as are unequal, wherefore satisfaction presupposes inequality among actions, which inequality constitutes an offence; so that satisfaction regards a previous offence. But no part of justice regards a previous offence, except vindictive justice, which establishes equality indifferently, whether the patient be the same subject as the agent, as when anyone punishes himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes another man, since vindictive justice deals with both cases. The

same applies to penance, which implies equality in the agent only, since it is the penitent who holds to the penance (*pœnam tenet*), so that penance is in a way a species of vindictive justice. This proves that satisfaction, which implies equality in the agent with respect to a previous offence, is a work of justice, as to that part which is called penance.

Reply Obj. 1. Satisfaction, as appears from what has been said, is compensation for injury inflicted. Wherefore as the injury inflicted entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently an inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings back directly equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship. And since an act is elicited by the habit to whose end it is immediately directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is directed ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is commanded by charity.

Reply Obj. 2. Although justice is chiefly about operations, yet it is consequently about passions, in so far as they are the causes of operations. Wherefore as justice curbs anger, lest it inflict an unjust injury on another, and concupiscence from invading another's marriage right, so satisfaction removes the causes of other sins.

Reply Obj. 3. Each moral virtue shares in the act of prudence, because this virtue completes in it the conditions essential to virtue, since each moral virtue takes its mean according to the ruling of prudence, as is evident from the definition of virtue given in *Ethic. ii.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF SATISFACTION GIVEN IN THE TEXT IS SUITABLE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the definition of satisfaction given in the text (*iv. Sent. D. 15*) and quoted from Augustine (*Gennadius Massiliensis,—De Eccl. Dogm. liv.*) is unsuitable,—viz. that *satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sins, and to give no opening to the suggestions thereof.* For the

cause of actual sin is the *fomes*.* But we cannot remove the *fomes* in this life. Therefore satisfaction does not consist in removing the causes of sins.

Obj. 2. Further, the cause of sin is stronger than sin itself. But man by himself cannot remove sin. Much less therefore can he remove the cause of sin; and so the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 3. Further, since satisfaction is a part of Penance, it regards the past and not the future. Now *to give no opening to the suggestions of sin* regards the future. Therefore it should not be put in the definition of satisfaction.

Obj. 4. Further, satisfaction regards a past offence. Yet no mention is made of this. Therefore the definition of satisfaction is unsuitable.

Obj. 5. Further, Anselm gives another definition (*Cur Deus homo*, i.): *Satisfaction consists in giving God due honour*, wherein no reference is made to the things mentioned by Augustine (Gennadius) in this definition. Therefore one or the other is unsuitable.

Obj. 6. Further, an innocent man can give due honour to God: whereas satisfaction is not compatible with innocence. Therefore Anselm's definition is faulty.

I answer that, Justice aims not only at removing inequality already existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding equality for the future, because according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii.) *punishments are medicinal*. Wherefore satisfaction which is the act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins and preserving from future sins: so that when one man makes satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for the past, and takes heed for the future. Accordingly satisfaction may be defined in two ways, first with regard to past sin, which it heals by making compensation, and thus it is defined as *compensation for an inflicted injury according to the equality of justice*.

* *Fomes* signifies literally *fuel*, and metaphorically, *incentive*. As used by theologians, it denotes the quasi-material element and effect of original sin, and sometimes goes under the name of *concupiscence*, (Cf. i.-ii., Q., LXXXII., A. 3).

The definition of Anselm amounts to the same, for he says that *satisfaction consists in giving God due honour*; where duty is considered in respect of the sin committed. —Secondly, satisfaction may be defined, considered as preserving us from future sins; and as Augustine (Cf. *Obj. 1*) defines it. Now preservation from bodily sickness is assured by removing the causes from which the sickness may ensue, for if they be taken away the sickness cannot follow. But it is not thus in spiritual diseases, for the free-will cannot be forced, so that even in the presence of their causes, they can, though with difficulty, be avoided, while they can be incurred even when their causes are removed. Hence he puts two things in the definition of satisfaction, viz. removal of the causes, as to the first, and the free-will's refusal to sin.

Reply Obj. 1. By *causes* we must understand the proximate causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the lust of sin through the habit or act of a sin that has been given up, and those things which are called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions of sin, such as place, bad company and so forth. Such causes are removed by satisfaction in this life, albeit the *fomes*, which is the remote cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by satisfaction in this life though it is weakened.

Reply Obj. 2. Since the cause of evil or of privation (according as it has a cause) is nothing else than a defective good, and since it is easier to destroy good than to set it up, it follows that it is easier to uproot the causes of privation and of evil than to remove the evil itself, which can only be removed by setting up good, as may be seen in the case of blindness and its causes. Yet the aforesaid are not sufficient causes of sin, for sin does not, of necessity, ensue therefrom, but they are occasions of sin. Nor again can satisfaction be made without God's help, since it is not possible without charity, as we shall state further on (Q. XIV., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3. Although Penance was primarily instituted and intended with a view to the past, yet, as a consequence,

it regards the future, in so far as it is a safeguarding remedy; and the same applies to satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 4. Augustine (Gennadius) defined satisfaction, as made to God, from Whom, in reality, nothing can be taken, though the sinner, for his own part, takes something away. Consequently in such like satisfaction, amendment for future time is of greater weight than compensation for the past. Hence Augustine defines satisfaction from this point of view. And yet it is possible to gauge the compensation for the past from the heed taken for the future, for the latter regards the same object as the former, but in the opposite way: since when looking at the past we detest the causes of sins on account of the sins themselves, which are the starting-point of the movement of detestation: whereas when taking heed of the future, we begin from the causes, that by their removal we may avoid sins the more easily.

Reply Obj. 5. There is no reason why the same thing should not be described in different ways according to the various things found in it: and such is the case here, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 6. By debt is meant the debt we owe to God by reason of the sins we have committed, because Penance regards a debt, as stated above (A. 2).

QUESTION XIII.

OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SATISFACTION.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must now consider the possibility of satisfaction, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether man can make satisfaction to God? (2) Whether one man can make satisfaction for another?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN CAN MAKE SATISFACTION TO GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that man cannot make satisfaction to God. For satisfaction should balance the offence, as shown above (Q. XII., AA. 2, 3). But an offence against God is infinite, since it is measured by the person against whom it is committed, for it is a greater offence to strike a prince than anyone else. Therefore, as no action of man can be infinite, it seems that he cannot make satisfaction to God.

Obj. 2. Further, a slave cannot make compensation for a debt, since all that he has is his master's. But we are the slaves of God, and whatever good we have, we owe to Him. Therefore, as satisfaction is compensation for a past offence, it seems that we cannot offer it to God.

Obj. 3. Further, if all that a man has suffices not to pay one debt, he cannot pay another debt. Now all that man is, all that he can do, and all that he has, does not suffice to pay what he owes for the blessing of creation, wherefore it is written (Isa. xl. 16) that *the wood of Libanus shall not*

*be enough for a burnt offering.** Therefore by no means can he make satisfaction for the debt resulting from the offence committed.

Obj. 4. Further, man is bound to spend all his time in the service of God. Now time once lost cannot be recovered, wherefore, as Seneca observes (*Lib. i., Ep. i., ad Lucilium*) loss of time is a very grievous matter. Therefore man cannot make compensation to God, and the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 5. Further, mortal actual sin is more grievous than original sin. But none could satisfy for original sin unless he were both God and man. Neither, therefore, can he satisfy for actual sin.

On the contrary, Jerome (Pelagius, *Expos. Fidei ad Damasum*) says: *Whoever maintains that God has commanded anything impossible to man, let him be anathema.* But satisfaction is commanded (Luke iii. 8): *Bring forth . . . fruits worthy of penance.* Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to God.

Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to make satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to God.

Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment balances the fault, since *justice is the same as counterpassion*, as the Pythagoreans said (Aristotle, *Ethic. v.*). Now punishment may equal the pleasure contained in a sin committed. Therefore satisfaction can be made to God.

I answer that, Man becomes God's debtor in two ways; first, by reason of favours received, secondly, by reason of sin committed: and just as thanksgiving or worship or the like, regard the debt for favours received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed. Now in giving honour to one's parents or to the gods, as indeed the Philosopher says (*Ethic. viii.*), it is impossible to repay them measure for measure, but it suffices that man repay as much as he can, for friendship does not demand measure for measure,

* Vulg.,—*Libanus shall not be enough to burn, nor the beasts thereof for a burnt offering.*

but what is possible. Yet even this is equal somewhat, viz. according to proportion, for as the debt due to God is, in comparison with God, so is what man can do, in comparison with himself, so that in another way the form of justice is preserved. It is the same as regards satisfaction. Consequently man cannot make satisfaction to God if *satis* (*enough*) denotes quantitative equality; but he can, if it denote proportionate equality, as explained above, and as this suffices for justice, so does it suffice for satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as the offence derived a certain infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so does satisfaction derive a certain infinity from the infinity of Divine mercy, in so far as it is quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to repay becomes acceptable.—Others, however, say that the offence is infinite as regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned gratuitously, but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, in which respect it is possible to make satisfaction for it. But this is not to the point, since satisfaction does not answer to sin, except as this is an offence against God, which is a matter, not of turning to a creature but of turning away from God.—Others again say that even as regards the aversion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in virtue of Christ's merit, which was, in a way, infinite. And this comes to the same as what we said before, since grace is given to believers through faith in the Mediator. If, however, He were to give grace otherwise, satisfaction would suffice in the way explained above.

Reply Obj. 2. Man, who was made to God's image, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as he is master of his actions through his free-will; so that, through acting by his free-will, he can make satisfaction to God, for though it belongs to God, in so far as it was bestowed on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on him, that he might be his own master, which cannot be said of a slave.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument proves that it is impossible to make equivalent satisfaction to God, but not that it is impossible to make sufficient satisfaction to Him. For though man owes God all that he is able to give Him, yet it

is not necessary for his salvation that he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is impossible for him, according to his present state of life, to put forth his whole power into any one single thing, since he has to be heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain measure, viz. the fulfilment of God's commandments, over and above which he can offer something by way of satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 4. Though man cannot recover the time that is past, he can in the time that follows make compensation for what he should have done in the past, since the commandment did not exact from him the fulfilment of his whole power, as stated above (*ad 3*).

Reply Obj. 5. Though original sin has less of the nature of sin than actual sin has, yet it is a more grievous evil, because it is an infection of human nature itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it could not be expiated by the satisfaction of a mere man.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE MAN CAN FULFIL SATISFACTORY PUNISHMENT
FOR ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one man cannot fulfil satisfactory punishment for another. Because merit is requisite for satisfaction. Now one man cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written (Ps. lxi. 12): *Thou wilt render to every man according to his works.* Therefore one man cannot make satisfaction for another.

Obj. 2. Further, satisfaction is condivided with contrition and confession. But one man cannot be contrite or confess for another. Neither therefore can one make satisfaction for another.

Obj. 3. Further, by praying for another one merits also for oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfaction for another, he satisfies for himself by satisfying for another, so that if a man satisfy for another he need not make satisfaction for his own sins.

Obj. 4. Further, if one can satisfy for another, as soon as he takes the debt of punishment on himself, this other is freed from his debt. Therefore the latter will go straight to heaven, if he die after the whole of his debt of punishment has been taken up by another; else, if he be punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid for the same sin, viz. by him who has begun to make satisfaction, and by him who is punished in Purgatory.

On the contrary, It is written (Gal. vi. 2): *Bear ye one another's burthens.* Therefore it seems that one can bear the burthen of punishment laid upon another.

Further, charity avails more before God than before man. Now before man, one can pay another's debt for love of him. Much more, therefore, can this be done before the judgment seat of God.

I answer that, Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin. Accordingly, as a remedy against future sin, the satisfaction of one does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by another's fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing, through the actions of another, except accidentally, in so far as a man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another, since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin. But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction. On the other hand, as regards the payment of the debt, one man can satisfy for another, provided he be in a state of charity, so that his works may avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satisfies for another should undergo a greater punishment than the principal would have to undergo (as some maintain, who argue that a man profits more by his own punishment than by another's), because punishment derives its power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man bears it. And since greater charity is evidenced by a man satisfying for another than for himself, less punishment is required of him who satisfies for another, than of the principal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the Fathers (v. 5) of one who for love of

his brother did penance for a sin which his brother had not committed, and that on account of his charity his brother was released from a sin which he had committed. Nor is it necessary that the one for whom satisfaction is made should be unable to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were able, he would be released from his debt when the other satisfied in his stead. But this is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment is medicinal: so that a man is not to be allowed to do penance for another, unless there be evidence of some defect in the penitent, either bodily, so that he is unable to bear it, or spiritual, so that he is not ready to undergo it.

Reply Obj. 1. The essential reward is bestowed on a man according to his disposition, because the fulness of the sight of God will be according to the capacity of those who see Him. Wherefore just as one man is not disposed thereto by another's act, so one man does not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit has infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby children come to eternal life through Baptism. On the other hand, the temporal punishment due to sin after the guilt has been forgiven is not measured according to the disposition of the man to whom it is due, since sometimes the better man owes a greater debt of punishment. Consequently one man can merit for another as regards release from punishment, and one man's act becomes another's, by means of charity whereby we are *all one in Christ* (Gal. iii. 28).

Reply Obj. 2. Contrition is ordained against the guilt which affects a man's disposition to goodness or malice, so that one man is not freed from guilt by another's contrition. In like manner by confession a man submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor can one man receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacrament grace is given to the recipient, not to another. Consequently there is no comparison between satisfaction and contrition and confession.

Reply Obj. 3. In the payment of the debt we consider the measure of the punishment, whereas in merit we regard

the root which is charity: wherefore he that, through charity, merits for another, at least congruously, merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies for another does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure of the punishment does not suffice for the sins of both, although by satisfying for another he merits something greater than the release from punishment, viz. eternal life.

Reply Obj. 4. If this man bound himself to undergo a certain punishment, he would not be released from the debt before paying it: wherefore he himself will suffer the punishment, as long as the other makes satisfaction for him: and if he do not this, then both are debtors in respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin committed, the other for his omission, so that it does not follow that one sin is twice punished.

QUESTION XIV.

OF THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE must now consider the quality of satisfaction, under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another? (2) Whether if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins which were pardoned him through his contrition? (3) Whether a man's previous satisfaction begins to avail when he recovers charity? (4) Whether works done without charity merit any good? (5) Whether such works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN CAN SATISFY FOR ONE SIN WITHOUT SATISFYING FOR ANOTHER?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another. Because when several things are not connected together one can be taken away without another. Now sins are not connected together, else whoever had one would have them all. Therefore one sin can be expiated by satisfaction, without another.

Obj. 2. Further, God is more merciful than man. But man accepts the payment of one debt without the payment of another. Therefore God accepts satisfaction for one sin without the other.

Obj. 3. Further, as stated in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 15), *satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sin, and give no opening to the suggestions thereof.* Now this can be done with regard to one sin and not another, as when a man curbs his lust and perseveres in covetousness. Therefore we can make satisfaction for one sin without satisfying for another.

On the contrary, The fast of those who fasted *for debates and strifes* (Isa. lviii. 4, 5) was not acceptable to God, though fasting be a work of satisfaction. Now satisfaction cannot be made save by works that are acceptable to God. Therefore he that has a sin on his conscience cannot make satisfaction to God.

Further, satisfaction is a remedy for the healing of past sins, and for preserving from future sins, as stated above (Q. XII., A. 3). But without grace it is impossible to avoid sins. Therefore, since each sin excludes grace, it is not possible to make satisfaction for one sin and not for another.

I answer that, Some have held that it is possible to make satisfaction for one sin and not for another, as the Master states (iv. *Sent.* 15). But this cannot be. For since the previous offence has to be removed by satisfaction, the mode of satisfaction must needs be consistent with the removal of the offence. Now removal of offence is renewal of friendship: wherefore if there be anything to hinder the renewal of friendship there can be no satisfaction. Since, therefore, every sin is a hindrance to the friendship of charity, which is the friendship of man for God, it is impossible for man to make satisfaction for one sin while holding to another; even as neither would a man make satisfaction to another for a blow, if while throwing himself at his feet he were to give him another.

Reply Obj. 1. As sins are not connected together in some single one, a man can incur one without incurring another; whereas all sins are remitted by reason of one same thing, so that the remissions of various sins are connected together. Consequently satisfaction cannot be made for one and not for another.

Reply Obj. 2. When a man is under obligation to another

by reason of a debt, the only inequality between them is that which is opposed to justice, so that for restitution nothing further is required than that the equality of justice should be reinstated, and this can be done in respect of one debt without another. But when the obligation is based on an offence, there is inequality not only of justice but also of friendship, so that for the offence to be removed by satisfaction, not only must the equality of justice be restored by the payment of a punishment equal to the offence, but also the equality of friendship must be reinstated, which is impossible so long as an obstacle to friendship remains.

Reply Obj. 3. By its weight, one sin drags us down to another, as Gregory says (*Moral.* xxv.): so that when a man holds to one sin, he does not sufficiently cut himself off from the causes of further sin.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER, WHEN DEPRIVED OF CHARITY, A MAN CAN MAKE SATISFACTION FOR SINS FOR WHICH HE WAS PREVIOUSLY CONTRITE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins which were already pardoned him through his contrition. For Daniel said to Nabuchodonosor (*Dan.* iv. 24): *Redeem thou thy sins with alms.* Yet he was still a sinner, as is shown by his subsequent punishment. Therefore a man can make satisfaction while in a state of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, *Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred* (*Eccle.* ix. 1). If therefore one cannot make satisfaction unless one be in a state of charity, it would be impossible to know whether one had made satisfaction, which would be unseemly.

Obj. 3. Further, a man's entire action takes its form from the intention which he had at the beginning. But a penitent is in a state of charity when he begins to repent. Therefore

his whole subsequent satisfaction will derive its efficacy from the charity which quickens his intention.

Obj. 4. Further, satisfaction consists in a certain equalization of guilt to punishment. But these things can be equalized even in one who is devoid of charity. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, Charity covereth all sins (Prov. x. 12). But satisfaction has the power of blotting out sins. Therefore it is powerless without charity.

Further, the chief work of satisfaction is almsdeeds. But alms given by one who is devoid of charity avail nothing, as is clearly stated 1 Cor. xiii. 3, *If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.* Therefore there can be no satisfaction with mortal sin.

I answer that, Some have said that if, when all a man's sins have been pardoned through contrition, and before he has made satisfaction for them, he falls into sin, and then makes satisfaction, such satisfaction will be valid, so that if he die in that sin, he will not be punished in hell for the other sins.

But this cannot be, because satisfaction requires the reinstatement of friendship and the restoration of the equality of justice, the contrary of which destroys friendship, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic. ix.*). Now in satisfaction made to God, the equality is based, not on equivalence but rather on God's acceptation: so that, although the offence be already removed by previous contrition, the works of satisfaction must be acceptable to God, and for this they are dependent on charity. Consequently works done without charity are not satisfactory.

Reply Obj. 1. Daniel's advice meant that he should give up sin and repent, and so make satisfaction by giving alms.

Reply Obj. 2. Even as man knows not for certain whether he had charity when making satisfaction, or whether he has it now, so too he knows not for certain whether he made full satisfaction: wherefore it is written (Ecclus. v. 5): *Be not without fear about sin forgiven.* And yet man need not,

on account of that fear, repeat the satisfaction made, if he is not conscious of a mortal sin. For although he may not have expiated his punishment by that satisfaction, he does not incur the guilt of omission through neglecting to make satisfaction; even as he who receives the Eucharist without being conscious of a mortal sin of which he is guilty, does not incur the guilt of receiving unworthily.

Reply Obj. 3. His intention was interrupted by his subsequent sin, so that it gives no virtue to the works done after that sin.

Reply Obj. 4. Sufficient equalization is impossible both as to the Divine acceptation and as to equivalence: so that the argument proves nothing.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER PREVIOUS SATISFACTION BEGINS TO AVAIL AFTER
MAN IS RESTORED TO CHARITY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that when a man has recovered charity his previous satisfaction begins to avail, because a gloss on Levit. xxv. 25, *If thy brother being impoverished, etc.*, says that *the fruit of a man's good works should be counted from the time when he sinned*. But they would not be counted, unless they derived some efficacy from his subsequent charity. Therefore they begin to avail after he recovers charity.

Obj. 2. Further, as the efficacy of satisfaction is hindered by sin, so the efficacy of Baptism is hindered by insincerity. Now Baptism begins to avail when insincerity ceases. Therefore satisfaction begins to avail when sin is taken away.

Obj. 3. Further, if a man is given as a penance for the sins he has committed, to fast for several days, and then, after falling again into sin, he completes his penance, he is not told, when he goes to confession a second time, to fast once again. But he would be told to do so, if he did not fulfil his duty of satisfaction by them. Therefore his previous works be-

come valid unto satisfaction, through his subsequent repentance.

On the contrary, Works done without charity were not satisfactory, through being dead works. But they are not quickened by penance. Therefore they do not begin to be satisfactory.

Further, charity does not quicken a work, unless, in some way that work proceeds therefrom. But works cannot be acceptable to God, and therefore cannot be satisfactory, unless they be quickened by charity. Since then the works done without charity, in no way proceeded from charity, nor ever can proceed therefrom, they can by no means count towards satisfaction.

I answer that, Some have said that works done while in a state of charity, which are called living works, are meritorious in respect of eternal life, and satisfactory in respect of paying off the debt of punishment; and that by subsequent charity, works done without charity are quickened so as to be satisfactory, but not so as to be meritorious of eternal life. But this is impossible, because works done in charity produce both these effects for the same reason, viz. because they are pleasing to God: wherefore just as charity by its advent cannot make works done without charity to be pleasing in one respect, so neither can it make them pleasing in the other respect.

Reply Obj. 1. This means that the fruits are reckoned, not from the time when he was first in sin, but from the time when he ceased to sin, when, to wit, he was last in sin; unless he was contrite as soon as he had sinned, and did many good actions before he confessed.—Or we may say that the greater the contrition, the more it alleviates the punishment, and the more good actions a man does while in sin, the more he disposes himself to the grace of contrition, so that it is probable that he owes a smaller debt of punishment. For this reason the priest should use discretion in taking them into account, so as to give him a lighter penance, according as he finds him better disposed.

Reply Obj. 2. Baptism imprints a character on the soul,

whereas satisfaction does not. Hence on the advent of charity, which removes both insincerity and sin, it causes Baptism to have its effect, whereas it does not do this for satisfaction. Moreover Baptism confers justification in virtue of the deed (*ex opere operato*) which is not man's deed but God's, wherefore it does not become a lifeless deed as satisfaction does, which is a deed of man.

Reply Obj. 3. Sometimes satisfaction is such as to leave an effect in the person who makes satisfaction, even after the act of satisfaction has been done; thus fasting leaves the body weak, and almsdeeds result in a diminution of a person's substance, and so on. In such cases there is no need to repeat the works of satisfaction if they have been done while in a state of sin, because through penance they are acceptable to God in the result they leave behind. But when a work of satisfaction leaves behind no effect in the person that does satisfaction, it needs to be repeated, as in the case of prayer and so forth. Interior works, since they pass away altogether, are nowise quickened, and must be repeated.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WORKS DONE WITHOUT CHARITY MERIT ANY,
AT LEAST TEMPORAL, GOOD ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that works done without charity merit some, at least a temporal, good. For as punishment is to the evil act, so is reward to a good act. Now no evil deed is unpunished by God the just judge. Therefore no good deed is unrewarded, and so every good deed merits some good.

Obj. 2. Further, reward is not given except for merit. Now some reward is given for works done without charity, wherefore it is written (Matth. vi. 2, 5, 16) of those who do good actions for the sake of human glory, that *they have received their reward*. Therefore those works merit some good.

Obj. 3. Further, if there be two men both in sin, one of whom does many deeds that are good in themselves and in their circumstances, while the other does none, they are not equally near to the reception of good things from God, else the latter need not be advised to do any good deeds. Now he that is nearer to God receives more of His good things. Therefore the former, on account of his good works, merits some good from God.

On the contrary, Augustine says that *the sinner is not worthy of the bread he eats*. Therefore he cannot merit anything from God.

Further, he that is nothing, can merit nothing. But a sinner, through not having charity, is nothing in respect of spiritual being, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 2. Therefore he can merit nothing.

I answer that, Properly speaking a merit is an action on account of which it is just that the agent should be given something. Now justice is twofold: first, there is justice properly so called, which regards something due on the part of the recipient. Secondly, there is metaphorical justice, so to speak, which regards something due on the part of the giver, for it may be right for the giver to give something to which the receiver has no claim. In this sense the *fitness of the Divine goodness* is justice; thus Anselm says (*Prosolog.* x.) that *God is just when He spares the sinner, because this is befitting*. And in this way merit is also twofold. The first is an act in respect of which the agent himself has a claim to receive something, and this is called merit of *condignity*. The second is an act the result of which is that there is a duty of giving in the giver by reason of fittingness, wherefore it is called merit of *congruity*. Now since in all gratuitous givings, the primary reason of the giving is love, it is impossible for anyone, properly speaking, to lay claim to a gift, if he lack friendship. Wherefore, as all things, whether temporal or eternal, are bestowed on us by the bounty of God, no one can acquire a claim to any of them, save through charity towards God: so that works done without charity are not condignly meritorious of any

good from God, either eternal or temporal. But since it is befitting the goodness of God, that wherever He finds a disposition He should grant the perfection, a man is said to merit congruously some good by means of good works done without charity. Accordingly suchlike works avail for a threefold good, acquisition of temporal goods, disposition to grace, habituation to good works. Since, however, this is not merit properly so called, we should grant that such works are not meritorious of any good, rather than that they are.

Reply Obj. 1. As the Philosopher states (*Ethic. viii.*), since no matter what a son may do, he can never give back to his father the equal of what he has received from him, a father can never become his son's debtor: and much less can man make God his debtor on account of equivalence of work. Consequently no work of ours can merit a reward by reason of its measure of goodness, but it can by reason of charity, which makes friends hold their possessions in common. Therefore, no matter how good a work may be, if it be done without charity, it does not give man a claim to receive anything from God. On the other hand, an evil deed deserves an equivalent punishment according to the measure of its malice, because no evil has been done to us on the part of God, like the good which He has done. Therefore, although an evil deed deserves condign punishment, nevertheless a good deed without charity does not merit condign reward.

Reply Obj. 2 and 3. These arguments consider merit of congruity; while the other arguments consider merit of condignity.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE AFORESAID WORKS AVAIL FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE PAINS OF HELL?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the aforesaid works do not avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell. For the measure of punishment in hell will answer to the measure of guilt.

But works done without charity do not diminish the measure of guilt. Neither, therefore, do they lessen the pains of hell.

Obj. 2. Further, the pain of hell, though infinite in duration, is nevertheless finite in intensity. Now anything finite is done away by finite subtraction. If therefore works done without charity cancelled any of the punishment due for sins, those works might be so numerous, that the pain of hell would be done away altogether: which is false.

Obj. 3. Further, the suffrages of the Church are more efficacious than works done without charity. But, according to Augustine (*Enchir. cx.*), *the suffrages of the Church do not profit the damned in hell.* Much less therefore are those pains mitigated by works done without charity.

On the contrary, Augustine also says (*Enchir. ibid.*): *Whomsoever they profit, either receive a full pardon, or at least find damnation itself more tolerable.*

Further, it is a greater thing to do a good deed than to omit an evil deed. But the omission of an evil deed always avoids a punishment, even in one who lacks charity. Much more, therefore, do good deeds void punishment.

I answer that, Mitigation of the pains of hell can be understood in two ways: first as though one were delivered from the punishment which he already deserved, and thus, since no one is delivered from punishment unless he be absolved from guilt, (for an effect is not diminished or done away unless its cause be diminished or done away), the pain of hell cannot be mitigated by works done without charity, since they are unable to remove or diminish guilt. Secondly, so that the demerit of punishment is hindered; and thus the aforesaid works diminish the pain of hell,—first because he who does such works escapes being guilty of omitting them,—secondly, because such works dispose one somewhat to good, so that a man sins from less contempt, and indeed is drawn away from many sins thereby.

These works do, however, merit a diminution or postponement of temporal punishment, as in the case of Achab (3 Kings xxi. 27 *seqq.*), as also the acquisition of temporal goods.

Some, however, say that they mitigate the pains of hell, not by subtracting any of their substance, but by strengthening the subject, so that he is more able to bear them. But this is impossible, because there is no strengthening without a diminution of passibility. Now passibility is according to the measure of guilt, wherefore if guilt is not removed, neither can the subject be strengthened.

Some again say that the punishment is mitigated as to the remorse of conscience, though not as to the pain of fire. But neither will this stand, because as the pain of fire is equal to the guilt, so also is the pain of the remorse of conscience: so that what applies to one applies to the other.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

QUESTION XV.

OF THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION.

(In Three Articles.)

WE must now consider the means of making satisfaction, under which head there are three points of inquiry : (1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works ? (2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are satisfactory ? (3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SATISFACTION MUST BE MADE BY MEANS OF PENAL WORKS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for the offence committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given to God by penal works, for God does not delight in our sufferings, as appears from Tob. iii. 22. Therefore satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works.

Obj. 2. Further, the greater the charity from which a work proceeds, the less penal is that work, for *charity hath no pain** according to 1 John iv. 18. If therefore works of satisfaction need to be penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will they be: which is false.

* Vulg.—*Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain.*

Obj. 3. Further, *Satisfaction*, as Anselm states (*Cur Deus homo* i.) consists in giving due honour to God. But this can be done by other means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by means of penal works.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Hom. in Evang.* xx.): *It is just that the sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so much the greater suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself by his sin.*

Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly nealed by satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii.). Therefore satisfaction should be made by means of penal works.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XII., A. 3), Satisfaction regards both the past offence, for which compensation is made by its means, and also future sin wherefrom we are preserved thereby: and in both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works. For compensation for an offence implies equality, which must needs be between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization in human justice consists in taking away from one that which he has too much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been taken. And, although nothing can be taken away from God, so far as He is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him of something by sinning, as stated above (Q. XII., AA. 3, 4). Consequently, in order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that may conduce to the glory of God must be taken away from the sinner. Now a good work, as such, does not deprive the agent of anything, but perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work unless it be penal. Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it needs to be good, that it may conduce to God's honour, and it must be penal, so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.

Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of the punishment. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (*loc. cit.*) punishments are medicinal.

Reply Obj. 1. Though God does not delight in our punishments as such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and thus they can be satisfactory.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note the penalty of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its difficulty. Now if the difficulty of the work itself be diminished, other things being equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the difficulty be diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will, this does not diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like manner, diminution of the penalty of a work, on account of the will being made more prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of satisfaction, but increases it.

Reply Obj. 3. That which is due for sin is compensation for the offence, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner. It is of this debt that Anselm speaks.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SCOURGES OF THE PRESENT LIFE ARE SATISFACTORY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the scourges whereby we are punished by God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. For nothing but what is meritorious can be satisfactory, as is clear from what has been said (Q. XIV., A. 2). But we do not merit except by what is in our own power. Since therefore the scourges with which God punishes us are not in our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.

Obj. 2. Further, only the good make satisfaction. But these scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, and are deserved by them most of all. Therefore they cannot be satisfactory.

Obj. 3. Further, satisfaction regards past sins. But these scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who have no sins, as in the case of Job. Therefore it seems that they are not satisfactory.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. v. 3, 4) : *Tribulation*

worketh patience, and patience trial, i.e. deliverance from sin, as a gloss explains it.

Further, Ambrose says (*Super Ps. cxviii.*): *Although faith, i.e. the consciousness of sin, be lacking, the punishment satisfies.* Therefore the scourges of this life are satisfactory.

I answer that, Compensation for a past offence can be enforced either by the offender or by another. When it is enforced by another, such compensation is of a vindictive rather than of a satisfactory nature, whereas when it is made by the offender, it is also satisfactory. Consequently, if the scourges, which are inflicted by God on account of sin, become in some way the act of the sufferer they acquire a satisfactory character. Now they become the act of the sufferer in so far as he accepts them for the cleansing of his sins, by taking advantage of them patiently. If, however, he refuse to submit to them patiently, then they do not become his personal act in any way, and are not of a satisfactory, but merely of a vindictive character.

Reply Obj. 1. Although these scourges are not altogether in our power, yet in some respect they are, in so far as we use them patiently. In this way man makes a virtue of necessity, so that such things can become both meritorious and satisfactory.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine observes (*De Civ. Dei i.*), even as *the same fire makes gold glisten and straw reek*, so by the same scourges are the good cleansed and the wicked worsened on account of their impatience. Hence, though the scourges are common to both, satisfaction is only on the side of the good.

Reply Obj. 3. These scourges always regard past guilt, not always the guilt of the person, but sometimes the guilt of nature. For had there not been guilt in human nature, there would have been no punishment. But since guilt preceded in nature, punishment is inflicted by God on a person without the person's fault, that his virtue may be meritorious, and that he may avoid future sin. Moreover, these two things are necessary in satisfaction. For the

work needs to be meritorious, that honour may be given to God, and it must be a safeguard of virtue, that we may be preserved from future sins.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WORKS OF SATISFACTION ARE SUITABLY
ENUMERATED ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the works of satisfaction are unsuitably enumerated by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer. For a work of satisfaction should be penal. But prayer is not penal, since it is a remedy against penal sorrow, and is a source of pleasure, wherefore it is written (James v. 13): *Is any of you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him sing.* Therefore prayer should not be reckoned among the works of satisfaction.

Obj. 2. Further, every sin is either carnal or spiritual. Now, as Jerome says on Mark ix. 28, *This kind of demons can go out by nothing, but by prayer and fasting :—Diseases of the body are healed by fasting, diseases of the mind, by prayer.* Therefore no other work of satisfaction is necessary.

Obj. 3. Further, satisfaction is necessary in order for us to be cleansed from our sins. But almsgiving cleanses from all sins, according to Luke xi. 41: *Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you.* Therefore the other two are in excess.

Obj. 4. *On the other hand,* it seems that there should be more. For contrary heals contrary. But there are many more than three kinds of sin. Therefore more works of satisfaction should be enumerated.

Obj. 5. Further, pilgrimages and scourgings are also enjoined as works of satisfaction, and are not included among the above. Therefore they are not sufficiently enumerated.

I answer that, Satisfaction should be of such a nature as to involve something taken away from us for the honour of

God. Now we have but three kinds of goods, bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or external goods. By almsdeeds we deprive ourselves of some goods of fortune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to goods of the soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves of any of them, either in whole or in part, since thereby we become acceptable to God, but we should submit them entirely to God, which is done by prayer.

This number is shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction uproots the causes of sin, for these are reckoned to be three (1 John ii. 16), viz. *concupiscence of the flesh*, *concupiscence of the eyes*, and *pride of life*. *Fasting* is directed against *concupiscence of the flesh*, *almsdeeds* against *concupiscence of the eyes*, and *prayer* against *pride of life*, as Augustine says (*Enarr. in Ps. xlii.*).

This number is also shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction does not open a way to the suggestions of sin, because every sin is committed either against God, and this is prevented by *prayer*, or against our neighbour, and this is remedied by *almsdeeds*, or against ourselves, and this is forestalled by *fasting*.

Reply Obj. 1. According to some, prayer is twofold. There is the prayer of contemplatives whose *conversation is in heaven*: and this, since it is altogether delightful, is not a work of satisfaction. The other is a prayer which pours forth sighs for sin; this is penal and a part of satisfaction.

It may also be replied, and better, that every prayer has the character of satisfaction, for though it be sweet to the soul it is painful to the body, since, as Gregory says (*Super Ezech., Hom. xiv.*), *doubtless, when our soul's love is strengthened, our body's strength is weakened*; hence we read (Gen. xxxii. 25) that the sinew of Jacob's thigh shrank through his wrestling with the angel.

Reply Obj. 2. Carnal sin is twofold; one which is completed in carnal delectation, as gluttony and lust; and another which is completed in things relating to the flesh, though it be completed in the delectation of the soul rather than of the flesh, as covetousness. Hence suchlike sins

are between spiritual and carnal sins, so that they need a satisfaction proper to them, viz. almsdeeds.

Reply Obj. 3. Although each of these three, by a kind of likeness, is appropriated to some particular kind of sin because it is reasonable that, whereby a man sins, in that he should be punished, and that satisfaction should cut out the very root of the sin committed, yet each of them can satisfy for any kind of sin. Hence if a man is unable to perform one of the above, another is imposed on him, chiefly almsdeeds, which can take the place of the others, in so far as in those to whom a man gives alms he purchases other works of satisfaction thereby. Consequently even if almsgiving washes all sins away, it does not follow that other works are in excess.

Reply Obj. 4. Though there are many kinds of sins, all are reduced to those three roots or to those three kinds of sin, to which, as we have said, the aforesaid works of satisfaction correspond.

Reply Obj. 5. Whatever relates to affliction of the body is all referred to fasting, and whatever is spent for the benefit of one's neighbour is a kind of alms, and whatever act of worship is given to God becomes a kind of prayer, so that even one work can be satisfactory in several ways.

QUESTION XVI.

OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider the recipients of the sacrament of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether penance can be in the innocent? (2) Whether it can be in the saints in glory? (3) Whether in the good or bad angels?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE CAN BE IN THE INNOCENT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that penance cannot be in the innocent. For penance consists in bewailing one's evil deeds: whereas the innocent have done no evil. Therefore penance cannot be in them.

Obj. 2. Further, the very name of penance (*Pœnitentia*) implies punishment (*pœna*). But the innocent do not deserve punishment. Therefore penance is not in them.

Obj. 3. Further, penance coincides with vindictive justice. But if all were innocent, there would be no room for vindictive justice. Therefore there would be no penance, so that there is none in the innocent.

On the contrary, All the virtues are infused together. But penance is a virtue. Since, therefore, other virtues are infused into the innocent at Baptism, penance is infused with them.

Further, a man is said to be curable though he has never

been sick in body: therefore in like manner, one who has never been sick spiritually. Now even as there can be no actual cure from the wound of sin without an act of penance, so is there no possibility of cure without the habit of penance. Therefore one who has never had the disease of sin, has the habit of penance.

I answer that, Habit comes between power and act: and since the removal of what precedes entails the removal of what follows, but not conversely, the removal of the habit ensues from the removal of the power to act, but not from the removal of the act. And because removal of the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can be no act without the matter into which it passes, hence the habit of a virtue is possible in one for whom the matter is not available, for the reason that it can be available, so that the habit can proceed to its act,—thus a poor man can have the habit of magnificence, but not the act, because he is not possessed of great wealth which is the matter of magnificence, but he can be possessed thereof.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the innocent have committed no sin, nevertheless they can, so that they are competent to have the habit of penance. Yet this habit can never proceed to its act, except perhaps with regard to their venial sins, because mortal sins destroy the habit. Nevertheless it is not without its purpose, because it is a perfection of the natural power.

Reply Obj. 2. Although they deserve no punishment actually, yet it is possible for something to be in them for which they would deserve to be punished.

Reply Obj. 3. So long as the power to sin remains, there would be room for vindictive justice as to the habit, though not as to the act, if there were no actual sins.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SAINTS IN GLORY HAVE PENANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the saints in glory have not penance. For, as Gregory says (*Moral.* iv.), *the blessed remember their sins, even as we, without grief, remember our griefs after we have been healed.* But penance is grief of the heart. Therefore the saints in heaven have not penance.

Obj. 2. Further, the saints in heaven are conformed to Christ. But there was no penance in Christ, since there was no faith which is the principle of penance. Therefore there will be no penance in the saints in heaven.

Obj. 3. Further, a habit is useless if it is not reduced to its act. But the saints in heaven will not repent actually, because, if they did, there would be something in them against their wish. Therefore the habit of penance will not be in them.

Obj. 4. *On the other hand,* penance is a part of justice. But justice is *perpetual and immortal* (*Wis.* i. 15), and will remain in heaven. Therefore penance will also.

Obj. 5. Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers, that one of them said that even Abraham will repent of not having done more good. But one ought to repent of evil done more than of good left undone, and which one was not bound to do, for such is the good in question. Therefore repentance will be there of evil done.

I answer that, The cardinal virtues will remain in heaven, but only as regards the acts which they exercise in respect of their end. Wherefore, since the virtue of penance is a part of justice which is a cardinal virtue, whoever has the habit of penance in this life, will have it in the life to come: but he will not have the same act as now, but another, viz. thanksgiving to God for His mercy in pardoning his sins.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument proves that they do not have the same act as penance has now; and we grant this.

Reply Obj. 2. Christ could not sin, wherefore the matter

of this virtue was lacking in His respect both actually and potentially: so that there is no comparison between Him and others.

Reply Obj. 3. Repentance, properly speaking, considered as that act of penance which is in this life, will not be in heaven: and yet the habit will not be without its use, for it will have another act.

Reply Obj. 4, 5. We grant the Fourth argument. But since the Fifth Objection proves that there will be the same act of penance in heaven as now, we answer the latter by saying that in heaven one will be altogether conformed to the will of God. Wherefore, as God, by His antecedent will, but not by His consequent will, wishes that all things should be good, and therefore that there should be no evil, so is it with the blessed. It is this will that this holy father improperly calls penance.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF PENANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that even a good or bad angel can be a subject of penance. For fear is the beginning of penance. But fear is in the angels, according to James ii. 19: *The devils . . . believe and tremble.* Therefore there can be penance in them.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic. ix.*) that *evil men are full of repentance, and this is a great punishment for them.* Now the devils are exceeding evil, nor is there any punishment that they lack. Therefore they can repent.

Obj. 3. Further, a thing is more easily moved to that which is according to its nature than to that which is against its nature: thus water which has by violence been heated, of itself returns to its natural property. Now angels can be moved to sin which is contrary to their common nature. Much more therefore can they return to that which is in accord with their nature. But this is done by penance. Therefore they are susceptible to penance.

Obj. 4. Further, what applies to angels, applies equally to separated souls, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthodox.* ii.). But there can be penance in separated souls, as some say, as in the souls of the blessed in heaven. Therefore there can be penance in the angels.

On the contrary, By penance man obtains pardon for the sin he has committed. But this is impossible in the angels. Therefore they are not subjects of penance.

Further, Damascene says (*loc. cit.*) that man is subject to penance on account of the weakness of his body. But the angels are not united to a body. Therefore no penance can be in them.

I answer that, In us, penance is taken in two senses; first, as a passion, and thus it is nothing but pain or sorrow on account of a sin committed: and though, as a passion it is only in the concupiscible part, yet, by way of comparison, the name of penance is given to that act of the will, whereby a man detests what he has done, even as love and other passions are spoken of as though they were in the intellectual appetite. Secondly, penance is taken as a virtue, and in this way its act consists in the detestation of evil done, together with the purpose of amendment and the intention of expiating the evil, or of placating God for the offence committed. Now detestation of evil befits a person according as he is naturally ordained to good. And since this order or inclination is not entirely destroyed in any creature, it remains even in the damned, and consequently the passion of repentance, or something like it, remains in them too, as stated in Wis. v. 3 (*saying*) *within themselves, repenting*, etc. This repentance, as it is not a habit, but a passion or act, can by no means be in the blessed angels, who have not committed any sins: but it is in the wicked angels, since the same applies to them as to the lost souls, for, according to Damascene (*loc. cit.*), *death is to man what sin is to an angel*. But no forgiveness is possible for the sin of an angel. Now sin is the proper object of the virtue itself which we call penance, in so far as it can be pardoned or expiated. Therefore, since the wicked angels

cannot have the matter, they have not the power to produce the act, so that neither can they have the habit. Hence the angels cannot be subjects of the virtue of penance.

Reply Obj. 1. A certain movement of penance is engendered in them from fear, but not such as is a virtue.

This suffices for the *Reply* to the *Second Objection*.

Reply Obj. 3. Whatever is natural in them is entirely good, and inclines to good: but their free-will is fixed on evil. And since the movement of virtue and vice follows the inclination, not of nature, but of the free-will, there is no need that there should be movements of virtue in them either actually or possibly, although they are inclined to good by nature.

Reply Obj. 4. There is no parity between the holy angels and the beatified souls, because in the latter there has been or could have been a sin that could be pardoned, but not in the former: so that though they are like as to their present state, they differ as to their previous states, which penance regards directly.

QUESTION XVII.

OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider the power of the ministers of this sacrament, which power depends on the keys. As to this matter, in the first place we shall treat of the keys, secondly, of excommunication, thirdly, of indulgences, since these two things are connected with the power of the keys. The first of these considerations will be fourfold: (1) the nature and meaning of the keys: (2) the use of the keys: (3) the ministers of the keys: (4) those on whom the use of the keys can be exercised.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there ought to be keys in the Church? (2) Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.? (3) Whether there are two keys or only one?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE KEYS IN THE CHURCH?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there is no necessity for keys in the Church. For there is no need for keys that one may enter a house the door of which is open. But it is written (*Apoc. iv. 1*): *I looked and behold a door was opened in heaven, which door is Christ, for He said of Himself (John x. 7): I am the door.* Therefore the Church needs no keys for the entrance into heaven.

Obj. 2. Further, a key is needed for opening and shutting. But this belongs to Christ alone, Who *openeth and no man*

shutteth, shutteth and no man openeth (Apoc. iii. 7). Therefore the Church has no keys in the hands of her ministers.

Obj. 3. Further, hell is opened to whomever heaven is closed, and vice versa. Therefore whoever has the keys of heaven, has the keys of hell. But the Church is not said to have the keys of hell. Therefore neither has she the keys of heaven.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xvi. 19): *To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven.*

Further, every dispenser should have the keys of the things that he dispenses. But the ministers of the Church are the dispensers of the divine mysteries, as appears from 1 Cor. iv. 1. Therefore they ought to have the keys.

I answer that, In material things a key is an instrument for opening a door. Now the door of the kingdom is closed to us through sin, both as to the stain and as to the debt of punishment. Wherefore the power of removing this obstacle is called a key. Now this power is in the Divine Trinity by authority; hence some say that God has the key of *authority*. But Christ Man had the power to remove the above obstacle, through the merit of His Passion, which also is said to open the door; hence some say that He has the keys of *excellence*. And since *the sacraments of which the Church is built, flowed from the side of Christ while He lay asleep on the cross* (Augustine,—*Enarr. in Ps. cxxxviii.*), the efficacy of the Passion abides in the sacraments of the Church. Wherefore a certain power for the removal of the aforesaid obstacle is bestowed on the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments, not by their own, but by a Divine power and by the Passion of Christ. This power is called metaphorically the Church's key, and is the key of *ministry*.

Reply Obj. 1. The door of heaven, considered in itself, is ever open, but it is said to be closed to someone, on account of some obstacle against entering therein, which is in himself. The obstacle which the entire human nature inherited from the sin of the first man, was removed by Christ's Passion; hence, after the Passion, John saw an opened door in

heaven. Yet that door still remains closed to this or that man, on account of the original sin which he has contracted, or the actual sin which he has committed: hence we need the sacraments and the keys of the Church.

Reply Obj. 2. This refers to His closing Limbo, so that thenceforth no one should go there, and to His opening of Paradise, the obstacle of nature being removed by His Passion.

Reply Obj. 3. The key whereby hell is opened and closed, is the power of bestowing grace, whereby hell is opened to man, so that he is taken out from sin which is the door of hell, and closed, so that by the help of grace man should no more fall into sin. Now the power of bestowing grace belongs to God alone, wherefore He kept this key to Himself. But the key of the kingdom is also the power to remit the debt of temporal punishment, which debt prevents man from entering the kingdom. Consequently the key of the kingdom can be given to man rather than the key of hell, for they are not the same, as is clear from what has been said. For a man may be set free from hell by the remission of the debt of eternal punishment, without being at once admitted to the kingdom, on account of his yet owing a debt of temporal punishment.

It may also be replied, as some state, that the key of heaven is also the key of hell, since if one is opened to a man, the other, for that very reason, is closed to him, but it takes its name from the better of the two.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE KEY IS THE POWER OF BINDING AND
LOOSING, ETC. ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the key is not the power of binding and loosing, whereby *the ecclesiastical judge has to admit the worthy to the kingdom and exclude the unworthy therefrom*, as stated in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 16). For the spiritual power conferred in a sacrament is the same as the

character. But the key and the character do not seem to be the same, since by the character man is referred to God, whereas by the key, he is referred to his subjects. Therefore the key is not a power.

Obj. 2. Further, an ecclesiastical judge is only one who has jurisdiction, which is not given at the same time as Orders. But the keys are given in the conferring of Orders. Therefore there should have been no mention of the ecclesiastical judge in the definition of the keys.

Obj. 3. Further, when a man has something of himself, he needs not to be reduced to act by some active power. Now a man is admitted to the kingdom from the very fact that he is worthy. Therefore it does not concern the power of the keys to admit the worthy to the kingdom.

Obj. 4. Further, sinners are unworthy of the kingdom. But the Church prays for sinners, that they may go to heaven. Therefore she does not exclude the unworthy, but admits them, so far as she is concerned.

Obj. 5. Further, in every ordered series of agents, the last end belongs to the principal and not to the instrumental agent. But the principal agent in view of man's salvation is God. Therefore admission to the kingdom, which is the last end, belongs to Him, and not to those who have the keys, who are as instrumental or ministerial agents.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*De Anima*, ii.), *powers are defined from their acts.* Wherefore, since the key is a kind of power, it should be defined from its act or use, and reference to the act should include its object from which it takes its species, and the mode of acting whereby the power is shown to be well ordered. Now the act of the spiritual power is to open heaven, not absolutely, since it is already open, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 1), but for this or that man; and this cannot be done in an orderly manner without due consideration of the worthiness of the one to be admitted to heaven. Hence the aforesaid definition of the key gives the genus, *viz. power*, the subject of the power, *viz. the ecclesiastical judge*, and the act, *viz. of excluding or admitting*, corresponding to the two acts of a material key

which are to open and shut; the object of which act is referred to in the words *from the kingdom*, and the mode, in the words, *worthy* and *unworthy*, because account is taken of the worthiness or unworthiness of those on whom the act is exercised.

Reply Obj. 1. The same power is directed to two things, of which one is the cause of the other, as heat, in fire, is directed to make a thing hot and to melt it. And since every grace and remission in a mystical body comes to it from its head, it seems that it is essentially the same power whereby a priest can consecrate, and whereby he can loose and bind, if he has jurisdiction, and that there is only a logical difference, according as it is referred to different effects, even as fire in one respect is said to have the power of heating, and in another, the power of melting. And because the character of the priestly order is nothing else than the power of exercising that act to which the priestly order is chiefly ordained (if we maintain that it is the same as a spiritual power), therefore the character, the power of consecrating, and the power of the keys are one and the same essentially, but differ logically.

Reply Obj. 2. All spiritual power is conferred by some kind of consecration. Therefore the key is given together with the order: yet the use of the key requires due matter, i.e. a people subject through jurisdiction, so that until he has jurisdiction, the priest has the keys, but he cannot exercise the act of the keys. And since the key is defined from its act, its definition contains a reference to jurisdiction.

Reply Obj. 3. A person may be worthy to have something in two ways, either so as to have a right to possess it, and thus whoever is worthy has heaven already opened to him,—or so that it is meet that he should receive it, and thus the power of the keys admits those who are worthy, but to whom heaven is not yet altogether opened.

Reply Obj. 4. Even as God hardens not by imparting malice, but by withholding grace, so a priest is said to exclude, not as though he placed an obstacle to entrance, but because he does not remove an obstacle which is there,

since he cannot remove it unless God has already removed it.* Hence God is prayed that He may absolve, so that there may be room for the priest's absolution.

Reply Obj. 5. The priest's act does not bear immediately on the kingdom, but on the sacraments, by means of which man wins to the kingdom.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE TWO KEYS OR ONLY ONE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are not two keys but only one. For one lock requires but one key. Now the lock for the removal of which the keys of the Church are required, is sin. Therefore the Church does not require two keys for one sin.

Obj. 2. Further, the keys are given when Orders are conferred. But knowledge is not always due to infusion, but sometimes is acquired, nor is it possessed by all those who are ordained, and is possessed by some who are not ordained. Therefore knowledge is not a key, so that there is but one key, viz. the power of judging.

Obj. 3. Further, the power which the priest has over the mystic body of Christ flows from the power which he has over Christ's true body. Now the power of consecrating Christ's true body is but one. Therefore the power which regards Christ's mystic body is but one. But this is a key. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 4. On the other hand, It seems that there are more than two keys. For just as knowledge and power are requisite for man to act, so is will. But the knowledge of discretion is reckoned as a key, and so is the power of judging. Therefore the will to absolve should be counted as a key.

Obj. 5. Further, all three Divine Persons remit sins. Now the priest, through the keys, is the minister for the remission of sins. Therefore he should have three keys, so that he may be conformed to the Trinity.

* Cf. note on p. 249.

I answer that, Whenever an act requires fitness on the part of the recipient, two things are necessary in the one who has to perform the act, viz. judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and accomplishment of the act. Therefore in the act of justice whereby a man is given what he deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to discern whether he deserves to receive. Again, an authority or power is necessary for both these things, for we cannot give save what we have in our power; nor can there be judgment, without the right to enforce it, since judgment is determined to one particular thing, which determination it derives, in speculative matters, from the first principles which cannot be gainsayed, and, in practical matters, from the power of command vested in the one who judges. And since the act of the key requires fitness in the person on whom it is exercised,—because the ecclesiastical judge, by means of the key, *admits the worthy and excludes the unworthy*, as may be seen from the definition given above (A. 2),—therefore the judge requires both judgment of discretion whereby he judges a man to be worthy, and also the very act of receiving (that man's confession); and for both these things a certain power or authority is necessary. Accordingly we may distinguish two keys, the first of which regards the judgment about the worthiness of the person to be absolved, while the other regards the absolution.

These two keys are distinct, not in the essence of authority, since both belong to the minister by virtue of his office, but in comparison with their respective acts, one of which presupposes the other.

Reply Obj. 1. One key is ordained immediately to the opening of one lock, but it is not unfitting that one key should be ordained to the act of another. Thus it is in the case in point. For it is the second key, which is the power of binding and loosing, that opens the lock of sin immediately, but the key of knowledge shows to whom that lock should be opened.

Reply Obj. 2. There are two opinions about the key of knowledge. For some say that knowledge considered as

a habit, acquired or infused, is the key in this case, and that it is not the principal key, but is called a key through being subordinate to another key: so that it is not called a key when the other key is wanting, for instance, in an educated man who is not a priest. And although priests lack this key at times, through being without knowledge, acquired or infused, of loosing and binding, yet sometimes they make use of their natural endeavours, which they who hold this opinion call a little key, so that although knowledge be not bestowed together with Orders, yet with the conferring of Orders the knowledge becomes a key which it was not before. This seems to have been the opinion of the Master (iv. *Sent.* D. 19).

But this does not seem to agree with the words of the Gospel, whereby the keys are promised to Peter (Matth. xvi. 19), so that not only one but two are given in Orders. For which reason the other opinion holds that the key is not knowledge considered as a habit, but the authority to exercise the act of knowledge, which authority is sometimes without knowledge, while the knowledge is sometimes present without the authority. This may be seen even in secular courts, for a secular judge may have the authority to judge, without having the knowledge of the law, while another man, on the contrary, has knowledge of the law without having the authority to judge. And since the act of judging, to which a man is bound through the authority which is vested in him, and not through his habit of knowledge, cannot be well performed without both of the above, the authority to judge, which is the key of knowledge, cannot be accepted without sin by one who lacks knowledge; whereas knowledge void of authority can be possessed without sin.

Reply Obj. 3. The power of consecrating is directed to only one act of another kind, wherefore it is not numbered among the keys, nor is it multiplied as the power of the keys, which is directed to different acts, although as to the essence of power and authority it is but one, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 4. Everyone is free to will, so that no one needs authority to will; wherefore will is not reckoned as a key.

Reply Obj. 5. All three Persons remit sins in the same way as one Person, wherefore there is no need for the priest, who is the minister of the Trinity, to have three keys: and all the more, since the will, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, requires no key, as stated above (*ad* 4).

QUESTION XVIII.

OF THE EFFECT OF THE KEYS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the effect of the keys, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt? (2) Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment? (3) Whether a priest can bind in virtue of the power of the keys? (4) Whether he can loose and bind according to his own judgment?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE POWER OF THE KEYS EXTENDS TO THE
REMISSION OF GUILT?*

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt. For it was said to the disciples (John xx. 23): *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.* Now this was not said in reference to the declaration only, as the Master states (iv. *Sent.* D. 18), for in that case the priest of the New Testament would have no more power than a priest of the Old Testament. Therefore he exercises a power over the remission of the guilt.

Obj. 2. Further, in Penance grace is given for the remission of sin. Now the priest is the dispenser of this sacrament by virtue of the keys. Therefore, since grace is opposed to sin, not on the part of the punishment, but on the part of

* St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. (Cf. P. iii., Q. LXII., A. 1; Q. LXIV., A. 1; Q. LXXXVI., A. 6)

the guilt, it seems that the priest operates unto the remission of sin by virtue of the keys.

Obj. 3. Further, the priest receives more power by his consecration than the baptismal water by its sanctification. Now the baptismal water receives the power *to touch the body and cleanse the heart*, as Augustine says (*Tract. lxxx. in Joan.*). Much more, therefore, does the priest, in his consecration, receive the power to cleanse the heart from the stain of sin.

On the contrary, The Master stated above (*iv. Sent. D. 18*) that God has not bestowed on the minister the power to co-operate with Him in the inward cleansing. Now if he remitted sins as to the guilt, he would co-operate with God in the inward cleansing. Therefore the power of the keys does not extend to the remission of guilt.

Further, sin is not remitted save by the Holy Ghost. But no man has the power to give the Holy Ghost, as the Master said above (*i. Sent. D. 14*). Neither therefore can he remit sins as to their guilt.

I answer that, According to Hugh (*De Sacram. ii.*), *the sacraments, by virtue of their sanctification, contain an invisible grace.* Now this sanctification is sometimes essential to the sacrament both as regards the matter and as regards the minister, as may be seen in Confirmation, and then the sacramental virtue is in both together. Sometimes, however, the essence of the sacrament requires only sanctification of the matter, as in Baptism, which has no fixed minister on whom it depends necessarily, and then the whole virtue of the sacrament is in the matter. Again, sometimes the essence of the sacrament requires the consecration or sanctification of the minister without any sanctification of the matter, and then the entire sacramental virtue is in the minister, as in Penance. Hence the power of the keys which is in the priest, stands in the same relation to the effect of Penance, as the virtue in the baptismal water does to the effect of Baptism. Now Baptism and the sacrament of Penance agree somewhat in their effect, since each is directly ordained against guilt, which is not the case in the other sacraments: yet they differ in this, that the sacrament of

Penance, since the acts of the recipient are as its matter, cannot be given save to adults, who need to be disposed for the reception of the sacramental effect; whereas Baptism is given, sometimes to adults, sometimes to children and others who lack the use of reason, so that by Baptism children receive grace and remission of sin without any previous disposition, while adults do not, for they require to be disposed by the removal of insincerity. This disposition sometimes precedes their Baptism by priority of time, being sufficient for the reception of grace, before they are actually baptized, but not before they have come to the knowledge of the truth and have conceived the desire for Baptism. At other times this disposition does not precede the reception of Baptism by a priority of time, but is simultaneous with it, and then the grace of the remission of guilt is bestowed through the reception of Baptism. On the other hand, grace is never given through the sacrament of Penance, unless the recipient be disposed either simultaneously or before. Hence the power of the keys operates unto the remission of guilt, either through being desired or through being actually exercised, even as the waters of Baptism. But just as Baptism acts, not as a principal agent but as an instrument, and does not go so far as to cause the reception itself of grace, even instrumentally,* but merely disposes the recipient to the grace whereby his guilt is remitted, so is it with the power of the keys. Wherefore God alone directly remits guilt, and Baptism acts through His power instrumentally, as an inanimate instrument, and the priest as an animate instrument, such as a servant is, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* viii.): and consequently the priest acts as a minister. Hence it is clear that the power of the keys is ordained, in a manner, to the remission of guilt, not as causing that remission, but as disposing thereto. Consequently if a man, before receiving absolution, were not perfectly disposed for the reception of grace, he would receive grace at the very time of sacramental confession and absolution, provided he offered no obstacle.

* Cf. note on p. 249.

For if the key were in no way ordained to the remission of guilt, but only to the remission of punishment, as some hold, it would not be necessary to have a desire of receiving the effect of the keys in order to have one's sins forgiven, just as it is not necessary to have a desire of receiving the other sacraments which are ordained, not to the remission of guilt, but against punishment. But this enables us to see that it is not ordained unto the remission of guilt, because the use of the keys, in order to be effective, always requires a disposition on the part of the recipient of the sacrament. And the same would apply to Baptism, were it never given save to adults.

Reply Obj. 1. As the Master says in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 18), the power of forgiving sins was entrusted to priests, not that they may forgive them, by their own power, for this belongs to God, but that, as ministers, they may declare* the operation of God Who forgives. Now this happens in three ways. First, by a declaration, not of present, but of future forgiveness, without co-operating therein in any way: and thus the sacraments of the Old Law signified the Divine operation, so that the priest of the Old Law did but declare and did not operate the forgiveness of sins. Secondly, by a declaration of present forgiveness without co-operating in it at all: and thus some say that the sacraments of the New Law signify the bestowal of grace, which God gives when the sacraments are conferred, without the sacraments containing any power productive of grace, according to which opinion, even the power of the keys would merely declare the Divine operation that has its effect in the remission of guilt when the sacrament is conferred. Thirdly, by signifying the Divine operation causing then and there the remission of guilt, and by co-operating towards this effect dispositively and instrumentally: and then, according to another and more common opinion, the sacraments of the New Law declare the cleansing effected by God. In this way also the priest of the New Testament declares the recipient to be absolved from guilt, because in speaking of

* Cf. note on p. 249.

the sacraments, what is ascribed to the power of the ministers must be consistent with the sacrament. Nor is it unreasonable that the keys of the Church should dispose the penitent to the remission of his guilt, from the fact that the guilt is already remitted, even as neither is it unreasonable that Baptism, considered in itself, causes a disposition in one who is already sanctified.

Reply Obj. 2. Neither the sacrament of Penance, nor the sacrament of Baptism, by its operation, causes grace, or the remission of guilt, directly, but only dispositively.* Hence the *Reply* to the *Third Objection* is evident.

The other arguments show that the power of the keys does not effect the remission of guilt directly, and this is to be granted.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER A PRIEST CAN REMIT SIN AS TO THE PUNISHMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a priest cannot remit sin as to the punishment. For sin deserves eternal and temporal punishment. But after the priest's absolution the penitent is still obliged to undergo temporal punishment either in Purgatory or in this world. Therefore the priest does not remit the punishment in any way.

Obj. 2. Further, the priest cannot anticipate the judgment of God. But Divine justice appoints the punishment which penitents have to undergo. Therefore the priest cannot remit any part of it.

Obj. 3. Further, a man who has committed a slight sin, is not less susceptible to the power of the keys, than one who has committed a graver sin. Now if the punishment for the graver sin be lessened in any way through the priestly administrations, it would be possible for a sin to be so slight that the punishment which it deserves is no greater than that which has been remitted for the graver sin. Therefore the priest would be able to remit the entire punishment due for the slight sin: which is false.

* Cf. note on p. 249.

Obj. 4. Further, the whole of the temporal punishment due for a sin is of one kind. If, therefore, by a first absolution something is taken away from the punishment, it will be possible for something more to be taken away by a second absolution, so that the absolution can be so often repeated, that by virtue of the keys the whole punishment will be taken away, since the second absolution is not less efficacious than the first: and consequently that sin will be altogether unpunished, which is absurd.

On the contrary, The key is the power of binding and loosing. But the priest can enjoin a temporal punishment. Therefore he can absolve from punishment.

Further, the priest cannot remit sin either as to the guilt,* as stated in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 18), or as to the eternal punishment, for a like reason. If therefore he cannot remit sin as to the temporal punishment, he would be unable to remit sin in any way, which is altogether contrary to the words of the Gospel.

I answer that, Whatever may be said of the effect of Baptism conferred on one who has already received grace, applies equally to the effect of the actual exercise of the power of the keys on one who has already been contrite. For a man may obtain the grace of the remission of his sins as to their guilt, through faith and contrition, previous to Baptism; but when, afterwards, he actually receives Baptism, his grace is increased, and he is entirely absolved from the debt of punishment, since he is then made a partaker of the Passion of Christ. In like manner when a man, through contrition, has received the pardon of his sins as to their guilt, and consequently as to the debt of eternal punishment, (which is remitted together with the guilt) by virtue of the keys which derive their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, his grace is increased and the temporal punishment is remitted, the debt of which remained after the guilt had been forgiven. However, this temporal punishment is not entirely remitted, as in Baptism, but only partly, because the man who is regenerated in Baptism is

* Cf. note on p. 249.

conformed to the Passion of Christ, by receiving into himself entirely the efficacy of Christ's Passion, which suffices for the blotting out of all punishment, so that nothing remains of the punishment due to his preceding actual sins. For nothing should be imputed to a man unto punishment, save what he has done himself, and in Baptism man begins a new life, and by the baptismal water becomes a new man, as that no debt for previous sin remains in him. On the other hand, in Penance, a man does not take on a new life, since therein he is not born again, but healed. Consequently by virtue of the keys which produce their effect in the sacrament of Penance, the punishment is not entirely remitted, but something is taken off the temporal punishment, the debt of which could remain after the eternal punishment had been remitted. Nor does this apply only to the temporal punishment which the penitent owes at the time of confession, as some hold, (for then confession and sacramental absolution would be mere burdens, which cannot be said of the sacraments of the New Law), but also to the punishment due in Purgatory, so that one who has been absolved and dies before making satisfaction, is less punished in Purgatory, than if he had died before receiving absolution.

Reply Obj. 1. The priest does not remit the entire temporal punishment, but part of it; wherefore the penitent still remains obliged to undergo satisfactory punishment.

Reply Obj. 2. Christ's Passion was sufficiently satisfactory for the sins of the whole world, so that without prejudice to Divine justice something can be remitted from the punishment which a sinner deserves, in so far as the effect of Christ's Passion reaches him through the sacraments of the Church.

Reply Obj. 3. Some satisfactory punishment must remain for each sin, so as to provide a remedy against it. Wherefore, though, by virtue of the absolution some measure of the punishment due to a grave sin is remitted, it does not follow that the same measure of punishment is remitted for each sin, because in that case some sin would remain without any

punishment at all: but, by virtue of the keys, the punishments due to various sins are remitted in due proportion.

Reply Obj. 4. Some say that at the first absolution, as much as possible is remitted by virtue of the keys, and that, nevertheless, the second confession is valid, on account of the instruction received, on account of the additional surety, on account of the prayers of the priest or confessor, and lastly on account of the merit of the shame.

But this does not seem to be true, for though there might be a reason for repeating the confession, there would be no reason for repeating the absolution, especially if the penitent has no cause to doubt about his previous absolution; for he might just as well doubt after the second as after the first absolution: even as we see that the sacrament of Extreme Unction is not repeated during the same sickness, for the reason that all that could be done through the sacrament, has been done once. Moreover, in the second confession, there would be no need for the confessor to have the keys, if the power of the keys had no effect therein.

For these reasons others say that even in the second absolution something of the punishment is remitted by virtue of the keys, because when absolution is given a second time, grace is increased, and the greater the grace received, the less there remains of the blemish of the previous sin, and the less punishment is required to remove that blemish. Wherefore even when a man is first absolved, his punishment is more or less remitted by virtue of the keys, according as he disposes himself more or less to receive grace; and this disposition may be so great, that even by virtue of his contrition the whole punishment is remitted, as we have already stated (Q. V., A. 2). Consequently it is not unreasonable, if by frequent confession even the whole punishment be remitted, that a sin remain altogether unpunished, since Christ made satisfaction for its punishment.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PRIEST CAN BIND THROUGH THE POWER OF
THE KEYS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the priest cannot bind by virtue of the power of the keys. For the sacramental power is ordained as a remedy against sin. Now binding is not a remedy for sin, but seemingly is rather conducive to an aggravation of the disease. Therefore, by the power of the keys, which is a sacramental power, the priest cannot bind.

Obj. 2. Further, just as to loose or to open is to remove an obstacle, so to bind is to place an obstacle. Now an obstacle to heaven is sin, which cannot be placed on us by an extrinsic cause, since no sin is committed except by the will. Therefore the priest cannot bind.

Obj. 3. Further, the keys derive their efficacy from Christ's Passion. But binding is not an effect of the Passion. Therefore the priest cannot bind by the power of the keys.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xvi. 19): *Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound also in heaven.*

Further, rational powers are directed to opposites. But the power of the keys is a rational power, since it has discretion connected with it. Therefore it is directed to opposites. Therefore if it can loose, it can bind.

I answer that, The operation of the priest in using the keys, is conformed to God's operation, Whose minister he is. Now God's operation extends both to guilt and to punishment; to the guilt indeed, so as to loose it directly, but to bind it indirectly, in so far as He is said to harden, when He withholds His grace; whereas His operation extends to punishment directly, in both respects, because He both spares and inflicts it. In like manner, therefore, although the priest, in absolving, exercises an operation ordained to the remission of guilt, in the way mentioned above (A. 1), nevertheless, in binding, he exercises no operation on the guilt; (unless he be said to bind by not absolving the peni-

tent and by declaring him to be bound), but he has the power both of binding and of loosing with regard to the punishment. For he looses from the punishment which he remits, while he binds as to the punishment which remains. This he does in two ways,—first as regards the quantity of the punishment considered in general, and thus he does not bind save by not loosing, and declaring the penitent to be bound, secondly, as regards this or that particular punishment, and thus he binds to punishment by imposing it.

Reply Obj. 1. The remainder of the punishment to which the priest binds the penitent, is the medicine which cleanses the latter from the blemish of sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Not only sin, but also punishment is an obstacle to heaven: and how the latter is enjoined by the priest, has been said in the article.

Reply Obj. 3. Even the Passion of Christ binds us to some punishment whereby we are conformed to Him.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PRIEST CAN BIND AND LOOSE ACCORDING
TO HIS OWN JUDGMENT?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment. For Jerome says (cf. *Can. Mensuram, De Pœnit.*, Dist. i.): *The canons do not fix the length of time for doing penance so precisely as to say how each sin is to be amended, but leave the decision of this matter to the judgment of a discreet priest.* Therefore it seems that he can bind and loose according to his own judgment.

Obj. 2. Further, *The lord commended the unjust steward, forasmuch as he had done wisely* (Luke xvi. 5), because he had allowed a liberal discount to his master's debtors. But God is more inclined to mercy than any temporal lord. Therefore it seems that the more punishment the priest remits, the more he is to be commended.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ's every action is our instruction. Now on some sinners He imposed no punishment, but only

amendment of life, as in the case of the adulterous woman (John viii.). Therefore it seems that the priest also, who is the vicar of Christ, can, according to his own judgment, remit the punishment, either wholly or in part.

On the contrary, Gregory VII. says (cf. *Act. Concil. Rom. v.*, Can. 5): *We declare it a mock penance if it is not imposed according to the authority of the holy fathers in proportion to the sin.* Therefore it seems that it does not altogether depend on the priest's judgment.

Further, the act of the keys requires discretion. Now if the priest could remit and impose as much as he liked of a penance, he would have no need of discretion, because there would be no room for indiscretion. Therefore it does not altogether depend on the priest's judgment.

I answer that, In using the keys, the priest acts as the instrument and minister of God. Now no instrument can have an efficacious act, except in so far as it is moved by the principal agent. Wherefore, Dionysius says (*Hier. Eccl.*, cap. ult.) that *priests should use their hierarchical powers, according as they are moved by God.* A sign of this is that before the power of the keys was conferred on Peter (Matth. xvi.) mention is made of the revelation vouchsafed to him of the Godhead; and the gift of the Holy Ghost, whereby *the sons of God are led* (Rom. viii. 14), is mentioned before power was given to the apostles to forgive sins. Consequently if anyone were to presume to use his power against that Divine motion, he would not realize the effect, as Dionysius states (*ibid.*), and, besides, he would be turned away from the Divine order, and consequently would be guilty of a sin. Moreover, since satisfactory punishments are medicinal, just as the medicines prescribed by the medical art are not suitable to all, but have to be changed according to the judgment of a medical man, who follows not his own will, but his medical science, so the satisfactory punishments appointed by the canons are not suitable to all, but have to be varied according to the judgment of the priest guided by the Divine instinct. Therefore just as sometimes the physician prudently refrains from giving a medicine sufficiently

efficacious to heal the disease, lest a greater danger should arise on account of the weakness of nature, so the priest, moved by Divine instinct, sometimes refrains from enjoining the entire punishment due to one sin, lest by the severity of the punishment, the sick man come to despair and turn away altogether from repentance.

Reply Obj. 1. This judgment should be guided entirely by the Divine instinct.

Reply Obj. 2. The steward is commended also for having done wisely. Therefore in the remission of the due punishment, there is need for discretion.

Reply Obj. 3. Christ had the power of *excellence* in the sacraments, so that, by His own authority, He could remit the punishment wholly or in part, just as He chose. Therefore there is no comparison between Him and those who act merely as ministers.

QUESTION XIX.

OF THE MINISTERS OF THE KEYS.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider the ministers and the use of the keys: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the priest of the Law had the keys? (2) Whether Christ had the keys? (3) Whether priests alone have the keys? (4) Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys or their use? (5) Whether wicked priests have the effective use of the keys? (6) Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded, have the use of the keys?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PRIEST OF THE LAW HAD THE KEYS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the priests of the Law had the keys. For the possession of the keys results from having Orders. But they had Orders since they were called priests. Therefore the priests of the Law had the keys.

Obj. 2. Further, as the Master states (iv. *Sent.* D. 18), there are two keys, knowledge of discretion, and power of judgment. But the priests of the Law had authority for both of these: therefore they had the keys.

Obj. 3. Further, the priests of the Law had some power over the rest of the people, which power was not temporal, else the kingly power would not have differed from the priestly power. Therefore it was a spiritual power; and this is the key. Therefore they had the key.

On the contrary, The keys are ordained to the opening of the heavenly kingdom, which could not be opened before Christ's Passion. Therefore the priest of the Law had not the keys.

Further, the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer grace. Now the gate of the heavenly kingdom could not be opened except by means of grace. Therefore it could not be opened by means of those sacraments, so that the priests who administered them, had not the keys of the heavenly kingdom.

I answer that, Some have held that, under the Old Law, the keys of the kingdom were in the hands of the priests, because the right of imposing punishment for sin was conferred on them, as related in Levit. v., which right seems to belong to the keys; but that these keys were incomplete then, whereas now they are complete as bestowed by Christ on the priests of the New Law.

But this seems to be contrary to the intent of the Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews (ix. 11-12). For there the priesthood of Christ is given the preference over the priesthood of the Law, inasmuch as Christ came, *a high priest of the good things to come*, and brought us *by His own blood* into a tabernacle not made with hand, whither the priesthood of the Old Law brought men *by the blood of goats and of oxen*. Hence it is clear that the power of that priesthood did not reach to heavenly things but to the shadow of heavenly things: and so, we must say with others that they had not the keys, but that the keys were foreshadowed in them.

Reply Obj. 1. The keys of the kingdom go with the priesthood whereby man is brought into the heavenly kingdom, but such was not the priesthood of Levi; hence it had the keys, not of heaven, but of an earthly tabernacle.

Reply Obj. 2. The priests of the Old Law had authority to discern and judge, but not to admit those they judged into heaven, but only into the shadow of heavenly things.

Reply Obj. 3. They had no spiritual power, since, by the sacraments of the Law, they cleansed men not from their

sins but from irregularities, so that those who were cleansed by them could enter into a tabernacle which was *made with hand*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST HAD THE KEY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that Christ did not have the key. For the key goes with the character of Order. But Christ did not have a character. Therefore He had not the key.

Obj. 2. Further, Christ had power of *excellence* in the sacraments, so that He could produce the sacramental effect without the sacramental rite. Now the key is something sacramental. Therefore He needed no key, and it would have been useless to Him to have it.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. iii. 7): *These things saith . . . He that hath the key of David, etc.*

I answer that, The power to do a thing is both in the instrument and in the principal agent, but not in the same way since it is more perfectly in the latter. Now the power of the keys which we have, like other sacramental powers, is instrumental: whereas it is in Christ as principal agent in the matter of our salvation, by authority, if we consider Him as God, by merit, if we consider Him as man.* But the very notion of a key expresses a power to open and shut, whether this be done by the principal agent or by an instrument. Consequently we must admit that Christ had the key, but in a higher way than His ministers, wherefore He is said to have the key of *excellence*.

Reply Obj. 1. A character implies the notion of something derived from another, hence the power of the keys which we receive from Christ results from the character whereby we are conformed to Christ, whereas in Christ it results not from a character, but from the principal form.

Reply Obj. 2. The key which Christ had was not sacramental, but the origin of the sacramental key.

* For St. Thomas's later teaching on this point, cf. P. III., Q. XLVIII., A. 6; I.-II., Q. CXII., A. 1., *ad. 1.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRIESTS ALONE HAVE THE KEYS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that not only priests have the keys. For Isidore says (*Etym.* vii.) that the *doorkeepers have to tell the good from the bad, so as to admit the good and keep out the bad.* Now this is the definition of the keys, as appears from what has been said (Q. XVII., A. 2). Therefore not only priests but even doorkeepers have the keys.

Obj. 2. Further, the keys are conferred on priests when by being anointed they receive power from God. But kings of Christian peoples also receive power from God and are consecrated by being anointed. Therefore not only priests have the keys.

Obj. 3. Further, the priesthood is an Order belonging to an individual person. But sometimes a number of people together seem to have the key, because certain Chapters can pass a sentence of excommunication, which pertains to the power of the keys. Therefore not only priests have the key.

Obj. 4. Further, a woman is not capable of receiving the priesthood, since she is not competent to teach, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. xiv. 34). But some women (abbesses, for instance, who exercise a spiritual power over their subjects), seem to have the keys. Therefore not only priests have the keys.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Pœnit.* i.): *This right, viz. of binding and loosing, is granted to priests alone.*

Further, by receiving the power of the keys, a man is set up between the people and God. But this belongs to the priest alone, who is *ordained . . . in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins* (Heb. v. 1). Therefore only priests have the keys.

I answer that, There are two kinds of key. One reaches to heaven itself directly, by remitting sin and thus removing the obstacles to the entrance into heaven; and this is called

the key of *Order*. Priests alone have this key, because they alone are ordained for the people in the things which appertain to God directly. The other key reaches to heaven, not directly but through the medium of the Church Militant. By this key a man goes to heaven, since, by its means, a man is shut out from or admitted to the fellowship of the Church Militant, by excommunication or absolution. This is called the key of *jurisdiction* in the external court, wherefore even those who are not priests can have this key, e.g. archdeacons, bishops elect, and others who can excommunicate. But it is not properly called a key of heaven, but a disposition thereto.

Reply Obj. 1. The doorkeepers have the key for taking care of those things which are contained in a material temple, and they have to judge whether a person should be excluded from or admitted to that temple; which judgment they pronounce, not by their own authority, but in pursuance to the priest's judgment, so that they appear to be the administrators of the priestly power.

Reply Obj. 2. Kings have no power in spiritual matters, so that they do not receive the key of the heavenly kingdom. Their power is confined to temporal matters, and this too can only come to them from God, as appears from Rom. xiii. 1. Nor are they consecrated by the unction of a sacred Order: their anointing is merely a sign that the excellence of their power comes down to them from Christ, and that, under Christ, they reign over the Christian people.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as in civil matters the power is sometimes vested in a judge, as in a kingdom, whereas sometimes it is vested in many exercising various offices but acting together with equal rights (*Ethic. viii.*), so too, spiritual jurisdiction may be exercised both by one alone, e.g. a bishop, and by many together, e.g. by a Chapter, and thus they have the key of jurisdiction, but they have not all together the key of Order.

Reply Obj. 4. According to the Apostle (1 Tim. ii. 11, Tit. ii. 5), woman is in a state of subjection: wherefore she

can have no spiritual jurisdiction, since the Philosopher also says (*Ethic.* viii.) that it is a corruption of public life when the government comes into the hands of a woman. Consequently a woman has neither the key of Order nor the key of jurisdiction. Nevertheless a certain use of the keys is allowed to women, such as the right to correct other women who are under them, on account of the danger that might threaten if men were to dwell under the same roof.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER HOLY MEN WHO ARE NOT PRIESTS HAVE THE KEYS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that holy men, even those who are not priests, have the use of the keys. For loosing and binding, which are the effects of the keys, derive their efficacy from the merit of Christ's Passion. Now those are most conformed to Christ's Passion, who follow Christ, suffering by patience and other virtues. Therefore it seems that even if they have not the priestly Order, they can bind and loose.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (*Heb.* vii. 7): *Without all contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the greater* (*Vulg.*,—*better*). Now, *in spiritual matters*, according to Augustine (*De Trin.* vi.), *to be better is to be greater*. Therefore those who are better, i.e. who have more charity, can bless others by absolving them. Hence the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, *Action belongs to that which has the power*, as the Philosopher says (*De Somno et vigil.* i.). But the key which is a spiritual power belongs to priests alone. Therefore priests alone are competent to have the use of the keys.

I answer that, There is this difference between a principal and an instrumental agent, that the latter does not produce, in the effect, not its own likeness, but the likeness of the principal agent, whereas the principal agent produces its own likeness. Consequently a thing becomes a principal agent through

having a form, which it can reproduce in another, whereas an instrumental agent is not constituted thus, but through being applied by the principal agent in order to produce a certain effect. Since therefore in the act of the keys the principal agent by authority is Christ as God, and by merit is Christ as man,* it follows that on account of the very fulness of Divine goodness in Him, and of the perfection of His grace, He is competent to exercise the act of the keys. But another man is not competent to exercise this act as principal agent, since neither can he give another man grace whereby sins are remitted, nor can he merit sufficiently; so that he is nothing more than an instrumental agent. Consequently the recipient of the effect of the keys, is likened, not to the one who uses the keys, but to Christ. Therefore, no matter how much grace a man may have, he cannot produce the effect of the keys, unless he be appointed to that purpose by receiving Orders.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as between instrument and effect there is need of likeness, not of a similar form, but of aptitude in the instrument for the effect, so is it as regards the instrument and the principal agent. The former is the likeness between holy men and the suffering Christ, nor does it bestow on them the use of the keys.

Reply Obj. 2. Although a mere man cannot merit grace for another man condignly, yet the merit of one man can co-operate in the salvation of another. Hence there is a twofold blessing. One proceeds from a mere man, as meriting by his own act: this blessing can be conferred by any holy person, in whom Christ dwells by His grace, in so far as he excels in goodness the person whom he blesses. The other blessing is when a man blesses, as applying a blessing instrumentally through the merit of Christ, and this requires excellence of Order and not of virtue.

* See footnote on p. 263.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WICKED PRIESTS HAVE THE USE OF THE KEYS ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that wicked priests have not the use of the keys. For in the passage where the use of the keys is bestowed on the apostles (John xx. 22, 23), the gift of the Holy Ghost is promised. But wicked men have not the Holy Ghost. Therefore they have not the use of the keys.

Obj. 2. Further, no wise king entrusts his enemy with the dispensation of his treasure. Now the use of the keys consists in dispensing the treasure of the King of heaven, Who is Wisdom itself. Therefore the wicked, who are His enemies on account of sin, have not the use of the keys.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Bapt.* v.) that *God gives the sacrament of grace even through wicked men, but grace itself only by Himself or through His saints. Hence He forgives sin by Himself, or by those who are members of the Dove.* But the remission of sins is the use of the keys. Therefore sinners, who are not *members of the Dove*, have not the use of the keys.

Obj. 4. Further, the prayer of a wicked priest cannot effect reconciliation, for, as Gregory says (*Pastor.* i.), *if an unacceptable person is sent to intercede, anger is provoked to yet greater severity.* But the use of the keys implies a kind of intercession, as appears in the form of absolution. Therefore wicked priests cannot use the keys effectively.

On the contrary, No man can know whether another man is in the state of grace. If, therefore, no one could use the keys in giving absolution unless he were in a state of grace, no one would know that he had been absolved, which would be very unfitting.

Further, the wickedness of the minister cannot void the liberality of his lord. But the priest is no more than a minister. Therefore he cannot by his wickedness take away from us the gift which God has given through him.

I answer that, Just as participation of a form to be induced into an effect does not make a thing to be an instrument, so neither does the loss of that form prevent that thing being used as an instrument. Consequently, since man is merely an instrument in the use of the keys, however much he may through sin be deprived of grace, whereby sins are forgiven, yet he is by no means deprived of the use of the keys.

Reply Obj. 1. The gift of the Holy Ghost is requisite for the use of the keys, not as being indispensable for the purpose, but because it is unbecoming for the user to use them without it, though he that submits to them receives their effect.

Reply Obj. 2. An earthly king can be cheated and deceived in the matter of his treasure, and so he does not entrust his enemy with the dispensation thereof. But the King of heaven cannot be cheated, because all tends to His own glory, even the abuse of the keys by some, for He can make good come out of evil, and produce many good effects through evil men. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. Augustine speaks of the remission of sins, in so far as holy men co-operate therein, not by virtue of the keys, but by merit of congruity. Hence He says that God confers the sacraments even through evil men, and among the other sacraments, absolution which is the use of the keys should be reckoned: but that through *members of the Dove*, i.e. holy men, He grants forgiveness of sins, in so far as He remits sins on account of their intercession.

We might also reply that by *members of the Dove* he means all who are not cut off from the Church, for those who receive the sacraments from them, receive grace, whereas those who receive the sacraments from those who are cut off from the Church, do not receive grace, because they sin in so doing, except in the case of Baptism, which, in cases of necessity, may be received even from one who is excommunicate.

Reply Obj. 4. The prayer which the wicked priest proffers on his own account, is not efficacious: but that which he

makes as a minister of the Church, is efficacious through the merit of Christ. Yet in both ways the priest's prayer should profit those who are subject to him.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE SCHISMATICS, HERETICS, EX-COMMUNICATE, SUSPENDED OR DEGRADED HAVE THE USE OF THE KEYS ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys. For just as the power of the keys results from Orders, so does the power of consecration. But the above cannot lose the use of the power of consecration, since if they do consecrate it is valid, though they sin in doing so. Therefore neither can they lose the use of the keys.

Obj. 2. Further, any active spiritual power in one who has the use of his free-will can be exercised by him when he wills. Now the power of the keys remains in the aforesaid, for, since it is only conferred with Orders, they would have to be reordained when they return to the Church. Therefore, since it is an active power, they can exercise it when they will.

Obj. 3. Further, spiritual grace is hindered by guilt more than by punishment. Now excommunication, suspension and degradation are punishments. Therefore, since a man does not lose the use of the keys on account of guilt, it seems that he does not lose it on account of the aforesaid.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Tract. cxxi. in Joan.*) that the *charity of the Church forgives sins*. Now it is the charity of the Church which unites its members. Since therefore the above are disunited from the Church, it seems that they have not the use of the keys in remitting sins.

Further, no man is absolved from sin by sinning. Now it is a sin for anyone to seek absolution of his sins from the above, for he disobeys the Church in so doing. Therefore

he cannot be absolved by them: and so the same conclusion follows.

I answer that, In all the above the power of the keys remains as to its essence, but its use is hindered on account of the lack of matter. For since the use of the keys requires in the user authority over the person on whom they are used, as stated above (Q. XVII., A. 2, *ad 2*), the proper matter on whom one can exercise the use of the keys is a man under one's authority. And since it is by appointment of the Church that one man has authority over another, so a man may be deprived of his authority over another by his ecclesiastical superiors. Consequently, since the Church deprives heretics, schismatics and the like, by withdrawing their subjects from them either altogether or in some respect, in so far as they are thus deprived, they cannot have the use of the keys.

Reply Obj. 1. The matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist, on which the priest exercises his power, is not a man but wheaten bread, and in Baptism, the matter is simply a man. Wherefore, just as, were a heretic to be without wheaten bread, he could not consecrate, so neither can a prelate absolve if he be deprived of his authority, yet he can baptize and consecrate, albeit to his own damnation.

Reply Obj. 2. The assertion is true, provided matter be not lacking as it is in the case in point.

Reply Obj. 3. Sin, of itself, does not remove matter, as certain punishments do: so that punishment is a hindrance not because it is contrary to the effect, but for the reason stated.

QUESTION XX.

OF THOSE ON WHOM THE POWER OF THE KEYS CAN BE EXERCISED.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider those on whom the power of the keys can be exercised. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether a priest can use the key, which he has, on any man? (2) Whether a priest can always absolve his subject? (3) Whether anyone can use the keys on his superior?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER A PRIEST CAN USE THE KEY WHICH HE HAS, ON ANY MAN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that a priest can use the key which he has, on any man. For the power of the keys was bestowed on priests by Divine authority in the words: *Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them* (John xx. 22, 23). But this was said without any restriction. Therefore he that has the key, can use it on any without restriction.

Obj. 2. Further, a material key that opens one lock, opens all locks of the same pattern. Now every sin of every man is the same kind of obstacle against entering into heaven. Therefore if a priest can, by means of the key which he has, absolve one man, he can do the same for all others.

Obj. 3. Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more perfect than that of the Old Testament. But the priest of the Old Testament could use the power which he

had of discerning between different kinds of leprosy, with regard to all indiscriminately. Much more therefore can the priest of the Gospel use his power with regard to all.

On the contrary, It is written in the Appendix of Gratian: *It is not lawful for every priest to loose or bind another priest's parishioner.* Therefore a priest cannot absolve everybody.

Further, judgment in spiritual matters should be better regulated than in temporal matters. But in temporal matters a judge cannot judge everybody. Therefore, since the use of the keys is a kind of judgment, it is not within the competency of a priest to use his key with regard to everyone.

I answer that, That which has to do with singular matters is not equally in the power of all. Thus, even as besides the general principles of medicine, it is necessary to have physicians, who adapt those general principles to individual patients or diseases, according to their various requirements, so in every kingdom, besides that one who proclaims the universal precepts of law, there is need for others to adapt those precepts to individual cases, according as each case demands. For this reason, in the heavenly hierarchy also, under the Powers who rule indiscriminately, a place is given to the Principalities, who are appointed to individual kingdoms, and to the Angels who are given charge over individual men, as we have explained above (P. I., Q. CXIII., AA. 1, 2). Consequently there should be a like order of authority in the Church Militant, so that an indiscriminate authority over all should be vested in one individual, and that there should be others under him, having distinct authority over various people. Now the use of the keys implies a certain power to exercise authority, whereby the one on whom the keys are used, becomes the proper matter of that act. Therefore he that has power over all indiscriminately, can use the keys on all, whereas those who have received authority over distinct persons, cannot use the keys on everyone, but only on those over whom they are appointed, except in cases of necessity, when the sacraments should be refused to no one.

Reply Obj. 1. A twofold power is required in order to ab-

solve from sins, namely, power of order and power of jurisdiction. The former power is equally in all priests, but not the latter. And therefore, when Our Lord (John xx. 23) gave all the apostles in general, the power of forgiving sins, this is to be understood of the power which results from receiving Orders, wherefore these words are addressed to priests when they are ordained. But to Peter in particular He gave the power of forgiving sins (Matth. xvi. 19), that we may understand that he has the power of jurisdiction before the others. But the power of Orders, considered in itself, extends to all who can be absolved: wherefore Our Lord said indeterminately, *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them*, on the understanding that this power should be used in dependence on the power given to Peter, according to His appointment.

Reply Obj. 2. A material key can open only its own lock, nor can any active force act save on its own matter. Now a man becomes the matter of the power of Order by jurisdiction: and consequently no one can use the key in respect of another over whom he has not jurisdiction.

Reply Obj. 3. The people of Israel were one people, and had but one temple, so that there was no need for a distinction in priestly jurisdiction, as there is now in the Church which comprises various peoples and nations.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER A PRIEST CAN ALWAYS ABSOLVE HIS SUBJECT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a priest cannot always absolve his subject. For, as Augustine says (*De Vera et falsa Pœnit.*),* *no man should exercise the priestly office, unless he be free from those things which he condemns in others.* But a priest might happen to share in a sin committed by his subject, e.g. by knowledge of a woman who is his subject. Therefore it seems that he cannot always use the power of the keys on his subjects.

* Work of an unknown author.

Obj. 2. Further, by the power of the keys a man is healed of all his shortcomings. Now it happens sometimes that a sin has attached to it a defect of irregularity or a sentence of excommunication, from which a simple priest cannot absolve. Therefore it seems that he cannot use the power of the keys on such as are shackled by these things in the above manner.

Obj. 3. Further, the judgment and power of our priesthood was foreshadowed by the judgment of the ancient priesthood. Now according to the Law, the lesser judges were not competent to decide all cases, and had recourse to the higher judges, according to Exod. xxiv. 14: *If any question shall arise among you, you shall refer it to them.* It seems, therefore, that a priest cannot absolve his subject from graver sins, but should refer him to his superior.

On the contrary, Whoever has charge of the principal has charge of the accessory. Now priests are charged with the dispensation of the Eucharist to their subjects, to which sacrament the absolution of sins is subordinate.* Therefore, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, a priest can absolve his subject from any sins whatever.

Further, grace, however small, removes all sin. But a priest dispenses sacraments whereby grace is given. Therefore, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, he can absolve from all sins.

I answer that, The power of Order, considered in itself, extends to the remission of all sins. But since, as stated above, the use of this power requires jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their superiors, it follows that the superior can reserve certain matters to himself, the judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior; otherwise any simple priest who has jurisdiction can absolve from any sin. Now there are five cases in which a simple priest must refer his penitent to his superior. The first is when a public penance has to be imposed, because in that case the bishop is the proper minister of the sacrament. The second is the case of those who are excommunicated, when the in-

* Cf. Q. XVII., A. 2, *ad* 1.

ferior priest cannot absolve a penitent through the latter being excommunicated by his superior. The third case is when he finds that an irregularity has been contracted, for the dispensation of which he has to have recourse to his superior. The fourth is the case of arson. The fifth is when it is the custom in a diocese for the more heinous crimes to be reserved to the bishop, in order to inspire fear, because custom in these cases either gives the power or takes it away.

Reply Obj. 1. In this case the priest should not hear the confession of his accomplice, with regard to that particular sin, but must refer him to another: nor should he confess to him, but should ask permission to go to another, or should have recourse to his superior if he refused, both on account of the danger, and for the sake of less shame. If, however, he were to absolve her it would be valid:* because when Augustine says that they should not be guilty of the same sin, he is speaking of what is congruous, not of what is essential to the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 2. Penance delivers man from all defects of guilt, but not from all defects of punishment, since even after doing penance for murder, a man remains irregular. Hence a priest can absolve from a crime, but for the remission of the punishment he must refer the penitent to the superior, except in the case of excommunication, absolution from which should precede absolution from sin, for as long as a man is excommunicated, he cannot receive any sacrament of the Church.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection considers those cases in which superiors reserve the power of jurisdiction to themselves.

* Benedict XIV. declared the absolution of an accomplice *in materia turpi* to be invalid.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN CAN USE THE KEYS WITH REGARD TO
HIS SUPERIOR ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a man cannot use the keys in respect of a superior. For every sacramental act requires its proper matter. Now the proper matter for the use of the keys, is a person who is subject, as stated above (Q. XIX., A. 6). Therefore a priest cannot use the keys in respect of one who is not his subject.

Obj. 2. Further, the Church Militant is an image of the Church Triumphant. Now in the heavenly Church an inferior angel never cleanses, enlightens or perfects a higher angel. Therefore neither can an inferior priest exercise on a superior a hierarchical action such as absolution.

Obj. 3. Further, the judgment of Penance should be better regulated than the judgment of an external court. Now in the external court an inferior cannot excommunicate or absolve his superior. Therefore, seemingly, neither can he do so in the penitential court.

On the contrary, The higher prelate is also *compassed with infirmity*, and may happen to sin. Now the power of the keys is the remedy for sin. Therefore, since he cannot use the key on himself, for he cannot be both judge and accused at the same time, it seems that an inferior can use the power of the keys on him.

Further, absolution which is given through the power of the keys, is ordained to the reception of the Eucharist. But an inferior can give Communion to his superior, if the latter asks him to. Therefore he can use the power of the keys on him if he submit to him.

I answer that, The power of the keys, considered in itself, is applicable to all, as stated above (A. 2) : and that a priest is unable to use the keys on some particular person is due to his power being limited to certain individuals. Therefore he who limited his power can extend it to whom he wills,

so that he can give him power over himself, although he cannot use the power of the keys on himself, because this power requires to be exercised on a subject, and therefore on someone else, for no man can be subject to himself.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the bishop whom a simple priest absolves is his superior absolutely speaking, yet he is beneath him in so far as he submits himself as a sinner to him.

Reply Obj. 2. In the angels there can be no defect by reason of which the higher angel can submit to the lower, such as there can happen to be among men; and so there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3. External judgment is according to men, whereas the judgment of confession is according to God, in Whose sight a man is lessened by sinning, which is not the case in human prelacy. Therefore just as in external judgment no man can pass sentence of excommunication on himself, so neither can he empower another to excommunicate him. On the other hand, in the tribunal of conscience he can give another the power to absolve him, though he cannot use that power himself.

It may also be replied that absolution in the tribunal of the confessional belongs principally to the power of the keys and consequently to the power of jurisdiction, whereas excommunication regards jurisdiction exclusively. And, as to the power of Orders, all are equal, but not as to jurisdiction. Wherefore there is no comparison.

QUESTION XXI.

OF THE DEFINITION, CONGRUITY AND CAUSE OF EXCOMMUNICATION.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now treat of excommunication: we shall consider (1) the definition, congruity and cause of excommunication, (2) who has the power to excommunicate, (3) communication with excommunicated persons, (4) absolution from excommunication.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether excommunication is suitably defined? (2) Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone? (3) Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm? (4) Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER EXCOMMUNICATION IS SUITABLY DEFINED AS SEPARATION FROM THE COMMUNION OF THE CHURCH, ETC. ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that excommunication is unsuitably defined by some thus: *Excommunication is separation from the communion of the Church, as to fruit and general suffrages.* For the suffrages of the Church avail for those for whom they are offered. But the Church prays for those who are outside the Church, as, for instance, for heretics and pagans. Therefore she prays also for the excommunicated, since they are outside the Church, and so the suffrages of the Church avail for them.

Obj. 2. Further, no one loses the suffrages of the Church except by their own fault. Now excommunication is not a fault, but a punishment. Therefore excommunication does not deprive a man of the general suffrages of the Church.

Obj. 3. Further, the fruit of the Church seems to be the same as the Church's suffrages, for it cannot mean the fruit of temporal goods, since excommunication does not deprive a man of these. Therefore there is no reason for mentioning both.

Obj. 4. Further, there is a kind of excommunication called minor,* by which man is not deprived of the suffrages of the Church. Therefore this definition is unsuitable.

I answer that, When a man enters the Church by Baptism, he is admitted to two things, viz. the body of the faithful and the participation of the sacraments; and this latter presupposes the former, since the faithful are united together in the participation of the sacraments. Consequently a person may be expelled from the Church in two ways. First by being deprived merely of the participation of the sacraments, and this is the minor excommunication. Secondly, by being deprived of both, and this is the major excommunication, of which the above is the definition. Nor can there be a third, consisting in the privation of communion with the faithful, but not of the participation of the sacraments, for the reason already given, because, to wit, the faithful communicate together in the sacraments. Now communion with the faithful is twofold. One consists in spiritual things, such as their praying for one another, and meeting together for the reception of sacred things; while another consists in certain legitimate bodily actions. These different manners of communion are signified in the verse which declares that those who are excommunicate are deprived of,—

os, orare, vale, communio, mensa.

Os, i.e. we must not give them tokens of good-will; *orare*, i.e. we must not pray with them; *vale*, we must not give

* Minor excommunication is no longer recognized by Canon Law

them marks of respect; *communio*, i.e. we must not communicate with them in the sacraments; *mensa*, i.e. we must not take meals with them. Accordingly the above definition includes privation of the sacraments in the words *as to the fruit*, and from partaking together with the faithful in spiritual things, in the words, *and the general prayers of the Church*.

Another definition is given which expresses the privation of both kinds of acts, and is as follows: *Excommunication is the privation of all lawful communion with the faithful*.

Reply Obj. 1. Prayers are said for unbelievers, but they do not receive the fruit of those prayers unless they be converted to the faith. In like manner prayers may be offered up for those who are excommunicated, but not among the prayers that are said for the members of the Church. Yet they do not receive the fruit so long as they remain under the excommunication, but prayers are said for them that they may receive the spirit of repentance, so that they may be loosed from excommunication.

Reply Obj. 2. One man's prayers profit another in so far as they can reach to him. Now the action of one man may reach to another in two ways. First, by virtue of charity which unites all the faithful, making them one in God, according to Ps. cxviii. 63: *I am a partaker with all them that fear Thee*. Now excommunication does not interrupt this union, since no man can be justly excommunicated except for a mortal sin, whereby a man is already separated from charity, even without being excommunicated. An unjust excommunication cannot deprive a man of charity, since this is one of the greatest of all goods, of which a man cannot be deprived against his will. Secondly, through the intention of the one who prays, which intention is directed to the person he prays for, and this union is interrupted by excommunication, because by passing sentence of excommunication, the Church severs a man from the whole body of the faithful, for whom she prays. Hence those prayers of the Church which are offered up for the

whole Church, do not profit those who are excommunicated. Nor can prayers be said for them among the members of the Church, as speaking in the Church's name, although a private individual may say a prayer with the intention of offering it for their conversion.

Reply Obj. 3. The spiritual fruit of the Church is derived not only from her prayers, but also from the sacraments received and from the faithful dwelling together.

Reply Obj. 4. The minor excommunication does not fulfil all the conditions of excommunication but only a part of them, hence the definition of excommunication need not apply to it in every respect, but only in some.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CHURCH SHOULD EXCOMMUNICATE ANYONE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Church ought not to excommunicate anyone, because excommunication is a kind of curse, and we are forbidden to curse (Rom. xii. 14). Therefore the Church should not excommunicate.

Obj. 2. Further, the Church Militant should imitate the Church Triumphant. Now we read in the epistle of Jude (verse 9) that *when Michael the Archangel disputing with the devil contended about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of railing speech, but said : The Lord command thee.* Therefore the Church Militant ought not to judge any man by cursing or excommunicating him.

Obj. 3. Further, no man should be given into the hands of his enemies, unless there be no hope for him. Now by excommunication a man is given into the hands of Satan, as is clear from 1 Cor. v. 5. Since then we should never give up hope about anyone in this life, the Church should not excommunicate anyone.

On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. v. 5) ordered a man to be excommunicated.

Further, it is written (Matth. xviii. 17) about the man who refuses to hear the Church: *Let him be to thee as the heathen or publican.* But heathens are outside the Church. Therefore they also who refuse to hear the Church, should be banished from the Church by excommunication.

I answer that, The judgment of the Church should be conformed to the judgment of God. Now God punishes the sinner in many ways, in order to draw him to good, either by chastising him with stripes, or by leaving him to himself, so that being deprived of those helps whereby he was kept out of evil, he may acknowledge his weakness, and humbly return to God Whom he had abandoned in his pride. In both these respects the Church by passing sentence of excommunication imitates the judgment of God. For by severing a man from the communion of the faithful that he may blush with shame, she imitates the judgment whereby God chastises man with stripes; and by depriving him of prayers and other spiritual things, she imitates the judgment of God in leaving man to himself, in order that by humility he may learn to know himself and return to God.

Reply Obj. 1. A curse may be pronounced in two ways: first so that the intention of the one who curses is fixed on the evil which he invokes or pronounces, and cursing in this sense is altogether forbidden. Secondly, so that the evil which a man invokes in cursing is intended for the good of the one who is cursed, and thus cursing is sometimes lawful and salutary: thus a physician makes a sick man undergo pain, by cutting him, for instance, in order to deliver him from his sickness.

Reply Obj. 2. The devil cannot be brought to repentance, wherefore the pain of excommunication cannot do him any good.

Reply Obj. 3. From the very fact that a man is deprived of the prayers of the Church, he incurs a triple loss, corresponding to the three things which a man acquires through the Church's prayers. For they bring an increase of grace to those who have it, or merit grace for those who have it not; and in this respect the Master of the Sentences says

(iv. Sent. D. 18): *The grace of God is taken away by excommunication.* They also prove a safeguard of virtue; and in this respect he says that *protection is taken away*, not that the excommunicated person is withdrawn altogether from God's providence, but that he is excluded from that protection with which He watches over the children of the Church in a more special way. Moreover, they are useful as a defence against the enemy, and in this respect he says that *the devil receives greater power of assaulting the excommunicated person, both spiritually and corporally.* Hence in the early Church, when men had to be enticed to the faith by means of outward signs (thus the gift of the Holy Ghost was shown openly by a visible sign), so too excommunication was evidenced by a person being troubled in his body by the devil. Nor is it unreasonable that one, for whom there is still hope, be given over to the enemy, for he is surrendered, not unto damnation, but unto correction, since the Church has the power to rescue him from the hands of the enemy, whenever he is willing.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYONE SHOULD BE EXCOMMUNICATED FOR INFLECTING TEMPORAL HARM?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that no man should be excommunicated for inflicting a temporal harm. For the punishment should not exceed the fault. But the punishment of excommunication is the privation of a spiritual good, which surpasses all temporal goods. Therefore no man should be excommunicated for temporal injuries.

Obj. 2. Further, we should render to no man evil for evil, according to the precept of the Apostle (Rom. xii. 17). But this would be rendering evil for evil, if a man were to be excommunicated for doing such an injury. Therefore this ought by no means to be done.

On the contrary, Peter sentenced Ananias and Saphira to death for keeping back the price of their piece of land

(Acts v. 1-10). Therefore it is lawful for the Church to excommunicate for temporal injuries.

I answer that, By excommunication the ecclesiastical judge excludes a man, in a sense, from the kingdom. Wherefore, since he ought not to exclude from the kingdom others than the unworthy, as was made clear from the definition of the keys (Q. XVII., A. 2), and since no one becomes unworthy, unless, through committing a mortal sin, he lose charity which is the way leading to the kingdom, it follows that no man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. And since by injuring a man in his body or in his temporalities, one may sin mortally and act against charity, the Church can excommunicate a man for having inflicted temporal injury on anyone. Yet, as excommunication is the most severe punishment, and since punishments are intended as remedies, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii), and again since a prudent physician begins with lighter and less risky remedies, therefore excommunication should not be inflicted, even for a mortal sin, unless the sinner be obstinate, either by not coming up for judgment, or by going away before judgment is pronounced, or by failing to obey the decision of the court. For then, if, after due warning, he refuse to obey, he is reckoned to be obstinate, and the judge, not being able to proceed otherwise against him, must excommunicate him.

Reply Obj. 1. A fault is not measured by the extent of the damage a man does, but by the will with which he does it, acting against charity. Wherefore, though the punishment of excommunication exceeds the harm done, it does not exceed the measure of the sin.

Reply Obj. 2. When a man is corrected by being punished, evil is not rendered to him, but good: since punishments are remedies, as stated above.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN EXCOMMUNICATION UNJUSTLY PRONOUNCED
HAS ANY EFFECT ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an excommunication which is pronounced unjustly has no effect at all. Because excommunication deprives a man of the protection and grace of God, which cannot be forfeited unjustly. Therefore excommunication has no effect if it be unjustly pronounced.

Obj. 2. Further, Jerome says (on Matth. xvi. 19, *I will give to thee the keys*): *It is a pharisaical severity to reckon as really bound or loosed, that which is bound or loosed unjustly.* But that severity was proud and erroneous. Therefore an unjust excommunication has no effect.

On the contrary, According to Gregory (*Hom. xxvi. in Evang.*), *the sentence of the pastor is to be feared whether it be just or unjust.* Now there would be no reason to fear an unjust excommunication if it did not hurt. Therefore, etc.]

I answer that, An excommunication may be unjust for two reasons. First on the part of its author, as when anyone excommunicates through hatred or anger, and then, nevertheless, the excommunication takes effect, though its author sins, because the one who is excommunicated suffers justly, even if the author act wrongly in excommunicating him. Secondly, on the part of the excommunication, through there being no proper cause, or through the sentence being passed without the forms of law being observed. In this case, if the error, on the part of the sentence, be such as to render the sentence void, this has no effect, for there is no excommunication; but if the error does not annul the sentence, this takes effect, and the person excommunicated should humbly submit (which will be credited to him as a merit), and either seek absolution from the person who has excommunicated him, or appeal to a higher judge. If, however, he were to contemn the sentence, he would *ipso facto* sin mortally.

But sometimes it happens that there is sufficient cause on the part of the excommunicator, but not on the part of the excommunicated, as when a man is excommunicated for a crime which he has not committed, but which has been proved against him: in this case, if he submit humbly, the merit of his humility will compensate him for the harm of excommunication.

Reply Obj. 1. Although a man cannot lose God's grace unjustly, yet he can unjustly lose those things which on our part dispose us to receive grace; for instance, a man may be deprived of the instruction which he ought to have. It is in this sense that excommunication is said to deprive a man of God's grace, as was explained above (A. 2, *ad* 3).

Reply Obj. 2. Jerome is speaking of sin, not of its punishments, which can be inflicted unjustly by ecclesiastical superiors.

QUESTION XXII.

OF THOSE WHO CAN EXCOMMUNICATE OR BE EXCOMMUNICATED.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider those who can excommunicate or be excommunicated. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether every priest can excommunicate? (2) Whether one who is not a priest can excommunicate? (3) Whether one who is excommunicated or suspended, can excommunicate? (4) Whether anyone can excommunicate himself, or an equal, or a superior? (5) Whether a multitude can be excommunicated? (6) Whether one who is already excommunicated can be excommunicated again?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY PRIEST CAN EXCOMMUNICATE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that every priest can excommunicate. For excommunication is an act of the keys. But every priest has the keys. Therefore every priest can excommunicate.

Obj. 2. Further, It is a greater thing to loose and bind in the tribunal of penance than in the tribunal of judgment. But every priest can loose and bind his subjects in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore every priest can excommunicate his subjects.

On the contrary, Matters fraught with danger should be left to the decision of superiors. Now the punishment of excommunication is fraught with many dangers, unless it

be inflicted with moderation. Therefore it should not be entrusted to every priest.

I answer that, In the tribunal of conscience the plea is between man and God, whereas in the outward tribunal it is between man and man. Wherefore the loosing or binding of one man in relation to God alone, belongs to the tribunal of Penance, whereas the binding or loosing of a man in relation to other men, belongs to the public tribunal of external judgment. And since excommunication severs a man from the communion of the faithful, it belongs to the external tribunal. Consequently those alone can excommunicate who have jurisdiction in the judicial tribunal. Hence, of their own authority, only bishops and higher prelates, according to the more common opinion, can excommunicate, whereas parish priests can do so only by commission or in certain cases, as those of theft, rapine and the like, in which the law allows them to excommunicate. Others, however, have maintained that even parish priests can excommunicate: but the former opinion is more reasonable.

Reply Obj. 1. Excommunication is an act of the keys, not directly, but with respect to the external judgment. The sentence of excommunication, however, though it is promulgated by an external verdict, still, as it belongs somewhat to the entrance to the kingdom, in so far as the Church Militant is the way to the Church Triumphant, this jurisdiction whereby a man is competent to excommunicate, can be called a key. It is in this sense that some distinguish between the key of Orders, which all priests have, and the key of jurisdiction in the tribunal of judgment, which none have but the judges of the external tribunal. Nevertheless God bestowed both on Peter (Matth. xvi. 19), from whom they are derived by others, whichever of them they have.

Reply Obj. 2. Parish priests have jurisdiction indeed over their subjects, in the tribunal of conscience, but not in the judicial tribunal, for they cannot summons them in contentious cases. Hence they cannot excommunicate, but they can absolve them in the tribunal of Penance. And though the tribunal of Penance is higher, yet more solemnity

is requisite in the judicial tribunal, because therein it is necessary to make satisfaction not only to God but also to man.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE NOT PRIESTS CAN EX-COMMUNICATE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that those who are not priests cannot excommunicate. Because excommunication is an act of the keys, as stated in iv. *Sent.* D. 18. But those who are not priests have not the keys. Therefore they cannot excommunicate.

Obj. 2. Further, more is required for excommunication than for absolution in the tribunal of Penance. But one who is not a priest cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Neither therefore can he excommunicate.

On the contrary, Archdeacons, legates and bishops-elect excommunicate, and yet sometimes they are not priests. Therefore not only priests can excommunicate.

I answer that, Priests alone are competent to dispense the sacraments wherein grace is given: wherefore they alone can loose and bind in the tribunal of Penance. On the other hand, excommunication regards grace, not directly but consequently, in so far as it deprives a man of the Church's prayers, by which he is disposed for grace or preserved therein. Consequently even those who are not priests, provided they have jurisdiction in a contentious court, can excommunicate.

Reply Obj. 1. Though they have not the key of Orders, they have the key of jurisdiction.

Reply Obj. 2. These two are related to one another as something exceeding and something exceeded,* and consequently one of them may be within the competency of someone while the other is not.

* Cf. A. 1, *ad.* 2, Q. XXIV., A. 1, *ad.* 1.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN WHO IS EXCOMMUNICATED OR SUSPENDED
CAN EXCOMMUNICATE ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another. For such a one has lost neither Orders nor jurisdiction, since neither is he ordained anew when he is absolved, nor is his jurisdiction renewed. But excommunication requires nothing more than Orders or jurisdiction. Therefore even one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate.

Obj. 2. Further, it is a greater thing to consecrate the body of Christ than to excommunicate. But such persons can consecrate. Therefore they can excommunicate.

On the contrary, One whose body is bound cannot bind another. But spiritual gyves are stronger than bodily fetters. Therefore one who is excommunicated cannot excommunicate another, since excommunication is a spiritual chain.

I answer that, Jurisdiction can only be used in relation to another man. Consequently, since every excommunicated person is severed from the communion of the faithful, he is deprived of the use of jurisdiction. And as excommunication requires jurisdiction, an excommunicated person cannot excommunicate, and the same reason applies to one who is suspended from jurisdiction. For if he be suspended from Orders only, then he cannot exercise his Order, but he can use his jurisdiction, while, on the other hand, if he be suspended from jurisdiction and not from Orders, he cannot use his jurisdiction, though he can exercise his Order: and if he be suspended from both, he can exercise neither.

Reply Obj. 1. Although an excommunicated or suspended person does not lose his jurisdiction, yet he does lose its use.

Reply Obj. 2. The power of consecration results from the

power of the character which is indelible, wherefore, from the very fact that a man has the character of Order, he can always consecrate, though not always lawfully. It is different with the power of excommunication which results from jurisdiction, for this can be taken away and bound.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN CAN EXCOMMUNICATE HIMSELF, HIS EQUAL,
OR HIS SUPERIOR ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior. For an angel of God was greater than Paul, according to Matth. xi. 11: *He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he, a greater than whom hath not risen among men that are born of women.* Now Paul excommunicated an angel from heaven (Gal. i. 8). Therefore a man can excommunicate his superior.

Obj. 2. Further, sometimes a priest pronounces a general excommunication for theft or the like. But it might happen that he, or his equal, or a superior has done such things. Therefore a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or a superior.

Obj. 3. Further, a man can absolve his superior or his equal in the tribunal of Penance, as when a bishop confesses to his subject, or one priest confesses venial sins to another. Therefore it seems that a man may also excommunicate his superior, or his equal.

On the contrary, Excommunication is an act of jurisdiction. But no man has jurisdiction over himself (since one cannot be both judge and defendant in the same trial), or over his superior, or over an equal. Therefore a man cannot excommunicate his superior, or his equal, or himself.

I answer that, Since, by jurisdiction, a man is placed above those over whom he has jurisdiction, through being their judge, it follows that no man has jurisdiction over himself, his superior, or his equal, and that, consequently, no one can excommunicate either himself, or his superior, or his equal.

Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle is speaking hypothetically, i.e. supposing an angel were to sin, for in that case he would not be higher than the Apostle, but lower. Nor is it absurd that, if the antecedent of a conditional sentence be impossible, the consequence be impossible also.

Reply Obj. 2. In that case no one would be excommunicated, since no man has power over his peer.

Reply Obj. 3. Loosing and binding in the tribunal of confession affects our relation to God only, in Whose sight a man from being above another sinks below him through sin; while on the other hand excommunication is the affair of an external tribunal in which a man does not forfeit his superiority on account of sin. Hence there is no comparison between the two tribunals. Nevertheless, even in the tribunal of confession, a man cannot absolve himself, or his superior, or his equal, unless the power to do so be committed to him. This does not apply to venial sins, because they can be remitted through any sacraments which confer grace, hence remission of venial sins follows the power of Orders.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SENTENCE OF EXCOMMUNICATION CAN BE PASSED
ON A BODY OF MEN ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men. Because it is possible for a number of people to be united together in wickedness. Now when a man is obstinate in his wickedness he should be excommunicated. Therefore a body of men can be excommunicated.

Obj. 2. Further, the most grievous effect of an excommunication is privation of the sacraments of the Church. But sometimes a whole country is laid under an interdict. Therefore a body of people can be excommunicated.

On the contrary, A gloss of Augustine* on Matth. xii.

* Cf. *Ep.* ccl.

asserts that the sovereign and a body of people cannot be excommunicated.

I answer that, No man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now sin consists in an act: and acts do not belong to communities, but, generally speaking, to individuals. Wherefore individual members of a community can be excommunicated, but not the community itself. And although sometimes an act belongs to a whole multitude, as when many draw a boat, which none of them could draw by himself, yet it is not probable that a community would so wholly consent to evil that there would be no dissentients. Now God, Who judges all the earth, does not condemn the just with the wicked (Gen. xviii. 25). Therefore the Church, who should imitate the judgments of God, prudently decided that a community should not be excommunicated, lest the wheat be uprooted together with the tares and cockle.

The *Reply* to the *First Objection* is evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 2. Suspension is not so great a punishment as excommunication, since those who are suspended are not deprived of the prayers of the Church, as the excommunicated are. Wherefore a man can be suspended without having committed a sin himself, just as a whole kingdom is laid under an interdict on account of the king's crime. Hence there is no comparison between excommunication and suspension.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN CAN BE EXCOMMUNICATED WHO IS ALREADY UNDER SENTENCE OF EXCOMMUNICATION ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a man who is already under sentence of excommunication cannot be excommunicated any further. For the Apostle says (I Cor. v. 12): *What have I to do to judge them that are without ?* Now those who are excommunicated are already outside the Church.

Therefore the Church cannot exercise any further judgment on them, so as to excommunicate them again.

Obj. 2. Further, Excommunication is privation of divine things and of the communion of the faithful. But when a man has been deprived of a thing, he cannot be deprived of it again. Therefore one who is excommunicated cannot be excommunicated again.

On the contrary, Excommunication is a punishment and a healing medicine. Now punishments and medicines are repeated when necessary. Therefore excommunication can be repeated.

I answer that, A man who is under sentence of one excommunication, can be excommunicated again, either by a repetition of the same excommunication, for his greater confusion, so that he may renounce sin, or for some other cause. And then there are as many principal excommunications, as there are causes for his being excommunicated.

Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle is speaking of heathens and of other unbelievers who have no (sacramental) character, whereby they are numbered among the people of God. But since the baptismal character whereby a man is numbered among God's people, is indelible, one who is baptized always belongs to the Church in some way, so that the Church is always competent to sit in judgment on him.

Reply Obj. 2. Although privation does not receive more or less in itself, yet it can, as regards its cause. In this way an excommunication can be repeated, and a man who has been excommunicated several times is further from the Church's prayers than one who has been excommunicated only once.

QUESTION XXIII.

OF COMMUNICATION WITH EXCOMMUNICATED PERSONS.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider communication with those who are excommunicated. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful to communicate in matters purely corporal with one who is excommunicated? (2) Whether one who communicates with an excommunicated person is excommunicated? (3) Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in matters not permitted by law?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL, IN MATTERS PURELY CORPORAL, TO COMMUNICATE WITH AN EXCOMMUNICATED PERSON?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person. For excommunication is an act of the keys. But the power of the keys extends only to spiritual matters. Therefore excommunication does not prevent one from communicating with another in matters corporal.

Obj. 2. Further, *What is instituted for the sake of charity, does not militate against charity.* (Cf. Q. XI., A. 1, *Obj. 1*). But we are bound by the precept of charity to succour our enemies, which is impossible without some sort of communication. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with an excommunicated person in corporal matters.

On the contrary, It is written (I Cor. v. II): *With such an one not so much as to eat.*

I answer that, Excommunication is twofold: there is minor excommunication, which deprives a man merely of a share in the sacraments, but not of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is lawful to communicate with a person lying under an excommunication of this kind, but not to give him the sacraments. The other is major excommunication, which deprives a man of the sacraments of the Church and of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is not lawful to communicate with one who lies under such an excommunication. But, since the Church resorts to excommunication to repair and not to destroy, exception is made from this general law, in certain matters wherein communication is lawful, viz. in those which concern salvation, for one is allowed to speak of such matters with an excommunicated person; and one may even speak of other matters so as to put him at his ease and to make the words of salvation more acceptable. Moreover exception is made in favour of certain people whose business it is to be in attendance on the excommunicated person, viz. his wife, child, slave, vassal or subordinate. This, however, is to be understood of children who have not attained their majority, else they are forbidden to communicate with their father: and as to the others, the exception applies to them if they have entered his service before his excommunication, but not if they did so afterwards.

Some understand this exception to apply in the opposite way, viz. that the master can communicate with his subjects: while others hold the contrary. At any rate it is lawful for them to communicate with others in matters wherein they are under an obligation to them, for just as subjects are bound to serve their master, so is the master bound to look after his subjects. Again certain cases are excepted; as when the fact of the excommunication is unknown, or in the case of strangers or travellers in the country of those who are excommunicated, for they are allowed to buy from them, or to receive alms from them

Likewise if anyone were to see an excommunicated person in distress; for then he would be bound by the precept of charity to assist him. These are all contained in the following line:

Utility, law, lowliness, ignorance of fact, necessity,

where *utility* refers to salutary words, *law* to marriage, *lowliness* to subjection. The others need no explanation.

Reply Obj. 1. Corporal matters are subordinate to spiritual matters. Wherefore the power which extends to spiritual things, can also extend to matters touching the body: even as the art which considers the end commands in matters ordained to the end.

Reply Obj. 2. In a case where one is bound by the precept of charity to hold communication, the prohibition ceases, as is clear from what has been said.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER A PERSON INCURS EXCOMMUNICATION FOR COMMUNICATING WITH ONE WHO IS EXCOMMUNICATED.

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a person does not incur excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated. For a heathen or a Jew is more separated from the Church than a person who is excommunicated. But one does not incur excommunication for communicating with a heathen or a Jew. Neither, therefore, does one for communicating with an excommunicated Christian.

Obj. 2. Further, If a man incurs excommunication for communicating with an excommunicated person, for the same reason a third would incur excommunication for communicating with him, and thus one might go on indefinitely, which would seem absurd. Therefore one does not incur excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated.

On the contrary, An excommunicated person is banished

from communion. Therefore whoever communicates with him leaves the communion of the Church: and hence he seems to be excommunicated.

I answer that, A person may incur excommunication in two ways. First, so that the excommunication includes both himself and whosoever communicates with him: and then, without any doubt, whoever communicates with him, incurs a major excommunication. Secondly, so that the excommunication is simply pronounced on him; and then a man may communicate with him either in his crime, by counsel, help or favour, in which case again he incurs the major excommunication, or he may communicate with him in other things by speaking to him, greeting him, or eating with him, in which case he incurs the minor excommunication.

Reply Obj. 1. The Church has no intention of correcting unbelievers as well as the faithful who are under her care: hence she does not sever those, whom she excommunicates, from the fellowship of unbelievers, as she does from the communion of the faithful over whom she exercises a certain power.

Reply Obj. 2. It is lawful to hold communion with one who has incurred a minor excommunication, so that excommunication does not pass on to a third person.

THIRD ARTICLE

WHETHER IT IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN TO COMMUNICATE
WITH AN EXCOMMUNICATED PERSON IN OTHER CASES
THAN THOSE IN WHICH IT IS ALLOWED ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in which it is allowed. Because a certain decretal (Cap. *Sacris : De his quæ vi, metuve*, etc.) declares that *not even through fear of death should anyone hold communion with an excommunicated person, since one ought to die rather than commit a mortal sin.* But this would be no

reason unless it were always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore etc.

Obj. 2. Further, it is a mortal sin to act against a commandment of the Church. But the Church forbids anyone to hold communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated.

Obj. 3. Further, No man is debarred from receiving the Eucharist on account of a venial sin. But a man who holds communion with an excommunicated person, outside those cases in which it is allowed, is debarred from receiving the Eucharist, since he incurs a minor excommunication. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, save in those cases in which it is allowed.

Obj. 4. Further, No one should incur a major excommunication save for a mortal sin. Now according to the law (*Can. Præcipue, seqq., caus. xi.*) a man may incur a major excommunication for holding communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated.

On the contrary, None can absolve a man from mortal sin unless he have jurisdiction over him. But any priest can absolve a man for holding communion with those who are excommunicated. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.

Further, The measure of the penalty should be according to the measure of the sin, as stated in *Deut. xxv. 3.* Now the punishment appointed by common custom for holding communion with an excommunicated person is not that which is inflicted for mortal sin, but rather that which is due for venial sin. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.

I answer that, Some hold that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, by word or in any of the forbidden ways mentioned above (*A. 2*), except in those cases allowed by law (*Cap. Quoniam*). But since it seems very hard that a man should be guilty of a mortal sin by uttering just a slight word to an excommunicated person, and that by excommunicating a person

one would endanger the salvation of many, and lay a snare which might turn to one's own hurt, it seems to others more probable that he is not always guilty of a mortal sin, but only when he holds communion with him in a criminal deed, or in an act of Divine worship, or through contempt of the Church.

Reply Obj. 1. This decretal is speaking of holding communion in Divine worship. It may also be replied that the same reason applies both to mortal and venial sin, since just as one cannot do well by committing a mortal sin, so neither can one by committing a venial sin: so that just as it is a man's duty to suffer death rather than commit a mortal sin, so is it his duty to do so sooner than commit a venial sin, inasmuch as it is his duty to avoid venial sin.

Reply Obj. 2. The commandment of the Church regards spiritual matters directly, and legitimate actions as a consequence: hence by holding communion in Divine worship one acts against the commandment, and commits a mortal sin; but by holding communion in other matters, one acts beside the commandment, and sins venially.

Reply Obj. 3. Sometimes a man is debarred from the Eucharist even without his own fault, as in the case of those who are suspended or under an interdict, because these penalties are sometimes inflicted on one person for the sin of another who is thus punished.

Reply Obj. 4. Although it is a venial sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated, yet to do so obstinately is a mortal sin: and for this reason one may be excommunicated according to the law.

QUESTION XXIV.

OF ABSOLUTION FROM EXCOMMUNICATION.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider absolution from excommunication: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication? (2) Whether a man can be absolved from excommunication against his will? (3) Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from another?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY PRIEST CAN ABSOLVE HIS SUBJECT FROM EXCOMMUNICATION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication. For the chains of sin are stronger than those of excommunication. But any priest can absolve his subject from sin. Therefore much more can he absolve him from excommunication.

Obj. 2. Further, If the cause is removed the effect is removed. But the cause of excommunication is a mortal sin. Therefore since any priest can absolve (his subject) from that mortal sin, he is able likewise to absolve him from the excommunication.

On the contrary, It belongs to the same power to excommunicate as to absolve from excommunication. But priests of inferior degree cannot excommunicate their subjects. Neither, therefore, can they absolve them.

I answer that, Anyone can absolve from minor excommunication who can absolve from the sin of participation in the sin of another. But in the case of a major excommunication, this is pronounced either by a judge, and then he who pronounced sentence or his superior can absolve,—or it is pronounced by law, and then the bishop or even a priest can absolve except in the six cases which the Pope, who is the maker of laws, reserves to himself :—the first is the case of a man who lays hands on a cleric or a religious; the second is of one who breaks into a church and is denounced for so doing; the third is of the man who sets fire to a church and is denounced for the deed; the fourth is of one who knowingly communicates in the Divine worship with those whom the Pope has excommunicated by name; the fifth is the case of one who tampers with the letters of the Holy See; the sixth is the case of one who communicates in a crime of one who is excommunicated. For he should not be absolved except by the person who excommunicated him, even though he be not subject to him, unless, by reason of the difficulty of appearing before him, he be absolved by the bishop or by his own priest, after binding himself by oath to submit to the command of the judge who pronounced the excommunication on him.

There are however eight exceptions to the first case: (1) In the hour of death, when a person can be absolved by any priest from any excommunication: (2) if the striker be the door-keeper of a man in authority, and the blow be given neither through hatred nor of set purpose: (3) if the striker be a woman: (4) if the striker be a servant, whose master is not at fault and would suffer from his absence: (5) if a religious strike a religious, unless he strike him very grievously: (6) if the striker be a poor man: (7) if he be a minor, an old man, or an invalid: (8) if there be a deadly feud between them.

There are, besides, seven cases in which the person who strikes a cleric does not incur excommunication: (1) if he do it for the sake of discipline, as a teacher or a superior: (2) if it be done for fun: (3) if the striker find the cleric

behaving with impropriety towards his wife, his mother, his sister or his daughter: (4) if he return blow for blow at once: (5) if the striker be not aware that he is striking a cleric: (6) if the latter be guilty of apostasy after the triple admonition: (7) if the cleric exercise an act which is altogether contrary to the clerical life, e.g. if he become a soldier, or if he be guilty of bigamy.*

Reply Obj. 1. Although the chains of sin are in themselves greater than those of excommunication, yet in a certain respect the chains of excommunication are greater, inasmuch as they bind a man not only in the sight of God, but also in the eye of the Church. Hence absolution from excommunication requires jurisdiction in the external forum, whereas absolution from sin does not. Nor is there need of giving one's word by oath, as in the case of absolution from excommunication, because, as the Apostle declares (Heb. vi. 16), controversies between men are decided by oath.

Reply Obj. 2. As an excommunicated person has no share in the sacraments of the Church, a priest cannot absolve him from his guilt, unless he be first absolved from excommunication.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYONE CAN BE ABSOLVED AGAINST HIS WILL?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that no man can be absolved against his will. For spiritual things are not conferred on anyone against his will. Now absolution from excommunication is a spiritual favour. Therefore it cannot be granted to a man against his will.

Obj. 2. Further, The cause of excommunication is contumacy. But when, through contempt of the excommunication, a man is unwilling to be absolved, he shows a high degree of contumacy. Therefore he cannot be absolved.

On the contrary, Excommunication can be pronounced on a man against his will. Now things that happen to a man against his will, can be removed from him against his will,

* Namely, that which is known by canonists as *similar bigamy*.

as in the case of the goods of fortune. Therefore excommunication can be removed from a man against his will.

I answer that, Evil of fault and evil of punishment differ in this, that the origin of fault is within us, since all sin is voluntary, whereas the origin of punishment is sometimes without, since punishment does not need to be voluntary, in fact the nature of punishment is rather to be against the will. Wherefore, just as a man commits no sin except willingly, so no sin is forgiven him against his will. On the other hand just as a person can be excommunicated against his will, so also can he be absolved therefrom.

Reply Obj. 1. The assertion is true of those spiritual goods which depend on our will, such as the virtues, which we cannot lose unwillingly; for knowledge, although a spiritual good, can be lost by a man against his will through sickness. Hence the argument is not to the point.

Reply Obj. 2. It is possible for excommunication to be removed from a man even though he be contumacious, if it seem to be for the good of the man for whom the excommunication was intended as a medicine.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN CAN BE ABSOLVED FROM ONE EXCOMMUNICATION WITHOUT BEING ABSOLVED FROM ALL ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a man cannot be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from all. For an effect should be proportionate to its cause. Now the cause of excommunication is a sin. Since then a man cannot be absolved from one sin without being absolved from all, neither can this happen as regards excommunication.

Obj. 2. Further, Absolution from excommunication is pronounced in the Church. But a man who is under the ban of one excommunication is outside the Church. Therefore so long as one remains, a man cannot be loosed from another.

On the contrary, Excommunication is a punishment. Now a man can be loosed from one punishment, while another remains. Therefore a man can be loosed from one excommunication and yet remain under another.

I answer that, Excommunications are not connected together in any way, and so it is possible for a man to be absolved from one, and yet remain under another.

It must be observed however that sometimes a man lies under several excommunications pronounced by one judge; and then, when he is absolved from one, he is understood to be absolved from all, unless the contrary be expressed, or unless he ask to be absolved from excommunication on one count only, whereas he was excommunicated under several. On the other hand sometimes a man lies under several sentences of excommunication pronounced by several judges; and then, when absolved from one excommunication, he is not therefore absolved from the others, unless at his prayer they all confirm his absolution, or unless they all depute one to absolve him.

Reply Obj. 1. All sins are connected together in aversion from God, which is incompatible with the forgiveness of sin: wherefore one sin cannot be forgiven without another. But excommunications have no such connection. Nor again is absolution from excommunication hindered by contrariety of the will, as stated above (A. 2). Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as such a man was for several reasons outside the Church, so is it possible for his separation to be removed on one count and to remain on another.

QUESTION XXV.

OF INDULGENCE ITSELF.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider indulgence, (1) in itself; (2) those who grant indulgence; (3) those who receive it.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether an indulgence remits any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins? (2) Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be? (3) Whether an indulgence should be granted for temporal assistance?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN INDULGENCE CAN REMIT ANY PART OF THE PUNISHMENT DUE FOR THE SATISFACTION OF SINS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that an indulgence cannot remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins. Because a gloss on 2 Tim. ii. 13, *He cannot deny Himself*, says: *He would do this if He did not keep His word.* Now He said (Deut. xxv. 2): *According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.* Therefore nothing can be remitted from the satisfactory punishment which is appointed according to the measure of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, An inferior cannot absolve from an obligation imposed by his superior. But when God absolves us from sin He binds us to temporal punishment, as Hugh of S. Victor declares (*Tract. vi. Sum. Sent.*). Therefore no man can absolve from that punishment, by remitting any part of it.

Obj. 3. Further, The granting of the sacramental effect without the sacraments belongs to the power of excellence. Now none but Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments. Since then satisfaction is a part of the sacrament of Penance, conducing to the remission of the punishment due, it seems that no mere man can remit the debt of punishment without satisfaction.

Obj. 4. Further, The power of the ministers of the Church was given them, not *unto destruction*, but *unto edification* (2 Cor. x. 8). But it would be conducive to destruction, if satisfaction, which was intended for our good, inasmuch as it serves for a remedy, were done away with. Therefore the power of the ministers of the Church does not extend to this.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. ii. 10): *For, what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ*, and a gloss adds: *i.e. as though Christ Himself had pardoned*. But Christ could remit the punishment of a sin without any satisfaction, as evidenced in the case of the adulterous woman (John viii.). Therefore Paul could do so likewise. Therefore the Pope can too, since his power in the Church is not less than Paul's.

Further, The universal Church cannot err, since He Who *was heard for His reverence* (Heb. v. 7) said to Peter, on whose profession of faith the Church was founded (Luke xxii. 32): *I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not*. Now the universal Church approves and grants indulgences. Therefore indulgences have some value.

I answer that, All admit that indulgences have some value; for it would be blasphemy to say that the Church does anything in vain. But some say that they do not avail to free a man from the debt of punishment which he has deserved in Purgatory according to God's judgment, and that they merely serve to free him from the obligation imposed on him by the priest as a punishment for his sins, or from the canonical penalties he has incurred. But this opinion does not seem to be true. First, because it is

expressly opposed to the privilege granted to Peter, to whom it was said (Matth. xvi. 19) that whatsoever he should loose on earth should be loosed also in heaven. Wherefore whatever remission is granted in the court of the Church holds good in the court of God. Moreover the Church by granting such indulgences would do more harm than good, since, by remitting the punishment she had enjoined on a man, she would deliver him to be punished more severely in Purgatory.

Hence we must say on the contrary that indulgences hold good both in the Church's court and in the judgment of God, for the remission of the punishment which remains after contrition, absolution, and confession, whether this punishment be enjoined or not. The reason why they so avail is the oneness of the mystical body in which many have performed works of satisfaction exceeding the requirements of their debts; in which, too, many have patiently borne unjust tribulations whereby a multitude of punishments would have been paid, had they been incurred. So great is the quantity of such merits that it exceeds the entire debt of punishment due to those who are living at this moment: and this is especially due to the merits of Christ: for though He acts through the sacraments, yet His efficacy is nowise restricted to them, but infinitely surpasses their efficacy.

Now one man can satisfy for another, as we have explained above (Q. XIII., A. 2). And the saints in whom this superabundance of satisfactions is found, did not perform their good works for this or that particular person, who needs the remission of his punishment (else he would have received this remission without any indulgence at all), but they performed them for the whole Church in general, even as the Apostle declares that he fills up *those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ . . . for His body, which is the Church* to whom he wrote (Col. i. 24). These merits, then, are the common property of the whole Church. Now those things which are the common property of a number are distributed to the various individuals according to the

judgment of him who rules them all. Hence, just as one man would obtain the remission of his punishment if another were to satisfy for him, so would he too if another's satisfactions be applied to him by one who has the power to do so.

Reply Obj. 1. The remission which is granted by means of indulgences does not destroy the proportion between punishment and sin, since someone has spontaneously taken upon himself the punishment due for another's guilt, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 2. He who gains an indulgence is not, strictly speaking, absolved from the debt of punishment, but is given the means whereby he may pay it.

Reply Obj. 3. The effect of sacramental absolution is the removal of a man's guilt, an effect which is not produced by indulgences. But he who grants indulgences pays the debt of punishment which a man owes, out of the common stock of the Church's goods, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 4. Grace affords a better remedy for the avoidance of sin than does habituation to (good) works. And since he who gains an indulgence is disposed to grace through the love which he conceives for the cause for which the indulgence is granted, it follows that indulgences provide a remedy against sin. Consequently it is not harmful to grant indulgences unless this be done without discretion. Nevertheless those who gain indulgences should be advised, not, on this account, to omit the penitential works imposed on them, so that they may derive a remedy from these also, even though they may be quit of the debt of punishment; and all the more, seeing that they are often more in debt than they think.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER INDULGENCES ARE AS EFFECTIVE AS THEY
CLAIM TO BE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be. For indulgences have no effect save from the power of the keys. Now by the power of the keys, he who has that power can only remit some fixed part of the punishment due for sin, after taking into account the measure of the sin and of the penitent's sorrow. Since then indulgences depend on the mere will of the grantor, it seems that they are not as effective as they claim to be.

Obj. 2. Further, The debt of punishment keeps man back from the attainment of glory, which he ought to desire above all things. Now, if indulgences are as effective as they claim to be, a man by setting himself to gain indulgences might become immune from all debt of temporal punishment. Therefore it would seem that a man ought to put aside all other kinds of works, and devote himself to gain indulgences.

Obj. 3. Further, Sometimes an indulgence whereby a man is remitted a third part of the punishment due for his sins is granted if he contribute towards the erection of a certain building. If, therefore, indulgences produce the effect which is claimed for them, he who gives a penny, and then another, and then again another, would obtain a plenary absolution from all punishment due for his sins, which seems absurd.

Obj. 4. Further, Sometimes an indulgence is granted, so that for visiting a church a man obtains a seven years' remission. If, then, an indulgence avails as much as is claimed for it, a man who lives near that church, or the clergy attached thereto who go there every day, obtain as much indulgence as one who comes from a distance (which would appear unjust); moreover, seemingly, they would gain the indulgence several times a day, since they go there repeatedly.

Obj. 5. Further, To remit a man's punishment beyond a just estimate, seems to amount to the same as to remit it without reason; because in so far as he exceeds that estimate, he limits the compensation. Now he who grants an indulgence cannot without cause remit a man's punishment either wholly or partly, even though the Pope were to say to anyone: *I remit to you all the punishment you owe for your sins.* Therefore it seems that he cannot remit anything beyond the just estimate. Now indulgences are often published which exceed that just estimate. Therefore they do not avail as much as is claimed for them.

On the contrary, It is written (Job xiii. 7): *Hath God any need of your lie, that you should speak deceitfully for Him?* Therefore the Church, in publishing indulgences, does not lie; and so they avail as much as is claimed for them.

Further, The Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 14): *If . . . our preaching is vain, your faith is also vain.* Therefore whoever utters a falsehood in preaching, so far as he is concerned, makes faith void; and so sins mortally. If therefore indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be, all who publish indulgences would commit a mortal sin: which is absurd.

I answer that, On this point there are many opinions. For some maintain that indulgences have not the efficacy claimed for them, but that they simply avail each individual in proportion to his faith and devotion. And consequently those who maintain this, say that the Church publishes her indulgences in such a way as, by a kind of pious fraud, to induce men to do well, just as a mother entices her child to walk by holding out an apple. But this seems a very dangerous assertion to make. For as Augustine states (*Ep. ad Hieron. LXXVIII.*) *if any error were discovered in Holy Writ, the authority of Holy Writ would perish.* In like manner, if any error were to be found in the Church's preaching, her doctrine would have no authority in settling questions of faith.

Hence others have maintained that indulgences avail as much as is claimed for them, according to a just estimate,

not of him who grants it,—who perhaps puts too high a value on it,—nor of the recipient,—for he may prize too highly the gift he receives, but a just estimate according to the estimate of good men who consider the condition of the person affected, and the utility and needs of the Church, for the Church's needs are greater at one time than at another. Yet, neither, seemingly, can this opinion stand. First, because in that case indulgences would no longer be a remission, but rather a mere commutation. Moreover the preaching of the Church would not be excused from untruth, since, at times, indulgences are granted far in excess of the requirements of this just estimate, taking into consideration all the aforesaid conditions, as, for example, when the Pope granted to anyone who visited a certain church, an indulgence of seven years, which indulgence was granted by Blessed Gregory for the Roman Stations.

Hence others say that the quantity of remission accorded in an indulgence is not to be measured by the devotion of the recipient, as the first opinion suggested, nor according to the quantity of what is given, as the second opinion held; but according to the cause for which the indulgence is granted, and according to which a person is held deserving of obtaining such an indulgence. Thus according as a man approached near to that cause, so would he obtain remission in whole or in part. But neither will this explain the custom of the Church who assigns, now a greater, now a lesser indulgence, for the same cause: thus, under the same circumstances, now a year's indulgence, now one of only forty days, according to the graciousness of the Pope, who grants the indulgence, is granted to those who visit a church. Wherefore the amount of the remission granted by the indulgence is not to be measured by the cause for which a person is worthy of an indulgence.

We must therefore say otherwise that the quantity of an effect is proportionate to the quantity of the cause. Now the cause of the remission of punishment effected by indulgences is no other than the abundance of the Church's merits, and this abundance suffices for the remission of all

punishment. The effective cause of the remission is not the devotion, or toil, or gift of the recipient; nor, again, is it the cause for which the indulgence was granted. We cannot, then, estimate the quantity of the remission by any of the foregoing, but solely by the merits of the Church—and these are always superabundant. Consequently, according as these merits are applied to a person so does he obtain remission. That they should be so applied demands, firstly, authority to dispense this treasure; secondly, union between the recipient and Him Who merited it—and this is brought about by charity; thirdly, there is required a reason for so dispensing this treasury, so that the intention, namely, of those who wrought these meritorious works is safeguarded, since they did them for the honour of God and for the good of the Church in general. Hence whenever the cause assigned tends to the good of the Church and the honour of God, there is sufficient reason for granting an indulgence.

Hence, according to others, indulgences have precisely the efficacy claimed for them, provided that he who grants them have the authority, that the recipient have charity, and that, as regards the cause, there be piety which includes the honour of God and the profit of our neighbour. Nor in this view have we *too great a market of the Divine mercy*,* as some maintain, nor again does it derogate from Divine justice, for no punishment is remitted, but the punishment of one is imputed to another.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. XIX., A. 3) there are two keys, the key of Orders and the key of jurisdiction. The key of Orders is a sacramental: and as the effects of the sacraments are fixed, not by men but by God, the priest cannot decide in the tribunal of confession how much shall be remitted by means of the key of Orders from the punishment due; it is God Who appoints the amount to be remitted. On the other hand the key of jurisdiction is not something sacramental, and its effect depends on a man's decision. The remission granted through indulgences

* S. Bonaventure, *Sent.* IV., D. 20.

is the effect of this key, since it does not belong to the dispensation of the sacraments, but to the distribution of the common property of the Church:—hence it is that legates, even though they be not priests, can grant indulgences. Consequently the decision of how much punishment is to be remitted by an indulgence depends on the will of the one who grants that indulgence. If, however, he remits punishment without sufficient reason, so that men are enticed to substitute mere nothings, as it were, for works of penance, he sins by granting such indulgences, although the indulgence is gained fully.

Reply Obj. 2. Although indulgences avail much for the remission of punishment, yet works of satisfaction are more meritorious in respect of the essential reward, which infinitely transcends the remission of temporal punishment.

Reply Obj. 3. When an indulgence is granted in a general way to anyone that helps towards the building of a church, we must understand this to mean a help proportionate to the giver: and in so far as he approaches to this, he will gain the indulgence more or less fully. Consequently a poor man by giving one penny would gain the full indulgence, not so a rich man, whom it would not become to give so little to so holy and profitable a work; just as a king would not be said to help a man if he gave him an *obol*.

Reply Obj. 4. A person who lives near the church, and the priests and clergy of the church, gain the indulgence as much as those who come perhaps a distance of a thousand days' journey: because the remission, as stated above, is proportionate, not to the toil, but to the merits which are applied. Yet he who toils most gains most merit. This, however, is to be understood of those cases in which an indulgence is given in an undeterminate manner. For sometimes a distinction is expressed: thus the Pope at the time of general absolution grants an indulgence of five years to those who come from across the seas, and one of three years to those who come from across the mountains, to others an indulgence of one year. Nor does a person gain the indulgence each time he visits the church during the

term of indulgence, because sometimes it is granted for a fixed time; thus when it is said, *Whoever visits such and such a church until such and such a day, shall gain so much indulgence*, we must understand that it can be gained only once. On the other hand if there be a continual indulgence in a certain church, as the indulgence of forty days to be gained in the church of the Blessed Peter, then a person gains the indulgence as often as he visits the church.

Reply Obj. 5. An indulgence requires a cause, not as a measure of the remission of punishment, but in order that the intention of those whose merits are applied, may reach to this particular individual. Now one person's good is applied to another in two ways:—first, by charity; and in this way, even without indulgences, a person shares in all the good deeds done, provided he have charity: secondly, by the intention of the person who does the good action; and in this way, provided there be a lawful cause, the intention of a person who has done something for the profit of the Church, may reach to some individual through indulgences.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN INDULGENCE OUGHT TO BE GRANTED FOR TEMPORAL HELP ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an indulgence ought not to be granted for temporal help. Because the remission of sins is something spiritual. Now to exchange a spiritual for a temporal thing is simony. Therefore this ought not to be done.

Obj. 2. Further, Spiritual assistance is more necessary than temporal. But indulgences do not appear to be granted for spiritual assistance. Much less therefore ought they to be granted for temporal help.

On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Church in granting indulgences for pilgrimages and almsgiving.

I answer that, Temporal things are subordinate to spiritual matters, since we must make use of temporal things on

account of spiritual things. Consequently an indulgence must not be granted for the sake of temporal matters as such, but in so far as they are subordinate to spiritual things: such as the quelling of the Church's enemies, who disturb her peace; or such as the building of a church, of a bridge, and other forms of almsgiving. It is therefore evident that there is no simony in these transactions, since a spiritual thing is exchanged, not for a temporal but for a spiritual commodity.

Hence the *Reply* to the *First Objection* is clear.

Reply Obj. 2. Indulgences can be, and sometimes are, granted even for purely spiritual matters. Thus Pope Innocent IV. granted an indulgence of ten days to all who prayed for the king of France; and in like manner sometimes the same indulgence is granted to those who preach a crusade as to those who take part in it.

QUESTION XXVI.

OF THOSE WHO CAN GRANT INDULGENCES.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider those who can grant indulgences: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences? (2) Whether a deacon or another, who is not a priest, can grant indulgences? (3) Whether a bishop can grant them? (4) Whether they can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY PARISH PRIEST CAN GRANT INDULGENCES?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that every parish priest can grant indulgences. For an indulgence derives its efficacy from the superabundance of the Church's merits. Now there is no congregation without some superabundance of merits. Therefore every priest, who has charge of a congregation, can grant indulgences, and, in like manner, so can every prelate.

Obj. 2. Further, Every prelate stands for a multitude, just as an individual stands for himself. But any individual can assign his own goods to another and thus offer satisfaction for a third person. Therefore a prelate can assign the property of the multitude subject to him, and so it seems that he can grant indulgences.

On the contrary, To excommunicate is less than to grant indulgences. But a parish priest cannot do the former. Therefore he cannot do the latter.

I answer that, Indulgences are effective, in as much as the works of satisfaction done by one person are applied to another, not only by virtue of charity, but also by the intention of the person who did them being directed in some way to the person to whom they are applied. Now a person's intention may be directed to another in three ways, specifically, generically and individually. Individually, as when one person offers satisfaction for another particular person; and thus anyone can apply his works to another. Specifically, as when a person prays for the congregation to which he belongs, for the members of his household, or for his benefactors, and directs his works of satisfaction to the same intention: in this way the superior of a congregation can apply those works to some other person, by applying the intention of those who belong to his congregation to some fixed individual. Generically, as when a person directs his works for the good of the Church in general; and thus he who presides over the whole Church can communicate those works, by applying his intention to this or that individual. And since a man is a member of a congregation, and a congregation is a part of the Church, hence the intention of private good includes the intention of the good of the congregation, and of the good of the whole Church. Therefore he who presides over the Church can communicate what belongs to an individual congregation or to an individual man: and he who presides over a congregation can communicate what belongs to an individual man, but not conversely. Yet neither the first nor the second communication is called an indulgence, but only the third; and this for two reasons. First, because, although those communications loose man from the debt of punishment in the sight of God, yet he is not freed from the obligation of fulfilling the satisfaction enjoined, to which he is bound by a commandment of the Church; whereas the third communication frees man even from this obligation. Secondly, because in one person or even in one congregation there is not such an unfailing supply of merits as to be sufficient both for the one person or congregation and for all others; and

consequently the individual is not freed from the entire debt of punishment unless satisfaction is offered for him individually, to the very amount that he owes. On the other hand in the whole Church there is an unfailing supply of merits, chiefly on account of the merit of Christ. Consequently he alone who is at the head of the Church can grant indulgences. Since, however, the Church is the congregation of the faithful, and since a congregation of men is of two kinds, the domestic, composed of members of the same family, and the civil, composed of members of the same nationality, the Church is like to a civil congregation, for the people themselves are called the Church; while the various assemblies, or parishes of one diocese are likened to a congregation in the various families and services. Hence a bishop alone is properly called a prelate of the Church, wherefore he alone, like a bridegroom, receives the ring of the Church. Consequently full power in the dispensation of the sacraments, and jurisdiction in the public tribunal, belong to him alone as the public person, but to others by delegation from him. Those priests who have charge of the people are not prelates strictly speaking, but assistants, hence, in consecrating priests the bishop says: *The more fragile we are, the more we need these assistants*: and for this reason they do not dispense all the sacraments. Hence parish priests, or abbots or other like prelates cannot grant indulgences.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER A DEACON OR ANOTHER WHO IS NOT A PRIEST
CAN GRANT AN INDULGENCE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that a deacon, or one that is not a priest cannot grant an indulgence. Because remission of sins is an effect of the keys. Now none but a priest has the keys. Therefore a priest alone can grant indulgences.

Obj. 2. Further, A fuller remission of punishment is

granted by indulgences than by the tribunal of Penance, But a priest alone has power in the latter, and, therefore, he alone has power in the former.

On the contrary, The distribution of the Church's treasury is entrusted to the same person as the government of the Church. Now this is entrusted sometimes to one who is not a priest. Therefore he can grant indulgences, since they derive their efficacy from the distribution of the Church's treasury.

I answer that, The power of granting indulgences follows jurisdiction, as stated above (Q. XXV., A. 2). And since deacons and others, who are not priests, can have jurisdiction either delegated, as legates, or ordinary, as bishops-elect, it follows that even those who are not priests can grant indulgences, although they cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance, since this follows the reception of Orders. This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*, because the granting of indulgences belongs to the key of jurisdiction and not to the key of Orders.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A BISHOP CAN GRANT INDULGENCES ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that even a bishop cannot grant indulgences. Because the treasury of the Church is the common property of the whole Church. Now the common property of the whole Church cannot be distributed save by him who presides over the whole Church. Therefore the Pope alone can grant indulgences.

Obj. 2. Further, None can remit punishments fixed by law, save the one who has the power to make the law. Now punishments in satisfaction for sins are fixed by law. Therefore the Pope alone can remit these punishments, since he is the maker of the law.

On the contrary stands the custom of the Church in accordance with which bishops grant indulgences.

I answer that, The Pope has the plenitude of pontifical

power, being like a king in his kingdom: whereas the bishops are appointed to a share in his solicitude, like judges over each city. Hence them alone the Pope, in his letters, addresses as *brethren*, whereas he calls all others his *sons*. Therefore the plenitude of the power of granting indulgences resides in the Pope, because he can grant them, as he lists, provided the cause be a lawful one: while, in bishops, this power resides subject to the Pope's ordination, so that they can grant them within fixed limits and not beyond.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER INDULGENCES CAN BE GRANTED BY ONE WHO IS
IN MORTAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that indulgences cannot be granted by one who is in mortal sin. For a stream can no longer flow if cut off from its source. Now the source of grace which is the Holy Ghost is cut off from one who is in mortal sin. Therefore such a one can convey nothing to others by granting indulgences.

Obj. 2. Further, It is a greater thing to grant an indulgence than to receive one. But one who is in mortal sin cannot receive an indulgence, as we shall show presently (Q. XXVII., A. 1). Neither, therefore, can he grant one.

On the contrary, Indulgences are granted in virtue of the power conferred on the prelates of the Church. Now mortal sin takes away, not power but goodness. Therefore one who is in mortal sin can grant indulgences.

I answer that, The granting of indulgences belongs to jurisdiction. But a man does not, through sin, lose jurisdiction. Consequently indulgences are equally valid, whether they be granted by one who is in mortal sin, or by a most holy person; since he remits punishment, not by virtue of his own merits, but by virtue of the merits laid up in the Church's treasury.

Reply Obj. 1. The prelate who, while in a state of mortal

sin, grants an indulgence, does not pour forth anything of his own, and so it is not necessary that he should receive an inflow from the source, in order that he may grant a valid indulgence.

Reply Obj. 2. Further, To grant an indulgence is more than to receive one, if we consider the power, but it is less, if we consider the personal profit.

QUESTION XXVII.

OF THOSE WHOM INDULGENCES AVAIL.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider those whom indulgences avail: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether indulgences avail those who are in mortal sin? (2) Whether they avail religious? (3) Whether they avail a person who does not fulfil the conditions for which the indulgence is given? (4) Whether they avail him who grants them?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN INDULGENCE AVAILS THOSE WHO ARE IN MORTAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin. For one person can merit grace and many other good things for another, even though he be in mortal sin. Now indulgences derive their efficacy from the application of the saints' merits to an individual. Therefore they are effective in one who is in mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, The greater the need, the more room there is for pity. Now a man who is in mortal sin is in very great need. Therefore all the more should pity be extended to him by indulgence.

On the contrary, A dead member receives no inflow from the other members that are living. But one who is in mortal sin, is like a dead member. Therefore he receives no inflow, through indulgences, from the merits of living members.

I answer that, Some hold that indulgences avail those even who are in mortal sin, for the acquiring of grace, but not for the remission of their punishment, since none can be freed from punishment who is not yet freed from guilt. For he who has not yet been reached by God's operation unto the remission of guilt, cannot receive the remission of his punishment from the minister of the Church, neither by indulgences nor in the tribunal of Penance.

But this opinion seems to be untrue. Because, although those merits which are applied by means of an indulgence, might possibly avail a person so that he could merit grace (by way of congruity and impetration), yet it is not for this reason that they are applied, but for the remission of punishment. Hence they do not avail those who are in mortal sin, and consequently, true contrition and confession are demanded as conditions for gaining all indulgences. If however the merits were applied by such a form as this: *I grant you a share in the merits of the whole Church,—or of one congregation, or of one specified person,* then they might avail a person in mortal sin so that he could merit something, as the foregoing opinion holds.

This suffices for the *Reply* to the *First Objection*.

Reply Obj. 2. Although he who is in mortal sin is in greater need of help, yet he is less capable of receiving it.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER INDULGENCES AVAIL RELIGIOUS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that indulgences do not avail religious. For there is no reason to bring supplies to those who supply others out of their own abundance. Now indulgences are derived from the abundance of works of satisfaction to be found in religious. Therefore it is unreasonable for them to profit by indulgences.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing detrimental to religious life should be done in the Church. But, if indulgences were to avail religious, this would be detrimental to regular discipline,

because religious would become lax on account of indulgences, and would neglect the penances imposed in Chapter. Therefore indulgences do not avail religious.

On the contrary, Good brings harm to no man. But the religious life is a good thing. Therefore it does not take away from religious the profit to be derived from indulgences.

I answer that, Indulgences avail both seculars and religious, provided they have charity and satisfy the conditions for gaining the indulgences: for religious can be helped by indulgences no less than persons living in the world.

Reply Obj. 1. Although religious are in the state of perfection, yet they cannot live without sin: and so if at times they are liable to punishment on account of some sin, they can expiate this debt by means of indulgences. For it is not unreasonable that one who is well off absolutely speaking, should be in want at times and in some respect, and thus need to be supplied with what he lacks. Hence it is written (Gal. vi. 2): *Bear ye one another's burdens.*

Reply Obj. 2. There is no reason why indulgences should be detrimental to religious observance, because, as to the reward of eternal life, religious merit more by observing their rule than by gaining indulgences; although, as to the remission of punishment, which is a lesser good, they merit less. Nor again do indulgences remit the punishment enjoined in Chapter, because the chapter is a judicial rather than a penitential tribunal; hence even those who are not priests hold chapter. Absolution from punishment enjoined or due for sin is given in the tribunal of Penance.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN INDULGENCE CAN EVER BE GRANTED TO ONE WHO DOES NOT FULFIL THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that an indulgence can sometimes be granted to one who does not fulfil the required conditions. Because when a person is unable to perform a certain

action his will is taken for the deed. Now sometimes an indulgence is to be gained by giving an alms, which a poor man is unable to do, though he would do so willingly. Therefore he can gain the indulgence.

Obj. 2. Further, One man can make satisfaction for another. Now an indulgence is directed to the remission of punishment, just as satisfaction is. Therefore one man can gain an indulgence for another; and so a man can gain an indulgence without doing that for which the indulgence is given.

On the contrary, If the cause is removed, the effect is removed. If therefore a person fails to do that for which an indulgence is granted, and which is the cause of the indulgence, he does not gain the indulgence.

I answer that, Failing the condition of a grant, no grant ensues. Hence, as an indulgence is granted on the condition that a person does or gives a certain thing, if he fails in this, he does not gain the indulgence.

Reply Obj. 1. This is true of the essential reward, but not of certain accidental rewards, such as the remission of punishment and the like.

Reply Obj. 2. A person can by his intention apply his own action to whomever he lists, and so he can make satisfaction for whomever he chooses. On the other hand an indulgence cannot be applied to someone, except in accordance with the intention of the grantor. Hence, since he applies it to the doer or giver of a particular action or thing, the doer cannot transfer this intention to another. If, however, the indulgence were expressed thus: *Whosoever does this, or for whomsoever this is done, shall gain so much indulgence,* it would avail the person for whom it is done. Nor would the person who does this action, give the indulgence to another, but he who grants the indulgence in this form.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN INDULGENCE AVAILS THE PERSON WHO GRANTS IT ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an indulgence does not avail him who grants it. For the granting of an indulgence belongs to jurisdiction. Now no one can exercise jurisdiction on himself; thus no one can excommunicate himself. Therefore no one can participate in an indulgence granted by himself.

Obj. 2. Further, If this were possible, he who grants an indulgence might gain the remission of the punishment of all his sins for some small deed, so that he would sin with impunity, which seems senseless.

Obj. 3. Further, To grant indulgences and to excommunicate belong to the same power. Now a man cannot excommunicate himself. Therefore he cannot share in the indulgence of which he is the grantor.

On the contrary, He would be worse off than others if he could not make use of the Church's treasury which he dispenses to others.

I answer that, An indulgence should be given for some reason, in order for anyone to be enticed by the indulgence to perform some action that conduces to the good of the Church and to the honour of God. Now the prelate to whom is committed the care of the Church's good and of the furthering of God's honour, does not need to entice himself thereto. Therefore he cannot grant an indulgence to himself alone; but he can avail himself of an indulgence that he grants for others, since it is based on a cause for granting it to them.

Reply Obj. 1. A man cannot exercise an act of jurisdiction on himself, but a prelate can avail himself of those things which are granted to others by the authority of his jurisdiction, both in temporal and in spiritual matters: thus also a priest gives himself the Eucharist which he gives to others.

And so a bishop too can apply to himself the suffrages of the Church which he dispenses to others, the immediate effect of which suffrages, and not of his jurisdiction, is the remission of punishment by means of indulgences.

The *Reply* to the *Second Objection* is clear from what had been said.

Reply Obj. 3. Excommunication is pronounced by way of sentence, which no man can pronounce on himself, for the reason that in the tribunal of justice the same man cannot be both judge and accused. On the other hand an indulgence is not given under the form of a sentence, but by way of dispensation, which a man can apply to himself.

QUESTION XXVIII.

OF THE SOLEMN RITE OF PENANCE.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider the solemn rite of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether a penance can be published or solemnized? (2) Whether a solemn penance can be repeated? (3) Whether public penance should be imposed on women?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER A PENANCE SHOULD BE PUBLISHED OR SOLEMNIZED?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that a penance should not be published or solemnized. Because it is not lawful for a priest, even through fear, to divulge anyone's sin, however notorious it may be. Now a sin is published by a solemn penance. Therefore a penance should not be solemnized.

Obj. 2. Further, The judgment should follow the nature of the tribunal. Now penance is a judgment pronounced in a secret tribunal. Therefore it should not be published or solemnized.

Obj. 3. Further, *Every deficiency is made good by penance* as Ambrose states (cf. *Hypognost.* iii., among the works of S. Augustine). Now solemnization has a contrary effect, since it involves the penitent in many deficiencies: for a layman cannot be promoted to the ranks of the clergy nor can a cleric be promoted to higher orders, after doing

solemn penance. Therefore Penance should not be solemnized.

On the contrary, Penance is a sacrament. Now some kind of solemnity is observed in every sacrament. Therefore there should be some solemnity in Penance.

Further, The medicine should suit the disease. Now a sin is sometimes public, and by its example draws many to sin. Therefore the penance which is its medicine should also be public and solemn so as to give edification to many.

I answer that, Some penances should be public and solemn for four reasons. First, so that a public sin may have a public remedy; secondly, because, he who has committed a very grave crime deserves the greatest confusion even in this life; thirdly, in order that it may deter others; fourthly, that he may be an example of repentance, lest those should despair, who have committed grievous sins.

Reply Obj. 1. The priest does not divulge the confession by imposing such a penance, though people may suspect the penitent of having committed some great sin. For a man is not certainly taken to be guilty, because he is punished, since sometimes one does penance for another: thus we read in the *Lives of the Fathers* of a certain man who, in order to incite his companion to do penance, did penance together with him. And if the sin be public, the penitent, by fulfilling his penance, shows that he has been to confession.

Reply Obj. 2. A solemn penance, as to its imposition, does not go beyond the limits of a secret tribunal, since, just as the confession is made secretly, so the penance is imposed secretly. It is the execution of the penance, that goes beyond the limits of the secret tribunal: and there is nothing objectionable in this.

Reply Obj. 3. Although Penance cancels all deficiencies, by restoring man to his former state of grace, yet it does not always restore him to his former dignity. Hence women after doing penance for fornication are not given the veil, because they do not recover the honour of virginity. In like manner, after doing public penance, a sinner does not

recover his former dignity so as to be eligible for the clerical state, and a bishop who would ordain such a one ought to be deprived of the power of ordaining, unless perhaps the needs of the Church or custom require it. In that case such a one would be admitted to minor orders by way of exception, but not to the sacred orders. First, on account of the dignity of the latter; secondly, for fear of relapse; thirdly, in order to avoid the scandal which the people might take through recollection of his former sins; fourthly, because he would not have the face to correct others, by reason of the publicity of his own sin.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER A SOLEMN PENANCE CAN BE REPEATED ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a solemn penance can be repeated. For those sacraments which do not imprint a character, can be solemnized a second time, such as the Eucharist, Extreme Unction and the like. But Penance does not imprint a character, therefore it can be solemnized over again.

Obj. 2. Further, Penance is solemnized on account of the gravity and publicity of the sin. Now, after doing penance, a person may commit the same sins over again, or even more grievous sins. Therefore the solemn penance should be imposed again.

On the contrary, Solemn penance signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise. Now this was done but once. Therefore solemn penance should be imposed once only.

I answer that, Solemn penance ought not to be repeated, for three reasons. First, lest frequency bring it into contempt. Secondly, on account of its signification; for it signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise, which happened only once; thirdly, because the solemnization indicates, in a way, that one makes profession of continual repentance. Wherefore repetition is inconsistent with solemnization. And if the sinner fall again, he is not

recluded from doing penance, but a solemn penance should not be imposed on him again.

Reply Obj. 1. In those sacraments which are solemnized again and again, repetition is not inconsistent with solemnity, as it is in the present case. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2. Although, if we consider his crime, he ought to do the same penance again, yet the repeated solemnization is not becoming, for the reasons stated above.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER SOLEMN PENANCE SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON WOMEN AND CLERICS, AND WHETHER ANY PRIEST CAN IMPOSE IT ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that solemn penance should not be imposed on women. Because, when this penance is imposed on a man, he has to cut his hair off. But this becomes not a woman, according to 1 Cor. xi. 15. Therefore she should not do solemn penance.

Obj. 2. It also seems that it ought to be imposed on clerics. For it is enjoined on account of a grievous crime. Now the same sin is more grievous in a cleric than in a layman. Therefore it ought to be imposed on a cleric more than on a layman.

Obj. 3. It also seems that it can be imposed by any priest. Because to absolve in the tribunal of Penance belongs to one who has the keys. Now an ordinary priest has the keys. Therefore he can administer this penance.

I answer that, Every solemn penance is public, but not vice versa. For solemn penance is done as follows: *On the first day of Lent, these penitents clothed in sackcloth, with bare feet, their faces to the ground, and their hair shorn away, accompanied by their priests, present themselves to the bishop of the city at the door of the church. Having brought them into the church the bishop with all his clergy recites the seven penitential psalms, and then imposes his hand on them, sprinkles them with holy water, puts ashes on their heads, covers their shoulders with a hair-shirt, and sorrowfully*

announces to them that as Adam was expelled from paradise, so are they expelled from the church. He then orders the ministers to put them out of the church, and the clergy follow reciting the responsory: 'In the sweat of thy brow, etc.' Every year on the day of Our Lord's Supper they are brought back into the church by their priests, and there shall they be until the octave day of Easter, without however being admitted to Communion or to the kiss of peace. This shall be done every year as long as entrance into the church is forbidden them. The final reconciliation is reserved to the bishop, who alone can impose solemn penance.

This penance can be imposed on men and women; but not on clerics, for fear of scandal. Nor ought such a penance to be imposed except for a crime which has disturbed the whole of the city.

On the other hand public but not solemn penance is that which is done in the presence of the Church, but without the foregoing solemnity, such as a pilgrimage throughout the world with a staff. A penance of this kind can be repeated, and can be imposed by a mere priest, even on a cleric. Sometimes however a solemn penance is taken to signify a public one: so that authorities speak of solemn penance in different senses.

Reply Obj. 1. The woman's hair is a sign of her subjection, a man's is not. Hence it is not proper for a woman to put aside her hair when doing penance, as it is for a man.

Reply Obj. 2. Although in the same kind of sin, a cleric offends more grievously than a layman, yet a solemn penance is not imposed on him, lest his Orders should be an object of contempt. Thus deference is given not to the person but to his Orders.

Reply Obj. 3. Grave sins need great care in their cure. Hence the imposition of a solemn penance, which is only applied for the most grievous sins, is reserved to the bishop.

QUESTION XXIX.

OF EXTREME UNCTION, AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE AND INSTITUTION.

(In Nine Articles.)

WE must now consider the sacrament of Extreme Unction: in respect of which five points have to be considered: (1) Its essentials and institution; (2) Its effect; (3) Its minister; (4) On whom should it be conferred and in what parts; (5) Its repetition.

Under the first head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament? (2) Whether it is one sacrament? (3) Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ? (4) Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament? (5) Whether the oil ought to be consecrated? (6) Whether the matter of this sacrament should be consecrated by a bishop? (7) Whether this sacrament has any form? (8) Whether the form of this sacrament should take the shape of a deprecatory phrase? (9) Whether this is a suitable form for this sacrament?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER EXTREME UNCTION IS A SACRAMENT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that Extreme Unction is not a sacrament. For just as oil is used on sick people, so is it on catechumens. But anointing of catechumens with oil is not a sacrament. Therefore neither is the Extreme Unction of the sick with]oil.

Obj. 2. Further, The sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. But there was no figure of Extreme Unction in the Old Law. Therefore it is not a sacrament of the New Law.

Obj. 3. Further, According to Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier.* iii., v.) every sacrament aims at either cleansing, or enlightening, or perfecting. Now Extreme Unction does not aim at either cleansing, or enlightening, for this is ascribed to Baptism alone, or perfecting, for according to Dionysius (*ibid.* ii.) this belongs to Confirmation and the Eucharist. Therefore Extreme Unction is not a sacrament.

On the contrary, The sacraments of the Church supply man's defects sufficiently with respect to every state of life. Now no other than Extreme Unction does this for those who are departing from this life. Therefore it is a sacrament.

Further, The sacraments are neither more nor less than spiritual remedies. Now Extreme Unction is a spiritual remedy, since it avails for the remission of sins, according to James v. 15. Therefore it is a sacrament.

I answer that, Among the visible operations of the Church, some are sacraments, as Baptism, some are sacramentals, as Exorcism. The difference between these is that a sacrament is an action of the Church that reaches to the principal effect intended in the administration of the sacraments, whereas a sacramental is an action which, though it does not reach to that effect, is nevertheless directed towards that principal action. Now the effect intended in the administration of the sacraments is the healing of the disease of sin: wherefore it is written (*Isa. xxvii. 9*): *This is all the fruit, that the sin . . . should be taken away.* Since then Extreme Unction reaches to this effect, as is clear from the words of James, and is not ordained to any other sacrament as an accessory thereto, it is evident that Extreme Unction is not a sacramental but a sacrament.

Reply Obj 2. The oil with which catechumens are anointed does not convey the remission of sins to them by its unction, for that belongs to Baptism. It does, however, dispose

them to receive Baptism, as stated above (P. III., Q. LXXI., A. 3). Hence that unction is not a sacrament as Extreme Unction is.

Reply Obj. 1. This sacrament prepares man for glory immediately, since it is given to those who are departing from this life. And as, under the Old Law, it was not yet time to enter into glory, because *the Law brought nobody* (Vulg.,—*nothing*) *to perfection* (Heb. vii. 19), so this sacrament had not to be foreshadowed therein by some corresponding sacrament, as by a figure of the same kind. Nevertheless it was somewhat foreshadowed remotely by all the healings related in the Old Testament.

Reply Obj. 3. Dionysius makes no mention of Extreme Unction, as neither of Penance, nor of Matrimony, because he had no intention to decide any question about the sacraments, save in so far as they serve to illustrate the orderly disposition of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, as regards the ministers, their actions, and the recipients. Nevertheless since Extreme Unction confers grace and remission of sins, there is no doubt that it possesses an enlightening and cleansing power, even as Baptism, though not so copious.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER EXTREME UNCTION IS ONE SACRAMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Extreme Unction is not one sacrament. Because the oneness of a thing depends on its matter and form, since being and oneness are derived from the same source. Now the form of this sacrament is said several times during the one administration, and the matter is applied to the person anointed in respect of various parts of his body. Therefore it is not one sacrament.

Obj. 2. Further, The unction itself is a sacrament, for it would be absurd to say that the oil is a sacrament. But there are several unctions. Therefore there are several sacraments.

Obj. 3. Further, One sacrament should be performed by

one minister. But the case might occur that Extreme Unction could not be conferred by one minister: thus if the priest die after the first unction, another priest would have to proceed with the others. Therefore Extreme Unction is not one sacrament.

On the contrary, As immersion is in relation to Baptism, so is unction to this sacrament. But several immersions are but one sacrament of Baptism. Therefore the several unctions in Extreme Unction are also one sacrament.

Further, if it were not one sacrament, then after the first unction, it would not be essential for the perfection of the sacrament that the second unction should be performed, since each sacrament has perfect being of itself. But that is not true. Therefore it is one sacrament.

I answer that, Strictly speaking a thing is one numerically in three ways. First, as something indivisible, which is neither actually nor potentially several,—as a point, and unity. Secondly, as something continuous, which is actually one, but potentially several,—as a line. Thirdly, as something complete, that is composed of several parts,—as a house, which is, in a way, several things, even actually, although those several things go together towards making one. In this way each sacrament is said to be one thing, in as much as the many things which are contained in one sacrament, are united together for the purpose of signifying or causing one thing, because a sacrament is a sign of the effect it produces. Hence when one action suffices for a perfect signification, the unity of the sacrament consists in that action only, as may be seen in Confirmation. When, however, the signification of the sacrament can be both in one and in several actions, then the sacrament can be complete both in one and in several actions, even as Baptism in one immersion and in three, since washing which is signified in Baptism, can be completed by one immersion and by several. But when the perfect signification cannot be expressed except by means of several actions, then these several actions are essential for the perfection of the sacrament, as is exemplified in the Eucharist, for the refreshment

of the body which signifies that of the soul, can only be attained by means of meat and drink. It is the same in this sacrament, because the healing of the internal wounds cannot be perfectly signified save by the application of the remedy to the various sources of the wounds. Hence several actions are essential to the perfection of this sacrament.

Reply Obj. 1. The unity of a complete whole is not destroyed by reason of a diversity of matter or form in the parts of that whole. Thus it is evident that there is neither the same matter nor the same form in the flesh and in the bones of which one man is composed. In like manner too, in the sacrament of the Eucharist, and in this sacrament, the diversity of matter and form does not destroy the unity of the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 2. Although those actions are several simply, yet they are united together in one complete action, viz. the anointing of all the external senses, whence arises the internal malady.

Reply Obj. 3. Although, in the Eucharist, if the priest die after the consecration of the bread, another priest can go on with the consecration of the wine, beginning where the other left off, or can begin over again with fresh matter, in Extreme Unction, he cannot begin over again, but should always go on, because to anoint the same part a second time would produce as much effect as if one were to consecrate a host a second time, which ought by no means to be done. Nor does the plurality of ministers destroy the unity of this sacrament, because they only act as instruments, and the unity of a smith's work is not destroyed by his using several hammers.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT WAS INSTITUTED BY CHRIST ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament was not instituted by Christ. For mention is made in the Gospel of the institution of those sacraments which Christ instituted,

for instance the Eucharist and Baptism. But no mention is made of Extreme Unction. Therefore it was not instituted by Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, The Master says explicitly (iv. *Sent.* D. 23) that it was instituted by the apostles. Therefore Christ did not institute it Himself.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ showed forth the sacraments which He instituted, as in the case of the Eucharist and Baptism. But He did not bestow this sacrament on anyone. Therefore He did not institute it Himself.

On the contrary, The sacraments of the New Law are more excellent than those of the Old Law. But all the sacraments of the Old Law were instituted by God. Therefore much more do all the sacraments of the New Law owe their institution to Christ Himself.

Further, To make an institution and to remove it belongs to the same authority. Now the Church, who enjoys the same authority in the successors of the apostles, as the apostles themselves possessed, cannot do away with the sacrament of Extreme Unction. Therefore the apostles did not institute it, but Christ Himself.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some hold that this sacrament and Confirmation were not instituted by Christ Himself, but were left by Him to be instituted by the apostles; for the reason that these two sacraments, on account of the plenitude of grace conferred in them, could not be instituted before the mission of the Holy Ghost in perfect plenitude. Hence they are sacraments of the New Law in such a way as not to be foreshadowed in the Old Law. But this argument is not very cogent, since, just as Christ, before His Passion, promised the mission of the Holy Ghost in His plenitude, so could He institute these sacraments.

Wherefore others hold that Christ Himself instituted all the sacraments, but that He Himself published some, which present greater difficulty to our belief, while he reserved some to be published by the apostles, such as Extreme Unction and Confirmation. This opinion seems so much

the more probable, as the sacraments belong to the foundation of the Law, wherefore their institution pertains to the lawgiver; besides, they derive their efficacy from their institution, which efficacy is given them by God alone.

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord did and said many things which are not related in the Gospel. For the evangelists were intent on handing down chiefly those things that were necessary for salvation or concerned the building of the Ecclesiastical edifice. Hence they related the institution by Christ of Baptism, Penance, the Eucharist and Orders, rather than of Extreme Unction and Confirmation, which are not necessary for salvation, nor do they concern the building or division of the Church. As a matter of fact however an anointing done by the apostles is mentioned in the Gospel (Mark vi. 13) where it is said that they *anointed the sick with oil*.

Reply Obj. 2. The Master says it was instituted by the apostles because its institution was made known to us by the teaching of the apostles.

Reply Obj. 3. Christ did not show forth any sacrament except such as He received by way of example: but He could not be a recipient of Penance and Extreme Unction, since there was no sin in Him: hence He did not show them forth.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER OLIVE OIL IS A SUITABLE MATTER FOR THIS
SACRAMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that olive oil is not a suitable matter for this sacrament. For this sacrament is ordained immediately to the state of incorruption. Now incorruption is signified by balsam which is contained in chrism. Therefore chrism would be a more suitable matter for this sacrament.

Obj. 2. Further, This sacrament is a spiritual healing. Now spiritual healing is signified by the use of wine, as may be gathered from the parable of the wounded man

(Luke x. 34). Therefore wine also would be more suitable a matter for this sacrament.

Obj. 3. Further, Where there is the greater danger, the remedy should be a common one. But olive oil is not a common remedy, since the olive is not found in every country. Therefore, since this sacrament is given to the dying, who are in the greatest danger, it seems that olive oil is not a suitable matter.

On the contrary, Oil is appointed (James v. 14) as the matter of this sacrament. Now, properly speaking, oil is none but olive oil. Therefore this is the matter of this sacrament.

Further, Spiritual healing is signified by anointing with oil, as is evident from Isa. i. 6 where we read: . . . *swelling sores : they are not . . . dressed nor fomented with oil*. Therefore the suitable matter for this sacrament is oil.

I answer that, The spiritual healing, which is given at the end of life ought to be complete, since there is no other to follow; it ought also to be gentle, lest hope, of which the dying stand in utmost need, be shattered rather than fostered. Now oil has a softening effect, it penetrates to the very heart of a thing, and spreads over it. Hence, in both the foregoing respects, it is a suitable matter for this sacrament. And since oil is, above all, the name of the liquid extract of olives, for other liquids are only called oil from their likeness to it, it follows that olive oil is the matter which should be employed in this sacrament.

Reply Obj. 1. The incorruption of glory is something not contained in this sacrament: and there is no need for the matter to signify such a thing. Hence it is not necessary for balsam to be included in the matter of this sacrament, because on account of its fragrance it is indicative of a good name, which is no longer necessary, for its own sake, to those who are dying; they need only a clear conscience which is signified by oil.

Reply Obj. 2. Wine heals by its roughness, oil by its softness, wherefore healing with wine pertains to Penance rather than to this sacrament.

Reply Obj. 3. Though olive oil is not produced everywhere, yet it can easily be transported from one place to another. Moreover this sacrament is not so necessary that the dying cannot obtain salvation without it.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE OIL OUGHT TO BE CONSECRATED ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the oil need not be consecrated. Because there is a sanctification in the use of this sacrament, through the form of words. Therefore another sanctification is superfluous if it be applied to the matter.

Obj. 2. Further, The efficacy and signification of the sacraments are in their very matter. But the signification of the effect of this sacrament, is suitable to oil on account of its natural properties, and the efficacy thereof is due to the Divine institution. Therefore its matter does not need to be sanctified.

Obj. 3. Further, Baptism is a more perfect sacrament than Extreme Unction. But, so far as the essentials of the sacrament are concerned, the baptismal matter needs no sanctification. Neither therefore does the matter of Extreme Unction need to be sanctified.

On the contrary, In all other anointings the matter is previously consecrated. Therefore since this sacrament is an anointing, it requires consecrated matter.

I answer that, Some hold that mere oil is the matter of this sacrament, and that the sacrament itself is perfected in the consecration of the oil by the bishop. But this is clearly false since we proved when treating of the Eucharist that that sacrament alone consists in the consecration of the matter. (Q. II., A. I. *ad* 2.)

We must therefore say that this sacrament consists in the anointing itself, just as Baptism consists in the washing, and that the matter of this sacrament is consecrated oil. Three reasons may be assigned why consecrated matter is needed in this sacrament and in certain others. The first

is that all sacramental efficacy is derived from Christ: wherefore those sacraments which He Himself used, derived their efficacy from His use of them, even as, by the contact of His flesh, He bestowed the force of regeneration on the waters. But He did not use this sacrament, nor any bodily anointing, wherefore in all anointings a consecrated matter is required. The second reason is that this sacrament confers a plenitude of grace, so as to take away not only sin but also the remnants of sin, and bodily sickness. The third reason is that its effect on the body, viz. bodily health, is not caused by a natural property of the matter; wherefore it has to derive this efficacy from being consecrated.

Reply Obj. 1. The first consecration sanctifies the matter in itself, but the second regards rather the use of the matter considered as actually producing its effect. Hence neither is superfluous, because instruments also receive their efficacy from the craftsman, both when they are made, and when they are used for action.

Reply Obj. 2. The efficacy which the sacrament derives from its institution, is applied to this particular matter when it is consecrated.

The *Reply to the Third Objection* is gathered from what has been said.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MATTER OF THIS SACRAMENT NEED BE
CONSECRATED BY A BISHOP ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the matter of this sacrament need not be consecrated by a bishop. Because the consecration of the Eucharistic elements surpasses that of the matter in this sacrament. But a priest can consecrate the matter in the Eucharist. Therefore he can do so in this sacrament also.

Obj. 2. Further, In material works the higher art never prepares the matter for the lower, because the art which applies the matter is more excellent than that which pre-

pare it, as stated in *Phys.* ii. Now a bishop is above a priest. Therefore he does not prepare the matter of a sacrament which is applied by a priest. But a priest dispenses this sacrament, as we shall state further on (Q. XXXI.). Therefore the consecration of the matter does not belong to a bishop.

On the contrary, In other anointings also the matter is consecrated by a bishop. Therefore the same applies to this.

I answer that, The minister of a sacrament produces the effect, not by his own power, as though he were the principal agent, but by the efficacy of the sacrament which he dispenses. This efficacy comes, in the first place, from Christ, and from Him flows down to others in due order, viz. to the people through the medium of the ministers who dispense the sacraments, and to the lower ministers through the medium of the higher ministers who sanctify the matter. Wherefore, in all the sacraments which require a sanctified matter, the first consecration of the matter is performed by a bishop, and the application thereof sometimes by a priest, in order to show that the priest's power is derived from the bishop's, according to Ps. cxxxii. 2: *Like the precious ointment on the head, i.e. Christ, that ran down upon the beard of Aaron first, and then to the skirt of his garment.*

Reply Obj. 1. The sacrament of the Eucharist consists in the consecration of the matter and not in its use. Consequently, strictly speaking, that which is the matter of the sacrament is not a consecrated thing. Hence no consecration of the matter by a bishop is required beforehand: but the altar and suchlike things, even the priest himself, need to be consecrated, all of which can be done by none but a bishop: so that in this sacrament also, the priest's power is shown to be derived from the bishop's, as Dionysius observes (*Eccl. Hier.* iii.). The reason why a priest can perform that consecration of matter which is a sacrament by itself, and not that which, as a sacramental, is directed to a sacrament consisting in something used by the faithful, is that in respect of Christ's true body no order

is above the priesthood, whereas, in respect of Christ's mystic body the episcopate is above the priesthood, as we shall state further on (Q. XL., A. 4).

Reply Obj. 2. The sacramental matter is not one that is made into something else by him that uses it, as occurs in the mechanical arts: it is one, in virtue of which something is done, so that it partakes somewhat of the nature of an efficient cause, in so far as it is the instrument of a Divine operation. Hence the matter needs to acquire this virtue from a higher art or power, since among efficient causes, the more prior the cause the more perfect it is, whereas in material causes, the more prior the matter, the more imperfect it is.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT HAS A FORM ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament has no form. Because, since the efficacy of the sacraments is derived from their institution, as also from their form, the latter must needs be appointed by the institutor of the sacrament. But there is no account of the form of this sacrament being instituted either by Christ or by the apostles. Therefore this sacrament has no form.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is essential to a sacrament is observed everywhere in the same way. Now nothing is so essential to a sacrament that has a form, as that very form. Therefore, as in this sacrament there is no form commonly used by all, since various words are in use, it seems that this sacrament has no form.

Obj. 3. Further, In Baptism no form is needed except for the sanctification of the matter, because the water is sanctified by the word of life so as to wash sin away, as Hugh states (*De Sacram. ii.*). Now the matter of this sacrament is already consecrated. Therefore it needs no form of words.

On the contrary, The Master says (*iv. Sent. D. 1*) that every sacrament of the New Law consists in things and words. Now the words are the sacramental form. Therefore, since

this is a sacrament of the New Law, it seems that it has a form.

Further, this is confirmed by the rite of the Universal Church, who uses certain words in the bestowal of this sacrament.

I answer that, Some have held that no form is essential to this sacrament. This, however, seems derogatory to the effect of this sacrament, since every sacrament signifies its effect. Now the matter is indifferent as regards its effect, and consequently cannot be determined to any particular effect save by the form of words. Hence in all the sacraments of the New Law, since they effect what they signify, there must needs be things and words. Moreover James (v. 14, 15) seems to ascribe the whole force of this sacrament to prayer, which is the form thereof, as we shall state further on (*ad 2*: AA. 8, 9). Wherefore the foregoing opinion seems presumptuous and erroneous; and for that reason we should hold with the common opinion that this, like all the other sacraments, has a fixed form.

Reply Obj. 1. Holy Writ is proposed to all alike: and so, the form of Baptism, which can be conferred by all, should be expressed in Holy Writ, as also the form of the Eucharist, which in regard to that sacrament, expresses faith which is necessary for salvation. Now the forms of the other sacraments are not contained in Holy Writ, but were handed down to the Church by the apostles, who received them from Our Lord, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. xi. 23): *For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered to you*, etc.

Reply Obj. 2. The words which are essential to the form, viz. the prayer of deprecation, are said by all; but other words which pertain to the well-being thereof, are not said by all.

Reply Obj. 3. The matter of Baptism has a certain sanctification of its own from the very contact of our Saviour's flesh; but the form of words sanctifies it so that it has a sanctifying force. In like manner when the matter of this sacrament has been sanctified in itself, it requires sanctification in its use, so that it may sanctify actually.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FORM OF THIS SACRAMENT SHOULD BE EXPRESSED BY WAY OF ASSERTION OR OF PETITION ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the form of this sacrament should be expressed by way of assertion rather than of petition. Because all the sacraments of the New Law have a sure effect. But sureness of effect is not expressed in the sacramental forms except by way of assertion, as when we say: *This is My body*, or *I baptize thee*. Therefore the form of this sacrament should be expressed as an assertion.

Obj. 2. Further, The intention of the minister should be expressed in the sacramental forms, because it is essential to the sacrament. But the intention of conferring a sacrament is not expressed except by an assertion. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 3. Further, In some Churches the following words are said in the conferring of this sacrament: *I anoint these eyes with consecrated oil in the name of the Father*, etc., which is in keeping with the forms of the other sacraments. Therefore it seems that such is the form of this sacrament.

On the contrary, The form of a sacrament must needs be one that is observed everywhere. Now the words employed according to the custom of all the Churches are not those quoted above, but take the form of a petition, viz.: *Through this holy unction, and His most tender mercy, may the Lord pardon thee whatever sins thou hast committed, by sight*, etc. Therefore the form of this sacrament is expressed as a petition.

Further, This seems to follow from the words of James, who ascribes the effect of this sacrament to prayer: *The prayer of faith*, says he (v. 15), *shall save the sick man*. Since then a sacrament takes its efficacy from its form, it seems that the form of this sacrament is expressed as a petition.

I answer that, The form of this sacrament is expressed by way of a petition, as appears from the words of James, and from the custom of the Roman Church, who uses no

other than words of supplication in conferring this sacrament. Several reasons are assigned for this: first, because the recipient of this sacrament is deprived of his strength, so that he needs to be helped by prayers; secondly, because it is given to the dying, who are on the point of quitting the courts of the Church, and rest in the hands of God alone, for which reason they are committed to Him by prayer; thirdly, because the effect of this sacrament is not such that it always results from the minister's prayer, even when all essentials have been duly observed, as is the case with the character in Baptism and Confirmation, transubstantiation in the Eucharist, remission of sin in Penance (given contrition), which remission is essential to the sacrament of Penance but not to this sacrament. Consequently the form of this sacrament cannot be expressed in the indicative mood, as in the sacraments just mentioned.

Reply Obj. 1. This sacrament, like the others mentioned, considered in itself, is sure of its effect; yet this effect can be hindered through the insincerity of the recipient (though by his intention he submit to the sacrament), so that he receives no effect at all. Hence there is no parity between this sacrament, and the others wherein some effect always ensues.

Reply Obj. 2. The intention is sufficiently expressed by the act which is mentioned in the form, viz.: *By this holy unction.*

Reply Obj. 3. These words in the indicative mood, which some are wont to say before the prayer, are not the sacramental form, but are a preparation for the form, in so far as they determine the intention of the minister.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FOREGOING PRAYER IS A SUITABLE FORM FOR THIS SACRAMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the foregoing prayer is not a suitable form for this sacrament. For in the forms of the

other sacraments mention is made of the matter, for instance in Confirmation, whereas this is not done in the aforesaid words. Therefore it is not a suitable form.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as the effect of this sacrament is bestowed on us by the mercy of God, so are the effects of the other sacraments. But mention is made in the forms of the other sacraments, not of the Divine mercy, but rather of the Trinity and of the Passion. Therefore the same should be done here.

Obj. 3. Further, This sacrament is stated in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 23) to have a twofold effect. But in the foregoing words mention is made of only one effect, viz. the remission of sins, and not of the healing of the body, to which end James directs the prayer of faith to be made (v. 15): *The prayer of faith shall save the sick man.* Therefore the above form is unsuitable.

I answer that, The prayer given above (A. 8) is a suitable form for this sacrament, for it includes the sacrament by the words: *By this holy unction,* and that which works in the sacrament, viz. *the mercy of God,* and the effect, viz. *remission of sins.*

Reply Obj. 1. The matter of this sacrament may be understood in the act of anointing, whereas the matter of Confirmation cannot be implied by the act expressed in the form. Hence there is no parity.

Reply Obj. 2. The object of mercy is misery: and because this sacrament is given when we are in a state of misery, i.e. of sickness, mention of mercy is made in this rather than in other sacraments.

Reply Obj. 3. The form should contain mention of the principal effect, and of that which always ensues in virtue of the sacrament, unless there be something lacking on the part of the recipient. Now bodily health is not an effect of this kind, as we shall state further on (Q. XXX., AA. 1, 2), though it does ensue at times, for which reason James ascribes this effect to the prayer which is the form of this sacrament.

QUESTION XXX.

OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider the effect of this sacrament: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins? (2) Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament? (3) Whether this sacrament imprints a character?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER EXTREME UNCTION AVAILS FOR THE REMISSION OF SINS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that Extreme Unction does not avail for the remission of sins. For when a thing can be attained by one means, no other is needed. Now repentance is required in the recipient of Extreme Unction, for the remission of his sins. Therefore sins are not remitted by Extreme Unction.

Obj. 2. Further, There are no more than three things in sin, the stain, the debt of punishment, and the remnants of sin. Now Extreme Unction does not remit the stain without contrition, and this remits sin even without Unction; nor does it remit the punishment, for if the recipient recover, he is still bound to fulfil the satisfaction enjoined; nor does it take away the remnants of sin, since the dispositions remaining from preceding acts still remain, as may easily be seen after recovery. Therefore remission of sins is by no means the effect of Extreme Unction.

Obj. 3. Further, Remission of sins takes place, not successively, but instantaneously. On the other hand, Extreme Unction is not done all at once, since several anointings are required. Therefore the remission of sins is not its effect.

On the contrary, It is written (James v. 15): *If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him.*

Further, Every sacrament of the New Law confers grace. Now grace effects the forgiveness of sins. Therefore since Extreme Unction is a sacrament of the New Law, its effect is the remission of sins.

I answer that, Each sacrament was instituted for the purpose of one principal effect, though it may, in consequence, produce other effects besides. And since a sacrament causes what it signifies, the principal effect of a sacrament must be gathered from its signification. Now this sacrament is conferred by way of a kind of medicament, even as Baptism is conferred by way of washing, and the purpose of a medicament is to expel sickness. Hence the chief object of the institution of this sacrament is to cure the sickness of sin. Therefore, just as Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, and Penance, a spiritual resurrection, so Extreme Unction is a spiritual healing or cure. Now just as a bodily cure presupposes bodily life in the one who is cured, so does a spiritual cure presuppose spiritual life. Hence this sacrament is not an antidote to those defects which deprive man of spiritual life, namely, original and mortal sin, but is a remedy for such defects as weaken man spiritually, so as to deprive him of perfect vigour for acts of the life of grace or of glory; which defects consist in nothing else but a certain weakness and unfitness, the result in us of actual or original sin; against which weakness man is strengthened by this sacrament. Since, however, this strength is given by grace, which is incompatible with sin, it follows that, in consequence, if it finds any sin, either mortal or venial, it removes it as far as the guilt is concerned, provided there be no obstacle on the part of the recipient; just as we have stated to be the case with regard

to the Eucharist and Confirmation (P. III., Q. LXXIII., A. 7; Q. LXXIX., A. 3). Hence, too, James speaks of the remission of sin as being conditional, for he says: *If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him, viz. as to the guilt.* Because it does not always blot out sin, since it does not always find any: but it always remits in respect of the aforesaid weakness which some call the remnants of sin. Some, however, maintain that it is instituted chiefly as a remedy for venial sin which cannot be cured perfectly in this lifetime: for which reason the sacrament of the dying is ordained specially against venial sin. But this does not seem to be true, since Penance also blots out venial sins sufficiently during this life as to their guilt, and that we cannot avoid them after doing penance, does not cancel the effect of the previous penance; moreover this is part of the weakness mentioned above.

Consequently we must say that the principal effect of this sacrament is the remission of sin, as to its remnants, and, consequently, even as to its guilt, if it find it.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the principal effect of a sacrament can be obtained without actually receiving that sacrament (either without any sacrament at all, or indirectly by means of some other sacrament), yet it never can be obtained without the purpose of receiving that sacrament. And so, since Penance was instituted chiefly against actual sin, whichever other sacrament may blot out sin indirectly, it does not exclude the necessity of Penance.

Reply Obj. 2. Extreme Unction remits sin in some way as to those three things. For, although the stain of sin is not washed out without contrition, yet this sacrament, by the grace which it bestows, makes the movement of the free will towards sin to be one of contrition, just as may occur in the Eucharist and Confirmation. Again it diminishes the debt of temporal punishment; and this indirectly, in as much as it takes away weakness, for a strong man bears the same punishment more easily than a weak man. Hence it does not follow that the measure of satisfaction is diminished. As to the remnants of sin, they

do not mean here those dispositions which result from acts, and are inchoate habits so to speak, but a certain spiritual debility in the mind, which debility being removed, though suchlike habits or dispositions remain, the mind is not so easily prone to sin.

Reply Obj. 3. When many actions are ordained to one effect, the last is formal with respect to all the others that precede, and acts by virtue of them: wherefore by the last anointing is infused grace which gives the sacrament its effect.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER BODILY HEALTH IS AN EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that bodily health is not an effect of this sacrament. For every sacrament is a spiritual remedy. Now a spiritual remedy is ordained to spiritual health, just as a bodily remedy is ordained to health of the body. Therefore bodily health is not an effect of this sacrament.

Obj. 2. Further, The sacraments always produce their effect in those who approach them in the proper dispositions. Now sometimes the recipient of this sacrament does not receive bodily health, no matter how devoutly he receives it. Therefore bodily health is not its effect.

Obj. 3. Further, The efficacy of this sacrament is notified to us in the fifth chapter of James. Now healing is ascribed there as the effect, not of the anointing, but of the prayer, for he says: *The prayer of faith shall save the sick man.* Therefore bodily healing is not an effect of this sacrament.

On the contrary, The operation of the Church is more efficacious since Christ's Passion than before. Now, before the Passion, those whom the apostles anointed with oil were healed (Mark vi. 13). Therefore unction has its effect now in healing bodies.

Further, The sacraments produce their effect by signifying it. Now Baptism signifies and effects a spiritual washing, through the bodily washing in which it consists

outwardly. Therefore Extreme Unction signifies and causes a spiritual healing through the bodily healing which it effects externally.

I answer that, Just as Baptism causes a spiritual cleansing from spiritual stains by means of a bodily washing, so this sacrament causes an inward healing by means of an outward sacramental healing: and even as the baptismal washing has the effect of a bodily washing, since it effects even a bodily cleansing, so too, Extreme Unction has the effect of a bodily remedy, namely a healing of the body. But there is a difference, for as much as the bodily washing causes a bodily cleansing by a natural property of the bodily element, and consequently always causes it, whereas Extreme Unction causes a bodily healing, not by a natural property of the matter, but by the Divine power which works reasonably. And since reasonable working never produces a secondary effect, except in so far as it is required for the principal effect, it follows that a bodily healing does not always ensue from this sacrament, but only when it is requisite for the spiritual healing: and then it produces it always, provided there be no obstacle on the part of the recipient.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection proves that bodily health is not the principal effect of this sacrament: and this is true.

The *Reply* to the *Second Objection* is clear from what has been said above (cf. Q. XXIX., A. 8).

Reply Obj. 3. This prayer is the form of this sacrament as stated above (Q. XXIX., AA. 8, 9). Hence, so far as its form is concerned, this sacrament derives from it its efficacy in healing the body.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT IMPRINTS A CHARACTER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament imprints a character. For a character is a distinctive sign. Now just as one who is baptized is distinguished from one who

is not, so is one who is anointed, from one who is not. Therefore, just as Baptism imprints a character so does Extreme Unction.

Obj. 2. Further, There is an anointing in the sacraments of Order and Confirmation, as there is in this sacrament. But a character is imprinted in those sacraments. Therefore a character is imprinted in this one also.

Obj. 3. Further, Every sacrament contains something that is a reality only, something that is a sacrament only, and something that is both reality and sacrament. Now nothing in this sacrament can be assigned as both reality and sacrament except a character. Therefore in this sacrament also, a character is imprinted.

On the contrary, No sacrament that imprints a character is repeated. But this sacrament is repeated as we shall state further on (Q. XXXIII.). Therefore it does not imprint a character.

Further, A sacramental character causes a distinction among those who are in the present Church. But Extreme Unction is given to one who is departing from the present Church. Therefore it does not imprint a character.

I answer that, A character is not imprinted except in those sacraments whereby man is deputed to some sacred duty. Now this sacrament is for no other purpose than a remedy, and man is not deputed thereby to do or receive anything holy. Therefore it does not imprint a character.

Reply Obj. 1. A character marks a distinction of states with regard to duties which have to be performed in the Church; a distinction which a man does not receive by being anointed.

Reply Obj. 2. The unction of Orders and Confirmation, is the unction of consecration whereby a man is deputed to some sacred duty, whereas this unction is remedial. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. In this sacrament, that which is both reality and sacrament is not a character, but a certain inward devotion which is a kind of spiritual anointing.

QUESTION XXXI.

OF THE MINISTER OF THIS SACRAMENT.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider the minister of this sacrament: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether a layman can confer this sacrament? (2) Whether a deacon can? (3) Whether none but a bishop can confer it?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER A LAYMAN CAN CONFER THIS SACRAMENT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that even a layman can confer this sacrament. For this sacrament derives its efficacy from prayer, as James declares (v. 15). But a layman's prayer is sometimes as acceptable to God as a priest's. Therefore he can confer this sacrament.

Obj. 2. Further, We read of certain fathers in Egypt that they sent the oil to the sick, and that these were healed. It is also related of the Blessed Geneviève that she anointed the sick with oil. Therefore this sacrament can be conferred even by lay people.

On the contrary, Remission of sins is given in this sacrament. But laymen have not the power to forgive sins. Therefore etc.

I answer that, According to Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier.* v.) there are some who exercise hierarchical actions, and some who are recipients only. Hence laymen are officially incompetent to dispense any sacrament: and that they can baptize in

cases of necessity, is due to the Divine dispensation, in order that no one may be deprived of spiritual regeneration.

Reply Obj. 1. This prayer is not said by the priest in his own person, for since sometimes he is in sin, he would not in that case be heard. But it is said in the person of the whole Church, in whose person he can pray as a public official, whereas a layman cannot, for he is a private individual.

Reply Obj. 2. These unctions were not sacramental. It was due to the devotion of the recipients of the unction, and to the merits of those who anointed them that they procured the effects of bodily health, through the *grace of healing* (1 Cor. xii. 9) but not through sacramental grace.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER DEACONS CAN CONFER THIS SACRAMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that deacons can confer this sacrament. For, according to Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier. v.*) *deacons have the power to cleanse.* Now this sacrament was instituted precisely to cleanse from sickness of the mind and body. Therefore deacons also can confer it.

Obj. 2. Further, Baptism is a more excellent sacrament than the one of which we are speaking. But deacons can baptize, as instanced by the Blessed Laurence. Therefore they can confer this sacrament also.

On the contrary, It is written (James v. 14): *Let him bring in the priests of the Church.*

I answer that, A deacon has the power to cleanse but not to enlighten. Hence, since enlightenment is an effect of grace, no sacrament whereby grace is conferred can be given by a deacon in virtue of his office: and so he cannot confer this sacrament, since grace is bestowed therein.

Reply Obj. 1. This sacrament cleanses by enlightening through the bestowal of grace: wherefore a deacon is not competent to confer it.

Reply Obj. 2. This is not a necessary sacrament, as

Baptism is. Hence its bestowal is not committed to all in cases of necessity, but only to those who are competent to do so in virtue of their office. Nor are deacons competent to baptize in virtue of their office.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER NONE BUT A BISHOP CAN CONFER THIS SACRAMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that none but a bishop can confer this sacrament. For this sacrament consists in an anointing, just as Confirmation does. Now none but a bishop can confirm. Therefore only a bishop can confer this sacrament.

Obj. 2. Further, He who cannot do what is less cannot do what is greater. Now the use of consecrated matter surpasses the act of consecrating the matter, since the former is the end of the latter. Therefore since a priest cannot consecrate the matter, neither can he use the matter after it has been consecrated.

On the contrary, The minister of this sacrament has to be brought in to the recipient, as is clear from James v. 14. Now a bishop cannot go to all the sick people of his diocese. Therefore the bishop is not the only one who can confer this sacrament.

I answer that, According to Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier.* v.), the office of perfecting belongs to a bishop, just as it belongs to a priest to enlighten. Wherefore those sacraments are reserved to a bishop's dispensation, which place the recipient in a state of perfection above others. But this is not the case with this sacrament, for it is given to all. Consequently it can be given by ordinary priests.

Reply Obj. 1. Confirmation imprints a character, whereby man is placed in a state of perfection, as stated above (P. III., Q. LXIII., AA. 1, 2, 6). But this does not take place in this sacrament; hence there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the use of consecrated matter is of more importance than the consecration of the matter,

from the point of view of the final cause; nevertheless, from the point of view of efficient cause, the consecration of the matter is the more important, since the use of the matter is dependent thereon, as on its active cause: hence the consecration of the matter demands a higher power than the use of the matter does.

QUESTION XXXII.

ON WHOM SHOULD THIS SACRAMENT BE CONFERRED
AND ON WHAT PART OF THE BODY ?

(In Seven Articles.)

WE must now consider on whom this sacrament should be conferred and on what part of the body: under which head there are seven points of inquiry: (1) Whether this sacrament should be conferred on those who are in good health? (2) Whether it should be conferred in any kind of sickness? (3) Whether it should be conferred on madmen and imbeciles? (4) Whether it should be given to children? (5) Whether, in this sacrament, the whole body should be anointed? (6) Whether certain parts are suitably assigned to be anointed? (7) Whether those who are deformed in the above parts ought to be anointed thereon?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT OUGHT TO BE CONFERRED ON
THOSE WHO ARE IN GOOD HEALTH ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament should be conferred even on those who are in good health. For the healing of the mind is a more important effect of this sacrament than the healing of the body, as stated above (Q. XXX., A. 2). Now even those who are healthy in body need to be healed in mind. Therefore this sacrament should be conferred on them also.

Obj. 2. Further, This is the sacrament of those who are departing this life, just as Baptism is the sacrament of those

who are entering this life. Now Baptism is given to all who enter. Therefore this sacrament should be given to all who are departing. But sometimes those who are near departure are in good health, for instance those who are to be beheaded. Therefore this sacrament should be conferred on them.

On the contrary, It is written (James v. 14): *Is any man sick among you* etc. Therefore none but the sick are competent to receive this sacrament.

I answer that, This sacrament is a spiritual healing, as stated above (Q. XXX., AA. 1, 2), and is signified by way of a healing of the body. Hence this sacrament should not be conferred on those who are not subjects for bodily healing, those, namely, who are in good health.

Reply Obj. 1. Although spiritual health is the principal effect of this sacrament, yet this same spiritual healing needs to be signified by a healing of the body, although bodily health may not actually ensue. Consequently spiritual health can be conferred by this sacrament on those alone who are competent to receive bodily healing, viz. the sick; even as he alone can receive Baptism who is capable of a bodily washing, and not a child yet in its mother's womb.

Reply Obj. 2. Even those who are entering into life cannot receive Baptism unless they are capable of a bodily washing. And so those who are departing this life cannot receive this sacrament, unless they be subjects for a bodily healing.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT OUGHT TO BE GIVEN IN ANY KIND OF SICKNESS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament should be given in any kind of sickness. For no kind of sickness is determined in the fifth chapter of James where this sacrament is delivered to us. Therefore this sacrament should be given in all kinds of sickness.

Obj. 2. Further, The more excellent a remedy is, the more generally should it be available. Now this sacrament is more excellent than bodily medicine. Since then bodily medicine is given to all manner of sick persons, it seems that this sacrament should be given in like manner to all.

On the contrary, This sacrament is called by all Extreme Unction. Now it is not every sickness that brings man to the extremity of his life, since some ailments prolong life, according to the Philosopher (*De Long. et Brev. Vitæ* i.). Therefore this sacrament should not be given in every case of sickness.

I answer that, This sacrament is the last remedy that the Church can give, since it is an immediate preparation for glory. Therefore it ought to be given to those only, who are so sick as to be in a state of departure from this life, through their sickness being of such a nature as to cause death, the danger of which is to be feared.

Reply Obj. 1. Any sickness can cause death, if it be aggravated. Hence if we consider the different kinds of disease, there is none in which this sacrament cannot be given; and for this reason the apostle does not determine any particular one. But if we consider the degree and the stage of the complaint, this sacrament should not be given to every sick person.

Reply Obj. 2. The principal effect of bodily medicine is bodily health, which all sick people lack, whatever be the stage of their sickness. But the principal effect of this sacrament is that immunity from disorder which is needed by those who are taking their departure from this life and setting out for the life of glory. Hence the comparison fails.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT OUGHT TO BE GIVEN TO MADMEN
AND IMBECILES ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament should be given to madmen and imbeciles. For these diseases are full of

danger and cause death quickly. Now when there is danger it is the time to apply the remedy. Therefore this sacrament, which was intended as a remedy to human weakness, should be given to such people.

Obj. 2. Further, Baptism is a greater sacrament than this. Now Baptism is conferred on mad people as stated above (P. III., Q. LXVIII., A. 12). Therefore this sacrament also should be given to them.

On the contrary, This sacrament should be given to none but such as acknowledge it. Now this does not apply to madmen and imbeciles. Therefore it should not be given to them.

I answer that, The devotion of the recipient, the personal merit of the minister, and the general merits of the whole Church, are of great account towards the reception of the effect of this sacrament. This is evident from the fact that the form of this sacrament is pronounced by way of a prayer. Hence it should not be given those who cannot acknowledge it, and especially to madmen and imbeciles, who might dishonour the sacrament by their offensive conduct, unless they have lucid intervals, when they would be capable of acknowledging the sacrament, for then the sacrament could be given them when they are in that state.

Reply Obj. 1. Although such people are sometimes in danger of death, yet the remedy cannot be applied to them, on account of their lack of devotion. Hence it should not be given to them.

Reply Obj. 2. Baptism does not require a movement of the free-will, because it is given chiefly as a remedy for original sin, which, in us, is not taken away by a movement of the free-will. On the other hand this sacrament requires a movement of the free-will; wherefore the comparison fails. Moreover Baptism is a necessary sacrament, while Extreme Unction is not.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CHILDREN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament ought to be given to children. Because children suffer from the same ailments sometimes as adults. Now the same disease requires the same remedy. Therefore this sacrament should be given to children the same as to adults.

Obj. 2. Further, This sacrament is given in order to remove the remnants of sin, whether original or actual, as stated above (Q. XXX., A. 1). Now the remnants of original sin are in children. Therefore this sacrament should be given to them.

On the contrary, This sacrament should be given to none but those to whom the form applies. But the form of this sacrament does not apply to children, since they have not sinned by sight and hearing; as expressed in the form. Therefore this sacrament should not be given to them.

I answer that, This sacrament, like the Eucharist, requires actual devotion in the recipient. Therefore, just as the Eucharist ought not to be given to children, so neither ought this sacrament to be given to them.

Reply Obj. 1. Children's infirmities are not caused by actual sin, as in adults, and this sacrament is given chiefly as a remedy for infirmities that result from sins, being the remnants of sin as it were.

Reply Obj. 2. This sacrament is not given as a remedy for the remnants of original sin, except in so far as they gather strength, so to speak, from actual sins. Hence from the very form it appears that it is given chiefly as a remedy for actual sins, which are not in children.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WHOLE BODY SHOULD BE ANOINTED IN THIS SACRAMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the whole body should be anointed in this sacrament. For, according to Augustine (*De Trin.* vi.), *the whole soul is in every part of the body.* Now this sacrament is given chiefly in order to heal the soul. Therefore the whole body ought to be anointed.

Obj. 2. Further, The remedy should be applied to the part affected by the disease. But sometimes the disease is general, and affects the whole body, as a fever does. Therefore the whole body should be anointed.

Obj. 3. Further, In Baptism the whole body is dipped under the water. Therefore in this sacrament the whole body should be anointed.

On the contrary, stands the Rite observed throughout the Church, according to which in this sacrament the sick man is anointed, only in certain fixed parts of the body.

I answer that, This sacrament is shown to us under the form of a healing. Now bodily healing has to be effected, by applying the remedy, not to the whole body, but to those parts where the root of the disease is seated. Consequently the sacramental unction also ought to be applied to those parts only in which the spiritual sickness is rooted.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the whole soul is, as to its essence, in each part of the body, it is not as to its powers which are the roots of sinful acts. Hence certain fixed parts have to be anointed, those, namely, in which powers have their being.

Reply Obj. 2. The remedy is not always applied to the part affected by the disease, but, with greater reason, to the part where the root of the disease is seated.

Reply Obj. 3. Baptism is given under the form of washing: and a bodily washing cleanses only the part to which it is

applied; for this reason Baptism is applied to the whole body. It is different with Extreme Unction, for the reason given above.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PARTS TO BE ANOINTED ARE SUITABLY
ASSIGNED ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that these parts are unsuitably assigned, namely, that the eyes, nose, ears, lips, hands, and feet should be anointed. For a wise physician heals the disease in its root. Now *from the heart come forth thoughts . . . that defile a man* (Matth. xv. 19, 20). Therefore the breast ought to be anointed.

Obj. 2. Further, Purity of mind is not less necessary to those who are departing this life than to those who are entering therein. Now those who are entering are anointed with chrism on the head by the priest, to signify purity of mind. Therefore in this sacrament those who are departing should be anointed on the head.

Obj. 3. Further, The remedy should be applied where the disease is most virulent. Now spiritual sickness is most virulent in the loins in men, and in the navel in women, according to Job xl. 11: *His strength is in his loins, and his force in the navel of his belly*, as Gregory expounds the passage (*Moral.* xxxii.). Therefore these parts should be anointed.

Obj. 4. Further, sins are committed with other parts of the body, no less than with the feet. Therefore, as the feet are anointed, so ought other members of the body to be anointed.

I answer that, The principles of sinning are the same in us as the principles of action, for a sin is an act. Now there are in us three principles of action; the first is the directing principle, namely, the cognitive power; the second is the commanding principle, namely, the appetitive power; the third is the executive principle, namely, the motive power.

Now all our knowledge has its origin in the senses. And, since the remedy for sin should be applied where sin originates in us first, for that reason the places of the five senses are anointed; the eyes, to wit, on account of the sight, the ears on account of hearing, the nostrils on account of the smell, the mouth on account of the taste, the hands on account of the touch which is keenest in the finger tips, (in some places too the loins are anointed on account of the appetite), and the feet are anointed on account of the motive power of which they are the chief instrument. And since the cognitive power is the first principle of human activity, the anointing of the five senses is observed by all, as being essential to the sacrament. But some do not observe the other unctions,—some also anoint the feet but not the loins,—because the appetitive and motive powers are secondary principles.

Reply Obj. 1. No thought arises in the heart without an act of the imagination which is a movement proceeding from sensation (*De Anima* ii.). Hence the primary root of thought is not the heart, but the sensory organs, except in so far as the heart is a principle of the whole body, albeit a remote principle.

Reply Obj. 2. Those who enter have to receive purity of the mind, whereas those who are departing have to cleanse the mind. Hence the latter need to be anointed in those parts in respect of which the mind's purity may be sullied.

Reply Obj. 3. Some are wont to anoint the loins, because they are the chief seat of the concupiscible appetite: however, as stated above, the appetitive power is not the primary root.

Reply Obj. 4. The bodily organs which are the instruments of sin, are the feet, hands, and tongue, all of which are anointed, and the organs of generation which it would be unbecoming to anoint, on account of their uncleanness, and out of respect for the sacrament.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE DEFORMED IN THOSE PARTS
SHOULD BE ANOINTED ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that those who are deformed should not be anointed in those parts. For just as this sacrament demands a certain disposition on the part of the recipient, viz. that he should be sick, so it demands that he should be anointed in a certain part of the body. Now he that is not sick cannot be anointed. Therefore neither can he be anointed who lacks the part to be anointed.

Obj. 2. Further, A man born blind does not sin by his sight. Yet in the anointing of the eyes mention is made of sins by sight. Therefore this anointing ought not to be applied to one born blind, and in like manner as regards the other senses.

On the contrary, Bodily deformity is not an impediment to any other sacrament. Therefore it should not be an impediment to this one. Now each of the anointings is essential to the sacrament. Therefore all should be applied to those who are deformed.

I answer that, Even those who are deformed should be anointed, and that as near as possible to the part which ought to have been anointed. For though they have not the members, nevertheless, they have, at least radically, the powers of the soul, corresponding to those members, and they may commit inwardly the sins that pertain to those members, though they cannot outwardly.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

QUESTION XXXIII.

OF THE REPETITION OF THIS SACRAMENT.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must now consider the repetition of this sacrament: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated? (2) Whether it ought to be repeated during the same sickness?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT OUGHT TO BE REPEATED?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament ought not to be repeated. For the anointing of a man is of greater import than the anointing of a stone. But the anointing of an altar is not repeated, unless the altar be shattered. Neither, therefore, should Extreme Unction, whereby a man is anointed, be repeated.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing comes after what is extreme. But this unction is called extreme. Therefore it should not be repeated.

On the contrary, This sacrament is a spiritual healing applied under the form of a bodily cure. But a bodily cure is repeated. Therefore this sacrament also can be repeated.

I answer that, No sacramental or sacrament, having an effect that lasts for ever, can be repeated, because this would imply that the sacrament had failed to produce that effect; and this would be derogatory to the sacrament.

On the other hand a sacrament whose effect does not last for ever, can be repeated without disparaging that sacrament, in order that the lost effect may be recovered. And since health of body and soul, which is the effect of this sacrament, can be lost after it has been effected, it follows that this sacrament can, without disparagement thereto, be repeated.

Reply Obj. 1. The stone is anointed in order that the altar may be consecrated, and the stone remains consecrated, as long as the altar remains, hence it cannot be anointed again. But a man is not consecrated by being anointed, since it does not imprint a character on him. Hence there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 2. What men think to be extreme is not always extreme in reality. It is thus that this sacrament is called Extreme Unction, because it ought not to be given save to those whose death men think to be nigh.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT OUGHT TO BE REPEATED DURING
THE SAME SICKNESS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament ought not to be repeated during the same sickness. For one disease demands one remedy. Now this sacrament is a spiritual remedy. Therefore it ought not to be repeated for one sickness.

Obj. 2. Further, If a sick man could be anointed more than once during one disease, this might be done for a whole day: which is absurd.

On the contrary, Sometimes a disease lasts long after the sacrament has been received, so that the remnants of sin, against which chiefly this sacrament is given would be contracted. Therefore it ought to be given again.

I answer that, This sacrament regards not only the sickness, but also the state of the sick man, because it ought not to be given except to those sick people who seem, in man's

estimation, to be nigh to death. Now some diseases do not last long; so that if this sacrament is given at the time that the sick man is in a state of danger of death, he does not leave that state except the disease be cured, and thus he needs not to be anointed again. But if he has a relapse, it will be a second sickness, and he can be anointed again. On the other hand some diseases are of long duration as hectic fever, dropsy and the like, and those who lie sick of them should not be anointed until they seem to be in danger of death. And if the sick man escape that danger while the disease continues, and be brought again thereby to the same state of danger, he can be anointed again, because it is, as it were, another state of sickness, although, strictly speaking, it is not another sickness. This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.



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